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Abstract 
Impact investing, defined as direct investments into funds, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and viable non-profit social enterprises with intentionality to 
simultaneously realise social impact and financial returns is increasingly attracting 
the attention of academics and industry practitioners. A contentious claim is that 
impact investment, as transformational in its approach to entrepreneurial financing, 
is a panacea to SME financing constraints and solutions to intractable societal 
problems, is contestable considering the myriad of developmental challenges in 
Bottom-of-the-Pyramid (BoP) communities in the developing world. Based on an 
empirical investigation of the influences of finance first and impact first investments 
into bank-based and capital market-based funds on SMEs in Ghana, this thesis 
interrogates this claim. Specifically, the thesis argues that though impact investing 
represents an innovation in private sector approaches to development, the extent to 
which it can achieve the much-hyped societal transformation in BoP communities 
cannot be substantiated. 
This research contributes to the above debate by critically investigating the 
influences of impact investment funds on investee SMEs through an integrated 
theoretical framework. The framework draws on the literature from different 
disciplines including impact investing, social entrepreneurship, strategic 
management, financial intermediation, economics, SME management and concepts 
of governance, strategy change and impacts, which was then applied within the 
research setting of Ghana.  
Empirically, the thesis develops two case studies of bank-based and capital market-
based funds into SMEs, respectively. Qualitative research was employed with data 
collection comprising in-depth interviews, rapid participant observation 
complemented by documentary evidence. Findings reveal that the distinctiveness 
of finance and impact first investors reflect their choices of bank and capital market-
based intermediary used resulting in pluralistic, entrepreneurial financing options for 
categories of SMEs targeted for social impact and financial returns. These findings 
have implication for fund managers, SME owner-managers and policymakers due 
to private sector-driven developmental model by impact investors.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Impact investing defined in this thesis as direct and indirect investments into funds 
and Small and Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs) for social impact and financial 
returns is an emerging institutional field of study and practice. Impact investors 
channel capital through bank and capital market-based funds as managed and 
equity/debt fund respectively which are then invested into SMEs. Three pivotal 
factors motivated me to pursue this PhD in the area of impact investing. Firstly, 
during my time as a professional commercial banker in Ghana, I saw many 
entrepreneurs struggling and becoming increasingly frustrated as they attempted to 
access bank loans for investment purposes. Furthermore, these bank-based 
financial products did not address the long-term financing needs of most SMEs. 
Commercial banks tended to perceive smaller enterprises as high risk, lacking 
proper governance structures and prone to failure. My personal experience of these 
constraints and limitations prompted critical thinking on potential alternatives to 
traditional forms of SME financing in a developing country context. Secondly, I 
completed a course on alternative types of lending to SMEs in developing countries, 
including emerging forms of microfinance. This prompted me to undertake my 
Executive MBA dissertation study on risk management and microfinance lending to 
SMEs, with its dual aim of alleviating financing challenges and encouraging 
business-focused solutions to societal problems (Lamptey, 2015).  
 The findings from my MBA dissertation shows how loans to owner-managers 
of micro and small businesses can be transformative in terms of operating their 
businesses in ways that contribute to address societal problems. Examples of these 
societal problems include high youth unemployment, post-harvest losses, 
inadequate housing, high drop-out of children at school attending age, inadequate 
health infrastructure and poor sanitation with associated health-related problems. It 
also emerged that with appropriate risk management from microfinance institutions, 
SME ventures could serve as agents of social impact and financial returns providing 
services to underserved communities. Thirdly, I developed a detailed understanding 
of the emerging impact investing institutional field at practitioner workshops and 
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desk research conducted as a graduate research assistant at the GIMPA Centre for 
Impact Investing (GCII) in Ghana. A case study research on Grofin Ghana Ltd (an 
impact investment fund) revealed how such funds are supporting SMEs to realise 
financial returns and social impact in terms of solutions to societal problems (Amewu 
and Lamptey, 2015). Presumably, the promoters of impact investing are seeking to 
solve through direct and indirect investment into high growth and established SMEs 
the same societal problems.  
For example, access to potable water, poor sanitation, and inadequate 
access to education, illegal mining, and lack of access to healthcare represent 
intractable societal problems in Ghana requiring solutions. These three motivations, 
therefore, encouraged me to undertake a PhD study on impact investment as an 
alternative SME financing to traditional enterprise financing and as a solution to 
societal problems. Specific interest is to explore and explain the similarities and 
differences of impact investment from microfinance, bank loans, angel investments, 
venture capital and private equity capital. I am seeking to uncover the 
distinctiveness to explain why and how impact investments represent an alternative 
SME funding within the research setting of Ghana, which further adds to the urge to 
undertake this PhD research project. In Chapter 1, a research problem is articulated 
as well as a viable research question (s) and objectives based on gaps in the 
literature. An overview of the research setting of Ghana is presented, followed by a 
summary of the research approach for this PhD study. Contribution of the study is 
presented, followed by the structure of the rest of the research. 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
In recent times, several high-profile promoters of impact investing, including the 
World Economic Forum, Rockefeller Foundation, Social Impact Investing Taskforce 
of the G8 have argued that it could play an essential role in addressing societal 
problems (WEF, 2013; Glänzel and Scheuerle, 2016). This has been echoed by 
other multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and UNPRI (Glänzel and 
Scheuerle, 2016; Jones and Turner, 2014).  Societal problems of the kind outlined 
above can be termed 'wicked problems' (Rittel and Webber 1973), meaning that 
they appear to present intricate, intractable, and often insurmountable challenges to 
the world's policy-makers, NGOs, and multilateral organisations (Clarkin and 
Cangioni, 2016; Head and Alford, 2015; Praszkier and Nowak, 2011). Impact 
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investment objectives are centred on the assumption of economic and social 
development (Jones and Turner, 2014; Rubin, 2009). Investments that provide 
financial returns alongside social impact in underserved and geographically 
disadvantaged communities represent economic and social development. For 
example, job creation, improved income for women, products and services that 
alleviate poverty constitute developmental objectives and assumptions behind 
impact investment (Jones and Turner, 2014; Rubin, 2009). Thus, the principal claim 
is that impact investments into both for-profit enterprises (e.g. SMEs) and 
commercially viable non-profit social enterprises can potentially eradicate some of 
these intractable societal problems (Ngoasong and Kimbu, 2016). 
While estimated impact investment flows to Sub-Saharan Africa are around 
$17 billion annually (GIIN 2015), it remains uncertain whether this level of funding 
is sufficient given the scale of the societal problems that impact investors are 
seeking to address and the underlying finance gap, which has been estimated at 
$70 - $90 billion for Sub-Saharan Africa (IFC,2013). Comparatively, the finance gap 
for formal SMEs in other regions is estimated as $260-$320 billion-Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA); $210-$250 billion-Latin America and Caribbean (LAC); and 
$10-$20 billion- South Asia (IFC,2013). While a sub-regional breakdown of the SME 
finance gap in SSA is not readily available, the foregone statistics from other regions 
show the enormity of challenges that impact investors are seeking to solve. A more 
recent IFC (2017) estimates of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) 
finance gap is as follows: SSA- $331 billion; South Asia-$337 billion and MENA-
$195 billion. The issue is further compounded when one observes that formal SMEs 
that represent channels and agents of the solution to societal problems such as job 
creation in African communities are financially constrained (Kuntchev et al., 2014; 
IFC, 2017).  
World Development indicators show that in SSA, about 45% proportion of the 
population live in extreme poverty (less than $1.90 a day) as of 2012 (WDI, 2016). 
Research shows that more than fifty per cent of this population, widely classified as 
bottom-of-the-pyramid (BoP) communities, live in developing countries in Africa 
(Oleksiak et al., 2015). I am therefore conducting this empirical study on investor-
fund manager and fund manager-SME investee governance in simultaneous pursuit 
of social impact and financial returns to explain how these societal problems can be 
alleviated in the context of Africa. Governance of high growth and established SMEs 
conceptualised as for-profit social enterprises are significant to ensure that they 
17 
 
realise the expected financial returns and social impact. Strategy change is critical 
to determine whether these SMEs integrating social impact into their operational 
and strategic objectives are delivering on the expectations of impact investors or it 
is a mere façade. Strategy which concerns positioning, choice and differentiation in 
creating unique shared value proposition (Porter and Kramer, 2011) plays a crucial 
role in realising the social impact and financial returns. High growth and established 
SMEs have changed their strategies to incorporate social impact (development) to 
attract impact investment capital. Interaction of governance and strategy change for 
SMEs would enable the realisation of the intended objectives. 
Based on a critical review of existing impact investing and related academic 
literature it is clear that the governance of impact investments matter for the 
effectiveness of funds and SMEs in realising social impact and financial returns 
(Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Geobey and Harji, 2014; 
Jones and Turner,2014; Rajan et al., 2014; Evans, 2013). Governance can be 
described as structures that assure financiers of obtaining return on their investment 
and other ancillary goals. Governance which concerns ownership, control and board 
representation is also vital for impact investors to achieve the anticipated social 
impact and financial returns (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009; Connelly et al., 2010; 
Gompers at al., 2016). From this notion, effective governance is crucial based on 
three significant reasons in promoting the emerging impact investment field. First, 
governance is vital for "effective ways to generate compelling returns and tangible 
impact" (Geobey and Harji, 2014, p. 276). Next, governance will prevent “wave of 
default” experienced by mutual funds and for-profit banks that demonstrated viability 
initially in a similar field century ago (Geobey and Harji, 2014, p. 276).  
Finally, effective governance will send the correct signal to attract 
mainstream financiers to the impact investing sector. There is however a dearth of 
literature on governance within the existing impact investing literature, except few 
passing comments about its role in investment and portfolio strategies that 
incorporates environmental, social and governance factors (Höchstädter and 
Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Geobey and Harji, 2014). Such sparsity of 
governance literature reflects a research gap in line with the call from Geobey and 
Harji (2014, p. 275) for the “need to develop and strengthen governance 
mechanisms” considering the growth of impact investment flows from investors to 
investees. Moreover, governance arrangements affect the strategies of impact 
funds and the SMEs they finance (Ebrahim et al., 2014).  
18 
 
Another issue which represents a major school of thought within the impact 
investing literature is the intentionality principle. This school of thought argues that 
impact investment spans across geographies, regions, and assets. More 
importantly, impact investments should be guided by the intentionality principle 
(Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Rubin, 2009) of social impact 
alongside financial returns. According to Wood et al., (2013), intentionality principle 
or deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial returns qualify an investment as 
impact investment. It is expected to occur at the institutional investor level (Wood et 
al., 2013), fund manager level and investee SME level (Rajan et al., 2014). 
Moreover, the intentionality principle implies that social impact should not be 
incidental to commercial or financial returns (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Addis 
et al., 2013). The study draws upon the social entrepreneurship literature to show 
how deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial returns can be conceptualised, 
reflecting the intentionality principle expected by impact investors. Social 
entrepreneurship theory argues that deliberate and simultaneous pursuit can be 
judged by first uncovering the commercial, social, and social transformational goals 
of an investor or enterprise and examining the extent to which these are intrinsic in 
to the mission, values and aspirations/goals of the enterprise/fund (Luke and Chu, 
2013; Seelos and Mair, 2005). The study, therefore, draws upon social 
entrepreneurship theory to address the second objective.  
  
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
This study addresses two main questions linked to the research problem in section 
1.2 and research objectives in section 1.4 as follows: 
• How do bank-based and capital market-based impact funds govern SMEs 
that simultaneously pursue a dual goal of social impact and financial returns? 
• How do the strategies of bank-based and capital market-based fund 
managers and the SMEs they finance change when they are no longer seen 
as vehicles for private wealth creation but as agents for creating social impact 
in bottom-of-the-pyramid communities? 
Based on the above research problem and research questions, an effort is made to 
undertake this study with three objectives: 
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1. To critically investigate the distinctiveness of bank-based versus capital 
market-based impact funds in terms of governance, strategy change and 
impacts on investee SMEs.  
2. To examine how the characteristics of impact investments as finance first 
and impact first enable managers of SMEs to integrate the dual mission of 
social impact and financial returns in their business strategies. 
3. To discuss the SME financing void that impact investing fills as alternative 
within the enterprise financing architecture of a BoP context/economy. 
 
1.4 Research setting of Ghana 
Ghana provides an interesting setting for researching the influences of impact 
investing on SMEs for five reasons. First, impact investment flows to Ghana over 
the past decade, estimated at $1.6 billion (GIIN, 2015) continues to grow. Second, 
impact investing has transformed the enterprise financing landscape through 
different financial instruments and funding institutions reducing the SME financing 
constraints. Third, access to impact investment capital provide alternative sources 
of funds for bank-based, capital market-based and other non-bank financial 
intermediaries to manage their liquidity and capital adequacy in line with regulatory 
requirements. Fourth, high growth, missing middle and established SMEs represent 
agents of social transformation through alleviation of the intractable societal 
problems in the country. Examples of these societal problems include 
unemployment, poverty, illegal mining, inadequate access to water, improvement in 
education and health (Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng, 2016). Thus, impact investment 
represents a game-changer in terms of private-sector led approach to development 
compared to the previous era of public-sector-led initiatives. 
Fifth, Ghana represents attractive investment destination in Africa with GDP 
per capita of $2,046.11 (World Bank, 2018) and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflow of $3.3 billion by 2017 but declined to $2.9 billion in 2018 (UNCTAD, 2018). 
The financial architecture of Ghana is bank-dominated alongside market-based 
segment (Tadesse, 2002). The enterprise architecture consists of 0.4% large 
enterprises, with an estimated number of 2,539 (GSS IBES, 2016). Medium-size 
enterprises constitute 1.5% of total business establishment in Ghana (GSS IBES, 
2016). An estimated 90% of enterprises in Ghana represent micro and small 
businesses (Abor and Biekpe, 2010). Established formal regulatory and promoting 
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institutions shape and influence the financial and enterprise architectures for 
enterprises and funds to deliver social and financial goals. An elaborate review of 
the research setting of Ghana is set out in Chapter 3. 
 
 
1.5 Research Approach  
This thesis aims to develop a new theory to critically investigate how impact 
investment funds through governance, strategy change, and impacts influenced 
high growth and established SMEs in BoP communities. The study builds on four 
existing theories namely agency theory of governance,  resource-based view of 
strategy change, social entrepreneurship theory related to simultaneous pursuit of 
social and financial returns  and institutional theory to develop and critically explore  
an integrated theoretical framework for understanding the influence of  impact 
investing on SME financing in BoP communities. Each of these theories are relevant 
for understanding aspects of impact investing; however, in this thesis, each makes 
an important contribution to the generation of an effective framework for 
understanding this recently emerged phenomenon of impact investing. To realise 
this objective, the study reviews different sets of literature and develops an 
integrated theoretical framework based on four themes emerging from literature. 
These themes comprise investors, funds, SMEs, and impacts.  
Two categories of impact investors emerged from the impact investing 
literature review representing finance first and impact first (called Principal 1). These 
impact investors channel investment capital through bank-based, and capital 
market-based funds (agent 1) uncovered from the impact investing and related sets 
of literature for social impact and financial returns. Bank-based and capital market-
based funds (now principal 2) subsequently identify and target high growth, missing 
middle and established SMEs (agent 2) as agents to realise outcomes of social 
impact and financial returns. High growth, missing middle and established SMEs 
conceptualised as for-profit social enterprises emerged from the social 
entrepreneurship literature. To investigate how the investor-fund manager and fund 
manager-SME investee realise the social impact and financial returns and thereby 
develop an empirically grounded  theoretical framework, this thesis integrates 
concepts from the theoretical and empirical literature on  governance (Gompers et 
al., 2016; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009), strategy change (Battilana et al 2012; 
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Vicente-Lorente and Zuniga-Vicente, 2006), social entrepreneurship (Zahra et 
al.,2009; Peredo and McLean, 2006;Seelos and Mair, 2005;) and institutional theory 
(Bruton et al., 2010; Scot, 2001; Boot, 2000). The framework was applied to answer 
the two main research questions stated earlier in section 1.3 using an interview 
schedule, rapid participant observation during the fieldwork and secondary sources 
for data collection.  
The study uses a qualitative case study research design of two cases with 
an embedded unit of analysis and abductive research strategy to investigate the 
influences of impact investment funds on SMEs in BoP communities. Where 
influences were viewed from governance, strategy change and impacts. An 
explanatory case study design is appropriate for addressing 'how?' and 'why?' 
research questions focusing on the socially constructed nature of reality (Bryman 
and Bell, 2015; Saunders et al., 2009 Yin 2014). A sampling of fund managers, 
investors, investee SMEs is based on non-probability techniques of purposive, 
theoretical, and snowballing sampling adopted during the pilot study in Ghana 
before the PhD fieldwork which also guaranteed access to research sites. Primary 
and secondary data collection methods were employed during four months of PhD 
fieldwork from January to April 2018. Data collection methods utilised involved face-
face interviews, rapid participant observations and secondary source documents 
such as leaflets, reports, annual financial statements of bank-based funds, impact 
reports of capital market-based fund managers and website information. 
Forty-four research participants were interviewed lasting 70-90 minutes in 
their offices comprising nine bank-based fund managers, eight capital market-based 
fund managers, fifteen SMEs owner managers and five officials of regulatory and 
policymaking institutions. In some bank-based and capital market-based funds, 
interviews were conducted with officials. These fieldwork interviews were 
complemented by telephone interviews with four research participants from global 
Development Finance Institutions (DFI) with a substantial capital commitment to 
bank-based and capital market-based funds. In addition, informal discussions were 
held with three employees of SMEs at their farm location, which were recorded as 
field notes and used for additional sense making (Hustinx and Waele, 2015).The 
main PhD fieldwork face-face in-depth interview with research participants was 
based on semi-structured interview guide as data collection instrument earlier pre-
tested in a pilot study involving three bank-based officials, two capital market-based 
and four beneficiaries of capital market-based funds as participants. Data analysis 
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were based on the theoretical framework developed which informed a coding 
scheme and applied during the data collection and guided by content analysis, 
narrative analysis, thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and Miles, Huberman 
and Saldana (2014) analytical approach. Finally, a new empirically derived theory is 
developed (figure 7.1 of chapter 7) from the application of the integrated theoretical 
framework (figure 2.1 of Chapter 2) to the empirical research setting of Ghana   
(chapters 5 and 6). 
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge 
The study makes two significant theoretical contributions. First, to understand and 
explain how bank-based fund managers influence high growth, missing middle and 
established SMEs in BoP communities, a focus on governance, strategy change, 
and impacts are essential. A review of the impact investing literature (Höchstädter 
and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Geobey and Harji, 2014) suggest that 
these influences constitute a research knowledge gap that must be understood and 
studied at the impact investor- fund manager level initially because it manifests and 
impacts at the fund manager-investee relationships and outcomes at the SME and 
wider societal levels. This thesis addresses this knowledge gap by developing and 
elaborating a theoretical framework that theorise impact investment governance and 
strategy change from finance first and impact first investors within the global context 
and strategy change of BBF and CMB fund managers within the institutional context 
in supporting SMEs achieve impacts in BoP communities. 
 The second theoretical contribution relates to the influences of BB and CMB 
fund managers on high growth and established SMEs in BoP communities. CMB 
fund influences on high growth, missing middle and established SMEs that 
simultaneously realise the social impact and financial returns can be investigated 
through a critical examination of governance, strategy change and impacts. 
Theoretically, previous literature has considered impact investments, social 
enterprise financing, SMEs, governance of enterprises and strategies of funds in 
silos (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Mair et al., 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; 
Ebrahim et al., 2014). Integrating these concepts and themes in the developed 
theoretical framework and applying the same in an empirical setting makes a 
significant contribution to theory building and theory elaboration. 
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Beyond the theoretical contribution, governance evidence of ownership, 
control and board representation fills the gap in the impact investing literature in 
response to the call from Geobey and Harji (2014, p.275) regarding the governance 
of impact investment funds. Thus, advances the research gap on future research on 
how investee organisations are benefiting from impact investment growth by 
Ormiston et al. (2015, p.375). Social entrepreneurship literature is augmented 
through SME owner-managers conceptualised as social entrepreneurs in 
theoretical framework applied and thus extends the theory on social entrepreneurs 
(Kimbu and Ngoasong, 2016; Ruebottom, 2013; Zahra et al., 2009). 
The study also contributes to practice in developing countries in Africa with a 
similar context and Ghana in particular. Applying the theoretical framework within 
the research setting of Ghana comprising three geographical regions, macro-
environment, financial and enterprise architectures, and institutional context which 
interact with the global context from which impact investment funds flow indicate 
empirical contribution. Similar context in Africa include Kenya and South Africa while 
other developing countries in South-East Asia like India and Bangladesh 
representing key recipients of impact investment. Moreover, adopting a qualitative 
case study research design to collect data from 5 bank-based fund managers, 5 
CMB fund managers, 15 investee SMEs and four formal institutions evidence 
empirical contribution within the research setting. Previous studies have examined 
MFIs as a bank-based intermediary of impact investing (Praseeda, 2018). Ghana's 
setting for undertaking this research from three Regions, namely Greater Accra, 
Ashanti and Eastern evidence geographical allocation of impact investment funds 
by these fund managers. Emerging differences, similarities, and conditions of 
effectiveness of bank base funds and capital market-based funds as intermediaries 
of impact investment funds would be beneficial to promoters of impact investing and 
impact investors. Impact investment funds as an alternative to traditional bank 
financing, MFI, private equity, venture capital, angel investment, crowdfunding for 
high growth, missing middle and established SMEs contributes to both theory and 
practice. 
 The study also provides important policy implications around legislative 
framework on impact investments aimed at attracting institutional investors to the 
impact investment sector in Ghana for the benefit of SMEs. The empirical evidence 
a successful fund management models (bank-based and capital market funds) 
based on governance and strategies and SME investees provide important lessons 
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for how the establishment of new impact investment catalyse social impact and 
financial returns. Policy and regulation concerning how capital market institutions 
can set up and obtain fund manager license can potentially benefit from this study, 
especially criteria, conceptualisation, and definition of an impact investment fund. 
Another area is amendment of taxes for high growth and established SMEs that 
deliberately integrate social impact strategy of job creation, poverty alleviation, and 
operate to realise affordable housing, improved education, and health (Addis et al., 
2013) objectives.  
 
1.7 Limitations of the study 
A qualitative case study research design was applied to investigate the influences 
of impact investment funds on investee SMEs in BoP communities. Qualitative 
studies have been criticised for the lack of generalisability of findings due to the 
sample size. While the study is not aimed at generalising the findings, a quantitative 
analytical approach would have confirmed the cause-effect relationship among the 
actors. This, therefore, represents a limitation which future studies could examine.  
1.8 Structure and Outline of the thesis 
This PhD thesis is divided into seven chapters. This introductory chapter is 
continued with Chapter 2, a critical literature review that is designed to determine 
the current state of knowledge within the impact investing discipline, uncovering 
research gaps, and development of a theoretical framework to conduct this 
research. The study draws on five sets of literature to develop a theoretical 
framework for empirical application within the research context of Ghana. Chapter 
3 explains the research setting of Ghana to understand the significance of 
conducting the study in that context. The study reviewed the different environmental 
factors contributing to societal problems that impact investors are seeking to 
resolve. Then focus on, financial and enterprise architectures, institutional context 
and positions impact investment within the financial and enterprise architectures. 
Next, Chapter 4 sets out the methods for undertaking this research study, 
highlighting philosophical assumptions, research design, sampling, access, data 
collection instruments, method of data analysis and ethics. Chapters 5 and 6 present 
empirical analysis of bank-based funds and investee SMEs and then capital market-
based funds and investee SMEs, respectively. Finally. Chapter 7 concludes the 
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thesis. First, the chapter details discussion of key findings about literature and then 
contributions to theory, empirical, practice and policy. Finally, limitations and future 
research direction.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Governance, Strategy Change and Impacts: A Review 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter critically reviews different sets of literature from six main disciplinary 
sources: impact investing (Hoctstadter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et. al.,2015; 
Rajan et al.,2014; Wood et al; 2013), social entrepreneurship (Luke and Chu, 2013; 
Chell et al, 2010; Paredo and McLean, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005), organisational 
governance (Gompers et al., 2016; Connelly et al., 2010; Kaplan and 
Stromberg,2009), enterprise financing (Cumming et al.,2019; Rajan et al,2014), 
strategic management (Porter and Kramer, 2011;Zuniga-Vicente et al, 2005) and 
institutional theory (Scott,2001; North,1990;Dimaggio and Powell,1983). The initial 
aim is to determine the current state of knowledge within the discipline, as it relates 
to the research questions 1 and 2 of Chapter 1. The second aim is to justify the 
study as it relates to research gaps and research questions. Finally, different sets of 
literature are reviewed to facilitate the development of a theoretical framework to 
investigate the influences of impact investment funds on SMEs in BoP communities. 
The study draws on varied sets of literature from diverse disciplines because of the 
sparsity of impact investing academic literature (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; 
Ormiston et al., 2015). Further, a theoretical approach based on one particular 
discipline on their own appears limited. Therefore, an integrated theoretical 
framework drawing on these disciplines based on the current state of knowledge 
and research gaps for conducting the study has become essential.  
In developing the integrated theoretical framework, the study integrates 
concepts from four sets of literature, each of which makes an important contribution 
to the generation of an effective framework from understanding impact investing. 
First, agency theory is drawn upon to identify how  impact investor intentions 
(finance-first, impact-first) representing principals manifest in the governance, 
strategy change and impacts carried-out by Bank-based fund (BBF) and Capital 
Market-based (CMB) managers to influence SMEs in BoP communities. Second, 
resource-based theories related to strategic adaptation reveals why BBF and CMB 
fund managers change/ align their strategies to access impact investment capital. 
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Third, to further explain the processes of strategy-change by BBF and CMB fund 
managers in ensuring that SMEs simultaneously pursue social impact and financial 
returns by impact investment funds, social entrepreneurship theory is applied. Social 
entrepreneurship theory argues that social mission and financial returns are 
embedded. Fourth, institutional theory (Scott, 2001) and its sub strands of 
stewardship theory (Basq et al., 2011; Short et al.,2009;), network theory 
(Micheulucci, 2016; Morley, 2016)  and financial intermediation (Boot,2000) are 
drawn upon for clarifying the financial and enterprise architecture of Ghana within 
which impact investing and associated impacts occur (empirical application). The 
framework aims at critically investigating the distinctiveness of finance first and 
impact first investors, bank-based versus capital market-based impact funds, and 
how impact investment fills SME financing void as alternative to traditional 
enterprise financing. These are examined from the perspectives of governance, 
strategy change and impacts. 
 First section 2.2 seeks to provide conceptual clarification of impact investing, 
SMEs, and objectives of impact investors. Two key concepts of governance and 
strategy change are examined in Section 2.3 and 2.4, respectively, first from the 
impact investing and other literature to determine the state of knowledge and 
contribute to an emerging theoretical framework. Section 2.5 details emerging 
themes from the impact investing and related literature review and indicate why 
other literature would be helpful. Section 2.6 draws on the social entrepreneurship 
literature to conceptualise high growth and established SMEs as for-profit social 
enterprises and clarify other terminologies. Also shows how social entrepreneurship 
theory helps to explain the pursuit of social impact and financial returns by fund 
managers and investee SMEs concerning strategy change deliberately. Section 2.7 
draws on two streams of institutional theory, new institutional Economic (NIE) and 
New Institutional Sociology (NIS) to determine how it could help in developing a 
theoretical framework. Section 2.8 details the emerging integrated theoretical 
framework for the study and Section 2.9 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 Impact investing: State of knowledge, definitions, and 
conceptualisation  
This section seeks to provide conceptual clarification of impact investing, SMEs, and 
objectives of impact investors. Impact investing literature draws on different 
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academic traditions because it can be described as an emerging academic 
discipline. Search strategy involved the use of keywords consisting of 'impact 
investing', "impact invest*" and "impact investments" in three central databases. 
Ebscohost Complete, Science Direct and Abi/Inform were the databases consulted 
from December 2016- January 2017. Possible limitation might be publications that 
did not use the keywords adopted in this search. Besides, a reference analysis of 
three sources of literature namely Daggers and Nicholls (2016), Clarkin and 
Cangioni (2016) and Höchstädter and Scheck (2015) were conducted for 
identification and addition of any omitted academic papers. The earliest article came 
from the California Management Review (two). Some were published in 
entrepreneurship research journal (three), journal of social entrepreneurship (nine), 
and sustainable finance and investment journals (eight). Others were also from the 
journal of business ethics (three), private equity journal (two), Voluntary sector 
journals (four) and social finance literature to develop the theoretical framework. In 
all, a total of 136 papers constituted the database of impact investing literature 
developed for the review. Other recent papers were also reviewed during the period 
through similar search strategy. 
 The state of academic knowledge within the impact investing discipline 
appears limited with many practitioner publications (Clarkin and Cangioni, 2016; 
Höchstädter and Scheck; 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015) which create several 
research gaps in the literature. Also, while consensus on definition exists, what 
remains unclear relate to different terminologies used for impact investing and 
categories of impact investors. Also, the channels of investment flows from investors 
to investees in African countries require clarification — finally, impacts on SMEs and 
bottom-of-the-pyramid (BoP) communities in developing countries. Where BoP 
communities are defined as populations in countries that "live on less than $2.5 a 
day" (Oleksiak et al., 2015, p. 217), these clarifications are essential to 
understanding the research objectives and research questions in Section 1.2 and 
1.3. Moreover, how this study advances the knowledge within the impact investing 
discipline depends on the current state of knowledge and emerging research gaps. 
Finally, the current state of knowledge, conceptual clarifications, emerging themes 
and concepts are aimed at developing a theoretical framework for conducting this 
study. 
 The literature on impact investing, a nascent area of academic research 
appears to be growing (Höchstädter and Scheck; 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015). 
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Some literature has focused on a specific context such as countries/markets 
(Glanzel and Scheurle, 2016; Michelucci, 2016 and Oleksiak et al., 2015; Geobey 
and Harji, 2014) and others addressing how to build market infrastructures 
(Schwartz et al., 2015; Bell and Haugh, 2013). A few sets of literature have attended 
to the role of Government and public policy (Addis, 2015; Spear et al., 2015; Wood 
et al.,2013; Wells,2012) as well as impact measurement and reporting (Vo et 
al.,2016; Morley,2016; Reeder et al.,2015; Nicholls et.al.,2015; Jackson, 2013). 
Also, a sizable number of the literature addresses social impact bonds (Arena et al., 
2015; Schinckus, 2015; Stoez, 2014; McHugh et al., 2013; Joy and Shields, 2013). 
Enterprise financing through venture capital and philanthropic venture funds 
representing financial intermediaries has also being researched within the impact 
investing literature (Spiess-Knafl and Aschari-Lincoln, 2015; Bocken, 2015; Bammi 
and Verna, 2014; Rajan et al., 2014; Stagars, 2014). Similarly, impact investing from 
developmental and sustainable financing perspectives can be found in the literature 
(Bhatt and Ahmad, 2017; Hart et al., 2016; Mahn, 2016; Jones and Turner, 2014; 
Martin; 2013; Geobey et al., 2012). Relatively few sets of literature addressed 
barriers to impact investing (Ormiston et al., 2015; Combs, 2014), institutional 
impact investing (Wood et al., 2013) and attitudes of the clergy towards investing 
(Louche et al., 2012). Also, other literature has focused on impact exchange 
platforms and crowdfunding (Stubbs, 2017; Tuomi and Harrison, 2017; Lehner and 
Nicholls, 2014; Lehner, 2013; Lee, 2013; Mendell and Barbosa, 2013). Another 
emerging set of literature concern social finance as an umbrella term which includes 
impact investing (Nicholls and Emerson, 2015; Mulgan; 2015; Steinberg, 2015; 
Benedikter, 2014; Geobey and Harji, 2014; Moore et al., 2012; Jones, 2010).  
A few other literatures also view impact investing from social banking 
perspectives (Hayday, 2014; Weber, 2014) and some consider financing of social 
enterprises (Lyons and Kickul, 2013). Within the impact investing literature also 
emerged studies addressing the growth of philanthropic capitalism (Bishop and 
Green, 2015; McGoey, 2014). A couple more sought to distinguish the term from 
other concepts (Daggers and Nicholls, 2016; Hebb, 2013). Based on the state of 
knowledge within the impact investing academic discipline, much attention has been 
given to impact measurement, social impact bonds, venture capital and 
philanthropic capital funds as intermediaries and sustainable finance from a 
development perspective. This, therefore, evidence potential research gaps in the 
impact investing literature to be uncovered linked to a theoretical framework to 
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conduct the study. Geobey and Harji (2014, p. 275) made a call for the "need to 
develop and strengthen governance mechanisms" considering the flow of impact 
investor capital through intermediaries to investees indicate a vital research gap. 
The concept has been mentioned in passing as part of ESG in socially responsible 
investing (SRI) literature with little conceptual clarity.  
Table 2.1 provides a summary of academic literature seeking show the state 
of knowledge focusing on a different dimension of the impact investing of concept. 
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Table 2. 1 Academic literature on Impact investing 
Literature focus Authors 
Market infrastructures  Bell and Haugh, 2013; Schwartz et al., 2015 
Government and public policy Wells,2012; Addis, 2015; Spear et al., 2015 
Countries/markets focus studies 
Geobey and Harji, 2014; Oleksiak et al., 2015; Glanzel 
and Scheurle, 2016; Michelucci, 2016  
Impact measurement and reporting 
Harji and Jackson 2018; Jackson, 2013; Nicholls et 
al.,2015; Reeder et al., 2015; Vo et al., 2016; 
Morley,2016 
Social impact bonds  
McHugh et al., 2013; Joy and Shields, 2013; Stoesz, 
2014; Nicholls and Tomkinson, 2015; Schinckus, 2015; 
Young, 2015  
Venture funds and philanthropic 
venture financing  
Bammi and Verna, 2014; Rajan et al., 2014; Stagars, 
2014; Bocken, 2015; John and Emerson, 2015; Spiess-
Knafl and Aschari-Lincoln, 2015 
Development and sustainable 
financing 
Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011; Geobey et al., 2012; 
Seba, 2013; Jones and Turner, 2014; Martin, 2015; 
Hinton and Penemetsa, 2015; Hart, et al., 2016; Mahn, 
2016; Bhatt and Ahmad (2017) 
Importance and barriers to impact 
investing Combs, 2014; Ormiston et al., 2015 
Institutional impact investing Wood et al., 2013 
Religious group attitude towards 
investing  Louche et al., 2012 
Impact exchange platforms and 
crowdfunding 
Mendell and Barbosa, 2013; Lehner and Nicholls, 2014; 
Lehner, 2013.   
Conceptualising impact investing as 
social finance 
Moore et al., 2012; Benedikter, 2014; Geobey and Harji, 
2014; Mulgan; 2015; Nicholls and Emerson, 2015; 
Steinberg, 2015. 
Social banking perspectives Weber, 2013; Hayday, 2014 
Social enterprise funding sources Lyons and Kickul, 2013; Sebea, 2013; Young,2015  
Philanthropic capitalism  McGoey, 2014; Bishop and Green, 2015.  
Primer, landscape, synthesis of 
literature and conceptual clarifications 
Hebb, 2013; Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Clarkin and 
Cangioni, 2016; Daggers and Nicholls, 2016.  
Source: Authors illustration from the impact investing literature. 
Definitions of impact investing have centred on two main pillars: investments for 
non-financial impact and financial return. Some identify both social impact and 
financial return (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Addis et al., 
2013). Financial return refers to at least invested capital preservation, market rate, 
below-market return, market-beating or risk-adjusted market returns (Höchstädter 
and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Addis et al., 2013). Social impact takes 
different forms including access to energy, affordable housing, disadvantaged 
community investments, job creation and access to technology (Höchstädter and 
Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Addis et al., 2013). Wood et al., (2013, p. 75) 
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defines impact investing as “investing that intentionally seeks targeted positive 
social impact as well as financial return”. Similarly, Höchstädter and Scheck (2015, 
p. 454) after reviewing papers from academic and practitioner documents (156 in 
total) summarised that impact investing definitions centre on two core elements 
"financial return and some sort of non-financial impact". Finally, it refers to 
"investments that are primarily made to create tangible social impact but also 
potentially financial return" (Clarkin and Cangioni, 2016, p. 137).  
Tangible social impact takes the form of solutions to “challenging and 
intractable situations” including poverty, unemployment and access to energy 
(Clarkin and Cangioni, 2016, p. 137). Social impact from the above definition’s 
manifests in the form of solutions to wicked, intractable and insurmountable societal 
problems confronting societies that impact investors are claiming to realise. These 
problems appear prevalent in BoP communities or in developing countries. Ormiston 
et al. (2015) suggest that multifaceted solutions have become essential in dealing 
with what Clarkin and Cangioni, (2016) termed challenging and intractable 
situations. These challenging situations which qualify as wicked problems include 
poverty, unemployment, poor sanitation, inadequate housing and access to energy. 
To this end, impact investors seek to invest with the goal of deliberate realisation of 
social impact and financial returns simultaneously. This intentionality will be visited 
in the social entrepreneurship literature for conceptual clarity. 
 Other academic studies concern investments for social and environmental 
impact  (Daggers and Nicholls, 2016; Ashta, 2012).  Impact investing involves “use 
of capital to create specified social or environmental impact, whether it is through 
direct allocation capital, investment in funds, or contractual agreements such as 
SIBs” (Daggers and Nicholls, 2016, p. 6). From this definition, the nature of 
investment can be direct to investees or indirect capital allocation through 
intermediary funds. These investments take the form of “venture capital and private 
equity funds” as well as “mainstream financial institutions” focusing on “targeting 
geographies and reducing poverty” (Ashta, 2012, p. 74). By inference, venture 
capital and private equity funds can be described as capital market-based funds and 
mainstream financial institutions can be classified as commercial banks or bank-
based funds. For bank-based funds, impact investments serve as new funding 
sources compared to traditional sources from the general public. Undeveloped 
capital markets in developing countries can benefit from impact investments funds 
as an alternative source of enterprise financing for development and promote 
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economic growth. The above and subsequent review of the current state of 
knowledge clarify concepts in the research question and objectives such as 
commercial banks and venture funds, social impact and financial returns, impact 
investor objectives, societal problems and deliberate pursuit of social impact and 
financial returns. 
Conceptually, the term impact investing has evolved over the past few 
decades with association to different concepts including 'blended value proposition' 
(Emerson, 2003), 'socially responsible investing' (Schueth, 2003), 'social 
investment' (Nicholls, 2010) and, more recently, 'social finance' (Nicholls and 
Emerson, 2015). Previous reviews of these concepts have identified some 
significant differences of emphasis concerning investment strategy, investor 
motivation, types of investments, and financial instruments deployed, (Hochstadter 
and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston el al, 2015). Conceptually clarifying synonymous terms 
while showing differences enable the study to be appropriately positioned and 
demonstrate originality from other related studies. Table 2.1 below shows these 
conceptual differences based on a review of the impact investing literature.   
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Table 2. 2 Summary of key concepts relating to impact investing 
Conceptual differences Blended Value Proposition  Social Investment Socially Responsible 
Investing (SRI) 
Social Finance Impact Investing 
Key descriptions Integrating economic and 
social value in outcomes 
Investment aimed at social 
outcomes from philanthropy, 
Government and non-profit 
foundations. Social sector 
organisations constitute 
primary investees 
Adopt negative screening to 
select public listed stocks for 
investments underpinned 
with environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) 
criteria 
Capital allocated primarily for 
social and environmental 
returns and sometimes 
financial returns 
Deliberate investments into 
funds and enterprises aimed 
at social and environmental 
impact together with financial 
returns. Focuses on investor 
motivation and behaviour 
Investment Strategy Combines philanthropic and 
mainstream investment 
strategies 
Pure social impact and 
blended value creation 
Negative screening, avoid 
'sin' stocks, adopt ESG 
criteria in public listed stock 
selection 
Encompasses the spectrum 
of capital from philanthropic 
to SRI for social outcomes 
Finance first prioritise 
commercial returns; impact 
firs focus on social impact 
with a floor for financial 
returns 
Investor Motivation The concurrent pursuit of 
social, financial and 
environmental value 
Consider means-ends and 
value-ends investor 
rationality (objective of 
capital placement  
Market returns, avoid 'sin' 
stocks, incorporate ESG in 
stock selection 
Social and environmental 
impact and sometimes 
financial returns 
Financial returns and 
social/environmental impact 
Investment types Span across sectors namely 
for-profit, non-profit and 
business sectors 
Non-profit organisations, for-
profit and non-profit social 
enterprises, public sector 
organisations, voluntary 
sector organisations 
Mutual funds, public listed 
stocks, exchange traded 
funds (ETF) that pass the 
test of 'sin' stocks and ESG 
criteria 
Investment in hybrid 
organisations, charities, non-
profit enterprises, 
companies, limited by 
shares, private co-
operatives, mutual finance, 
for –profit limited companies 
Direct and indirect 
investments into funds, 
enterprises across sectors 
and geographies. Funds, 
e.g. Private equity, venture 
capital, commercial banks, 
microfinance, social venture 
capital. Organisations and 
enterprises, e.g. SMEs, for-
profit social enterprises, 
social purpose organisations 
Financial instruments  Grants, program related 
investments (PRI), 
loans/debt, community debt 
finance and recoverable 
grants 
Grants, soft or subordinated 
debt, quasi-equity 
Primarily equity and 
sometimes debt 
Grants, debt, equity, quasi, 
equity, SRI, 
soft/subordinated debt 
Debt, equity, quasi-equity, 
grants, Guarantees, 
convertible debt 
Sectors Health, agri-business, 
community redevelopment 
Health, education, 
community regeneration, co-
operatives, third sector and 
charities 
Publicly listed companies 
and commercial business 
sectors 
Non-profit/ foundations, 
business, government and 
social sectors,  
For-profit, business, non-
profit sectors in Agri-
business, education, health, 
financial services  
Source: Authors illustration from a critical review of literature from Hochstadter and Scheck, (2015); Nicholls and Emerson (2015); Bennett and Iqbal, (2013); 
Nicholls (2010); and Emerson (2003)
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2.2.1 Categories of impact investors 
A review of impact investor categories contributes to the development of the 
theoretical framework and clarifies emerging research gaps. 'Impact first' and 
'finance first' represent two categories of impact investors emerging from literature 
with different risk-return and social impact expectations (Hochstadter and Scheck, 
2015; Ormiston el al, 2015). Such categories of investors channel funds to SMEs to 
realise the social impact and financial returns in developing countries. 'Finance first' 
impact investors place a premium on the financial returns with a floor to the social 
impact (Hochstadter and Scheck, 2015). These investors "tend to include banks, 
pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and development finance institutions that 
seek to achieve market-competitive financial returns from investments that offer the 
prospect of positive social and environmental impact" (Ormiston et al., 2015, p. 355). 
'Impact first' investors "preferring to position themselves as 'impact-first' investors; 
seeking to maximise social or environmental returns while having a minimum 
required financial returns" (Ormiston et al., 2015, p. 355). Examples include 
philanthropic foundations (Rockefeller, Esmee Fairbairn, Omidyar Network, Ashoka, 
and Schwab), venture philanthropy and family offices. Typically, most of these 
investors are situated at the global and regional levels operating across continents 
and sectors. Examples include JP Morgan, TIAA-CREF, IFC Fund, Micro Vest and 
Tridos Bank, Africa Agricultural Capital Fund. 
           For this PhD project, impact investors comprise both 'finance first' and 'impact 
first' with different financial risk-return and social impact expectations, investment 
through bank-based and capital market-based funds to impact SMEs. Finance first 
investors channel investments through intermediaries with a similar investment 
objective of priority of financial return over social impact. Similarly, impact first 
investors deploy capital through intermediaries with emphasis on social impact. 
Under certain conditions, both finances first and impact first investors pool capital 
through an intermediary fund with varying risk-return and impact expectations for 
portfolio investments by the fund. To this end, subsection 2.2.2 review 
intermediaries of finance first and impact first investors representing intermediaries 
of funding into SMEs in African countries. 
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2.2.2 Impact investment intermediaries to investee SMEs in African countries  
Finance first and impact first investors use the same or different intermediaries to 
facilitate the flow of investment capital to SMEs in African countries. The section 
clarifies impact investment flow channels through the lens of finance first and impact 
first investors. 
‘Impact first' and ‘finance first' represent two categories of impact investors 
emerging from literature with different risk-return and social impact expectations 
(Hochstadter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston el al, 2015). Such categories of investors 
channel funds to investee SMEs to realize the social impact and financial returns in 
developing countries. ‘Finance first' impact investors place a premium on the 
financial returns with a floor to the social impact (Hochstadter and Scheck, 2015). 
These investors "tend to include banks, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and 
development finance institutions that seek to achieve market-competitive financial 
returns from investments that offer the prospect of positive social and environmental 
impact" (Ormiston et al., 2015, p. 355). ‘Impact first' investors "preferring to position 
themselves as ‘impact-first' investors seeking to maximize social or environmental 
returns while having a minimum required financial returns" (Ormiston et al., 2015, p. 
355). Examples include philanthropic foundations, venture philanthropy and family 
offices. 
Finance first and impact first investors use the same or different 
intermediaries to facilitate the flow of investment capital to SMEs in African 
countries. Finance first intermediaries adopt both bank-based (e.g. commercial 
banks) and capital market-based (e.g. private equity, and venture capital funds) 
financial intermediaries as channels to impact SMEs serving BoP communities 
(Geobey and Harji, 2014). Impact first investors deploy capital through capital 
market-based funds as intermediaries namely venture philanthropy (PhVC) and 
social venture capital funds (Spiess-Knafl and Aschari-Lincoln, 2015; Rajan et al., 
.2014) to SMEs. Table 2.3 illustrates the impact investment intermediaries from the 
global to country/local level. 
 
 
  
37 
 
 
Table 2. 3 Intermediaries of Impact investments 
Financial Intermediaries Consulting 
intermediaries 
Others 
 Asset 
Managers 
Funding 
Sources 
Examples Specialised 
intermediaries 
that provide 
market 
research and 
other 
consulting 
services to 
actors at the 
global and 
regional levels, 
sometimes 
called advisors 
e.g., Dalberg, 
KPMG, Monitor 
Institute 
Focus on 
capacity 
building of 
organisations 
through 
business 
modelling and 
teambuilding; 
also link 
organisations 
to external 
capital 
providers. 
They include 
aggregators, 
incubators 
and 
accelerators 
Global  Institutional 
stewards of 
managing 
capital of 
institutional 
investors and 
asset owners  
High Net 
Worth 
Individuals 
(HNWI), 
Pension 
Funds, 
Endowment 
Funds, 
Private 
Investors, 
Governments 
JP Morgan, 
Goldman 
Sachs, Credit 
Suisse,  
UBS Bank 
Regional  Channels of 
investment 
flows from 
global asset 
managers. 
Intermediate 
funds and 
banks that 
invest across 
geographic 
regions 
Multilateral 
Institutions, 
Sovereign 
Wealth 
Funds, 
Governments 
IFC Africa, 
Latin-America 
and 
Caribbean 
Fund; Africa 
Agricultural 
Fund; 
Procredit 
Holdings; 
Small 
Enterprise 
Assistance 
Funds 
(SEAF) 
Local Commercial 
banks, Private 
equity funds, 
Venture funds 
at the country 
level. They 
link investors 
and SMEs. 
Foundations, 
Governments, 
Development 
agencies 
Big lottery 
fund, Sarona 
Investments 
 
Source: Authors illustration from critical review of Glanzel and Scheuerle (2016); Michellucci 
(2016); Ormiston et al., (2015); and Geobey and Harji (2014) literature. 
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Table 2.4 also describes fund types, categorization and financial instruments 
deployed at the country level by bank-based and capital market-based 
intermediaries. 
Table 2. 4 Distinctive types and categories of impact investing 
Type of intermediary Category 
(finance first 
/impact first) 
Bank-based / Capital 
market-based 
Financial Instruments 
Venture Philanthropy funds Impact first Capital Market-based Grants, equity, debt, 
quasi-equity loans 
Social Venture Capital Funds (SVCF) Impact first Capital Market-based Debt, Equity, quasi-
equity 
Private Equity Funds Finance first Capital Market-based  Debt, quasi –debt and 
equity 
Venture Capital Funds Finance first Capital Market-based Equity, Debt, convertible 
debt, preferred equity 
Commercial Banks Finance first Bank-based Debt, Guarantees 
Source: Authors illustration based review of literature from Spiess-Knafl and Aschari-Lincoln, (2015); 
Rajan et al., (.2014);Scarlata and Alemany (2010); and Kaplan and Stromberg (2009)  
From the previous review, channels or intermediaries represent financial 
intermediaries for this PhD project. Within the capital market-based segment of the 
financial intermediaries, different categories of funds are emerging, which require 
some clarification. Bank-based and capital market-based intermediaries target 
SMEs serving BoP communities in developing countries to realise the social impact 
and financial returns (Jones and Turner, 2014). 
2.2.3 Impacts of high growth and established SMEs in BoP communities  
Impact investor proposition of deliberate investments into enterprises to achieve 
social impact and financial returns target investee SMEs serving BoP communities 
in developing countries. The nature of impacts is essential towards the development 
of a theoretical framework. Subsection 2.1.3 link SMEs to social entrepreneurship 
detailed in Section 2.5 and explain categories of SMEs that impact BoP communities 
in developing countries due to social impact. Three categories of SMEs emerge 
based on literature and evidence during the pilot study concerning investee 
enterprises that impact funds target to realise the social impact and financial returns. 
High growth, missing middle and established SMEs represent agents of universal 
change (Jones and Turner, 2014) especially in developing countries by way of 
developmental impact in serving BoP communities constitute investees (Rajan et 
al., 2014). Understanding the characteristics of these categories of investee SMEs 
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further clarifies the nature of research questions and objectives while contributing to 
the development of a theoretical framework for the study. 
Scholarly debate on definitions of high growth firms and characteristics have 
been inconclusive based on different measurement indicators (Delmar et al., 2003; 
Moreno and Casillas, 2007; Hoxha and Capelleras, 2010; Brown et al., 2017). High 
growth firms can be defined premised on sales and employment growth in both 
relative and absolute terms (Delmar et al., 2003). They are firms that exhibit "high 
potential for growth in value" (Nelson and Levesque, 2007; p. 210). Hoxha and 
Capelleras (2010; p.352) defined high growth firms as "small size firms that show 
extraordinary growth in terms of sales or employment. Also, Brown et al., (2017) 
suggest that key literature defining high growth enterprises have been based on the 
metrics of employment, turnover and assets overlooking profitability. The term 
‘gazelles' emerge in literature as a sub-set of high growth enterprises comprising 
enterprises up to 5 years old with an annualized growth rate higher than 25% per 
annum (Delmar et al., 2003; OECD, 2011). Another definitional perspective of high 
growth firm is the focus on the evolutionary sense of firms in line with the enterprise 
growth theory. Based on the elucidated growth literature, this research deviates from 
high growth enterprises described as ‘gazelles' (Delmar et al., 2003), the 
extraordinary growth in sales (Hoxha and Caperlleras, 2010) and rather concur with 
investee SMEs that exhibit high growth potential (Nelson and Levesque, 2007). 
A spectrum of ‘missing middle' (requiring $20,000.00 to $2 million impact 
investments) is positioned to facilitate development and growth in BoP communities 
(Jones and Turner, 2014). Characteristically, 'missing middle' enterprises are 
medium size, aged greater than 10 years and more than 20 employees (Robson et 
al., 2009) and correspond to the growth stage in the enterprise cycle. Kunthev et al., 
(2012) finds that some percentages of medium-size enterprises are credit 
constrained; 15.3%- fully constrained, 27.3% partially constrained. Established 
SMEs represent medium-size enterprises with specific characteristics including 
above 10 years of business operations, mostly non-family business and innovative 
(Robson et al., 2009), exhibit proper governance structures, sometimes dominated 
markets or industries and in terms of growth stage occupy within the transition to 
large enterprise. Majority of such enterprises might have encountered challenges 
and had to be restructured to realise anticipated goals. These high growths, missing 
middle and established SME business activities in developing countries can be 
viewed as the engine of social entrepreneurship because of simultaneous pursuit of 
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social impact and financial returns. Also, such enterprises with operations that 
integrate social impact objective qualify them as social enterprises (Martin, 2015; 
Lyons and Kickul, 2013). High-growth and established SMEs can potentially cause 
a systemic change in developing countries in serving BoP communities. These 
categories of SMEs legally incorporated as for-profit limited liability companies 
function as market linkages to small producers to the global value chain, which 
ultimately reduces poverty in BoP communities (Rajan et al., 2014). 
To summarize, high growth, missing middle and established for-profit limited 
liability SMEs can be positively impacted through impact investments to realise 
expected objectives. Some these goals include access to capital, inclusive 
development, and growth for all stakeholders; facilitate linkage of small producers 
to global value chain; jobs creation and improved incomes. Moving forward in this 
PhD project, high growth, missing middle and established for-profit investee SMEs 
have been conceptualized as for-profit social enterprises serving BoP communities 
reviewed further in section 2.5. The lower spectrum of SMEs has been ignored 
owing to the expected developmental impacts of high growth, missing middle and 
established SMEs conceptualized as for-profit social enterprises.  
The importance of governance cannot be overemphasized from different 
disciplines including public and voluntary sector (Hustinx and Waele, 2015; Rhodes 
and Donnelly-Cox, 2014) mainstream corporate finance (Haan and Vlahu, 2016; 
Daily et al., 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) social entrepreneurship (Pestoff and 
Hulgard, 2016; Bacq et al., 2011), development studies (Andrews, 2008; Berenson, 
2010) and political governance (Kumah and Brazys, 2016; Al-Marhubi, 2005). 
However, a dearth of literature within the impact investing discipline creates a 
research gap based on Geobey and Harji (2014, p. 275) call for the "need to develop 
and strengthen governance mechanisms" considering the growth of impact 
investments through intermediaries to high growth and established SMEs for social 
impact and financial returns. To this end, the study reviews three sets of literature 
in Section 2.3 to understand the nature of governance that impact investment funds 
adopt to influence investee SMEs in BoP communities. This review aims at 
evidencing a research gap and toward the development of a theoretical framework 
based on the concept of governance. 
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2.3 The nature of governance influences   
The literature on the importance of governance from different disciplines based on 
a similar literature search strategy as the one in section 2.1 reveals that it is an 
important mechanism to realise anticipated objectives.  Section 2.3 reviews the prior 
impact investing and other academic literature for three reasons. First, to uncover a 
research gap as part of the current state of knowledge within the impact investing 
discipline. Second to show the relevance of first research questions and objectives 
and finally to identify governance mechanisms of impact investment funds to assist 
in the development of a theoretical framework. There is a dearth of governance 
literature within the impact investing discipline (Clarkin and Cangioni, 2016; 
Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015). A primer on impact investing 
literature conducted by Clarkin and Cangioni (2016) avails the term governance 
eight times with one from an academic source, another one practitioner publication. 
Similarly, in another review by Höchstädter and Scheck, (2015), the term 
governance appeared seven times mostly as part of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) criteria in SRI strategy without conceptual clarity. 
The concept of governance has been mentioned in passing as part of 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices and noted three times in 
Ormiston et al. (2015) as part of socially responsible investing (SRI) strategy. Rubin 
(2009) observe that additive developmental venture capital plays a vital effect within 
the impact investing discipline in realizing the social impact and financial returns 
objective. Significantly, the recognition that through equity capital, developmental 
venture capital fund managers influence portfolio companies through board seat 
(Rubin, 2009). Further, Höchstädter and Scheck, (2015, p. 460) made a call for 
research that investigates whether impact investors "place limits on the size and 
ownership structure of investees". From this research gap emerges an associated 
concept of governance, which is ownership. Michelucci (2016) investigating whether 
an alternative to the Anglo-Saxon paradigm exists within the social impact investing 
ecosystem in Italy, finds that backers within the ecosystem usually banks control 
and manage the investment. Similarly, Glanzel and Scheuerle (2016) note that 
investee autonomy and investor control create conflicts in mainstream venture 
funds. Emerging from the above set of impact investing literature are concepts 
associated with governance which lack in-depth clarification and meaning, namely 
ownership, control, and board seat. 
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  Governance, which concerns ownership, control, and board representation 
spans two levels of investor-fund manager and fund manager-SME investee 
relationships in pursuit of social impact and financial returns. The study, therefore, 
draws from other disciplines for conceptual clarification of the term governance and 
associated concepts. Majority of academic literature on corporate governance has 
focused on the board of directors as a critical governance mechanism. Connelly et 
al. (2010) suggest that different governance mechanisms exist to control the 
behaviour and actions of firm managers which could be either internal or external. 
External governance mechanisms included the market for corporate control, 
competitive environment, laws, and formal and informal institutions (Johnson et al. 
2010). Internal governance mechanism, on the other hand, consists of a board of 
directors, compensation structures, processes, and procedures for the effective 
functioning of the business entity (Connelly et al., 2010). From this perspective, 
governance comprising ownership, control and board representation is viewed in 
this study as internal governance mechanisms deployed by the impact investment 
fund managers to influence investee SMEs to realise critical objectives.  
Ownership as a form of governance emerges through majority or minority 
interest in another firm by institutional investors, private equity investors (venture 
capitalist and business angels) as documented in the literature. Connelly et al. 
(2010) suggested that the literature on corporate governance identify heterogeneity 
in ownership governance structures. Ownership governance comprised executive, 
board, employee (non-executive), block holders, agent owners and private equity 
ownership. According to the authors, these different ownership governance forms 
have implications on the performance of firms and the behaviour of managers 
representing the interest of the owners. Drawing on the private equity and VC 
ownership governance structures (Connelly et al., 2010), impact investors through 
a capital commitment to intermediary funds acquire ownership in these funds 
subject to agreed covenants (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Thus, to curb the 
opportunistic and conflict of interest behaviour of fund managers, impact investors 
through ownership governance ensure that fund managers realise the anticipated 
objectives. Legally, private equity funds are structured as a limited partnership 
where the investors commit capital as limited partners and fund managers represent 
general partners manages of the fund (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009; Metrick and 
Yasuda, 2011). Due to the separation of the fund manager from the investors who 
committed the capital, ownership governance mechanism is applied by impact 
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investors to guarantee alignment of interest. Governance mechanism based on 
contracts documented is established in "partnership agreement that spells out 
obligations of each group" (Sahlman, 1990, p. 489; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; 
Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). Gompers et al. (2016), in a survey of 79 private equity 
firms with over $750 billion assets under management, found that governance was 
paramount to the performance of portfolio companies. 
Control governance usually transpires through an equity stake in funds and 
companies by investors. According to Dalton et al., (2003), equity held allow 
shareholders (impact investors) to exert control approach on the behaviour of 
managers (fund managers). Such control rights through ownership, either majority 
or minority confers decision rights on shareholders (impact investors) especially 
concentrated decision rights (Connelly et al. 2010). From a venture capitalist and 
entrepreneur relationship, Scarlata and Alemany (2010, p. 125) observed that 
"convertible securities efficiently allocate control between the VC investor and the 
entrepreneur". Theoretically, control governance exerted by investors is aimed at 
limiting fund managers and ultimately investee enterprises to engage in empire 
building arising from the separation of ownership from control. 
Furthermore, Robinson and Sensoy (2012) observed that contractual 
provisions between limited partners (investors) and general partners (fund 
managers) set out compensation modalities. These provisions require fund 
managers to return to investors contributed capital before carried interest is earned. 
Moreover, "waterfall" allows investors to receive their money back before fund 
managers obtain any profit sharing. Additionally, considering how private funds are 
structured, control governance mechanism emerges. Gompers and Lerner (1996) 
find that limited partnership agreements contain three main restrictive covenants as 
evidence of control. Restrictive covenants relating to the management of the fund, 
activities of general partners and permissible types of investments (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1996; 2001) manifesting control rights. Kaplan and Stromberg (2009, p.123) 
note that key "covenants include restrictions on how much fund capital can be 
invested in one company, on types of securities a fund can invest in, and on debt at 
the fund level ". Control governance can be inferred from these contractual 
provisions as potential agency conflicts between investors, and fund managers are 
addressed through the partnership agreement (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). Control 
governance mechanism also occurs through an advisory committee appointed by 
investors. Cumming and Macintosh, (2003, p. 5) found that investors "appoint an 
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investment advisory committee that is independent of management" to control the 
activities of fund managers. 
Board representation constitutes another governance mechanism from the 
corporate governance literature. Based on the private equity fund structuring, 
investor nominees are represented on the advisory board of the fund (Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2009). Board of directors representing the shareholders (investors) 
constitute a tool to monitor and influence decisions of fund managers in the case of 
private equity funds (Gompers et al. 2016). Guercio et al., (2003) observed that fund 
directors of closed-end funds, including private equity, are responsible for evaluating 
portfolio performance, monitoring and compliance with laws and regulations. 
Nominees of investors as a board of directors. Existing literature shows that board 
representation as a governance mechanism, typically are relatively smaller in size 
and perform better (Gompers et al. 2016). Separation of ownership (impact first and 
finance first investors) and control (fund management Company) raises governance 
issues, which further justify the investigation of governance mechanisms in pursuit 
of dual objectives. 
Governance also emerges at the fund manager-investees relationship where 
the fund invests in SMEs to realize the social impact and financial returns. 
Governance mechanisms of ownership, control, and board representation surface 
at the fund manager-SME investee level. Extant private equity and venture capital 
literature show that fund managers through equity ownership and sometimes debt 
capital investment exert influences on decisions of SME investee. Cumming et al. 
(2010) argued that venture capital (VC) funds through equity ownership control 
cashflows and disbursement while providing management oversight. Metrick and 
Yasuda (2011) also find that in addition to incremental rounds of investments, VC's 
exercise right to monitor and evaluate the interim performance of investee 
companies. Both private equity and venture capital funds from the literature tends 
to adopt hands-on and actively participate in the governance of investees to 
maximize returns for their principals (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2009). 
Control governance mechanism in the relationship between fund managers 
and SME investee takes the form of contractual provisions and board control. Equity 
investment by fund managers in portfolio companies provides control rights to fund 
managers. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) found that representation of venture 
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capitalist (VC) on investee board of directors represent a means by which VC exert 
control. Contractual provisions such as various contingent control rights, tag-along, 
pre-emptive rights for sale of shares and drag-along empower fund managers to 
influence the investee company management (Scarlata and Alemany, 2010; Metrick 
and Yasuda, 2011). Sometimes, to control investee companies, venture capitalists 
stage their investments through incremental rounds subject to the satisfaction of 
performance milestones (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). This kind of staging 
arrangement signifies another dimension of control governance mechanism. 
Board representation as a governance mechanism tends to be typical in the 
private equity and venture capital literature to curb conflict of interest, opportunism 
and agency problems. Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) showed that through 
governance engineering, private equity fund managers control the boards of 
portfolio companies. The authors further added that through formal and informal 
meetings, non-hesitation to remove non-performing management team, use of 
expert knowledge for value addition creation, board representation ensure control 
of investee companies. Gompers at al., (2016) explored from the private equity 
industry issue relating to governance engineering, operational engineering and 
value addition of fund managers before and after transactions. Findings showed that 
private equity investors control the boards of portfolio companies and are actively 
involved in governance. Primarily this oversight and active involvement through 
board representation seek to limit empire building (Gompers et al., 2016). According 
to Cumming, Schmidt and Walz (2010), in countries with poor legal systems, board 
representation substitute for legality as protection to fund managers due to the cost 
of information generated from different sources. 
Moreover, board representation facilitates transparent and complete access 
to information relating to investee activity (Cumming et al., 2010). Cumming et al. 
(2007) found that private equity firms' active engagement in the management of 
investee companies result in governance changes, including corporate code 
development, agency problem reduction and enhanced monitoring. Also, Bonini et 
al., (2012) find a robust positive relationship between venture capital funding and 
their influence on board decisions and member appointments. In a survey of 79 
private equity firms managing over $750 billion assets, Gompers et al., (2016) found 
that through governance engineering (how funds control the boards of portfolio 
companies), fund managers prefer smaller board size (maximum of five) and advise 
investee companies for enhanced value creation. 
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As Ashta (2012) observed, impact investors also channel funds through 
"mainstream financial institutions" to realise developmental objectives in developing 
countries. Bank-based funds traditionally source capital through financial 
intermediation (Vashishtha, 2014; Boot, 2000; Peterson and Rajan, 1994). Where 
financial intermediation means accepting deposits from the general public and on-
lending to deficit economic agents (individual, firms and governments). With the 
emergence of impact investors (finance first and impact first), bank-based funds 
setups can be described as strategic business units with appropriate governance 
systems in support of SMEs. Financial intermediation theory provides that through 
relationship lending, banks utilize control and monitoring as fundamental 
governance mechanisms (Vashishtha, 2014; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Boot, 2000; 
Peterson and Rajan, 1994). According to Peterson and Rajan (1994), the length of 
the relationship enhances lenders (banks) control and deepen the relationship. 
Chava and Roberts (2008) also suggest that borrowers retain control rights based 
on covenants in loan contracts provided there is full compliance with covenants. 
Covenants violation shift rights to banks for either termination of loans or demand 
for early repayment. Therefore, covenants in loan contracts are deployed by banks 
to control customers (Vashishtha, 2014). 
Peterson and Rajan (1994) examining the benefits of relationship lending 
finds that monitoring provides bank access to reliable information through accounts. 
Further, Boot (2000) argues that relationship lending facilitates monitoring and 
screening to overcome information asymmetry. Chakraborty and Ray (2006) assert 
that banks typically monitor firms to resolve agency problems, which makes bank 
financing expensive. Authors find that bank monitoring does not ultimately eliminate 
agency problem but reduce exposure to a high-risk project (Charkroboty and Ray; 
2006). According to Vashishtha (2014) rights, which accrue to banks through loan 
covenants and serve as a disciplinary mechanism for banks to influence the 
management of firms to realise critical objectives. Monitoring as a governance 
mechanism is deemed to increase post covenant violation (Tan, 2013). The 
governance issues of ownership, control and board representation emerge 
especially for capital market-based-funds, where impact investments are concerned 
due to the simultaneous pursuit of social impact and financial returns. 
In summary, this review of literature from private equity, corporate 
governance and finance disciplines reveal that bank-based funds adopt control and 
monitoring as the central governance mechanisms. Capital market-based funds 
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employ ownership, control and board representation types of governance 
mechanism to influence SMEs that pursue dual goals. Impact investing literature 
showed a research gap on governance mechanisms that funds utilize to influence 
investee SMEs. To this end, the study drew on other disciplines to demonstrate the 
nature of governance influences that bank-based and capital market-based fund 
managers deploy to ensure investee SMEs realise the social impact and financial 
returns. Banks might set up these funds as strategic support units, compared to 
capital market-based funds. The capital market-based fund adopts the limited 
partnership model with ownership, control and board representation to govern 
investor-fund manager relationship. Similar governance mechanisms manifest at 
the fund manager- investee SME level for capital market-based fund managers. 
2.4 Strategy change of impact investment fund managers 
Section 2.4 focuses on strategy change of impact investment fund managers who 
hitherto existed as agents of private wealth creation. This part of the literature review 
addresses the second research question. It examines the impact investing, strategic 
management and social entrepreneurship literature in order to discover how the 
strategies of bank-based and capital market-based fund managers change when 
they are offering impact investment products to SMEs in search of multiple 
objectives. Further, the review seeks to contribute towards the development of a 
theoretical framework integrating the concept of strategy change or alignment. 
Previously, bank-based and capital market-based intermediary strategies tend to 
focus on sectors, geographies, asset classes that generate above-market returns to 
shareholders under the maxim of shareholder value maximization. Where strategy 
is defined as "choosing a unique position and distinctive value chain to deliver on it" 
(Porter and Kramer, 2011). This motivation and objectives of maximizing 
shareholder wealth led to financing and investing by bank-based and capital market-
based fund managers respectively in enterprises that exhibit viability for high 
financial returns only in varied geographies and sectors to the neglect of social 
impact. 
The emergence of impact investing reveals evidence of strategic change or 
alignment among key stakeholders in the impact investment ecosystem including 
investors, fund managers and investee SMEs. The ostensible reason for strategy 
changes and alignment is to meet impact investor intentionality or deliberate 
objectives of social impact and financial returns (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; 
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Ormiston et al., 2015; Rubin, 2009). Impact investing literature indicates the nature 
of strategies that existing actors are expected to adapt or align to within the impact 
investment ecosystem. Three major actors include investors, fund managers and 
investee SMEs in deliberate search of social impact and financial returns in BoP 
communities (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Rajan et al., 
2014). A critical examination of the literature reveals concepts such as adapted 
portfolio strategy (Brandstetter and Lehner 2015), demography, geography and 
sectors (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015), integrated approach strategy (Ormiston et 
al., 2015), ‘finance and Impact' strategy (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston 
et al., 2015), expected risk-return characteristics (Ormiston et al., 2015; Wood et al., 
2013) and integrated ESG strategies (Wood et al., 2013). These strategies, on their 
own, reflect current approaches that impact investors are seeking to deploy to 
overcome challenges of impact investing (Ormiston et al., 2015). 
Further, impact investors at the institutional investor level expect intermediary 
fund managers to either adapt or align with these strategies in order to deliberately 
realise expected social impact and financial returns objectives. At the impact 
investor level, Ormiston et al. (2015) and Wood et al. (2013) noted impact 
investment strategies that can be applied at the portfolio level for institutional asset 
owners. Impact investment strategies in the words of Wood et al. (2013) reside at 
the portfolio level of institutional investors and could either be stated explicitly or not 
in investment policy statements or fund strategy documents. Wood et al. (2013, p 
81) further submit that institutional asset owners target impact investment strategies 
within asset classes through conventional tools and benchmarks in making 
allocation and investment decisions. In doing so, Wood et al. (2013) suggest an 
integrative impact investment strategy which focuses on intermediaries for deal 
pipelines. Authors claim that an integrated impact investment strategy will create a 
universe of deal pipelines for realising impact investment objectives for institutions 
interested in impact investing. Ormiston et al. (2015, p.356) identified five challenges 
confronting institutional investors relating to impact investing among which 
"uncertainty as to where impact investment is included within modern investment 
portfolio" emerged. 
The authors submitted that an impact investment strategy based on an 
integrated approach could be beneficial to institutional investors. Based on this 
integrated approach, Ormiston et al. (2015) find that institutional investors should 
focus on finance-first investment strategy due to fiduciary duty with a floor on social 
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impact. Besides, institutional investors should adopt the same due diligence 
processes with additional social impact consideration to overcome the uncertainty 
of impact investment strategy. Additionally, Brandstetter and Lehner (2015) 
proposed an adapted portfolio optimization strategy based on a risk-return 
relationship that incorporates social impact parameters as well as traditional 
financial returns. It further shows that incorporating social impact in investment 
decisions at the portfolio level by institutional investor and fund level require strategy 
change that has not been adequately captured in the impact investing literature. An 
impact investment strategy also encapsulates sectors, geographies and 
demography emerging from the impact investing literature as target segments on 
the field. Höchstädter and Scheck, (2015) discussed the impact investment strategy 
that addresses geography, demography and sectors because of impact objectives. 
Demography and geography refer to end-beneficiaries of impact investment. 
Emerging from the analysis, BoP communities represented vital 
beneficiaries. However, authors find that impact investment must not necessarily 
focus only on such demography (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015). In terms of 
geography, findings by Höchstädter and Scheck, (2015) shows that impact 
investment does not necessarily address underserved and impoverished 
communities only but rather spans across geographies in both developed and 
developing communities. This corresponds to the general school of thought that 
impact investment span across geographies, all asset classes and impact areas 
endorsed by the Global Impact Investing Network (Ormiston et al., 2015). Another 
impact investment strategy emerging in the literature deals with sectors 
(Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Addis et al., 2013). 
According to Höchstädter and Scheck, (2015), multiple or specific sectors emerge 
in fulfilment of expected objectives. Höchstädter and Scheck, (2015) further find no 
limitation on a specific sector, and observed that varied sectors emerged namely 
agriculture, health, education, microfinance, housing, financial services, water, and 
energy (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015). 
These sets of impact investing literature (Brandstetter and Lehner 2015; 
Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Rajan et al., 2014; Wood et 
al., 2013) show the current state of knowledge of ‘what' regarding an impact 
investment strategy and less of ‘why' and ‘how'. It further reveals the need for 
strategy change if bank-based and capital market-based fund managers and 
investee SMEs seeks to implement an impact investment strategy. Theoretically, 
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answering the ‘why' and ‘how' of strategic change or alignment by bank-based and 
capital market-based funds show a research gap in the impact investing literature 
which justifies research question 2 in Section 1.3. The study, therefore, draws on 
strategic management literature to understand the ‘why' of bank-based and capital 
market-based fund manager strategy change or alignment. 
Extant strategic management literature identifies two views on ‘why’ and 
‘how’ organizations change strategy namely strategic adaption (Porter and Kramer, 
2011; Zuniga-Vicente et al., 2005; Porter, 1980) and inertial views (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977). Strategy change arises from misalignment of environmental 
conditions and current operating strategies of organisations (Vicente-Lorente and 
Zuniga-Vicente, 2006; Porter, 1980). The main argument of strategic adaption view 
is that managers of an enterprise change strategies overtime on the one hand either 
rapidly or flexibly or slowly and gradually due to firm-specific factors as sources of 
rigidity or change (Vicente-Lorente and Zuniga-Vicente, 2006). Strategic adaption 
theorist argues that managers of organisations review and evaluate environmental 
conditions and change strategies or align with emerging trends for survival and 
growth. Resource-based theorist also posits that the board of directors of 
organisations tend to be boundary spanners between external environment and 
managers of organisations. Thus, the consequences of changing environmental 
conditions, turbulent or gradual, negatively affect organisational performance, 
access to resources and survival. 
 Options for managers is, therefore, to either change strategy or ensure 
alignment with environmental conditions. Dowling and Moran (2012) defined 
alignment in the context of strategic choice and reputation, focusing on external and 
internal fit. Empirically, Zuniga-Vicente et al. (2005) find that environmental events, 
including deregulation in the external context, facilitate strategy change. Authors 
also find that other external events, such as liberalisation inhibit strategy change. 
Vicente-Lorente and Zuniga-Vicente (2006) examining time-variant determinants of 
strategy change using data from Spanish banks, 1983-1997 finds that strategic 
change from both adaption and inertial perspectives should be viewed as ‘time' or 
‘context-dependent. Drawing on the strategic adaption view of alignment to external 
environment context, bank-based and capital market-based fund managers either 
adapt or align their strategies for external and internal fit to access resource for 
survival. Bank-based fund managers dominate the financial system in most 
developing countries (Beck, 2013) and a significant source of external funding for 
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SMEs (Beck, 2013; Ayyagari et al. 2011; Le and Nguyen, 2009). However, capital 
secured for on-lending to SMEs through financial intermediation tend to be short-
term (Boot, 2000). 
Further, perceived risks, high level of default and weak governance system 
of SMEs compel bank-based funds to allocate capital to alternative risk-free 
instruments or ventures. Also, unfavourable macro-economic environment affects 
the capital adequacy and the useful influences of bank-based funds in supporting 
SMEs. Consequently, bank-based fund managers adapt or align their strategies to 
access impact investor resources for liquidity management, capital adequacy, long-
term funding, financial sustainability, and global citizenship. 
Capital market-based fund managers also adapt or align their strategies to 
access impact investor resources to deliver social impact and financial returns. 
Based on structure, sectors, geographies, deal sizes, financial instruments 
deployed and an integrated strategy, capital market-based fund managers adapt 
their strategies to meet impact investor needs (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; 
Ormiston et al., 2015; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009; 2003). Expectations from 
finance first and impact first investors make a strategy change by capital market-
based fund managers quite unavoidable. In adopting these strategies, high growth, 
missing middle and established SMEs targeted seeks to realize the high social 
impact and financial returns to reduce the intractable societal problems. 
Strategy management literature uncovered why bank-based and capital 
market-based fund managers adapt or align their strategies. However, social 
entrepreneurship is drawn upon to explain how bank-based, capital market-based 
and investee SMEs deliberately realise the social impact and financial returns. The 
purpose is first, to conceptualize simultaneous pursuit of social impact and financial 
returns and then contribute towards the development of a theoretical framework. 
Social entrepreneurship theory argues that deliberate and simultaneous pursuit can 
be judged by first uncovering the commercial and social transformational goals of 
the actors. Seelos and Mair (2005) empirically find a business model where 
commercial profits are used to support social mission such as education and health 
represent a strategy to support BoP communities. Peredo and McLean (2006) also 
find that an organization can adopt a complementary strategy where commercial 
profits are used to support social impact. Batillana et al. (2011) suggested an 
integrated hybrid business model which produces social impact and financial returns 
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within a unified strategy. Microfinance institutions have been observed to have 
adopted an integrated unified strategy which ensures the deliberate pursuit of social 
impact and financial returns simultaneously (Batillana et al., 2011; Peredo and 
McLean 2006; Seelos and Mair; 2005). These sets of literature based on social 
entrepreneurship theory shows the ‘how' of strategy change or alignment of an 
investor or enterprise and the extent to which these are intrinsic to the mission, 
values and aspirations/goals of the enterprise/fund (Batillana et al.,2011; Peredo 
and McLean 2006; Seelos and Mair; 2005). The deliberate pursuit of social impact 
and financial return objectives of impact investors is connected to strategy change 
from the social entrepreneurship literature. 
Social impact (defined as scale and reach of investee services or products) 
can take several forms including an enterprise or fund investing in providing goods 
and services in the low income or BoP communities (Rajan et al., 2014). Further, it 
comprises affordable housing to underserved communities, improved health, 
enhanced education, clean water, and access to energy (Höchstädter and Scheck 
(2015). Financial returns can be described in the form of revenue-generation, profit, 
return on investment or assets and repayment of principal and interest to investors 
(Ormiston et al., 2015). Moreover, in an emerging institutional field like impact 
investing, failure of existing capital market-based funds to change strategies can be 
detrimental, given competition from new entrants. Further reviews are detailed in 
section 2.6. 
In summary, the impact investment literature mentions integrated strategy, 
adapted portfolio strategy (Brandstetter and Lehner 2015), geography and 
demography as well as sectors (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Rajan et al., 2014), 
finance and impact strategy (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015) 
and integrated strategy (Ormiston et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2013). Further, multi-
sector focus portfolio strategy (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 
2015). Finally, a strategy of deploying different financial instruments such as while 
debt, equity and quasi-equity, including credit enhancement instrument 
(Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015). These strategies reveal little 
empirical evidence about ‘why' of strategy change. Strategic management theory of 
strategic adaption or alignment explains why bank-based and capital market-based 
funds either alter or align their strategies for external and internal fit (Porter and 
Kramer, 2011; Zuniga-Vicente et al., 2005; Zuniga-Vicente et al. 2005; Bocker, 
1989). Access to impact investor resource constitutes one of the reasons for 
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alignment and strategy change. Social entrepreneurship literature shows that bank-
based, capital market-based and investee SMEs could adopt unified strategy 
(Batillana et al., 2011), complementary strategy (Peredo and McLean, 2006) and 
commercial profits invested in the social sector (Seelos and Mair, 2005). These 
models from social entrepreneurship literature reveal the ‘how' of strategy change 
or alignment to realise the social impact and financial returns simultaneously. 
2.5 Emerging themes and concepts  
Based on the preceding literature review, two themes emerge for understanding 
how the governance of impact investments influences the realisation of financial 
returns and societal impact in BoP communities. First, impact investing is defined 
as a direct and indirect investment through bank-based and capital market-based 
funds into SMEs for social impact and financial returns in this study. The term is 
conceptualized to encompass direct and indirect investments by finance first and 
impact first through bank-based and capital market-based funds, to SMEs serving 
BoP communities. Direct investments mean, capital allocation to SMEs to create 
social impact and financial returns. Indirect investments entail either bank-based or 
capital market-based fund investing in another financial intermediary for on-lending 
ultimately to SMEs. Other investments into service providers, public listed 
companies and social impact bonds are outside this conceptualization. Finance first 
represent a category of impact investors that focus on the market return and 
prioritize financial returns to social impact. Impact first focuses on social impact with 
a floor on financial returns. These two categories of investors serve as funding 
sources of impact investment flows to bank-based fund and capital market-based 
funds. Bank-based and capital market-based funds have been conceptualized as 
channels/intermediaries of impact investment flows to SMEs serving BoP 
communities. SMEs constitute the ultimate recipient of impact investment capital to 
realise the social impact and financial returns in serving BoP communities. Impact 
investing is conceptualized as both ‘finance first' and ‘impact first', direct and indirect 
investments through bank-based and capital market-based funds as intermediaries 
into SMEs serving BoP communities. 
The second theme is governance, which has so far received minimal 
attention in the impact investing academic literature. Research is needed to examine 
the governance mechanisms of impact funds flow from investors to investees. This 
shows a research gap in line with the call from Geobey and Harji (2014, p. 275) for 
54 
 
the "need to develop and strengthen governance mechanisms" considering the flow 
of impact investments from investors to investees. Bank-based funds functioning as 
strategic business units within their traditional corporate structure raises governance 
and strategy issues which require detail empirical study. Moreover, it is unclear 
whether bank-based or capital market-based funds model represent the most 
effective tool for investee SMEs to realise the social impact and financial returns 
expectation of impact investors. Capital market-based funds adoption of profit-
making private equity/venture capital model reveals that limited partnership 
contractual governance arrangement as the dominant organizational form. 
Partnership agreements that contain restrictive covenants, board representation on 
the fund management company, independent advisory investment committee 
comprise some of the governance mechanisms at the investor-fund manager level. 
Governance arrangements affect the strategies of impact funds and the 
SMEs they finance (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Thus, a change in strategy is required 
that aligns the investor-fund manager and fund-manager-investee interest in the 
pursuit of social impact, and financial returns are under-researched and therefore 
justifies this study. Some strategies of funds uncovered comprise adapted portfolio 
optimization strategy, finance and impact first strategy, investee production 
technology adjustment, multi-sector portfolio strategy, informal incentives to 
subsidize impact of investees.  
Governance mechanisms addresses how impact investors ensure that bank 
and capital market-based fund managers and SMEs realise agreed objectives. 
However, governance is not adequate in addressing other aspects such how fund 
managers and investee SMEs deliberately pursue simultaneous impact and 
financial returns in BoP communities. Moreover, while the impact investing literature 
explains the ‘what’ of an impact investment strategy in section 2.4, strategic 
management theory assist in understanding ‘why’ BB and CMB fund managers 
change their strategies and less of the ‘how’ to realise social impact and financial 
returns. The next section 2.6 therefore draws on the social entrepreneurship 
literature towards contributing to the development of an integrated theoretical 
framework. Many of the studies in finance, economics and entrepreneurship 
literature view SMEs as purely commercial ventures. Adopting a social 
entrepreneurship perspective provide significant opportunities to critically 
understand, explain and evidence findings of strategy change by impact funds and 
investee SMEs based on the research gap. A radical shift is therefore needed in the 
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framing of SMEs as agents of development in BoP communities through social 
entrepreneurship. 
 
2.6 Social entrepreneurship perspective of the theoretical 
framework 
The social entrepreneurship literature, which has proliferated in the last two 
decades, has strong parallels with impact investing. The study, therefore, probes 
the social entrepreneurship literature to see what insights it can provide. Explicitly, 
for conceptual clarity on SME activities as social entrepreneurship as well as 
conceptualize high growth, missing middle and established SME ventures as social 
enterprises. The study acknowledges that other disciplines including finance, 
entrepreneurship and economics view SMEs as purely commercial ventures and 
therefore adopting social entrepreneurship perspective shows evidence of research 
gap and contribute to the development of an integrated theoretical framework. A 
similar theme-based approach to literature search and review that was presented in 
section 2.1 was also employed in the review of the social entrepreneurship literature. 
Keywords and phrases searched includes "social enterpr*", "social 
entrepreneurship", "social enterpr* and governance", "social enterpr* and 
institutions", social enterpr* as literature search strategy from Science Direct and 
Ebscohost business source databases. 
2.6.1 Definition and conceptualization of social entrepreneurship 
Social entrepreneurship as a concept continues to dominate discussion in academic 
literature in different jurisdictions. Some academics have sought to conceptualize 
the term through a focus on its two constituents of "social" and "entrepreneurship" 
(Luke and Chu, 2013; Peredo and McLean, 2006; Dees, 1998). The social 
dimension represents the mission or purpose of the venture (Luke and Chu, 2013; 
Dees, 1998) and also connotes the outcome of the business venture, which is "to 
address social problems" (Zahra et al., 2009, p. 520). The entrepreneurship angle 
of the concept appears connected with "methods of market-driven enterprise" 
(Peredo and McClean, 2006, p. 58). In order to define social entrepreneurship 
concept for this study, some definitions of authors were reviewed based on literature 
in Latin America, Asia and Africa, thus inspiring the definition for this research. 
Besides, some of the authors illustrated with case studies of enterprises in Africa, 
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Asia and Latin America that shares similar characteristics of high growth, missing 
middle and established SMEs that emerged in section 2.0 of the impact investing 
literature review. Seelos and Mair (2005, p. 243-244) defines the concept as "Social 
entrepreneurship creates new models for the provision of products and services that 
cater directly to basic human needs that remain unsatisfied by current economic or 
social institutions" or an extended definition "as entrepreneurship that creates new 
models for the provision of products and services that cater directly to the social 
needs underlying sustainable development goals such as MDGs". For Mair and 
Marti (2006, p. 38), social entrepreneurship:  
"...as a process involving the innovative use and combination of resources to 
pursue opportunities to catalyse social change or address social needs", or 
"social entrepreneurship as a process of creating value by combining 
resources in new ways. Second, these resource combinations are intended 
primarily to explore and exploit opportunities to create social value by 
stimulating social change or meeting social needs. And third, when viewed 
as a process, social entrepreneurship involves the offering of services and 
products but can also refer to the creation of new organizations" (Mair and 
Marti, 2006, p. 38). Along a similar line, Zahra et al. (2009, p. 522) express 
the notion that "Social entrepreneurship encompasses the activities and 
processes undertaken to discover, deﬁne, and exploit opportunities in order 
to enhance social wealth by creating new ventures or managing existing 
organizations in an innovative manner". 
Two critical themes observed in the above literature are an activity (which 
can be commercial or social) and innovative processes such as market-based 
models and income-generating approaches (Nicholls, 2009; Zahra et al., 2009; Mair 
and Marti, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005). Social entrepreneurship deploys a 
combination of resources including social, human, financial and psychological 
mobilization or reconfiguration (Mair and Marti, 2006).  A third emerging theme 
concerns the combination of the resources aimed at producing goods and services 
that remain unsatisfied or inadequately supplied (Nicholls, 2009; Seelos and Mair, 
2005). Some expected outcomes include job creation, social value addition, poverty 
reduction and wealth creation among the poor (Peredo and McLean, 2006). Finally, 
social entrepreneurship activities aimed at creating social value and solution to 
social needs (Luke and Chu, 2013; Zahra et al. 2009; Seelos and Mair, 2005). To 
this end, social entrepreneurship is defined as an innovative entrepreneurial 
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activity/process of exploiting both social and economic opportunities by a profit-
making limited liability SMEs to address societal problems. Thus, social 
entrepreneurship conceptualization in academic literature has focused on different 
dimensions. 
 Some include (1) motivation (Zahra et al, 2009; Peredo and McLean, 2006), 
(2) mission (Dees, 1998), (3) activity or process (Mair and Marti, 2006), (4) 
opportunity identification (Martin and Osberg, 2007; Austin et al., 2006) and (5) 
impact or outcomes (Seelos and Mair, 2005). In this study, the concepts social 
entrepreneurship and social enterprise are separate and distinct with some 
overlaps. Social entrepreneurship activities ultimately realise the social impact and 
financial returns as impacts or outcomes. Seelos and Mair (2005) investigating 
social entrepreneurship business models to serve BoP communities finds that value 
creation comprises economic, social and cultural values. In one case study, a 
company based in Egypt called Sekem, authors illustrated that outcomes of social 
entrepreneurship activity consist of economic profit and social impact. The venture 
generates economic profits that are invested in social sectors, including adult 
education centre, schools, and medical centre (Seelos and Mair, 2005). Thus, 
through service delivery and other ventures of Sekem, poverty level reduces, and 
basic human needs are met as social impact while generating economic profit. 
Social entrepreneurship activities, therefore, garner both social impact and financial 
returns. 
 The motivation for social entrepreneurship activity can be segmented into 
purely social, a mix of economic and social, and purely economic or financial in a 
continuum (Paredo and McLean, 2006). Two extremes on a continuum of pure 
profit-making activity of the business venture with an implicit social objective and 
real social impact as an underlying motivation. The third is a mix of the two with 
social and economic goals. These goals may not necessarily be equal, but some 
slight variation in the focus might occur. Peredo and McLean (2006), therefore 
suggests that provided social goals are present or partly for instrumental reasons 
does not matter in qualifying activity as social entrepreneurship. Therefore, in terms 
of motivation, it is argued in this study that a profit limited liability enterprise with 
financial returns and social impact objectives, whether explicit or implicit, qualifies 
as social entrepreneurship.  
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Social entrepreneurship as an activity or process encompasses the 
production of goods and services involving resource combination. Mair and Marti 
(2006) provide three factors that identify a social entrepreneurship activity by 
suggesting that as a process, it involve innovative resource combination in a distinct 
manner. Also, the resource combination aims at opportunity exploitation in creating 
social impact. Finally, in all these, the social entrepreneurship venture offers goods 
and services either through a new venture or existing business (Mair and Marti, 
2006). While acknowledging the existence of individual and collective models 
(Spear, 2006), the nature of activities is neither individual nor collective but rather 
venture engaged in the transformational process of goods and services through a 
production unit (Mair and Marti, 2006). Therefore, in terms of activity, social 
entrepreneurship involves the transformation of goods and services continuously 
within a newly established for-profit making legal entity in different sectors of the 
economy. 
Based on the literature reviewed so far, high growth and established SME 
activities qualify as social entrepreneurship under three main conditions: (1) 
motivation, (2) activities and (3) impact. In doing so, poverty reduces, unemployment 
declines, household income improves, enhanced access to housing as well as 
access to efficient and reliable energy are realised as social impact. Financial 
returns for the enterprise occur in the form of earned-income, revenue generation, 
profitability and repayment of invested capital to bank and capital market-based 
funds. 
2.6.2 Defining and conceptualising SMEs as for-profit social enterprises 
The concept of social enterprise has been differently defined in social 
entrepreneurship literature. Some academics have used the term social enterprise 
and social entrepreneurship interchangeably (Luke and Chu, 2013; Peredo and 
McLean, 2006). An attempt is made to review some definitions of social enterprises 
in literature where the authors reviewed literature from Latin America, Asia and 
Africa. These sets of literature serve as inspiration for the definition of a social 
enterprise in this study. From the perspective of Mair and Martı´ (2006, p. 37) "social 
enterprises refer to the tangible outcome of social entrepreneurship". This definition 
fails to describe whether a social enterprise is a business venture, ignores the 
motivation of social enterprises and perhaps the purpose of a social enterprise. 
Austin et al. (2006, p. 2) point out that 
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“… social entrepreneurial venture can thus be conceptualized as a vehicle 
for creating social value, either directly or through facilitating the creation of social 
value with and by others”. It is unclear about the type and nature of ‘vehicle’ referred 
to in the latter definition. 
 Luke and Chu (2013 p. 765-766) define social enterprise…. " as an 
organisation that exists for a social purpose and engages in trading to fulfil its 
mission, using market-based techniques to achieve social ends". By inference, this 
definition of social enterprise can be described as a non-profit organization 
deploying a market-based approach and trading as an earned-income strategy to 
realise social objectives. It is therefore difficult to be applied in the context of Africa 
and especially enterprises operating in the business sector like SMEs. A social 
enterprise is defined as for-profit limited liability company owned individually/team 
operating principally in the business sector producing goods and services with profit 
motive among other goals to realise the social impact and financial returns. 
  Social enterprises have been conceptualised differently in specific 
geographical areas across the globe. It is therefore prudent to conceptualise the 
term because wholesale adoption of social enterprise usage from the UK, USA, 
Europe and other geographies to an African context appears problematic. 
Differences and magnitude of societal problems (Ormiston et al., 2015), especially 
in Africa, vary relative to other geographies. A social enterprise is argued as an 
organisational type or form addressing societal problems. A high growth established 
and missing middle SMEs can be described as for-profit social enterprises 
manifesting the activities of social entrepreneurship (Chell et al., 2010). The reason 
is that "not every enterprise- social or otherwise- is entrepreneurial" (Luke and Chu, 
2013, p. 764). Austin et al., (2006, p. 2) claims that "the organisational form a social 
enterprise takes should be based on which format would most effectively mobilise 
resources to address the problem". 
Further, such an organisation can take the form of non-profit with non-
distribution of profit, for-profit with embedded social purpose or hybrid (Austin et al., 
2006). By inference high growth and established SMEs can be categorised as social 
enterprises. Plausibly, a high growth and established SMEs possess the capacity to 
mobilise resources to address societal problems. 
Chell et al. (2010, p. 486) argue that social enterprises are organisations that 
social entrepreneurship activity manifest. Moreover, the activities of a social 
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enterprise organisation can take place in either "for-profit sector", corporate social 
responsibility related activities or in the non-profit sector". Therefore, social 
enterprise can be described as organisations whose activities occur across sectors 
including non-profit, business, or governmental sectors (Chell et al., 2010). In this 
regard, high growth and established SME activities spanning across sectors and 
mainly for-profit-sector can also be described as social enterprises. 
From the perspective of "social purpose”, high growth and established SMEs 
can be identified with for-profit social enterprises (Luke and Chu, 2013, p. 765). Luke 
and Chu (2013) describe social enterprises as organisations that combine 
commercial activities with social objectives. In the authors view, ‘enterprise' can be 
associated with for-profit, non-profit activities and commercial activity arguing that 
"social enterprise represents a form of social business or venture" (Luke and Chu, 
2013, p. 765). The authors raised the issue of whether all social enterprises are 
entrepreneurial. The social purposes of organisations that combine commercial 
activities and social objectives qualify high growth, missing middle and established 
SMEs as for-profit social enterprises. 
In summary, high growth and established SMEs can be considered as for-
profit social enterprises under three primary conditions; (1) Resource mobilization 
ability to address societal problems (2) venture activities are occurring across 
sectors especially the business or for-profit sectors and (3) outcomes that account 
for social purpose and financial returns. Also, for-profit limited liability SMEs 
described as social enterprises because they can mobilize resources effectively 
from bank-based and capital market-based impact first or finance first investors to 
address intractable societal problems. To address these intractable societal 
problems requires personal commitment and agency by key actors including 
investors, officials of bank-based and capital market-based managers and 
entrepreneur owners of these SMEs representing agents of social transformation in 
BoP communities. High growth, missing middle and established SMEs 
conceptualized as for-profit social enterprise apply different strategies in fulfilling the 
objective of deliberate social impact and financial returns in BoP communities. 
These different strategies enable access to impact investment capital for scale and 
growth. Social entrepreneurship literature perspective on the deliberate pursuit of 
social impact and financial returns to evidence of the ‘how' of strategy change to 
complement the review in Section 2.4. 
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2.6.3 Deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial returns 
This subsection reviews the social entrepreneurship literature to uncover the how of 
strategy change applied by fund managers and SMEs in BoP communities. In 
section 2.4 impact investing literature review showed impact investment strategies 
expected from fund managers and investee SMEs. However, strategic management 
literature explained why fund managers and investee SMEs either change or aligned 
their strategy to environmental conditions. How the strategy change of fund 
managers and investees manifest in reality is examined from the social 
entrepreneurship literature which has developed over the past two decades. 
Social entrepreneurship theory argues that social enterprises design and 
apply different strategies that ensure the realisation of social impact and financial 
returns (Peredo and McLean, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005). These strategies 
implemented can be integrated, unified hybrid, complementary, stand-alone, and 
embedded (Battilana et al., 2012; Austin et al. 2006; Peredo and McLean, 2006; 
Seelos and Mair, 2005) completes the review with an empirical literature. 
2.6.4 Fund managers and SME entrepreneurs as agents of social 
transformation 
The subsection reviews the individual role of financial intermediary officials and 
entrepreneurs as agents of social impact and financial returns in BoP communities. 
This review draws from the social entrepreneurship literature to conceptually clarify 
and obtain insights about the actual agents of transformation who deliberately 
pursue social impact and financial returns simultaneously linked to the second 
research question. Social entrepreneurship theory suggests that social 
entrepreneurs are agents of social transformation through innovative methods, 
funding, and motivation (Luke and Chu, 2013; Zahra et al., 2009; Seelos and Mair, 
2005; Alvord et al., 2004). The values of an entrepreneur and fund managers are 
instrumental in allocating resources that create both social impact and financial 
returns. SME entrepreneurs or owner-managers are key actors in the pursuit of 
social impact and financial returns. Such managers exploit opportunities through 
risk-taking, especially in resource constraint environment in developing countries. 
Zahra et al. (2009) find that these SME entrepreneurs described as bricoleurs effect 
transformation in providing a solution to societal needs. 
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These entrepreneurs were categorised as social bricoleurs, social 
constructionist and social engineers (Zahra et al., 2009). Ruebottom (2013), in a 
study of ten for-profit and non-profit social enterprises, suggest that owner-
managers of the investigated enterprises can be described as social entrepreneurs. 
Kimbu and Ngoasong (2016) in a study of women as vectors of social 
entrepreneurship, described these entrepreneurs as social entrepreneurs based on 
simultaneous pursuit of social and financial goals. In summary, fund managers and 
SME owner-managers are social entrepreneurs based on motivation and agency to 
concurrently pursue hi social and economic goals (Kimbu and Ngoasong, 2016; 
Ruebottom, 2013; Zahra et al., 2009). An institutional theoretical perspective is 
reviewed in section 2.7 to justify why an integrated theoretical framework approach 
for this study is appropriate instead of relying on one specific theoretical perspective. 
Other theoretical approaches were also reviewed prior to the development of 
the integrated theoretical framework for examining the governance dimension which 
were dropped based on the research objectives, the focus of the study and a 
plausible application to the research setting.  
Stewardship theory assumes that decision makers of the enterprise (CEO, 
top management team and managers) are motivated by altruism, collective interest 
and less self-interest (Basq et al., 2011). The “management-philosophy” involves 
“directing efforts toward organizational rather than personal objectives” (Short et.al, 
2009, p. 176). Further, stewardship theory argues that manager’s place “high 
importance on collaboration, trust in the community and long-term orientation” 
(Short et al., 2009, p. 176). This implies that the management’s desire is to do a 
great job and act as effective stewards of organizational resources (Cornforth, 2004) 
contrary to the proposition of agency theory. In applying this governance model, the 
board role can be described as improving organisational performance unlike 
compliance in the agency governance model. Thus, the board through 
representation of independent directors with different expertise are viewed as 
partners in adding value to managerial decision making. 
Network theory is another theory which was reviewed and subsequently 
dropped because of the research objectives and actors investigated. Network theory 
focuses on the interplay of different actors within an ecosystem in facilitating the 
realisation of common outcomes or objectives. Networks - where the market 
stakeholders represent nodes and their relations, links in the view of Michelucci 
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(2016, pg.5) allow examination of a market at the global, regional, and national 
levels of interaction. Network theory facilitates the understanding of how outcomes 
emerge including the nature of the outcome. Empirical studies that applied the 
network theory within the impact investing literature comprise Michelluci (2016) and 
Morley (2016) who investigated the social investment market in Italy and the United 
Kingdom respectively. However, this study is not interested in understanding the 
impact investment market in Ghana or the extent of interactions among the actors 
in Ghana’s ecosystem. These reasons explain why the study adopted an integrated 
theoretical framework instead of relying on a single theoretical lens. 
2.7 Institutional Perspectives 
This section reviews two streams of institutional theory, New Institutional Economic 
(NIE) and New Institutional Sociology (NIS) to determine how it can help develop 
the theoretical framework. The aim is to evidence other theoretical perspectives that 
can be drawn upon to conduct the study and the current state of knowledge. Further 
to assist in justifying the rationale for an integrated theoretical framework which is 
informed by impact investing, strategic management, and social entrepreneurship. 
Institutions define what is acceptable objectively and reject inappropriate or 
inconsiderate actions based on formal and informal rules and norms (Welter, 2011). 
Two streams of institutional theory emerge in literature driven from sociology/ 
organizational theory (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and political 
science/economics (e.g. North, 1990; Shepsle, 1989; Bruton et al., 2010). 
 Reiterating the objectives of this study as captured in Section 1.3; to critically 
investigate the distinctiveness of finance first and impact first investors, bank-based 
versus capital market-based impact funds, and how impact investment fills SME 
financing void as alternative to traditional enterprise financing. Formal institutional 
rules via economic and political processes shape the context and setting in which 
bank-based, capital market-based-funds and investee SMEs operate. Applying the 
perspectives of both new institutional Economic (NIE) and New Institutional 
Sociology (NIS) on their exclusively can potentially and to some extent realise the 
research objectives. However, it fails to assist in revealing the nuances of bank-
based, capital market-based funds and investee SMEs in deliberate pursuit of social 
impact and financial return simultaneously. Besides, integrating institutional theory 
into the emerging framework drawn from multiple disciplines could complicate the 
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theoretical approach. Finally, institutional theories reviewed are applicable if SMEs 
are conceptualised as pure commercial ventures.  
Institutional theory can help explain and understand how the context and 
research setting are shaped in either promoting opportunities or constraining the 
agency of investors, fund managers and investee SMEs. Table 2.5 below details 
institutional theoretical perspectives, why they cannot be applied to the current 
research, which further provide justifications for adopting an integrated theoretical 
framework for conducting this PhD study.
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Table 2. 5 Other theoretical perspectives 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
Premised on cognitive limitations or bounded rationality of human actors. Focuses 
on governance structures and formal incentives 
Social norms, shared cultures and cognitive scripts drive human behaviour. 
Key Proponents (Shepsle, 1989; North, 1990, Williamson,2000) DiMaggio and Powell (1983) Scott (2001) 
Assumptions Agency cost theory assume 
principal-agent experience 
conflicting interest. Ex-ante 
contractual incentive can 
promote alignment of 
interest and control 
behaviour of agents 
(Jensen and Meckling, 
1973). Outcome and 
behaviour-based incentive 
contracts can be applied 
(Eisenhart,1989) 
Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) 
assumes ex-post 
governance structures 
and incentives preferable 
to ex-ante incentives. 
Contract incompleteness 
makes, ex-post 
governance structures 
appropriate. 
Organizations adapt to the institutional 
environment through homogenization 
manifesting the concept of 
isomorphism. Assumes constraining 
process that exert influence on a unit of 
population to be similar to other units 
confronted with same environmental 
conditions 
Categorised formal and informal 
institutions into regulatory, normative 
and cognitive groups that influence 
organizations legitimacy, access to 
resources and support in society. 
Types Autonomous contracts, 
complex contracts, long 
term contracts, intermediate 
product transaction etc. 
Inchoate contracts lead to 
opportunism manifesting in 
moral hazards, shirking, 
sub-goal and adverse 
selection. 
Autonomous contracts, 
complex contracts, long 
term contracts, 
intermediate product 
transactions, final goods 
market and government 
procurement transactions 
Coercive isomorphism comprises 
formal and informal pressures.eg. Legal 
and political environment. Mimetic 
Isomorphism result from standard 
responses to uncertainty encouraging 
imitation or modelling best in class 
organizations. Normative pressures 
another source of isomorphic 
organizational change emerge from 
professionalization pressures. 
Cognitive institutional pillars are 
informal, taken for granted with rules 
established among individuals, 
groups and professionals. Normative 
institutional pillar defines roles and 
agency expected of individuals, 
professionals and organizations. 
Regulatory institutions govern the 
interaction of individuals and 
organizations through formal rules 
and laws. 
Unit of Analysis Contracts Transaction cost Organisations Organisations 
Application to Current 
Research 
Given that in this PhD study, 
high growth, established 
and missing middle SMEs 
are conceptualized as for-
profit social enterprises, 
applying agency cost theory 
from NIE perspective 
becomes problematic. It can 
be helpful where SMEs are 
cocnceptualised as pure 
commercial ventures. 
Inappropriate for this study 
as it can lead to short- 
termism on the part of 
bank-based and capital 
market-based funds 
together with SME 
investees in pursuit of 
social impact and financial 
return. 
The aim of this study is not to evaluate 
conditions for homogenisation of 
organisations in a new institutional field 
like impact investing. Consequently, 
applying this NIS theoretical 
perspective can potentially change the 
objective of this PhD study. 
Adopting an approach that seeks to 
examine conditions under which 
capital market-based funds and SME 
investees gain societal and 
institutional legitimacy may not 
provide requisite answers to the 
research questions for this study. 
Source: Authors illustration based on institutional theory literature
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2.8 Emerging theoretical framework for the study 
 In this Section 2.8, an emerging theoretical framework developed aims at 
investigating the distinctiveness of finance first and impact first investors, bank-
based versus capital market-based impact funds, and how impact investment fills 
SME financing void as alternative to traditional enterprise financing from the 
perspectives of governance, strategy change and impacts. First, linking the 
concepts of governance and strategy change to understand and explain the 
influences of impact investment funds on high growth, missing middle and 
established SMEs in BoP communities is significant. Second, the enterprise funding 
context has been transformed because of the volume of impact funding, which is 
distinct from what exists from traditional sources. Three main actors driving the 
study comprise impact investors, fund managers and investee SMEs (owner-
managers) drawing from the multi-disciplinary insights reviewed in the preceding 
seven sections. These actors are theoretically connected via a cause-effect 
relationship with the concepts of governance and strategy change in deliberate 
pursuit of social impact and financial returns as impacts.   
Impact investors, including institutional investors, private investors, asset 
owners, and foundations, emerge as two categories of finance first and impact first 
investors. Theoretically, the concepts of governance and strategy change connect 
these actors for social and commercial transformation in BoP communities. 
Governance conceptually represents internal mechanisms comprising ownership, 
control and board representation for deployed by capital market-based fund 
managers to influence investee SMEs. Bank-based funds adopt control and 
monitoring as a governance mechanism to influence SMEs to realise the social 
impact and financial returns simultaneously. These internal governance 
mechanisms first manifest at the investor-fund manager level and then apply at the 
fund manager-SME level to realise the stated objectives. 
Strategy change involves adaptation or alignment by bank-based, capital 
market-based fund managers and investee SMEs to ensure external-internal fit for 
access to impact investor capital. Second, pursuing an impact investment strategy 
which deliberately realises the social impact and financial returns require strategy 
change of the existing actors specifically impact investment fund managers and 
investee SMEs. Social entrepreneurship theory enabled conceptualization of high 
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growth, missing middle and established SMEs as for-profit social enterprises. 
Similarly, fund managers and SME owners qualified as social entrepreneurs based 
on motivation and values in deliberate pursuit of social impacts and financial returns. 
Finally, social entrepreneurship theory facilitated conceptual clarity on societal 
problems and how they manifest in BoP communities. Institutional theoretical review 
instead provides perspectives on the research setting and context on how formal 
institutions through rules and regulations shape the context. It was not applied in the 
emerging theoretical framework. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the emerging theoretical framework based on the 
integration of concepts from the impact investing and social entrepreneurship sets 
of literature. From figure 2.1 below, governance dimensions between investor-fund 
managers are shown as Principal 1 (finance and impact first investors) and Agent 1 
(bank-based and capital market-based investors) represented by Governance 1 
(P1A1). The second governance dimension at the fund manager-SME investee level 
shown in figure 2.1 depicts Principal 2 (Bank-based and capital market-based funds) 
and Agents 2 (SME investees) represented by Governance 2 (P2A2). Strategy 
change is shown as strategy 1 manifesting investor-fund manager strategy 
alignment from A to B. Secondly, strategy 2 at the fund manager to SME investee 
level designated to occur from B to C. An interaction effect occurs at the governance 
and strategy change levels through investee SMEs for realisation of social impact 
and financial returns as impacts represented by arrows from strategy change and 
governance to outcome represented by D.  
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Figure 2. 1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Source: Authors illustration based on literature from diverse disciplines 
 
Impact investors (A) categorised as finance first and impact first channel 
investments through bank-based and capital market-based funds for investment in 
SMEs (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015). In Figure 2.1, the 
arrows ( ) shows relationship between investors (A) and fund managers 
(B) based on agreed strategy 1, and fund managers (B) and investee SMEs (C) 
based on strategy 2. Also, the lines show connection between the actors (Investors, 
fund managers and investee SMEs) from governance perspectives which interact 
with strategy change to realise the expected impacts (D). Thus, from A to B reflects 
the relationship between impact investors and fund managers based on agreement 
established. Besides, it shows that impact investor strategies are expected to be 
implemented by BB and CMB fund managers in strategy 1. As limited partners, 
impact investors become principals, and fund managers (general partners) denote 
agents in creating social impact and financial returns. The nature of governance at 
the investor-fund manager level is depicted as governance 1 in Figure 2.1. 
Governance mechanism representing ownership, control and board representation 
manifest in different forms. Ownership variables comprise the amount of capital 
invested, equity stake or proportion of debt and equity that impact investors commit 
to a fund. Control rights arise from the type of investment in a fund as well as 
covenants in partnership agreements (Scarlata and Alemany, 2010; Gompers and 
Strategy 1 B Strategy 2 C
Funds SMEs
Bank based
High Growth, 
Missing middle
&
Capital Market Based Established
Principal 1 Agent 1   Principal 2 Agent 2
Governance 1 Governance 2
Social Impact 
Financial Returns
Impacts
D
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Lerner, 1996). Control variables consist of approval authority within investment 
committee, a voice on critical social and financial decisions, and transaction 
termination or extension authority. Board representation on the fund management 
company variables includes the appointment of independent directors to the fund 
management board, attendance and frequency of board meetings, channels of 
information flow, influence over strategic decisions, and board sub-committee. 
Governance 1, as already explained, is represented by (P1A1) in Figure 2.1. Strategy 
change at the investor-fund manager level represented by strategy 1, occurs in two 
ways. Impact investors either invest in funds that pursue a specific strategy that 
aligns with their investment strategy, thesis or philosophy. Alternatively, impact 
investors invest in funds that are willing to alter their investment strategies. Similarly, 
strategy change at the fund manager-SME investee level represented by strategy 2 
(B to C) manifests in two ways. Fund managers select SME investees that reflect 
their investment strategy or are willing to alter their strategies in alignment with the 
investment criteria of the fund. 
Governance 2 (P2A2) at the fund manager-SME investee level create a 
principal-agent relationship in pursuit of social impact and financial returns. Bank-
based and capital market-based funds represent principals playing the roles of 
impact investors. The governance at this level though similar to the investor-fund 
manager stage has some variation. SMEs investees constitute the ultimate agents 
of social impact and financial returns. As alluded to in Section 1.2, creation of social 
impact by SMEs forms the basis for alleviating wicked and intractable societal 
problems that impact investors are claiming to solve. Governance in terms of 
ownership, control and board representation manifest at the fund manager-investee 
level in different ways. Ownership variables depend on financial instruments 
deployed since equity, a mixture of debt and equity guarantee ownership and 
control. However, debt only instruments serve as post investments monitoring 
control variable. Board representation variables include attendance at board 
meetings, influence over strategic appointments, access to crucial information 
including management reports, attendance of social networking events (Scarlata 
and Alemany, 2010; Gompers and Lerner, 2002). 
High growth, missing middle and established investee SMEs conceptualized 
as social enterprises based on resource mobilization ability, activities spanning 
across sectors and social impact (Mair and Marti, 2006; Peredo and McLean,2006; 
Seelos and Mair, 2005) realise the social impact and financial returns as impacts. 
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In serving BoP communities, high growth, missing middle and established SMEs 
create social impact (Jones and Turner, 2014). Social impact variables comprise 
several jobs created, income growth for employees and associated ventures, 
number of households out of poverty, level and reach of access to products and 
services in rural areas (Rajan et al., 2014). The developmental impacts of this high 
growth, missing middle, and established SME positions them as attractive 
destinations of impact investment funds in developing countries (Jones and Turner, 
2014). Financial returns variables include profitability, revenue generation, invested 
capital repayment, business growth and market size. 
Capital market-based funds and investee SMEs in an emerging institutional 
field of impact investing adapt their strategies for the realisation of social impact and 
financial returns. Thematic strategies include financial instruments deployment 
represented by variables such as debt, equity, quasi-equity and guarantees. Multi-
sector focus strategy to be investigated using variables such as percentage of 
capital allocated to different sectors, expected social impact and returns from these 
sectors, number of sectors, and sectoral distribution of portfolios (Höchstädter and 
Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015). A mixture of finance and impact-first strategy 
represented by interest rates on loans, the tenor of investment, repayment period, 
loan moratorium, expected social impact, subsidized returns and potential interest 
write-off. Strategy change and governance, as explained earlier, do not occur in 
isolation for the realisation of social impact and financial returns as an outcome. In 
figure 2.1, the arrows from strategy 2 and governance 2 towards an outcome is an 
indication of interaction effects. In effect, the governance mechanism interacts with 
the strategy change of fund managers to influence investee SMEs investees for the 
realisation of social impact and financial returns in BoP communities. 
The role of fund managers and entrepreneurs in the pursuit of multiple 
objectives is critical in exploring and studying how impact investors accomplish their 
investment strategies. Fund managers are a catalyst of social entrepreneurship 
ventures based on an economic system that focuses on impact, transformational 
goal, development and community (Rajan et al. 2014; Ruebottom, 2013). 
Entrepreneurs of SME ventures are social entrepreneurs based on the simultaneous 
pursuit of social and financial goals (Kimbu and Ngoasong, 2016; Ruebottom, 2013; 
Zahra et al., 2009). Like social entrepreneurs, they play the role of agents of social 
transformation through the provision of goods and services for BoP or underserved 
communities (Kimbu and Ngoasong, 2016; Ruebottom, 2013; Zahra et al., 2009). 
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2.9 Chapter summary and conclusion 
This literature review chapter had a three-fold objective, namely, to demonstrate the 
current state of knowledge, uncover research gaps within the impact investing 
literature. Besides, to draw on multiple disciplines to justify the research questions 
concerning the research gaps uncovered and finally to develop a theoretical 
framework. The emerging theoretical framework seeks to critically investigate the 
influences of impact investment funds on investee SMEs viewing this influence 
through the lens of governance, strategy change and impacts (social impact and 
financial returns). The current state of knowledge within the impact investing 
discipline shows two main research gaps. First, a research gap exists in 
understanding the governance mechanism that impact investment funds deploy to 
ensure investee SMEs realise social impact and financial returns in BoP 
communities. The second gap uncovered is related to strategy change in that while 
impact investment strategy is expected to be applied by fund managers and 
investee SMEs, the process to deliberately realise these objectives is under-
researched. In developing the integrated theoretical framework, governance 
mechanisms of ownership, control and board representation were reviewed and 
applied to examine the influences of fund managers and investees to deliver on 
impact investor objectives. Moreover, strategic management literature facilitated 
understanding why BB and CMB fund managers that hitherto were agents of wealth 
creation now changed their strategies. However, social entrepreneurship theory is 
applied to explain the ‘how’ of strategy change by fund managers and investee 
SMEs in BoP communities. SME categories of high growth, missing middle and 
established as agents of development in BoP communities were conceptualised as 
for-profit social enterprises for effective application of the integrated theoretical 
framework.  
To implement the theoretical framework, require data collection from bank-
based and capital market-based fund managers who have financed or invested in 
specific SME categories. Primary data collection is significant to uncover in-depth 
knowledge and insights about how governance and strategy change are executed 
by fund managers and SMEs in the research setting. Secondary sources of data 
could complement the primary sources. The categories of SMEs are mostly 
medium-size enterprises with high growth potential and established. Besides 
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evidence of operating in sectors, geographies and regions which reflect BoP 
communities.  
The emergent theoretical framework, presented as figure 2.1 suggest that a 
theoretical relationship exists whereby governance mechanism of ownership, 
control and board representation is applied by impact investors based on agreement 
with fund managers. Subsequently, fund managers employ the agreed governance 
mechanism with impact investors for investee SMEs to realise social impact and 
financial returns. Besides, impact investors expect strategy change by fund 
managers and investee SMEs in deliberate pursuit of impacts in BoP communities. 
This theoretical relationship is elaborated in this thesis to address the two research 
questions set out in section 1.3 of Chapter 1.The emergent framework (figure 2.1) 
is applied to explain how BB and CMB fund managers govern SMEs and strategy 
change of these impact investment funds and SMEs when they are no longer agents 
of private wealth creation but impacts in BoP communities. Ghana provides an 
exciting context for the application of the framework with similarities to other African 
countries as recipients of impact investment funds.  
Ghana’s financial architecture is bank dominated and a growing capital 
market-based fund manager. A large SME segment of the enterprise architecture 
are micro and small ventures which reflect similar settings in other countries in 
Africa. Also, substantial flows of impact investments fund change the enterprise 
financing landscape from traditional financing, which focuses on private wealth 
creation. Therefore, an adaptation of the framework might be required in applying 
to another context where legislation, financial architecture and enterprise categories 
have variations. The next section reviews the research setting of Ghana for the 
study focusing on the financial and enterprise architectures as a setting and 
institutional context representing formal institutions that regulate and promote 
finance and business venture activities. 
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 CHAPTER 3  
The Historical Context of Impact Investing in Ghana  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to present the financing and enterprise context of Ghana, which 
justifies why it is a suitable research setting for investing. Further, impact investing 
within the research setting of Ghana enables me to situate the study within the 
country's financial and enterprise architectures, and to highlight relevant features of 
its historical and institutional context (Welter, 2011). Finally, the research context 
and setting facilitate the empirical application of the theoretical framework for 
undertaking the study and answering the research questions.  Institutional context 
refers to sets of formal and informal institutions as "rules of the game" espoused by 
North (1990). Formal institutions comprise "political and economic-related rules" 
which create opportunities and challenges for different actors (Welter, 2011, p.172). 
Alternatively, informal institutions represent norms, values, a culture of a society, 
and how they interact in accessing resources. This section focuses on formal 
institutions first at the policy-making level and implementing agencies within 
Ghana's institutional context. In 1998  the Government of Ghana, African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Programme and Development 
(UNDP) established the Social Investment Fund (SIF) which represent an episode 
before the emergence of the impact investing concept.  
In a nutshell, this chapter elaborates on five reasons why Ghana represents 
an exciting and vital research setting for investigating the role of bank and capital 
market-based impact funds on SMEs. First, impact investment flows to Ghana over 
the past decade estimated at $1.6 billion (GIIN, 2015) and continues to grow. Bank-
and capital market-based funds represent intermediaries of impact investments to 
SMEs. These SMEs categorised as high growth, missing middle and established 
represent agents of development in alleviating intractable societal problems in the 
country. Examples of these societal problems include unemployment, poverty, 
illegal mining, inadequate access to water, improvement in education and health 
(Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng, 2016).  
Second, impact investing has transformed the enterprise financing 
landscape. As elaborated later in this chapter, traditional bank financing, private 
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equity, venture capital, microfinance and other non-bank financing have focused on 
SMEs that demonstrate profitability, revenue generation and financial performance 
only (Beck; 2013; Abor and Quartey, 2010). However, impact investment capital 
through a combination of financial instruments such as equity, debt, convertible 
debt, and grant target enterprises that realise dual objectives of social impact and 
financial returns (Hochtstadter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015). 
Third, access to impact investment capital provides alternative sources of 
funds for bank and capital market-based funds and other non-bank financial 
intermediaries to manage their liquidity and capital adequacy in line with regulatory 
requirements. Fourth, impact investment represents a game-changer in terms of 
private-sector led approach to development compared to the previous era of public-
sector-led initiatives. Finally, Ghana represents attractive investment destination in 
Africa with GDP per capita of $2,046.11 (World Bank, 2018) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflow of $3.3 billion by 2017 (UNCTAD, 2018). A portion of the 
FDI inflows represent impact investments. To demonstrate these shreds of evidence 
which informs the choice of Ghana as a new research setting, a review of the 
financial architecture, enterprise architecture representing the setting and 
institutional context (Welter, 2011) is conducted. Context refers to financial and 
enterprise architectures, and institutional setting (regulatory and promoting 
institutions, laws, policies, regulations, codes and standards) which shape the entry 
and post-entry choices of impact fund management companies, investee SMEs in 
different sectors (Ngoasong, and Kimbu, 2016; Welter 2011).  
The structure of the remaining sections are as follows: Section 3.2 details the 
nature of development and wicked problems in the context of Ghana. Section 3.3 
review reforms within the financial architecture aimed at enhancing enterprise 
financing landscape. Section 3.4 examines the current financial architecture and 
enterprise financing. Next section 3.5 reviews the enterprise architecture and 
enterprise categories to uncover the type of SMEs that impact investors are 
targeting for dual goals. Section 3.6 reviews impact investing and financial 
architecture to understand where impact investments are situated. Section 3.7 
details impact investing and enterprise architecture in providing some mapping of 
impact funds and SMEs within the enterprise architecture. Finally, section 3.8 
provide chapter summary and conclusions. 
75 
 
3.2 Addressing developmental societal problems: Government 
efforts 
Development concerns income improvement, access to educational and health 
opportunities, reduced income inequality, marginal chronic hunger, enhanced 
social-wellbeing and global poverty reduction for the majority of the population 
(Vazquez and Sumner, 2013; Sachs 2014). "Development initiatives with the 
ultimate goal of poverty alleviation" underpin the objectives of impact investors 
(Jones and Turner, 2014, p. 299). Along a similar notion of reasoning, the concept 
of development can be described as social and economic impact. Thus, in search 
of development, economic and social impacts realised alleviate societal problems. 
Financing developmental initiatives can, therefore, alleviate societal problems 
based on valid policies. Development can be inferred as a critical assumption which 
underlay the objectives of impact investors. Promoters of impact investors claim that 
to alleviate the wicked societal problems confronting societies, investments that 
seek social impact and financial returns become indispensable. Financial returns 
will ensure sustainability and improved funding of development-led projects will 
ultimately reduce the myriad of societal problems that have become intractable. 
Theoretically, economic development that encapsulates social impact and 
financial returns lead to a decline in wicked societal problems. Unemployment, 
inadequate housing, child mortality, illegal mining, poor access to education, 
malnutrition, poor access to water and sanitation difficulties constitute wicked 
societal problems in the context of Ghana (World Bank, 2015). As Mlachila et al., 
(2015, p. 14) surmise that "better living standards, lower poverty, and reduced 
inequality" constitute key development policy goals which ultimately reflect social 
impact in societies. Some of the improvements have been recorded in some societal 
problems, while remarkable numbers deteriorated over these periods. 
Unfortunately, the financing of projects and initiatives to curb some of the worsening 
societal problems were donor-dependent or external (World Bank, 2015). The 
consequences of external-finance dependency created challenges of sustainability 
of these solutions to societal problems in Ghana. Table 3.1 summarises key 
examples of societal problems that impact investors are seeking solution for in 
Ghana. 
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Table 3. 1 Summary of key societal problems in Ghana 
Examples of 
societal problems 
Description 
Agriculture The negative consequences of Economic Recovery Program I (1983-
1986) and II (1987-1990) and trade liberalisation policies (Aryeetey and 
Fenny, 2017) affected the performance of the sector. Trade liberalisation 
policies also affected manufacturing thus, worsening existing 
unemployment situation among the youth. 
Population growth World Bank (2015) suggests that rapid urbanization has occurred, 
resulting in 3.5 times increase in urban population from 1984-2014 in 
Accra. This rapid urbanization generated rapid economic growth 
averaging 5.7% from 1984-2013. However, the expected benefits of 
population growth have eluded the country due to education-related 
issues. 
Health Ghana still lags in terms of health-related Millennium Development Goals. 
Saleh (2013) finds that communicable diseases are prevalent and non-
communicable diseases are increasing. Three significant causes of death 
as estimated by the World Health Organisation as at 2008 comprised 
communicable disease (53%), Cardiovascular (18%) and cancer (6%) in 
Ghana (Saleh, 2013). 
Education Baah-Boateng and Baffour-Awuah, (2015) finds that Ghana’s educational 
system has produced excess graduates in humanities and shortages of 
skills for industry, mining, oil and gas and other professional skills. There 
is lack of engineers for the oil and gas industry, professionals for medicine 
and health (Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng, 2006). 
Energy Kumi (2017, p 1) estimates that energy crisis over the past decade (2006-
2016) resulted in $2.1 million daily production loss. Many of the installed 
capacities over the period were both broken down or under maintenance 
and not available to generate power (Kumi, 2017). High energy cost and 
unavailability, a general increase in utility prices affected industry and 
manufacturing (Aryeetey and Fenny, 2017) 
Source: Authors illustration from review of academic publication and reports. 
These societal problems depicted in table 3.1 have worsened mainly due to 
under- investment in the sectors. Impact investment through bank and capital 
market-based funds can potentially alleviate these intractable societal problems 
through private sector-led approach. Such private sector-led approach through 
impact investment create diverse entrepreneurial financing opportunities for high 
growth, missing middle and established SMEs thereby reducing the SME financing 
constraints which further justify research object set out in section 1.3. Examples of 
how impact investment funds are investing these sectors are detailed in section 3.7. 
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The next subsection review efforts mainly Government-led in finding multi-faceted 
solutions to these intractable problems. 
3.2.1 Government efforts to curb societal problems   
Efforts at curbing these societal problems summarised in table 3.1 over the past 
three decades have been public-sector led through interventions in the financial, 
enterprise architectures and direct projects. State-owned banks were established to 
invest in specific sectors, including agriculture, rural communities, manufacturing to 
promote economic growth and development. Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) 
and the National Investment Bank (NIB) were established within the financial 
architecture to spearhead industrialisation in specific sectors to reduce intractable 
societal problems. Government efforts to promote entrepreneurial financing 
opportunities for SMEs led to policies for lower-tier financial institutions. Lower tier 
financial institutions such as Non-bank financial institutions (NBFI), Rural and 
Community Banks and Microfinance institutions were also established through the 
Bank of Ghana to support enterprises in rural areas.  
Educational challenges in terms of skills and capabilities efforts include 
intervention such as the establishment of the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GET 
Fund), Skills Development Fund (SDF) and private sector approaches. The GET 
Fund was set up by an Act of Parliament to develop infrastructure in public sector 
educational institutions in Ghana. Funding sources were from budgetary allocation 
and taxes. Opportunities for private sector participation in the education sector were 
also created. The skills shortage in the oil and gas sector are being addressed 
through investment from some of the MNCs in the sector via training and capacity 
development. Also attempts to reduce the health sector problems are quite 
encouraging from the Government. To improve healthcare delivery in Ghana, 
incentives such as housing, additional allowances and career opportunities were 
initiated for recruitment and retention of health professionals (Saleh, 2013). In the 
2019 budget, the Government has allocated funds for the completion of four district 
hospitals and construction of seven more. A 650-bed capacity University of Ghana 
Medical Centre II would be completed. Also, some enterprises within the enterprise 
architecture have corporate social responsibility activities to support the government 
in mitigating the deteriorating societal problems in health, education, and other 
sectors. Some companies have contributed funding to build infrastructure for some 
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of the health centres across the country. Subsection 3.4.2 provide an additional 
public sector-led approach to solve these intractable problems. 
To conclude, attempts by the Government to reduce these intractable 
problems include the establishment of financial institutions for relatively cheaper 
loans to SMEs. Direct investments in social sector projects and budgetary allocation 
through state institutions and agencies. Donor-support via bilateral and multi-lateral 
agency projects also aimed at realising economic development and reducing 
intractable societal problems. However, Government efforts have failed to yield the 
expected results through the financial and enterprise architectures because of over- 
politicisation and undue influence in most of these financial institutions. The next 
section reviews the historical reforms within the institutional context before the 
emergence of impact investing concept. 
3.3 Financial architecture reforms and Enterprise financing 
landscape 
This section reviews Ghana’s institutional context to uncover previous 
attempts to develop the financial architecture for diverse funding to ensure 
dynamism within the enterprise financing landscape. Investments that integrate 
social impact and financial returns within the institutional context dates back to the 
1990s with the establishment of the Social Investment Fund. However, the term 
impact investing emerged in Ghana from 2012 under the auspices of the Venture 
Capital Trust Fund (VCTF). Financial sector reforms within a broader framework of 
macro-economic reforms enable understanding and background to impact investing 
through intermediaries within the financial system. Financial sector improvement 
and development catalyse economic development and growth. Access to different 
sources and types of capital enhances the enterprise financing landscape to realise 
expected development and growth. Within the institutional context of macro-
economic, technological and political reviews, the concept of impact investing with 
the objective of deliberate social impact and financial returns are examined in this 
review. 
3.3.1 Macro-economic reforms and impact investing 
The macroeconomic environment of Ghana transitioned different phases of growth 
and decline over the past four decades. This subsection section offers an overview 
of Ghana’s macroeconomic environment along categorised as four stylised facts of 
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4Rs: Reforms decades- 1980-2000; Restoration and Growth- 2000-2010; 
Retrogression- 2010-2016: Revival- 2017 till date. These timelines represent 
different waves of macroeconomic development characterised by reforms and 
policies over the past four decades. The Bretton Woods Institutions comprising the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank led the reforms. These 
reforms comprised the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983 and related 
Financial Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP) by 1986 to correct structural 
imbalances (Bawumia and Halland, 2017). Some of the significant economic 
reforms comprised trade liberalisation, financial deregulation and privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises. Under the ERP and SAP trade controls were removed, 
price controls eliminated, and flexible foreign exchange regime was initiated driven 
by market mechanism (Aryeetey and Ahene, 2005). The World Bank implemented 
two credits, namely Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FINSAC I and II). 
FINSAC II had the objective of consolidating previous gains under FINSAC I. 
and introduction of other reforms (Mensah, 2017). Capital market policies under 
FINSAC II also enabled the establishment of the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) by 
1990 for companies to access long-term capital. Banks- based lower-tier financial 
institutions, including NBFI, RCB's and MFI's were established. FINSAC II resulted 
in the establishment of a Venture capital Trust Fund (VCTF) to provide venture 
funding to early-stage and high growth enterprises. Social investment fund (SIF) 
was established by the Government in 1998 to support SMEs and social sector 
projects. The concept of Impact investing emerged within the economic restoration 
period of 2001-2010. In Ghana, impact investing was spearheaded by the VCTF to 
promote investments into enterprises that seek to realise the social impact and 
financial returns. Figure 3.2 illustrate episodes of reforms aimed at stimulating 
growth, improving the financial architecture and change within the enterprise 
financing landscape before and after the emergence of the impact investing 
concept. 
 
.
80 
 
Figure 3. 1 Summary of Ghana’s macroeconomic environment 
 
Source: Author’s illustration from literature
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983 and related Financial Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP) by 1986 to correct
structural imbalances (Bawumia and Holland, 2017).Under the ERP and Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) trade controls were
removed, price controls eliminated, and flexible foreign exchange regime was initiated driven by market mechanism (Aryeetey and
Ahene, 2005)
1980-2000
Reforms
• Ghana experienced high inflation and unsustainable balance of payment (BOP) deficits within the period 1987-1990 under ERP II similar to other Sub Saharan African (SSA)
countries leading to extreme poverty (Aryeetey and Fenny, 2017).O’Connell and Ndulu (2010) found that domestic macroeconomic policies, deteriorating terms of trade and high
debt burden contributed to economic difficulties within and post ERP II in most SSA countries and Ghana. The World Bank implemented two credits namely Financial Sector
Adjustment Credit (FINSAC I and II). FINSAC I (1988-1991) aimed at improving the soundness of the banking system. FINSAC II had the objective of consolidating FINSAC I
and introduction of other reforms (Mensah, 2017)
Expansionary fiscal policy took hold of the government in the run-up to Dec 2000 election deteriorating macroeconomic indicators (Bawumia and
Holland, 2017). An estimated inflow of $4.2 billion from the World Bank, Donor Agencies, Multilateral and Bilateral Institutions came to Ghana due
to the HIPC initiative (Bawumia and Holland, 2017) from 2001-2005.
2001-2010
Restoration
• The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I (2002-2005) and II (2006-2009) were initiated. GPRS I aimed at economic restructuring under the HIPC initiative of debt forgiveness.
GPRS II sought to address macroeconomic stability, human capital development, and private sector-led growth. Major indicators improved including exchange rate stability,
inflation decline, and private sector access to credit, BOP improvement and four months international reserve. The per capita GDP increased to USD$ 930 from USD $502 in
2005 and grew further to USD $1,099 by end of 2007 shifting Ghana into a lower-middle income country (Aryeetey and Fenny, 2017).
Pre-2010 average growth of 6% upsurge to 14% in 2011 with the commencement of crude oil production in commercial quantities 
and declined to 8% by 2013. Different corruption scandals characterised the government activities.
2011-2016
Retrogression
• Ghana’s economy experienced challenges since the peak in GDP growth of 14% in 2011. Energy crisis, rising external debt, low output and unfavourable world market prices, 
rising utility prices culminated in decline in economic growth over the period 2012-2016. In 2012, fiscal monetary expansion during the run-up to Dec 2012 election resulted in 
budget deficit of GHS8.7 billion representing 11.6% of GDP (Bawumia and Holland, 2017). A Single Spine Policy of  for public sector workers salary alignment led  to growth in 
Government expenditure during 2011-2014 of 94% mainly wages and interest payments. Government resorted to IMF bail-out by 2014 for three years ushering in a period of 
austerity worsening an existing societal problems, enterprise financing constraints and liquidity challenges of bank-based and capital market based fund managers.
Policies initiated by the current Government reflected in growth in GDP to 9.3% in the last quarter of 2017.Positive economic
indicators emerged based on effective fiscal management in 2017. Real GDP growth for 2017 is estimated at 7.9% compared to
3.7% for 2016.
2017 to Date
Revival
• Current enterprise and industrial policy under the 10 point agenda to stimulate economic growth and development indicate signs of revival
• Inflation which experienced decline over past twelve months reduced from 15.4% in December 2016 to 11.6% in October 2017 with further decline anticipated at the end of the
year 2017.
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Energy challenges, rising external debt, low output and unfavourable world market 
prices, rising utility prices culminated in decline in economic growth over the period 
2012-2016. Figure 3.2 evidence Ghana's GDP per capita, percentage of GDP 
growth rate and comparison with Sub-Sahara Africa. 
Figure 3. 2 Ghana’s GDP per capita, % growth and SSA 1991-2011 
 
Source: Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng (2016, p.3) 
Ghana’s economy in 2018 withstood external challenges resulting in weak 
local currency against the US dollar, government deficit of 3.9 per cent of GDP, 
external trade balance surplus of $1.78 billion (BOG,2019). Impact investment flows 
through bank-based, and capital market-based fund managers have improved the 
enterprise financing landscape with different categories of financial intermediaries. 
Further review of impact investing occurs under the financial architecture later in the 
chapter. 
 
3.3.2 Technology context and financial inclusion 
Over the past three decades, technology penetration and acceptance has been on 
the increase in Ghana. Bank-based and capital market-based funds require effective 
communication in delivering financial solutions to SMEs. Such solutions require 
reliance on technology and telecommunication companies. Telecommunication 
companies consist of MTN Ghana, Vodafone Ghana, AirtelTigo, Globacom and 
Expresso. AirtelTigo merged two years ago based for increased market penetration 
opportunities. World Bank (2018) development indicators reveal that mobile phone 
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subscription in Ghana increased from 17.4 m in 2010 to 36.7 subscribers by 2017, 
indicating multiple subscriptions per person. Similarly, mobile cellular subscription 
per 100 people rose from 71.1 in 2010 to 127.5 by 2017 (WDI, 2018). Major players 
in the industry currently operate 3G/4G technology and the regulatory institution 
expects that all the companies will at least migrate to 4G technology.  
A significant benefit of improved telecommunication and mobile phone 
penetration is access to financial services and financial inclusion, which impact 
investors are seeking to promote. Attempts to improve financial inclusion through 
different financial institutions such as Rural Commercial Banks (RCB) NBFI's and 
Microfinance Institutions (MFI's) yielded some positive results, yet many were 
unbanked. This adds to the reason why Ghana represent an important investment 
destination and impact investment creating pluralistic entrepreneurial financing 
through financial inclusion. Impact investor expectation of social impact and financial 
returns can be realised through intermediaries that are scale in promoting financial 
inclusion in BoP communities. Mobile money financial services have surged in 
promoting financial inclusion. Many bank-based institutions have either developed 
or collaborated with telecommunication companies to promote financial inclusion.  
MTN, Vodafone and AirtelTigo have launched and provide mobile financial services 
to individuals and SMEs in Ghana for the past five years. Anecdotal evidence shows 
that MTN holds an estimated 90% of the mobile money market share in Ghana with 
the difference split between Vodafone and AirtelTigo. Financial institutions are 
promoting financial inclusion through digitisation services, including mobile money 
wallet, online services, and automated self-service branch network across the 
country. The growth in broadband access has facilitated digital services in the 
country. 
The World Bank (2017) reports that ICT contributed 10.6% to Ghana's GDP 
in 2016, rising from 2.8% in 2006. Moreover, the average growth of 30% per annum 
since 2009-2014 in ICT driven by mobile voice telephony. Government strategy of 
universal access in promoting digitisation by way of infrastructure include fibre optic 
services to 200 communities, and regional centres are fostering growth. Private 
sector players such as MTN and Ericsson Rural Telephony Project in rural areas 
(World Bank, 2017). The ICT context is an enabler of economic development and 
facilitated communication between investors, fund managers and investee SMEs 
managers ubiquitously. In summary, the technology context has promoted financial 
inclusion in BoP communities in Ghana through mobile financial services.  
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3.3.3 Democratic Political Governance and Investment attractiveness 
The nature of political governance either attract impact investment capital and FDI 
or creates an unfavourable environment for financial institutions and enterprise 
financing. Political institutions therefore shape and influence the financial and 
enterprise architectures in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) which include 
impact investor capital. Two major political parties won election since the 1992 
democratic dispensation over the period, namely the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) and the New Patriotic Party. The NDC espouses social-democratic political 
ideology while the NPP holds a capitalist ideological orientation. Under the 
dispensation of constitutional rule, NDC has governed the country within the periods 
1993-1996 and 1997-2000 (President Jerry Rawlings), 2009-2016 (President John 
Atta Mills/ President John Mahama). Social democratic policies are expected to lead 
to attracting capital that will alleviate societal problems, including poverty, 
unemployment, improved education and health as clarified earlier in the chapter. 
Within the intervening period of 2001-2004 and 2005-2008 (President John 
Kufuor) and 2017 to date (President Nana Akuffo-Addo) of the NPP. These different 
democratic political regimes made efforts through government agencies to attract 
foreign direct investment, including impact investment for economic development. 
Evidence of political stability further justify the emerging private sector-led approach 
to development through impact investor capital, signalling strategy change among 
finance-first and impact-first investors particularly Development Finance Institutions 
(DFIs). 
In summary, Ghana's financial architecture reforms enhanced the enterprise 
financing landscape through institutional macro-economic reforms within the period 
1980's -2000 and 2001-2010. These reforms aimed at stability and improvement in 
the macro-economic context, financial architecture and growth of different financing 
opportunities for enterprises. Improvement in the technology context through 
telecommunication companies and mobile financial services facilitated financial 
inclusion in the BoP communities, an essential tool for economic development. 
Democratic political governance promoted stability within the country catalysing 
growth of different typologies of financial institutions within the financial architecture 
and investment attractiveness. However, societal problems were exacerbated due 
to the politicisation of economic and social initiatives. Section 3.4 presents a review 
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of the prevailing financial architecture of Ghana to show the changing landscape of 
enterprise financing and explain where impact funds are situated. 
3.4 Current Financial Architecture and Enterprise Financing 
landscape 
This section reviews the current financial architecture of Ghana with details about 
the four main segments aimed at providing varied enterprise financing opportunities 
within the financial system. Moreover, a review of Government initiated funds aimed 
at reducing the SME financing constraints and societal problems discussed in 
Section 3.2. It then dovetails into policy-making institutions within the financial 
architecture that shape and affects financial development and enterprise financing 
landscape. Further, a diagram is presented to show the current disposition of 
Ghana's financial architecture and where impact investment funds are situated 
within the financial architecture. 
3.4.1 Bank-based and Capital Market-Based Segments of Financial 
Architecture 
This subsection presents the current financial architecture of Ghana within the last 
decade concerning how it has changed the enterprise financing landscape. The 
current financial architecture of Ghana comprises four primary categorisation or 
segments, namely bank-based, capital market-based, pensions industry and 
insurance sector. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) retains 
supervisory authority over these four segments of the financial architecture. 
Different segments of Ghana's financial architecture deliver financial solutions to 
individuals, firms, Government and Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Such 
financial intermediation through different channels facilitates the growth of 
enterprises and consequently, economic growth. This section details an overview of 
the four segments of Ghana's financial architecture. 
The Bank-based segment under the supervision of the Bank of Ghana (BOG) 
comprises Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs), 
Rural and Community Banks (RCBs) and Microfinance Institutions (MFI's). Mensah, 
(2017) observed that Ghana’s banking system has undergone different reforms over 
the past three decades promoted by the World Bank. Some of these reforms include 
FINSAC I and II (1986-1997), Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFI) reforms and 
Financial Sector Strategic Plan I and II (2003-2016). The four categories of the bank-
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based segment of Ghana's financial architecture are expected to meet the 
enterprise financing needs of different enterprises within the enterprise architecture. 
Also, to promote financial inclusion of the un-banked and underserved BoP 
communities, NBFI's, RCBs and MFI's were established. Finally, to curb financing 
constraints of SMEs through capital access from lower-tier institutions such as NBFI, 
RCBs and MFI's. Licensing and minimum capital requirement distinguishes the 
typology of financial institutions under the supervision of the central bank. BOG is 
empowered by different legal Acts to regulate and supervise the bank-based 
segment of the financial system in Ghana.  
Ghana's banking sector experienced transformation over the past two years, 
spearheaded by the Central Bank. Non-performing Loans (NPL) of the banking 
industry deteriorated reaching GHS8.3 billion representing 27.2% by October 2017 
(BOG, 2018). NPL ratio in the past two years was comparable to the 1980s, which 
led to the FINSAP I reforms by the World Bank. Therefore, in line with the 
Specialized Deposit-taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930), the Bank of Ghana 
commenced a review of the performance of banks. The BOG increased the 
minimum capital requirements from GHS120 million to GHS400 million by 2018. The 
number of Universal banks operating in the country at the end of the recapitalisation 
exercise nose-dived from 34 to 23 banks (BOG, 2019). Licenses of two banks were 
revoked, and six banks were merged to form Consolidated Bank, Ghana (CBG). 
Moreover, the BOG, together with the Ministry of Finance established the Ghana 
Amalgamated Trust Ltd (GAT), an asset holding company or asset recovery 
company to manage the distressed debt of the merged banks.  
The bank-based segment consisting of these four significant intermediaries 
with different capital requirements transformed the enterprise financing landscape 
for the unmet needs of different categories of SMEs. The expectation was that 
policies which led to the transformation of the financial architecture would have 
enabled growth in access to capital by SMEs that are financially constrained. On the 
contrary, SME financing constraints has become pervasive within the last two 
decades (Quartey et al., 2017). Impact investment funds channelled through these 
four intermediaries within the bank-based segment-first improved the liquidity of 
these intermediaries and secondly enhanced lending to SMEs to alleviate societal 
problems. Examples and role of impact investing in transforming the financial 
architecture and enterprise financing are detailed in the latter sections of the 
chapter. 
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The Capital market constitutes the second segment of the financial 
architecture, providing opportunities for sourcing long term capital for enterprises. 
The Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) regulates the capital market in 
Ghana (SEC, 2016). Ghana's Securities and Exchange Commission pointed out 
that "The Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as "SEC") 
is the statutory body mandated by the Securities Industry Act 2016 (Act 929) to 
protect investors and the interest of the general investing public. Ghana’s capital 
market under the supervision of the SEC, is governed and regulated by laws and 
regulations.  The securities industry is governed by the Securities Industry Act, 2016 
(Act 929) and its Regulations. These laws and regulations consist of Securities 
Industry Act, 2016, (Act 929); Foreign Exchange Act 2006 (Act 723); SEC 
Regulations 2003 (LI 1728); Unit Trust and Mutual Fund Regulations (LI 1695). 
Other mechanisms of regulating the capital market by SEC consists of circulars, 
guidelines, directives, codes, and drafts (SEC, 2019).  
A significant feature of the capital market is the Ghana Stock Exchange 
(GSE), for listing and trading of shares of listed companies. Besides the GSE, the 
capital market has participants including brokers and dealers, investment advisors, 
fund managers, collective investment schemes, registrars and unit trust, custodians 
and primary and representatives (Mensah, 2017). The GSE enable medium to large 
enterprises within the enterprise architecture to access long term capital through the 
issuance of shares/stocks and bonds for investment. In 2016, the GSE CI outturn 
was a negative 15.53% due to macroeconomic challenges. However, in 2017, the 
GSE CI recorded a positive return of 52.73 % (SEC, 2018). The number of listed 
companies on the GSE main index are 36 and four companies listed on the Ghana 
Alternative Market (GAX). The GAX is aimed at attracting SMEs with governance 
structures, effective strategies and sound operational capabilities seeking to expand 
but require long term capital. These enterprises can then issue shares/stocks to the 
public and subsequently trade on the GAX. As stated above, only 4 enterprises are 
listed on the GAX. Table 3.2 show participants on the capital market, 2017. 
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Table 3. 2 Participants in the Capital Market, 2017 
  2015 2016 2017 
Stock Exchange 1 1 1 
Fund Managers 126 145 155 
Custodians 18 17 18 
Trustees 5 6 6 
Mutual Funds 29 34 34 
Unit Trusts 17 19 19 
Broker-Dealers 23 23 23 
Primary Dealers 16 12 17 
Dealer Representatives 91 81 87 
Investment Advisors 4 2 3 
Source: SEC Annual Reports, 2016-2017   
 
Fund manager sub-segment of the capital market industry is experiencing colossal 
uptake over the last decade. Growth in the pension funds industry has positively 
impacted the fund management sub-segment of the capital market industry in 
Ghana. Private equity funds, venture capital funds and impact investment funds 
consist of key stakeholders in the fund manager sub-segment of the capital market-
based segment of the financial architecture. 
Fund managers represent companies managing retail and institutional fund 
portfolios, pension funds and collective investment schemes (CIS). The CIS 
represents mutual funds and unit trust (SEC, 2017). Table 3.3 shows assets under 
management by fund managers. 
Table 3. 3 Trend of Assets under Management (AUM), 2017 
   
AUM 2015 (GHS) %  2016 (GHS) %  2017 (GHS) 
Pension 
Funds        2,567,942,044.51  72%         4,423,178,350.48  63%            7,207,863,213.17  
CIS           727,626,915.89  56%         1,131,705,585.14  91%            2,167,066,358.09  
Other Funds      10,376,193,488.23  41%       14,603,994,850.62  49%          21,687,189,377.69  
Total      13,671,762,448.63  47%       20,158,878,786.24  54%          31,062,118,948.95  
Source: Authors illustration from 
the SEC Annual reports, 2016 and 
2017  
                                
-      
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Fund managers are expected to allocate capital to ventures and enterprises that 
require funding over a more extended period through equity and debt financial 
instruments. Many of the pension fund managers due to fiduciary duties allocate 
funding to enterprises listed on the GSE, Government securities and investment 
instruments in bank-based institutions. Though such sources of long-term funds are 
transforming the enterprise financing landscape, SME financing constraints persist. 
Apart from the impact investment fund managers who have committed to 
channelling funds to investee SMEs.  
 Pensions industry represent the third sub-segment of Ghana's financial 
system and a critical source of long-term investment capital. Pensions serve as 
sources of long-term funding for businesses and Governments globally and Ghana. 
Pensions industry within the past decade went through reforms. New Pensions 
Industry Act led to the establishment of the National Pensions Regulatory Authority 
(NPRA) regulate the pensions industry. Hitherto the Pension funds within the 
industry in Ghana were administered and managed by the Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), a compulsory scheme for all workers, either 
private or public. The managers of the trust were criticised for poor investments 
decision and political interference in the resource allocation choices toward non-
performing projects. A white paper presented to the President of Ghana in 2009 
under the leadership of Mr T. A. Bediako recommended what is known as "Three-
Tier Pension Scheme which entails two mandatory schemes and a voluntary 
scheme. Besides regulating the Pensions Industry, the Act empowers NPRA to 
supervise affiliated institutions that manage pension funds in Ghana.  
The growth of pension funds over the past five years are exhibited in Table 
3.4 below. These funds consist of the mandatory pension contribution to SSNIT, 
private pension funds and funds accrued in the Temporary Pension Fund Accounts 
(TPFA). 
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Table 3. 4 GDP Analysis of Tier 3 Pension Funds Growth, Dec 2012- Dec 2017 
  
Year SSNIT Trustees AUM TPFA Funds Total % of 
GDP 
2012 
    
4,280,596,000.00  
        
48,237,965.69  
        
756,873,159.69  
    
5,085,707,125.18  
    
6.75  
2013 
    
5,564,784,000.00  
      
429,110,869.05  
        
914,132,017.00  
    
6,908,026,886.05  
    
7.39  
2014 
    
7,427,318,000.00  
   
1,116,492,197.00  
     
1,465,015,857.00  
  
10,008,826,054.00  
    
8.83  
2015 
    
8,810,075,000.00  
   
2,358,555,107.12  
     
2,313,553,357.00  
  
13,482,183,464.12  
    
9.84  
2016 
    
8,888,601,000.00  
   
4,122,492,021.68  
     
2,670,454,240.00  
  
15,681,547,261.68  
    
9.37  
2017 
    
9,771,140,000.00  
   
7,699,442,720.40  
     
3,323,735,749.00  
  
20,794,318,469.40  
   
10.10  
Source: Authors illustration from NPRA data    
 
Table 3.5 also shows top 5 pension fund trustees for Tier 2 and 3 schemes. 
 
Table 3. 5 Top 5 pension Fund Trustees, 2017 
 
Private pension fund scheme which has a total of 34 trustees, had total assets under 
management of GHS 7.6 billion. Out of the 34 private pension fund trustees, the top 
5 manages 78.37% of the assets under management by 2017. Table 3.5 beside 
provide details of the top 5 pension fund trustees and their respective ranking. 
Restrictive investment parameters of the NPRA influenced the capital allocation 
policies of pension fund managers under the Tier-2 pension scheme. Pensions 
serve as a source of long-term capital for SMEs and other large enterprises. The 
current investment policies of fund managers favour allocation to companies listed 
on the GSE, Government Securities and investment instruments in bank-based 
intermediaries. This issue will be explicated in the empirical analysis. 
Insurance industry constitutes the fourth and final segment of the financial 
system in Ghana. The insurance sub-segment of the financial system has been a 
No. Corporate Name Market share AUM Ranking
1 Enterprise Trustees Ltd 39.90 2,808,610,608.11 1
2 Petra Trust Ltd 13.86 975,525,950.94    2
3 Axis Pension Trust Ltd 10.75 756,825,459.52    3
4 United Pension Trustees Ltd 8.52 599,900,526.08    4
5 Hedge Pension Trust Ltd 5.33 375,444,077.50    5
Source: Authors illustration from NPRA, 2019
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significant source of long-term funding to businesses and government in the past. 
National Insurance Commission (NIC) has supervisory and regulatory authority over 
the insurance industry. The Insurance Industry is governed by Insurance Act 2006, 
ACT 724 (NIC, 2019). Two categories of the insurance industry can be observed 
namely Life and Non- Life (General Insurance). Reforms by the NIC resulted in 
different legal entity managing the life and non-life categories of insurance in Ghana. 
Figure 3.2 Total assets of Life and Non-life Insurance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NIC, Annual Report (2017, p.30) 
National Insurance Commission 2017 report shows that life insurance companies 
invested their funds as follows: deposits at licenced banks (42%), Government 
securities (21%) and Equities (14%). Non-Life insurance companies invested the 
majority of their premiums in the asset class term deposits with licensed banks. 
Term deposit investments with licensed banks rose from GHS348 million, 2016 to 
GHS460 million by 2017 (NIC, 2017). Investment in Government securities went up 
from GHS 144 million, 2016 to GHS225 million by 2017 (NIC, 2017). An opportunity 
exists for insurance companies to invest some of the premiums in an impact 
investment fund to support heterogeneous categories of SMEs in Ghana. Also, it 
shows the knowledge gap among research institutions, funding sources and 
policymaking institutions to promote economic development in the country.  
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3.4.2 Government funds, SME financing constraints and Societal Problems 
This subsection 3.4.2 present Government funds established to reduce the SME 
financing constraints, improve entrepreneurial financing opportunities (Cumming et 
al., 2019) and ultimately salvaging the intractable societal problems presented in 
Section 3.2. SMEs represent an essential source of job creation and catalyse 
economic growth. However, different categories of SMEs constituting agents of 
social impact and financial returns encounter enormous financial challenges due to 
perceived risk as well as the unfavourable macro-economic environment. SMEs 
contribute 70 per cent to Ghana's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), generate 85 per 
cent of manufacturing jobs and account for 90.5 per cent of enterprise establishment 
(Abor and Quartey, 2010; GSS IBES, 2016). Significant constraints to SMEs as 
agents of social impact and financial returns can be described as access to finance 
or capital for investments. Exacerbating the challenges of access to finance is the 
unstable and highly unfavourable macroeconomic conditions reviewed, which 
ultimately worsen societal problems that enterprises seek to alleviate. 
Impact investments into SMEs described as a panacea to the financing 
challenges of SMEs given the scarcity of private capital (Hinton and Penemetsa, 
2015) to alleviate societal problems in Ghana. Before impact investment capital, 
Government funds were established to ameliorate the enterprise financing 
challenges of SMEs to reduce societal problems. Besides, entrepreneurial financing 
options including venture capital, microfinance, trade financing, trade guarantee 
institutions (Cumming et al., 2019; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009) emerged to 
provide pluralistic funding sources to different categories of SMEs. This is because 
bank-based and capital market segment intermediaries tend to be agents of private 
wealth creation. Within the four segments of Ghana's financial system, Government 
funds were initiated over the period to transform the lives of people in BoP 
communities through investment and financing of SMEs. Some these funds include 
the Venture Capital Trust Fund (VCTF), Ghana EXIM (formerly EDAIF), Business 
Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund (BUSAC), Social Investment Fund (SIF), Skills 
Development Fund (SDF) and Microfinance and Small Scale Loan Centre 
(MASLOC). The next four paragraphs provide a review of some these funds as 
alternatives for enterprise financing and how these financing institutions provide 
sources of entrepreneurial financing options (Cumming et al., 2019; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2009) to SMEs in Ghana.  
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Government, development partners and NGOs acknowledged the role and 
contribution of SMEs to Ghana's economy. SME contribution towards employment, 
social cohesion, taxes and ultimately, economic growth prompted Government 
agencies to catalyse their growth through alternative funding sources. While many 
Government funding initiatives emerged over the past two decades, table 3.6 
provide details of some Government initaitives in creating alternative SME funding 
and ameliorate sociatl problems. 
Table 3. 6 Government-initiated funds for SMEs 
Name of 
institution 
Purpose Funding Sources Target Market 
Venture Capital 
Trust Fund 
Support the growth of 
venture capital industry 
Act as a fund-of funds for 
emerging venture capital 
firms 
Government of 
Ghana 
Start-up, early stage 
and high-growth SMEs. 
Ghana EXIM Promote industrialisation 
through funding to export-
oriented and other large-
scale enterprises. Assist 
enterprises to secure 
machinery, equipment for 
operations. 
Government of 
Ghana 
-Multilateral 
borrowing 
-Bilateral trade 
financing 
arrangement 
-SMEs 
-Large businesses 
-Corporates 
-Multinational 
Corporations 
-State owned 
Enterprises 
MASLOC Support and loan facilities 
for micro, small and 
medium-size enterprises 
-Government of 
Ghana 
-Bilateral 
instructions 
-Development 
Agencies 
Micro, Small and 
Medium-Size 
enterprises 
-Self-employed 
informal sector workers 
BUSAC Promotion of private 
sector advocacy to 
achieve an enabling 
environment 
DANIDA, USAID, 
and EU 
Business support 
groups, and 
associations, private 
sector organizations 
and farm-based 
organizations 
Skills 
Development 
Fund (SDF) 
Government initiative to 
improve the capacity of 
SMEs in different sector. 
A challenge fund to 
improve skiils of 
employees in private-
sector organisations,and 
technology transfer 
Government of 
Ghana, the World 
Bank and DANIDA 
SMEs and informal 
sector economy 
Source: Authors illustration from websites of these institutions 
 
The Venture Capital Trust fund (VCTF) was established through an act of 
parliament, Act 680 in 2004 to promote long term venture capital funding for SME's 
in Ghana.  The Trust fund commenced operations on January 2006. The VCTF is 
currently a fund of funds providing funding to locally established venture funds to 
finance SME's in specific critical sectors of the economy. The principal objective for 
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the VCTF "…….. is to provide financial resources for the development and 
promotion of venture capital financing for SMEs in priority sectors of the economy 
as shall be specified from time to time". In pursuant of this objective, funds secured 
either internally or externally should are towards; (a) the provision of credit and 
equity financing to eligible venture capital financing companies to support SMEs 
which qualify for equity and quasi-equity financing; (b) the provision of monies to 
support other activities and programs for the promotion of venture capital financing 
(VCTF, Act 2004, Act 680). The VCTF pursue their funding activity through both 
direct and indirect structures. VCTF sometimes directly finance SMEs in critical 
sectors that Government expects growth.Alternatively, indirect financing is pursued 
through Venture Capital Finance Companies (VCFCs). These VCFC's are managed 
by Fund Managers, licensed as Investment Advisors by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Some of the Government set-up funding can be 
situated in the banking system and capital market-based system. Sadly, political 
interference has affected most of these funds and thus failed to realise their intended 
objectives as alternatives for enterprise financing.  
Before the impact investing concept emerged, the Government of Ghana and 
two other development agencies initiated the Social Investment Fund (SIF). This 
fund is meant for social sector infrastructure development in BoP communities and 
SMEs that experienced financial constraints. SIF is a company limited by guarantee 
established in 1998 by the Government of Ghana, African Development Bank 
(AfDB) and the United Nations Programme and Development (UNDP). SIF was 
incorporated as an intermediary to deliver poverty reduction in BoP communities. 
The mandate includes 1. Facilitate access of the poor to economic and social 
infrastructure, i.e. schools and health centres; 2. Access to financial services 
including microfinance to MSMEs; 3. Strengthen Community Based organisations 
(CBO's), Non-Governmental organisations (NGO's and MFIs in support of poverty 
reduction; 4.Create social development fund as a resource pool and access by 
MSMEs. (SIF, 2019). Over the past two decades, SIF mobilised an estimated $49 
million from institutions including   Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 
(BADEA), the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), the Government 
of Ghana (GoG), AfDB, UNDP. These funds were disbursed to execute 
infrastructure projects in health, education, and water and sanitation sector in more 
impoverished communities. Moreover, an estimated $1.2 million Social Loan Fund 
was allocated to  MSMEs in different districts across the country (SIF, 2019). 
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3.4.3 Policymaking institutions and  financial architecture 
The Finance Ministry is a crucial institution that leads the design of policies aimed 
at improving the business climate for bank-based, capital market-based funds and 
SMEs to thrive. Overall MOFEP functions consist of sound fiscal and financial policy 
formulation and implementation, resource mobilisation and allocation as well as 
public financial management. In performing these functions, MOFEP direct 
departments, agencies, and other institutions under its supervision to accomplish 
such mandates. For example, agencies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Institute of Accountancy Training and Ghana Revenue 
Authority (GRA) are under the supervision of the Finance Ministry (MOFEP, 2019). 
Administratively, the public sector managers of these institutions report 
directly to the Finance Minister. Also, MOFEP has oversight responsibilities over 
other semi-autonomous institutions including the Bank of Ghana (BOG), National 
Lotteries Authority (NLA), Public Procurement Authority (PPA), and Ghana Cocoa 
Board (COCOBOD). Besides, various financing agreements, mostly through 
bilateral and multilateral relations, are initiated from the Ministry. Furthermore, there 
are other institutions under the supervision of the MOFEP that promote or regulate 
activities of businesses in Ghana, including SMEs. Key departments and desk of 
MOFEP liaise with multilateral and bilateral institutions through programs and 
projects for SMEs. Over the past decade, the Ministry of Finance sourced different 
tranches of long-term funding in the global Eurobond Market. The Government of 
Ghana, through MOFEP, raised USD 3 billion through the issuance of long-dated 
Eurobond securities, which was oversubscribed in March 2019 (MOFEP, 2019; 
Bloomberg, 2019). MOFEP, therefore, initiate all policies relating to the financial 
system or architecture in Ghana. 
In summary, Ghana's financial architecture, which can be described as the 
bank-based system has three other sub-segments, namely the capital market-
based segment, pensions and insurance. Bank-based and capital market-based 
segments constitute the investment avenues of funds mobilised by participants in 
the pensions and insurance sub-segments of the financial system. Therefore, 
access to funding for investments by high growth, missing middle and established 
SMEs are channelled through either the bank-based fund managers or capital 
market-based fund managers within the financial system. Meanwhile, the pensions 
and insurance industries or sub-segments of the financial system serve as sources 
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of capital and liquidity for bank-based and capital market-based segments. Banks 
perception of SMEs as risky, lacking proper governance structures, poor 
management leads to low capital allocation to owner-managers of this vital business 
sector. 
These effects of lack of access to financing and constraints within the 
financial system worsened the myriad of societal problems that the country have 
encountered over the past four decades. The Government initiated funds to catalyse 
SME support though commendable has been criticised for representing channels 
for rewarding party officials. Impact investing funds, therefore, provided long term 
funding to aid liquidity of bank-based and capital market-based fund managers. 
Consequently improved financing of high growth, established and missing middle 
SMEs that seek to realise the social impact and financial returns. The Ministry of 
Finance represents the policymaking institutions with oversight over the Bank Of 
Ghana (BOG), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), NPRA and NIC 
representing regulatory institutions within the financial architecture. 
In conclusion, investigating the phenomenon of impact investing in Ghana 
through bank-based and capital market-based intermediaries within the context 
mentioned above of the financial system assures the empirical contribution of the 
study. An interaction effect occurs among the institutions in the respective segment 
of the architecture in the form of debt, equity, quasi-equity, syndicated financing, 
and money market investments. Figure 3.3 shows Ghana’s financial architecture.  
 
96 
 
Figure 3. 3 Current Financial Architecture of Ghana 
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3.5 Enterprise Architecture and Enterprise categories 
This section reviews the enterprise architecture of Ghana to show the categories of 
ventures operating within this context. Further, the section presents economic and 
industrial policies to stimulate the growth of enterprises within the architecture in 
solving societal problems. Then reviews the regulatory and promotional context of 
the architecture in attracting different categories of enterprises to stimulate 
development and mitigate societal problems. Moreover, reviews the nature of SME 
governance within the enterprise architecture. Finally, a mapping of impact 
investment funding to SMEs within the enterprise architecture reflecting changing 
the entrepreneurial financing landscape and reducing SME financing constraints. 
Enterprise architecture for this study explains the categories and mix of single SMEs 
at different stages of growth and not the production system as a whole. The 
enterprise categories consist of those with employees of 1-5 (micro-size), 6-30 
employees (small-size), 31-100 employees (medium size) and above 100 
employees as large enterprises (GSS IBES, 2016). Large enterprises constitute 
0.4% of total enterprises, with an estimated number of 2,539 in Ghana (GSS IBES, 
2016). Sectoral distribution of these enterprises varies but predominantly in the 
services and industry sectors. 
The current state of Ghana's architecture can be understood from the 
historical context of economic and industrial policies. Different economic and 
industrial policy reforms have shaped and influenced the constituent of enterprise 
architecture. High growth, missing middle and established SMEs that currently 
represent almost 5% of the enterprise architecture has been shaped and affected 
by various policy changes. Small enterprises: Some of these small enterprises tend 
to be registered. However, most of them are informal and rely on owners' expertise 
(AfDB and OECD, 2005). Of the total 638,234 enterprises operating in Ghana, 
117,329 are categorised as small, representing 18.4 % (GSS IBES, 2016). The top 
3 regional distribution of these enterprises comprise Greater Accra (4.6%), Ashanti 
(3.3%) and Western (1.9%). Typically, family members constitute more than 70% of 
the staff strength (AfDB and OECD, 2005). This study divides medium-size 
enterprises into three distinct categories using staff strength and an annual turnover 
in line with expectations of financial institutions and impact investment stakeholders. 
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These indicators include growth, expansion/upper medium and matured medium 
enterprises. 
Growth enterprises:  Enterprises that transition to this phase can be in their 
early growth, stable or upper growth stage and are medium-sized enterprises. The 
extent of business formalisation, operations and tax compliance is relatively high 
(AfDB and OECD, 2005). A total of 9,333 were found to be medium-size enterprises 
in Ghana (GSS-IBES, 2016). Adopting the 70%:20%:10% principle to segment 
these enterprises into growth, expansion and matured implies 6,533 enterprises 
occupy growth category. Turnover is estimated at $350,000 to $1 million with total 
assets up to $0.5 million. A high growth SME conceptualised as  for-social enterprise 
can be found within these categories of ventures. 
Expansion/Upper Medium:  Medium size enterprises in the upper growth 
phase and expanding in terms of distribution, product lines and new product 
development. They are legally registered with effective accounting systems which 
are essential to their survival (AfDB and OECD, 2005). From the GSS-IBES, (2016) 
estimation of 9,333 enterprises in Ghana constituting medium-size businesses, 20% 
representing 1,867 are in this category. Typically operate with a staff strength 
exceeding 100 and turnover higher than $1.5 million. A missing middle SME can be 
categorised as expansion /upper medium-size venture within Ghana's enterprise 
architecture. 
Matured medium-size enterprise:  These are relatively few and become the 
target for bank-based and capital market-based financial institutions. Of the total 
9,333 enterprises classified as medium-size ventures (GSS-IBES, 2016), it can be 
estimated that 933, representing 10 per cent constitute this category. Matured 
medium-size enterprises, therefore, occupy the top of the SME architecture in 
Ghana. An established SME conceptualised as for-profit social enterprise represent 
part of the matured medium business within Ghana's enterprise architecture 
typologies, 
3.5.1 Industrial Policies to attract Enterprises within the Enterprise 
Architecture    
Ghana has pursued different economic and industrial policies aimed at economic 
growth and industrial transformation, respectively. Economic and industrial policies 
aim to stimulate structural changes in the enterprise architecture for accelerated 
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growth and reduction in societal problems through development. Development and 
implementation of these policies span four decades. Beginning from the post-
independence period, industrial policies developed and implemented first sought to 
realise import-substitution objectives or promote competition through liberalisation. 
SMEs were absent in the formal enterprise architecture during the post-colonial era 
because of perceived "political threats" (Aryeetey and Ahene, 2005, p.4). State-
owned enterprises (SOE's) formed the majority of enterprises, and foreign-owned 
large businesses dominated the enterprise architecture during the import 
substitution period. Economic liberalisation period of the 1980s to 2000 did not also 
bode well for SMEs as industrial policies were unfavourable and also exposed them 
to greater competition (Aryeetey and Ahene, 2005). However, post-2000 ushered in 
the "the Golden Age of Business" which catalyse the growth of much high growth, 
missing middle and established SMEs. Many critics have argued that compared to 
other communities in South East Asia who achieved political independence during 
the same time, economic fortunes of Ghana went through a vicious cycle. Table 3.7 
details critical economic and industrial policies implemented over the past three 
decades aimed at attracting different categories of enterprises into the enterprise 
architecture for economic development. 
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Table 3. 7 Economic and Industrial Policies of Ghana, 2000-2019 
Period Industrial Policy Thematic Areas and strategic objectives 
2000-
2002 
Poverty Reduction strategy Focused on private-sector-led growth 
emphasising rural enterprises, SME 
development and linkage between 
agriculture and industry 
2003-
2009 
Ghana Poverty reduction 
strategy I and II 
Address macroeconomic stability, human 
capital development, and private sector-led 
growth. 
2010-
2013 
Ghana Shared Growth and 
Development Agenda 
(GSGDA I) 
Strategy focus entails improved enabling 
environment to empower the private sector; 
Active collaboration between the public and 
private sectors, including public-private 
partnerships and civil society organisations; 
Active government interventions where 
appropriate; Transparent and accountable 
governance and efficiency in public service 
delivery at all levels; and Effective 
decentralisation for enhanced local 
economic development 
2013-
2015 
GSGDA II Ensuring and sustaining macroeconomic 
stability; Enhanced competitiveness of 
Ghana’s private sector; Accelerated 
agricultural modernisation and natural 
resource management; Oil and gas 
development; Infrastructure and human 
settlements development; Human 
development, productivity and employment; 
and Transparent and accountable 
governance 
2011-
2016 
Industrial Development 
Strategy 
Anchored on oil production economy and 
associated manufacturing activities. New 
industries include petrochemicals, fertilisers, 
LPG cylinder production. Development of 
manufacturing enterprises to process 
agricultural commodities, beans, fruits and 
shea nuts. 
2017-
2020 
National Industrial 
Revitalisation Programme 
(Export-Led 
Industrialisation Strategy 
and Domestic Market-Led 
Industrialisation Strategy 
based on Import 
Competition) 
Dubbed 10-point Agenda for Industrial 
Transformation. Key initiatives include 
industrial revitalisation programme ($200m 
stimulus package); One District One Factory 
policy; Strategic Anchor Industries; One 
Region one Industrial Park; Development of 
SMEs; Export Development Programme; 
Domestic retail Infrastructure; Business 
Environment Regulatory Reforms; Industrial 
Sub-Contracting Exchange; Public-Private 
Sector Improvement Dialogue 
Source: Authors illustration from context review  
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3.5.2 Enterprise architecture, policy and legislative context 
This subsection reviews the enterprise architecture to uncover key policymaking 
institutions that influence SME development in Ghana. Welter (2011) suggest that 
formal institutions shape and influence the agency of entrepreneurs and ventures 
within a social, economic and cultural context and settings.  Many of the businesses 
within the enterprise architecture in Ghana are micro-enterprises. They are usually 
family-oriented and established for subsistence in Africa (AfDB and OECD, 2005). 
A total of 509,033 of these businesses are micro-enterprises representing 79.8 % 
operating in the services sector in Ghana. A review of the historical policymaking 
context in the next section explains why most enterprises are micro-businesses in 
Ghana.  In terms of regional distribution of micro-enterprises, the top three regions 
consist of Greater Accra, Ashanti and Western regions with 22.3%, 15.8% and 7.8% 
respectively (GSS IBES, 2016).  The enterprise distribution in Ghana follows the 
industrialisation drive after independence with a concentration within the 'golden 
triangle' (Songsore, 2009) of Accra-Tema, Kumasi and Secondi-Takoradi. Several 
institutions play a vital role in shaping the enterprise architecture through policies 
and growth strategies which influence the type of businesses operating within the 
architecture. These institutions are reviewed in the subsequent paragraphs.  
At the policy level, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) over the past 
three decades have spearheaded policies and initiatives aimed at promoting private 
sector development (MOTI, 2016). MOTI invariably collaborate with the MOFEP in 
promoting a business-friendly environment for SME and private sector in general. 
While MOTI focuses on the policies that promote growth and opportunities for SME's 
through access to physical assets, MOFEP identifies and initiative financing 
arrangements these businesses. The country implemented the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (I and II) over the period 2001 to 2008 under the theme "the 
golden age of business" (Aryeetey and Ahene, 2005, p.1). Previous initiatives have 
been detailed in Table 3.6 above. Figure 3.4 shows the current enterprise 
architecture of Ghana shaped by the institutional context.
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Figure 3. 4 Enterprise architecture and Characteristics                
   
Source: Authors illustration from GSS IBES, 2016 data
Mature (933) 
0.1%
Expansion
(1,867) 0.3%
Growth (6,533)  
1%
Small (117,329) 
18.4%
Micro (509,033) 79.8%
•Over 200 staff:
•Over 1,000  in number
•Almost 50% operate in Greater Accra
•85% in the Services sector
•Turnover exceeding $3m
Matured SME
•Above 60 up to 90 employees
•Estimated 1,867 operating
•Almost 50% in Greater Accra
•Over 80% in the Services Sector
•Turnover greater than $1.5 m
Expansion
•From 31-60 staff;
•Estimated no of 6,533 in Ghaana
•Almost 50% in Greater Accra
•85% in Services Sector
•Turnover  $0.35 m to $1.0m
Growth
•From 6-30 employees;
•Total of 117,329 operating
• Almost 1/4 in Greater Accra
•81% in the Services sector
•Turnover between $50K to $99K
Small
•Less than 5 staff 
•82% in the Services sector
•More than a quarter in Greater Accra
•mostly women & informal
•Assets less than $25K;
•Turnover up to $50K
Micro
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           It is worth emphasising that private sector development has been a critical 
component of the GSGDA and subsequent policies in the last few years. Because 
of the purported private sector role in economic development, Government initiated 
activities toward the development of strategies and policies in specific sectors. For 
example, Private sector development strategy, Industrial policy, and Industrial 
Sector Support Programme, Aid policy Education Sector Policy were expected to 
be developed under the GDSDA. The Ministry dedicated division called SME and 
Technology responsible for the implementation of the Trade Sector Support 
Programme (TSSP) under the Industrial Policy (MOTI, 2019). Others include 
technological innovation centre for capital goods manufacture; technology centres 
and business incubators; industrial sub-contracting and partnership exchange; 
education and industry linkage (MOTI, 2016). The National Board for Small Scale 
Industries (NBSSI) under MOTI is the apex institution for micro and small enterprise 
development in Ghana (NBSSI, 2019). The role of other regulatory and promoting 
institutions were reviewed under the institutional context. Recently, Government of 
Ghana under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) and other 
collaborating institutions launched the "Ten-point Agenda for Industrial 
Transformation" (MOTI, 2019) earlier shown in Table 3.6. 
Another recently established policymaking institution is the Ministry for Business 
Development (MBD). Government objective of creating an enabling environment to 
attract foreign direct investment capital to high-end technology and non-resource-
based industries facilitated the establishment of this new Ministry. In the year 2001, 
the regime established a similar Ministry called the Ministry for Private Sector 
Development (MPSD) which was scrapped due to change in political power. The 
MBD is among other things mandated; 
• To facilitate the improvement of business in Ghana 
• Promote the development of the MSME Sector for job creation 
• To increase the entrepreneurial capacity of the youth 
• To nurture, build and promote medium to large size indigenous Ghanaian 
business giants 
• To enhance the image of Ghana as an investment destination through 
effective branding 
In line with the above mandate, the Ministry launched a National 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation plan (NEIP) aimed at supporting start-ups and 
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small businesses (MOBD, 2019). MBD has identified key investment attractive 
sectors to create sustainable and high impact job opportunities for investors, both 
local and foreign. Other notable institutions comprise Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MOFA), National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSS), Ghana 
Investment Promotion Council (GIPC), Ghana Free Zone Authority (GFZA) and 
Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) have programs and projects focusing on 
SMEs. Besides the policymaking institutions that shape the context of the enterprise 
architecture, there are regulatory and promoting agencies that ensure stability and 
attractiveness of the context. These are reviewed in the following subsections. 
3.5.3 The regulatory and promotional context of the enterprise architecture 
The enterprises within Ghana's enterprise architecture are regulated by-laws, rules 
and formal institutions (Scott, 2001) in respect of business registration, licensing, 
taxes, business operating permit, among others. This regulatory context affects the 
entry choices, legitimacy, and access to resources (Scott, 2001) of SMEs in different 
sectors of the economy. In addition to business registration, access to specific 
industries requires compliance with different legislative requirements. Enterprise 
promoting institutions were also established to facilitate trade, attract foreign 
enterprises, and support indigenous SMEs to grow in different sectors of the 
economy. Knowledge about these regulatory and promotional contexts provide 
more in-depth insight on how impact investors can facilitate SMEs development 
through the capital for compliance with regulatory requirements and where 
investees could connect to global value chains through local network. Technical 
assistance facilities from impact investors through intermediary funds are 
sometimes utilised for SMEs to achieve regulatory compliance, especially 
standards, health, and safety. Moreover, review of three areas of the regulatory and 
promotional context follows show gaps for improvement. Table 3.8 exhibit a 
summary of regulatory and promotional institutions. 
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Table 3. 8 Summary of regulatory and promoting institutional context 
Name of institution Responsibility Type 
Ghana Revenue Authority 
(GRA) 
Management, 
administration, and 
collection of domestic 
taxation empowered by 
GRA Act 2009 
Regulatory 
Registrar Generals 
Department (RDG) 
Mandated by Companies 
Code 1963 (Act 673) for all 
business registration 
Regulatory 
Ghana Standards Authority 
(GSA) 
Institution for standards, 
metrology, testing and 
quality assurance (Aryeetey 
and Ahene, 2005) 
Regulatory 
   
Ghana Investment 
Promotion Council (GIPC) 
Established under the GIPC 
Act 2013 (Act 865) for 
investment promotion 
especially attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) 
Promotional 
Ghana Export Promotion 
Authority (GEPA) 
Export promotion of 
especially non-traditional 
exports mandated by Act 
396 of 1969   
Promotional 
Ghana Free Zone Authority 
(GFZA) 
Attract both foreign and 
local export-oriented 
businesses through Free 
Zone incentives within 
export processing enclaves 
Promotional 
Source: Authors illustration from literature and websites of these institutions 
 
The World Bank ranks Ghana at 106 out of 189 communities on the ease of 
paying taxes (World Bank, 2016). These taxation challenges affect the entry and 
post entry choices of different categories of SMEs, create uncompetitive 
environment, which subsequently affect SME growth and impact in alleviating 
societal problems. Impact investment funds therefore utilised some of their technical 
assistance funds to support investees to obtain these certification standards. Other 
formal regulatory institutions not reviewed in this study comprised Metropolitan, 
Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDA's) and the Lands Commission whose 
actions shape and affect SME growth in the country. The role of promotional 
institutions reflects in foreign direct investment inflows. UNCTAD report showed that 
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FDI, net inflows to Ghana over the past five years have been in the range of $3.1 
billion and $3.4 billion (UNCTAD, 2019). Anecdotal evidence shows abuse of Ghana 
Free Zone Authority tax incentives to foreign businesses in the past by some 
investors with impunity. 
Critically formal regulatory institutions to some extent have constrained the 
growth of SMEs through cumbersome business registration procedures, lack of 
property rights, and access to technology transfer (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000). 
Aryeetey and Ahene, (2005) in a survey of 200 SMEs in Accra and Tema 
Municipalities finds that 24% complained of business registration procedures and 
delays. Another 35% about land acquisition delays. In a recent report, Ghana ranked 
overall 120 on the World Bank (2018) ease of doing a business assessment, 
compared to Kenya (80), Cote D'Ivore (139) and South Africa (82) (World Bank, 
2018). This review facilitates understanding the type of enterprises that promotional 
institutions are attracting and regulatory context to stimulate economic development 
and improve entrepreneurial financing in Ghana. Moreover, it shows the gap within 
the entrepreneurial financing landscape that impact investment can fill in alleviating 
the existing societal problems. 
In summary, few large enterprises (0.4%) exist within the enterprise 
architecture in Ghana. Most enterprises are micro (79.8%), followed by small 
(18.4%), and medium size (1.5%) enterprises (GSS IBES, 2016). Services sector 
constitute the primary focus of enterprises in all categories within the enterprise 
architecture and mostly located in the Greater Accra Region. 
Greater proportion of micro and small enterprises are sole ventures for 
subsistence in Africa (AfDB and OECD, 2005) and the medium enterprises tend to 
be incorporated as limited liability companies. In terms of legislation on business 
registration per Ghana’s Companies Code 1963 (Act 673), five categories of 
incorporation emerged. Social enterprise as legal form of business registration can 
be registered as limited liability or non-profit. Therefore, conceptualizing high growth 
start-ups and established SMEs as social enterprise is justified based on the current 
legislation in Ghana.  
3.5.4 Governance of high growth, missing middle and established SMEs 
The management of many enterprises within the enterprise architecture of Ghana 
are headed by the founder. Aryeetey and Ahene (2005) suggest that some SMEs 
are owned by founders who remain small and die small. Because many enterprises 
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are micro and the next category are small, most of these enterprises have 
inadequate governance systems and formalisation of business operating structures. 
Some high growth, missing middle and established enterprises with some degree 
of formalisation and governance systems rely on family and friends as directors and 
board members. Based on the pilot study conducted in March 2017, it emerged that 
some of these enterprise lack formal governance structures. Therefore, fund 
managers provide support for formalisation and proper governance systems to 
ensure that growth prospects are realised. For instance, a bank-based official 
remarked that “…in this part our world, the total ownership of business connotes 
success. It gives pride, it gives you some status in the society that I have this 
business, it is mine…I run it alone. That is the impetus for people to hold on to the 
business. So even if the business is failing and somebody want to inject capital or 
refinance, he will not agree. They will rather die with the business; the business will 
completely shut down than to take money from somebody else. You know it is a 
serious cultural dimension to all these things………….”. Thus, the cultural dimension 
of ownership implies many of these SMEs become reluctant to discuss equity 
financing with funders. Because equity funding would require a different governance 
of the SMEs in line with investor expectation to realise anticipated objectives.  
In summary, many of the SMEs in the enterprise architecture are founder-
owned and managed, relatively few have right governance systems and structures. 
However, the emergence of impact investment capital is likely to change the 
governance of high growth, missing middle and established SMEs within the 
enterprise architecture in Ghana. Impact investments channelled through 
intermediaries in Ghana are located within the bank-based and capital market-
based segment of the financial system. Examples of impact investment 
intermediaries and how impact funds influence SMEs in the research setting of 
Ghana dovetails into the next section 3.6. 
 
3.6 Impact Investing and financial Architecture  
Impact investing can be found within the bank-based and capital market-based 
segments of the financial architecture. Both the bank-based and capital market-
based segments of the financial architecture represent capital deployment 
intermediary or channels for impact investors. Ultimately, the use of these channels 
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of capital deployment are towards SMEs to achieve the expected social and 
environmental impacts including financial return in BoP communities. 
3.6.1 Bank-based intermediaries 
Impact investing funds from DFI’s, foundations and private investors have been 
channelled through some DMBs for on-lending to SMEs. Illustratively, UT Bank 
which carved a niche for providing capital to SMEs closed a $15 million equity deal 
with IFC in 2015 for SME financing. Another DMB, Access Bank Ghana Ltd also 
signed a senior convertible loan agreement with the International Finance 
Corporation for $30 million investment in 2015 (Access Bank, 2018). 
 Similarly, impact investing through debt equity and quasi equity instruments 
occurs through lower-tier bank-based segments. For example, Oikocredit deployed 
GH ¢ 10 million debt to ASA Savings and Loans Ltd in 2015 (Oikocredit, 2017). 
Furthermore, Goodwell Investments acquired a 30 percent equity interest in 
Women’s World Banking Ghana (WWBG), a savings and loans NBFI with an 
estimated SME client of over 70,000 across the country in 2015 Table 3.9 below 
show examples of impact investing through bank-based fund manager
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Table 3. 9 Assets under management by Bank-based fund managers, 2017 
    
      
Impact Investor Investee Business Type Investment/Deal Size Period Type 
      
IFC Access Bank Ghana Ltd DMB USD $30 million 2016 Debt 
IFC and MasterCard Foundation Fidelity Bank Ghana DMB USD $37.4 million 2016 Debt 
IFC UT Bank  DMB USD $15 million 2015 Equity 
Goodwell Investments BV Womens World Banking Savings and Loans Company N/A 2015 Equity 
Goodwell Investments Nwabiagya Rural Bank RCB USD $ 1 million 2014 Equity 
Goodwell Investments Innovative Microfinance MFI N/A 2016 Debt 
OIKOCREDIT ASA Savings and Loans Ltd Savings and Loans Company GH ¢ 10  million 2015 Debt 
OIKOCREDIT Advans Ghana  Savings and Loans Company GH ¢ 9 million 2014 Debt 
OIKOCREDIT Opportunity International Savings 
and Loans 
Savings and Loans Company GH ¢ 8 million 2011 Debt 
OIKOCREDIT Sinapi Aba Savings and Loans Savings and Loans Company GH ¢ 5  million 2011 Debt 
OIKOCREDIT Bonzali Rural Bank Ltd Savings and Loans Company GH ¢ 2  million 2011 Debt 
OIKOCREDIT Fidelity Equity Partners Ltd Private Equity Fund USD $ 2 million 2008 Equity 
Source: Authors illustration from the websites of bank-based fund manager
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3.6.2 Capital Market-based 
 Unlike the bank-based segment, impact investing within the capital-market-based 
segments were deployed through private equity fund managers seeking to realise 
social impact and financial returns through direct investments into SMEs. The 
funding sources of these impact investing funds comprise DFI’s, Governments, 
Private investors, Philanthropic Organizations and Pensions funds from developed 
communities.  
Contrasting the bank-based and capital market-based impact investing, 
intermediaries within the bank-based segment serve as credit transmission 
channels of impact investors for on-lending to SMEs through debt, equity and quasi 
equity instruments. However, the capital market impact funds are investment 
vehicles that attract capital through investment solicitation with concise investment 
framework. Also, payback period to investors after the funding life vary, usually 7 to 
10 years. 
In summary, both bank-based and capital market-based intermediaries 
represent channels of impact investing in curbing the financing challenges of SMEs 
while achieving social and environmental impact together with financial return. Table 
3.10 present various capital market-based funds (anonymised) that have attracted 
impact investment capital for funding SMEs in Ghana.
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Table 3. 10 Capital Market Based funds description, funding sources, investees and sectors  
Fund Funding Sources Fund Size Ticket size Investees Sectors 
CGF001 KWF, DGGF, Norfund, CDC, 
FMO, USAID, AfDB, EIB, IFC,       
Proparco, Shell Foundation, 
Calvert Foundation, Lundin 
Foundation, Finn fund, Triodos 
$ 170 m $0.1 m to $1.5m Cob A Ghana, 
Homefoods Ltd, Firm 
Foundation Montessori 
et 
Wholesale and Retail, 
Manufacturing, IT, 
Transport, Agriculture 
et 
CIP002 AfDB,EIB, Government of 
Monaco, FMO, Proparco, BOAD, 
Rothschild Foundation, Small 
Foundation, Caritas 
 € 65 m € 0.3 to €1.5 M Eden Tree Ltd, Volta 
Car Rental Services 
Agriculture, Transport,     
Solar Energy 
CIN003 AGRA, CDC, FMO, LUNDIN 
Foundation, NETRI Foundation, 
Proparco, SEDF 
$50 m  $ 0.2m to $4 m Sekaf Ghana Ltd, Kona 
Agro Processing 
Agriculture 
COA004 DGGF, IFC and other institutional 
investors 
$50.5 m $0.5 m to $ 5m Yet to be deployed Education, Financial 
services, Housing, 
Healthcare, Food 
services and Hospitality 
Goodwell Investments 
BV 
Goodwell Microfinance 
Development Company II, KfW 
and Norwegian Microfinance 
Initiative 
 $50 m >   $1 m Women’s World 
Banking, NRB, 
Innovative Microfinance 
Financial Services 
Source: Authors illustration from websites of fund managers
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3.7 Impact investing and Enterprise Architecture 
This section reviews and maps impact investment unto various categories of SMEs 
within the enterprises architecture to show which of these segments is attracting 
impact capital to ameliorate societal problems. Bank-based funds typically attracting 
impact investment capital allocate funding to different categories of SMEs. Banks 
normally target all enterprises in different segment of the enterprise architecture 
including high growth, missing middle, established SMEs and large enterprises. The 
non-bank financial institutions within the bank-based segment including RCBs, 
Savings and Loans companies and MFI target micro, small and sometimes early 
stage enterprises.  Figure 3.5 shows that typologies of SMEs targeted by bank-
based and capital market-based fund managers. Bank-based funds especially 
commercial banks target early stage, high growth, missing middle and established 
SMEs. Lower tier bank-based funds however focus on micro, early stage and high 
growth SMEs with differences and similarities. 
 
Figure 3. 5 Mapping of impact funds and SME categories  
 
Capital market-based funds comprising venture capital, private equity and impact 
investment funds also target SMEs in the early stage to established stage in the 
enterprise life cycle and size. As earlier explained fund economics implicitly play a 
role in the stage and type of SMEs that capital market-based funds target for 
investment. Based on the pilot study it emerged that a number of impact funds 
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operate as catalyst for SMEs at growth, expansion, and transition to large enterprise 
stages. GG Ltd for example structured US$1,483,525 debt deal for Cob A, Ghana 
Ltd (CAGL). A small water purification enterprise with less than 20 staff, packaging 
purified water into sachets, plastic bottles and dispensers targeting over 4,000 
families (GCII,2015). The GG deal grew the company to a staff strength of 1,100 
and an estimated annual revenue exceeding three times deal size. 
Similarly, Home foods Ltd (HFCL) manufacturer of Ghanaian traditional food 
products with 20 employees has grown from a small enterprise into a matured 
medium size enterprise. HFCL annual revenue is almost US$10 million annually and 
provides more than USD $0.5 million to families of local raw materials suppliers after 
the GG deal (GCII, 2015).  
Another fund closed a syndicated deal for PEG, a leading off-grid solar 
company in Ghana, of $7.5 million Series A Round (I and P, 2016) is another 
example. The deal aims at expansion in Ghana and potential entry into the Cote 
D’Ivoire market. Impact funds play an important role within the enterprise 
architecture includes to ensure that SMEs achieve the objectives of social impact. 
These include; governance (ownership and Control); fast and accurate capital 
deployment; bouquet of financial solution; technical assistance (Lamptey, 2017). 
The following section provides a summary and conclusion of the chapter. 
3.8 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter detailed five main reasons for examining the historical context of impact 
investing and Ghana as the research setting. Key evidence of the institutional 
context, financial architecture and enterprise architecture emerged. Social 
Investment fund (SIF) represent the first fund established in the 1990’s prior to the 
concept of impact investing in Ghana. The research setting of Ghana is of 
significance interest because of the growth of impact investment flows over the past 
decade estimated at $1.6 billion (GIIN, 2015) among others. There is notable 
increase in liquidity and capital for bank-based, capital market-based and other non-
bank financial intermediaries due to the emergence of impact investing These 
evidences from the context further justify the research objectives set out in section 
1.3 and the emerging findings from the study on distinctiveness of finance-first and 
impact-first investors channelling funds through bank-and capital-market based fund 
managers. Impact investing is also said to be transforming the enterprise financing 
landscape through pluralistic enterprise financing options and institutions. The 
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review further reveals differences and similarities within the bank-based and capital 
market-based funds targeting high growth, missing middle and established SMEs. 
However, a lack of clarity of these differences based on published documents does 
not assure an in-depth understanding of how impact investment transformed the 
enterprise financing landscape in Ghana. This is a significant knowledge gap being 
addressed through this thesis, knowledge that is vital for informing Ghana’s attempt 
to attract and benefit from impact investments.  
The evidence of a transition from government-led approach to private sector-
led approaches to enterprise development through impact investment and the 
associated implications is another key finding from this chapter.  What is observed 
is that Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), Rural Commercial banks (RCBs), 
Social Investment funds (SIF) and more recently, a government-created Venture 
capital Trust Fund are creating diverse entrepreneurial financing opportunities for  
all categories of SMEs.  This has a created a major debate about whether 
commercially viable SMEs represent the solutions to the intractable development 
problems of Ghana, discussed in chapter as wicked problems. These private-sector 
led approach to alleviating societal problems through impact investor funds are 
empirically examined in chapters 5 and 6. Chapters 5 and 6 details analysis of 
governance mechanisms deployed by impact funds, the associated strategy 
changes these instigate in SMEs and the outcomes for impact funds, SMEs and 
wider society. From a regulatory environment review, legislations and rules that 
seek to consolidate the financial system have long affected entry and post-entry 
activities of enterprises including financial service providers. The empirical chapters 
in this thesis will provide the much needed research evidence to begin to judge 
whether impact investing can address some of the governance and regulatory 
challenges that have persistently affected SMEs in Ghana and, if not, what the role 
of impact investing in SME financing can be improved.  
The review further shows that impact funds serve as alternative sources of 
funding for BBF and CMB fund managers for their liquidity and capital adequacy. 
Bank-based fund managers exercise huge caution in allocating capital to different 
categories of SMEs in BoP settings due to perceived risk. Capital market-based 
funds focus more on high growth and established enterprises because of their ability 
to achieve high social impact and financial returns over the investment period. Fund 
duration, size and implicit fund economics also influence the extent of selectivity of 
SMEs by capital market-based funds. Diverse opportunities emerged for impact 
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investment fund managers in different sectors where intractable societal problems 
are prevalent These opportunities further explain strategy change of private equity 
fund managers in terms of sector focus with the emergence of impact investing 
presented in Chapter 6. Evidence of linkage of bank-based funds, SMEs and MNCs 
through financing are provided in the empirical Chapter 5. It suffice add that both 
financial and enterprise architecture do not exist in isolation, they are interlinked, 
and they influence each other through funding of enterprises and channels of impact 
investment capital and that is why the study also shows the  influence of one on the 
other in the two empirical chapters.  
It also emerged from the financial architecture that impact funds representing 
bank-based and capital market-based funds are situated within the banking and 
capital market segments respectively of the financial system. This is quite expected 
because of the reforms and regulatory regimes of the financial system in Ghana. 
However, what requires deeper insight is how these different categories are 
effectively supporting investee SMEs as agents of social transformation in BoP 
communities. The extent to which impact investment capital has alleviated SME 
financing constraint, provided improved entrepreneurial financing opportunities 
within the research setting requires further interrogation. Moreover, why and how 
these fund managers have changed their strategies to finance or support high 
growth, missing middle and established SMEs that deliberately pursue dual goals 
of social impact and financial returns. Bank-based and capital market-based funds 
situated in the financial architecture implies that there are differences and similarities 
between the two categories, but these are not as clear when one critically examines 
only published documents. This therefore lends credence to adopting multiple data 
collection techniques to uncover the influences of impact investment funds on 
investee SMEs in BoP communities like Ghana. 
The enterprise architecture review uncovered investments and financing of 
SMEs by impact funds mostly at the growth and expansion stage of the enterprise 
growth cycle. Cross-case analyses of chapters 5 and 6 provides an integrated 
discussion about the place of impact investing within the broader enterprise 
financing landscape of Ghana. A critical analysis of this evidence of capital-market-
based funds uncovered fund economics as an implicit determinant of fund managers 
focusing on high growth and missing middle SMEs at expansion stage. Moreover, 
both financial and enterprise architecture do not exist in isolation, they are 
interlinked, and they influence each other and that is why we need to study how they 
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are interconnected in influencing investee SMEs as two sets of cases presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Institutional context further revealed formal regulatory and 
promoting institutions safeguarding the enterprise and financial architecture for 
stability and growth. Finally, the research setting could be extended to the African 
context which exhibit commonalities emerging from the framework applied in 
Ghana. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology used to undertake the study 
presented in this thesis. It demonstrates how the theoretical framework developed 
in Chapter 2 to investigate the influences of bank-based and capital market-based 
funds on investee SMEs to realise the social impact and financial returns in BoP 
communities informs the adoption of a qualitative research design. Where 
influences are viewed from governance, strategy change and impact perspectives. 
While many studies have highlighted the role of SMEs in developing countries, few 
if not any have examined high growth, established, and missing middle SMEs as 
for-profit social enterprises in pursuit of dual goals with the emergence of impact 
investing. 
The study adopts a qualitative research approach involving two embedded 
case study approach of impact funds with sub-unit of analysis within the research 
setting of Ghana. Bank-based funds (BBF) and Capital Market-based funds (CMB) 
represent two distinctive case studies and investors, enterprises, and institutions 
comprise sub-unit of analysis detailed under the research design in Section 4.3. The 
research setting of Ghana represents one of the significant recipients of impact 
investments over the past decade, reflecting a rich context to conduct this study as 
detailed in Chapter three. The methodology employed in this chapter draws on a 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 integrating literature from different 
disciplines including impact investing, social entrepreneurship, economics, finance, 
strategic management as well as governance and strategy change concepts. This 
study required a set of methods in order to address the research questions and 
objectives in Section 1.3. 
The remaining sections of the chapter are structured as follows: Section 4.1 
sets out the research paradigm and research strategy. Sections 4.2 examines the 
research philosophy and research design. Section 4.3 explains the ideas which 
informed the overall research design. Section 4.4 details sampling approach 
followed by Section 4.5, which presents how access to research participants for data 
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collection was obtained. Section 4.6 reveals the data collection methods deployed 
followed by Section 4.7, which focus on methods of data analysis. Details of ethical 
issues and chapter summary were presented in Sections 4.8 and 4.9, respectively. 
4.2 Research Paradigm 
Impact investing as a phenomenon appears to lack a definitive “epistemological and 
ontological boundaries” and as such permit flexibility in adopting different methods 
for investigation (Rizzi, Pellegrini and Battaglia, 2018, p. 808). In undertaking this 
research which investigates the phenomenon of impact investing, the need for 
combining existing theoretical knowledge and empirical insights (F. Riizi et al., 2018) 
within the universe of social finance plays an important role. This study integrates 
literature and concepts from different disciplines to develop a theoretical framework 
for application to a research setting in Ghana might justify the significance of a new 
research paradigm. A research paradigm consists of a broad framework of 
perception, beliefs, assumptions, and understanding of theories for undertaking 
research including methods and philosophies. Drawing on existing paradigms for 
the conduct of this impact investing research advances knowledge and demonstrate 
evidence of ‘why' and ‘how' of such a multi-disciplinary field evolution. Every 
researcher requires a framework which situates the issue under investigation and in 
turn, determines the choices of methods for examining the problem (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003). There are several research philosophies in a continuum (Morgan 
and Smicrich, 1980; Saunders at al., 2009). However, two significant strands have 
been employed by business and management scholars: Positivist and Interpretivist 
(Phenomenology). 
Positivist holds a philosophical stance that advocate methods of natural 
science and assumes that knowledge of reality is obtained through generalisable 
and observable discrete objects (Saunders et al., 2009). In seeking to understand 
and explain reality, positivist applies the methods and principles of natural science 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003; Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
Interpretivist adopts a philosophical stance which seeks to explain social 
reality based on human behaviour as a product of how people interpret the world 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003; Bryman and Bell, 2015). Interpretivist paradigm 
recommends that reality is socially constructed rather than from external sources. 
Further, interpretivist suggest that explanation and understanding of social reality 
can be studied by constructing models of shared meanings based on participant 
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concepts, beliefs and views (Saunders et al., 2015). Collis and Hussey (2003) 
provide differences between the two dominant research paradigms in Table 4.1 
Table 4. 1 Features of two paradigms 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Rely on large samples Rely on small samples 
Produce precise, objective, 
quantitative data 
Produce rich, subjective, qualitative 
data 
Concerned with hypothesis testing Concerned with generating theories 
Produce results with high reliability 
but low validity 
Produce findings with low reliability but 
high validity 
Allow results to be generalised from 
the sample to the population 
Allow findings to be generalised from 
one setting to another similar setting 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2003) 
Based on the overarching research objectives of the study, an interpretivist 
research paradigm provides an opportunity to critically investigate how impact funds 
govern SMEs that pursue dual goals of social impact and financial returns in BoP 
communities. Corley and Gioia (2011, p.12) define theory as a "statement of 
concepts and their interrelationships that shows how and why a phenomenon 
occurs". Critically investigating the ‘how' of impact investment fund manager 
influences on investee SMEs for social impact and financial returns through an 
integrated theoretical framework reflect theory generation. Evidentially from Collis 
and Hussey (2003) table 4.1 above, the focus of this study is toward theory 
generation or theory building through subjective meanings of bank-based and 
capital market-based fund managers as two case studies while impact investors, 
investee SMEs and institutional actors represent sub-unit of analysis. Eisenhardt 
and Graeber, (2007, p. 25) suggest that "theory-building involves use of one or more 
cases to create theoretical constructs, proposition and or mid-range theory from 
case-based empirical evidence". Considering the nascent nature of the impact 
investing discipline in the last decade and lack of adequate academic research 
(Hotcstadter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015), the need for an integrated 
theoretical framework for the conduct of this study is significant.  
Moreover, the lack of plausible and viable existing theory (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007) which are not silos-based justify why the research draws on 
different disciplines to develop a theoretical framework in Section 2.8 and empirically 
apply within the research setting of Ghana. According to Bhatt and Ahmad (2017, 
p.398), an interpretivist research paradigm draws on the following assumptions: 
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• Recognition that research is value laden. 
• Relies on subjective experiences and behaviours of participants. 
• Heterogeneity of experiences is relevant due to the involvement of multiple 
stakeholders. 
• Values of research participants are noted. 
 
4.2.1 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy concerns the development of knowledge, which entails 
assumptions and beliefs of how academics perceive the world (Saunders et al., 
2015). A significant way to develop knowledge is to answer questions that are 
important for society and which we do not currently have answers as detailed in 
table 4.2. This is what this study is seeking to do with the two research questions 
stated in Section 1.3. In providing answers to those research questions represent 
new knowledge relevant for both theory and practice. Drawing on different 
philosophical underpinnings in developing this new knowledge from this study is 
further explored in this subsection. Moreover, how scholars view the world underlie 
the research strategy and methods they employ to conduct studies. This section 
details the philosophical underpinning of the study to realise the overarching 
objective of examining how impact funds govern SMEs that pursue dual goals of 
social impact and financial returns in BoP communities. The philosophical position 
then informs the research strategy and research design. Three main research 
philosophies are employed within the research process: ontology, epistemology, 
and axiology. 
According to Saunders et al. (2015, p.128), ontology refers to researchers 
"assumptions about the nature of reality or being". Such a view of reality determines 
the ‘how' a researcher view his/her relationship with study participants in explaining 
the phenomenon under study. Objectivist ontology suggests that social reality is a 
concrete structure with constituent parts, observed in concrete behaviours and 
activities. In other words, reality representing the world can externally be explained 
objectively. However, subjectivist ontology holds the view that reality is a projection 
of human imagination and the outcome of the human mind. Subjectivist suggest that 
reality is subjective and socially constructed through human experiences and 
perceptions. Epistemology, however, concern researchers "assumptions about 
knowledge, what constitute acceptable, valid and legitimate knowledge" (Saunders 
et al., 2015, p.128). Positivist and subjectivist epistemologies represent two ends of 
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a continuum. Saunders et al. (2015) suggest that different epistemologies have 
implications on methods chosen as well as strength and limitations of future 
research findings. Axiology refers to the "sets of values and ethics" of a researcher 
within the research process (Saunders et al., 2015; p.128). Table 4.2 reveals 
paradigm contrast and type of research questions for each. 
Table 4. 2 Comparison of research paradigms 
Assumption type Questions asked Objectivism Subjectivism 
Ontology What is the nature 
of reality 
Real/External/One 
true reality 
Nominal/Socially 
constructed;  
Multiple realities 
Epistemology How can we know 
what we know? 
 
 
 
What is the 
relationship of the 
researcher to that 
researched? 
Adopt assumptions 
of the natural 
scientist 
 
 
Research is 
independent of the 
researcher 
Adopt 
assumptions of the 
arts and 
humanities 
 
 
Researcher is 
involved in the 
research 
Axiology What is the role of 
values in 
research? 
Value-free Value-bound; 
researcher 
Rhetorical 
assumption 
What is the role of 
language? 
Formal style,  
passive voice; 
operationalised 
and measurable 
concepts; objective 
facts; hypothesis 
formulation 
Personal voice; 
informal; pattern 
observation; 
researcher 
involvement 
Methodological What is the 
process of 
research? 
Deductive; cause-
effect; large 
sample; highly 
structured 
Inductive small 
sample; in-depth 
investigation; 
qualitative 
methods of 
analysis 
Source: Saunders et al. (2015) 
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This study examines how impact funds govern SMEs and strategy change of impact 
funds and SMEs to realise the social impact and financial returns in BoP 
communities. In doing so, it pays attention to the influences of impact investors on 
Bank-based and Capital market-based funds from a governance, strategy change 
and impact perspectives. Subsequently, the research focused on the influences of 
bank-based and capital market-based impact funds on SMEs from similar 
perspectives. The latter justifies the adoption of a more subjectivist ontology which 
holds that reality is subjective, multiple realities, and socially constructed through 
human experiences and perceptions (Saunders et al., 2015) rather than objectivist 
which assumes that reality can be externally explained objectively. 
Previous studies on financing-decision making have adopted conventional 
positivist epistemology (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2013; Quartey et al., 
2017). These studies view the research objects as independent of the researcher, 
value-free and rhetorical assumption of objective facts and hypothesis formulation. 
Methods employed were structured based on cause-effects, deductive strategies 
and use large samples to conduct the study. However, some researchers have 
highlighted the need to get beneath the surface through the adoption of subjectivist 
and intersubjectivist epistemologies (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006: Ormiston et al., 
2015; Roundy, Holzhauer and Dai, 2017). This study is informed by a subjectivist 
epistemological position informed by critical realism. The study assumes that 
knowledge is personal and experiential, and the researcher is connected to the 
research participants and the research setting. Further, the study adopts both 
deductive and inductive methodological approach based on the developed 
theoretical framework and emerging dimensions from participants, respectively. 
Finally, the theoretical framework lends itself more to a qualitative constructionist 
approach compared to the objectivist approach.  
In summary, the study adopts an interpretivist ontology of social 
constructionist and subjectivist epistemology informed by critical realism to 
investigate the phenomenon of impact investing within the research setting of 
Ghana. 
4.3 Research Design 
Research design encompasses a process describing the various stages of the 
research process that links the philosophical assumptions to approaches for 
conducting a study, data collection and analysis. Denzin and Lincoln (1998, p.28) 
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describe it as a "flexible set of guidelines that connect theoretical paradigm to 
strategies of inquiry and methods for collecting empirical material". Yin (2014, p.28) 
points out that a "research design is a logical plan for getting from here to there 
where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered and there 
is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions". Furthermore, the 
research design is "a framework for the collection and analysis of data" (Bryman 
and Bell, 2015, p. 49). 
Taking these definitions and descriptions of research designs altogether, a 
research design ultimately situates the researcher in the empirical world through 
interconnection with methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation toward 
findings of the phenomenon under investigation. Table 4.1 details the research 
criteria recommended by Yin in selecting a research design. 
Table 4. 3 How to select a research design 
Research 
strategy 
Form of the 
research 
question 
Requires control 
over behavioural 
events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary 
events? 
Case study how, why no yes 
Survey who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
no yes 
Archival analysis who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
no yes/no 
History how, why no  
Experiment how yes yes 
Source: Yin 2014 
Yin provided a valid criterion for selecting a case study research design to 
assist researchers in choosing a case study approach, including a focus on the 
research question. Based on the selection criteria detailed in Table 4.1, a case study 
research design is appropriate for investigating the influences of bank-based and 
capital market-based fund managers on investee SMEs to realise the social impact 
and financial returns. In line with research questions for this study previously stated 
in 4.0 using how/why questions, a case study research design became suitable for 
conducting this research. The study adopts a qualitative case study research design 
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involving a multiple case study of impact funds with sub-unit of analysis. Yin further 
defined a case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon (the "case") in-depth and within its real-world context especially when 
the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context may not be clearly 
evident” (Yin, 2014; p.16). Premised on the suggestion by Yin, four significant 
reasons informed the selection of a case study for this research in addition to the 
research questions. First, impact investing emerged within the past decade 
represents a contemporary phenomenon worth investigating in Ghana with rich-
context specific factors. Second, case studies, in general, provide opportunities for 
an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the impact investing phenomenon 
with multiple units of analysis like this study. Third, multiple options for conducting 
this study such as geography (Regions or districts), investors, fund managers (bank 
and capital market-based), relationships (investors-intermediaries-investees) and 
investees only are amenable to case study designs. Finally, the multi-dimensional 
nature of case studies (quantitative or qualitative) for investigating the phenomenon 
of impact investing in single or multiple contexts justify the adoption.  
Empirical studies and methodology books categorise research design into 
quantitative and qualitative research for business and management social enquiry. 
A quantitative research approach has an underlying assumption of objectivist 
ontology and positivist epistemology (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Bryman and Bell 
(2015) observe that quantitative research strategies focus on quantification or 
expressed in numbers. Such research designs adopt a deductive approach to 
determine relationships among variables with the aim of testing theory. 
4.3.1 Other research designs 
Qualitative research designs have an underlying subjectivist ontology and 
phenomenological epistemology (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Qualitative research 
designs, however, collect and analyse data in the form of words rather than 
quantification (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2015). Moreover, in 
terms of research strategy, qualitative studies adopt inductive and sometimes 
abductive approach with a focus on building theory or theory elaboration. Beyond 
the dichotomy of quantitative and qualitative research designs, in the main, research 
designs can be further classified as case study designs experimental, longitudinal, 
cross-sectional and (Silverman, 2010; Yin, 2014; Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
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Experimental designs refer to classic experimental design entails the random 
assignment of subjects to two groups, namely control or experimental groups. 
Conditions for the experimental group are manipulated by the researcher and 
compared to the control group (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
Such research designs are employed in natural science and medical research due 
to the setting. However, in business management and organizational research, field 
experiments are conducted in a real-life setting. Two major advantages comprise 
clarity of issue and ease of study replication and claims (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). The difficulty of randomization in business research creates some 
disadvantage and internal validity (eliminating systematic factors of bias) and 
external validity (generalizability of findings) if not appropriately addressed threaten 
experimental designs (Bryman and Bell, 2015).  
Cross-sectional or survey designs involve data collection on more than one 
case and at a single point in time (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Saunders et al., 2009). 
At least one independent variable and at least two categories are present (Bryman 
and Bell, 2015; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Such designs are usually aimed at 
collecting quantifiable data relating to two or more variables investigated to 
determine relationships (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Longitudinal designs come in 
different forms and concerns investigation into a phenomenon over a period or 
across time. Before and after longitudinal designs entail two points in time for the 
same group of participants or sample (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Further 
corroborating the examination of the same group of research participants, Bryman 
and Bell (2015, p.66) pointed out that in longitudinal designs "a sample is surveyed 
and then surveyed on at least one further occasion" Three other variations of 
longitudinal studies emerging from literature comprises time series, panel study and 
cohort analysis. As alluded earlier, case study represents the most suitable research 
design to critically investigate the phenomenon of impact investing in Ghana. Case 
study research strategy is presented next detailing how it has been applied in the 
study. 
4.3.2 Case study research strategy 
Yin (2014) proposes five elements of case study design strategy- a case study's 
questions; its propositions; it is unit (s) of analysis – the "case"; the logic linking the 
data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting the findings. Research 
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questions and propositions via theoretical framework for this study have been 
detailed in previous chapters. 
The ‘case' representing the unit of analysis involves a two-step process of 
defining and bounding the case (Yin, 2014). A "case" is defined as the phenomenon 
of some sort occurring in a bounded context, and it is the unit of analysis (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; p.25). Yin, 2014 posits that bounding the case or the unit of 
analysis assists in determining the research setting, time and scope of data 
collection, data about the case and those external (context). Four types of case 
studies identified by Yin (2014) comprise- holistic single case (single unit of 
analysis); Single case embedded (multiple units of analysis); Holistic multiple cases 
(single unit of analysis); Multiple cases embedded (multiple units of analysis). 
Informed by the preceding, this research relied on a multiple embedded case study 
of impact funds with multiple units of analysis for investigating the phenomenon of 
impact investing within the research setting of Ghana (discussed-next paragraph). 
Bounding the case as impact funds within the research setting of Ghana facilitated 
data collection and other contextual factors detailed in section 4.3. Ghana was 
selected as the research setting, bank-based and capital market-based funds as 
multiple embedded case with sub-unit of analysis based on the context-specific 
factors including institutional, financial and enterprise architecture and geographic 
context (Autio, 2014; Kimbu and Ngoasong, 2016).  
 By cases, the study focuses on the narratives and pieces of evidence of 
bank-based and capital market-based impact fund managers as multiple cases 
complemented by sub-unit analysis of impact investors, investee SMEs and 
institutions in pursuit of social impact and financial returns. These multiple sets of 
cases were examined in a local context complemented by global context evidence 
from impact investors. Selecting Ghana as the research setting emerged based on 
the theoretical framework and literature review conducted in Chapter 2 in addition 
to the constraints of time and resources. Deciding to bound the study and 
determination of what constitutes a case, four options emerged based on a pilot 
study conducted in March 2017 and the theoretical framework developed in previous 
Chapter 2. The first option, Ghana, can be described as a case where the 
relationship involving bank-based-SME investee as well as capital market-based-
SME investee could be investigated — focusing on governance and strategy change 
and outcome (social impact and financial returns). However, applying the developed 
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theoretical framework at the macro level using Ghana as a single holistic case might 
require some changes. 
 Also, a comparator of another developing country in the Sub Region or Sub 
Saharan Africa (SSA) would be required for cross-case comparison and analysis. 
Geographically the three regions of Greater Accra, Ashanti and Eastern qualified as 
a case where bank-based-SME investees and capital market-based funds-SME 
investees could be investigated applying the developed theoretical framework. Such 
geographic focus implies the need for representativeness of samples selected from 
these geographic territories and location of impact funds. The third category of 
impact funds and investee SME as a set of cases based on the theoretical 
framework also emerged. In adopting impact funds-SME investees as cases 
address one segment of the theoretical framework and ignore a vital segment which 
might not provide the full picture of the phenomenon under investigation. A final 
option, where impact investing phenomenon is examined within the research setting 
of Ghana and impact funds (bank-based and capital market-based) as two 
embedded case studies complemented by sub-unit of analysis of impact investors, 
investee SMEs and formal institutions. Such multiple units of analysis enable the 
application of the theoretical within a global context and local context for realising 
the social impact and financial returns in BoP communities.  
The unit of analysis can be either an individual, family, role, small group, 
places, communities, specific events, organization, or a nation (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2014). In this research, the unit of analysis focuses on bank-
based funds and Capital Market-based funds. The sub-unit of analysis first 
addressed the interaction or relationship between the impact investor-fund manager 
level and fund manager- investee SME level in realising the social impact and 
financial returns. Formal institutional sub-unit of analysis complemented emerging 
evidence from an impact investor, impact funds, and investee SMEs. Succinctly put, 
the unit of analysis involved analysing governance, strategy change and impacts at 
the investor-fund manager level and fund manager-investee SME levels. Multiple 
units of analysis were adopted because it ensures useful application of the 
theoretical framework within the research context of Ghana and within the global 
context. Moreover, such analysis through case study facilitates theory elaboration 
and theory building (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Figure 4.1 illustrates a schematic 
diagram of a multiple case study of impact funds and sub-unit of analysis for the 
study as earlier elaborated. 
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Figure 4. 1 Schematic diagram of multiple embedded case study 
Source: Authors illustration based on PhD fieldwork, 2018 
An explanatory case study purpose is adopted involving two case study of 
bank-based and capital market-based funds within the research setting of Ghana 
with multiple units of analysis aimed at theory building or theory elaboration. As 
suggested by Yin (2014), different purposes of case study research could be 
observed. A descriptive case study purpose is to describe a phenomenon in its real-
world context; exploratory purposes seek to identify the research questions and 
procedures necessary to explore a phenomenon in future research. Explanatory - 
explaining why some phenomenon came to be, and Evaluation- the purpose is to 
compare an intervention to an outcome of interest. It is in line with these purposes 
of case studies; a pilot research was conducted with an exploratory aim to uncover 
the actors in the field and test effectiveness of research instruments. Also, to identify 
research questions in the field, including ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions 
focusing on the socially constructed nature of reality within the research setting of 
Ghana. 
The pilot study enabled discovery of actors including impact investors, bank-
based and capital market-based funds, investee SMEs, institutions both formal and 
informal. Such discovery shaped the research design in terms of a two-case 
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embedded (multiple units of analysis). The pilot study further shaped the research 
design by way of data collection methods adopted and data collection instruments 
which guaranteed success during the fieldwork. The purpose of adopting a two-case 
study for this research is to explain the influences bank-based and capital market-
based funds on investee SMEs to realise the social impact and financial returns in 
BoP communities. Where influences are critically examined from governance, 
strategy change and impact perspectives. Perspectives of high growth, missing 
middle and established investee SMEs pursuing the dual goal of social impact and 
financial returns in BoP communities adds to the adoption of a two-case study 
design. To this end, an in-depth local context interaction between impact fund 
managers (bank-based and capital market-based) and investee SMEs are 
investigated. In applying and elaborating on the theoretical framework, the research 
seeks to uncover how the governance and strategies of bank-based and capital 
market-based institutions as agents of impact investors influence SMEs to realise 
the social impact and financial returns. Ultimately, the study seeks to provide a 
theoretical contribution in terms of theory building relating to governance 
mechanisms, strategy change and impacts that fund managers adopt to influence 
high growth and established SMEs to realise the social impact and financial returns. 
4.3.3 Validity and Reliability 
Criticism of case study research designs has focused on reliability, 
replicability, and validity from a positivist orientation. According to Yin (2014, p.45), 
underlisted tactics enable qualitative researchers using case study research 
designs to overcome critics: 
• Construct validity- use multiple sources of evidence, establish a chain of 
evidence, have critical informants review draft report 
• Internal Validity - do pattern matching, do explanation building, address rival 
explanations, use logic models 
• External validity- use theory in single-case studies, use replication logic in 
multiple-case studies 
• Reliability- use case study protocol, develop case study database 
Twining et al., (2017, p. A7) defined data triangulation as “using data from different 
participants or in different settings; and method triangulation-using multiple methods 
to collect data”. Consistent with this definition, data collection for this PhD relied on 
multiple sources to achieve data triangulation (Twining et al., 2017), principally 
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primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include interviews with investors, 
bank and capital market-based fund managers, investee SMEs and institutions. 
Fieldwork notes from rapid participant observation of participants in their offices, 
visits to sites and informal chat with other employees uncovered the depth of 
information or otherwise from secondary sources for triangulation. Secondary 
sources of data were also collected from websites of investors, bank and capital 
market-based fund managers, SMEs, practitioner associations, academic research 
centres and publications from development finance institutions. Employing 
interviews, rapid participant observations and documentary methods of data 
collection accomplished methods triangulation (Twining et al., 2017). Section 4.6 
evidence further details of multiple data sources and collection methods to achieve 
data and methods triangulation (Twining et al., 2017). Internal validity was address 
through different analytical techniques detailed in Section 4.7.  Bank-based funds 
and SMEs as one set of cases and capital market-based funds and investee SMEs 
representing another set of cases were critically examined for differences and 
similarities through pattern matching aimed at towards theory building. Other cases 
within these two sets that displayed contrary pattern were also critically analysed for 
contrast in line with the suggestion by Yin (2014). 
The rigorous application of this process of collecting data from different 
research participants and applying multiple methods of data collection, cross-
checking interviews with fieldwork notes and reports obtained justifies external 
validity, through cross-case analysis of fund managers and SME investees. Further, 
adopting a non-probability purposive sampling technique discussed next, collecting, 
and analysing multiple sources of data, cross-checking of interview transcripts with 
fieldwork notes and analysed documents obtained from different sources about 
these sets of cases add to external validity evidence. Also, reliability details through 
a case study database are shown in Section 4.5. Suffice to add that inferences and 
generalisability of the findings are to the "theoretical propositions and not to the 
population of universes" (Baskarada, 2014, p. 8) in this study. 
In summary, case study research design is appropriate to investigate the 
‘why' and ‘how' about the influences of impact investment funds on investee SMEs 
through governance, strategy and impacts to realise the social impact and financial 
returns. This approach compared to the other designs that focus on quantification 
and frequencies of events occurrence, is suitable for theory building or development. 
The adopted sampling techniques are presented next. 
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4.4 Sampling Approach 
Two broad categories of sampling techniques emerge in literature comprising 
probability and non-probability sampling methods (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin; 
2014; Bryman and Bell, 2015). Probability sampling is a method where the 
probability of selecting each unit is random from the population as a sample (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). A population represent total sample of case with a given 
criteria. The aim in probability sampling can be described as an effort to make 
inferences and a generalisation about the population based on the samples chosen 
for the study (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Examples 
of probability sampling include pure random, systematic, stratified random and 
multistage cluster (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Non-probability sampling techniques, 
however, entails non-random selection of members of a population as samples or 
cases based on the researcher interest and cases are for theoretical rather than 
statistical generalisation (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Such approaches tend to be 
unique due to different conditions for case selection, e.g. specific questions, specific 
sites, and cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
In adopting a non-probability sampling approach, I do not aim at making 
generalisations of the study based on the sample but instead seeks to explore 
different perspectives from a range of individuals relevant to the research questions 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015). Non-Probability sampling techniques include purposive, 
convenient, snowballing, theoretical, opportunistic and stratified purposive. In 
purposive sampling, a researcher sets sample characteristics to check whether units 
meet such eligibility criteria and identifies them for inclusion (Bryman and Bell, 
2015). Purposive sampling allows a choice of a case because it illustrates some 
feature or process of interest to a researcher. Convenient sampling is another non-
probability sampling technique where participants are selected based on ease of 
access. Theoretical sampling technique involves the process of data collection, 
coding, and analysis in a continuous manner where decisions about sample size 
are made progressively until theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). Snowballing, also known as a referral, network or chain sampling (Bryman 
and Bell, 2015) involves identifying a unit that meets the eligibility criteria for 
inclusion and then asks for the recommendation of other units. 
Conceptually case selections based on purposive sampling versus 
theoretical sampling approach have sometimes been viewed synonymously based 
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on the interest of the researcher in selecting sample cases. However, while 
purposive sampling selects sample cases or participants based on clearly defined 
parameters of a population, theoretical sampling case selection is instead based on 
theory and not defined a-priori. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that 
purposive sampling is adopted when there is a focus on the unique context of a case 
however when a case is easily accessible geographically and immediately, it 
becomes convenient sampling. Bryman and Bell (2015) viewed theoretical sampling 
as a form of purposive sampling deployed in the context of grounded theory. 
Theoretical saturation implies the successive selection of cases, and the collection 
of data through interviews or observations leads to repeated categories or themes 
with little need for further data collection (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Also, case 
selection in theoretical sampling focuses on samples that will either appropriately 
illuminate examples of the case or extend relationships and logic among the 
construct for theory testing, theory-building, and theory elaboration (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). Selecting two cases through theoretical sampling are more based 
on theoretical reasons such as replication, an extension of theory, contrary 
replication and dropping of alternative explanations (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007; Yin, 2014). In view of the theoretical sampling approach, the study selected 
samples of a bank-based and capital market-based funds as two sets of cases 
toward theory development. 
  By way of sampling cases, I first conducted a pilot study in Ghana in March 
2017 to test access to research participants. A non-probability sampling technique 
of convenient sampling because of easy access and snowballing sampling (referral, 
chain or network based on an initial sample) were deployed to access banks, capital 
market-based funds and SME investees. The outcome from the pilot study informed 
the sampling technique adopted during the actual PhD fieldwork and data collection. 
Based on the developed theoretical framework, a theoretical sampling of cases was 
utilised from an initial database of twenty bank-based institutions, ten capital market-
based funds and twenty SME investees. As Yin (2014) pointed out, selection of 
cases should be related to the theoretical proposition of interest. For bank-based 
institutions, preliminary analysis of interviews and analysis of documentary evidence 
from the first two cases were revelatory, and differences emerged. The subsequent 
case also provided additional perspectives towards the theoretical framework and 
with evidence of consistency compared to the previous cases. The fourth case 
showed marginal differences and significant evidence similarities from the first two 
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cases. So, with the fourth case, a semblance of theoretical saturation started 
emerging. The last case, which was the fifth case confirmed theoretical saturation 
in virtually repeating the evidence emerging in the previous four cases consistent 
with Twining et al., (2017). 
Similarly, with the capital market-based funds, the first three cases provided 
enough information on similarities and differences based on the theoretical 
framework. The fourth case had some unique characteristics and contextual factors, 
which varied from the previous three. This informed the further selection of the 
capital market- based cases for analysis in line with theoretical sampling techniques. 
Consequently, the fifth case selection facilitated replication logic of multi-case study 
approach. The last case, an exemplar showed theoretical saturation in providing 
similar evidence like all the previous cases. 
For investee SME cases, purposive sampling technique was initially 
developed focusing on early-stage, high growth, established and missing middle 
SMEs in five geographical regions in Ghana. Research constraints of funding, 
logistics and time led to a revision of the geographical regions from five to three. 
Based on the evidence from the pilot study, interaction with fund managers and 
theoretical framework for the study, theoretical sampling technique was employed 
during the PhD fieldwork for selection of SME cases. SME investees cases provided 
instances of high growth, missing middle and established enterprises which had 
access to funds from bank-based institutions only, capital market-based funds only 
and others with experiences of both banks based and capital market-based 
institutions. This evidence and perspectives from managers of this high growth, 
missing middle and established businesses reached theoretical saturation where 
subsequent case selection added little information. 
In all, an estimated number of ten bank-based funds, ten capital market-
based funds and 25 SME investees initially constituted the sample size for the PhD 
project located in three geographical regions in Ghana. Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) 
observed that after conducting 30 interviews, they reached theoretical saturation 
with no new concept emerging. In exploring informal microfinance institutions and 
development-led tourism entrepreneurship, Ngoasong and Kimbu (2016) sampled 
twelve enterprises for their study. Along a similar line, Ruebottom (2013) selected 
ten for-profit and non-profit social enterprises as samples to investigate 
microstructures of rhetorical strategy in social entrepreneurship. These qualitative 
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studies serve as illustrative examples of how theoretical saturation can be achieved 
during qualitative data collection. Consistent with Bryman and Bell (2015, p.431-
432) definition of saturation where “successive interviews/observations have both 
formed the basis for the creation of a category and confirmed its importance and 
theoretical categories, the relevant categories”, the sample of 45 for this PhD was 
meant to achieve saturation. Development finance institutions and impact investors 
located globally were also selected through theoretical sampling technique to 
complement local contextual unit of analysis on impact investing in Ghana. I now 
address how access to research participants was secured in the next section. 
4.5 Access to research participants 
This section 4.5 present explanation on how I secured access to research 
participants through a pilot study and consequently PhD fieldwork. Challenges are 
also highlighted. Access to some research participants started from the pilot study 
conducted in March 2017 through pre-notification of participants that the researcher 
would return later in the year for PhD data collection. Key issues relating to access 
to research participants involves negotiation to gain entry to organizations, 
institutions or locations and participants for the study. Negotiating access to 
research participants occurs in two forms; discussion to access research 
participants and manoeuvring into positions for necessary data collection ease, 
requiring diplomacy and patience (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). For some of 
the bank-based participants, the researcher negotiated access first through former 
university colleagues at the undergraduate level currently working and holding 
middle-level management positions in these organizations. These key contacts then 
informed research participants who obliged to provide interview before email 
exchanges with attached PhD research information sheet, consent form and sample 
interview protocol. Table 4.4 details pre-fieldwork preparation. 
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Table 4. 4 Timelines to PhD data collection 
Timelines Activity Goal and Outcome 
March 2017 • Pilot study • To secure access to research 
participants and test data 
collection methods and tools. 
• To confirm the relevance of the 
research questions from impact 
investment fund managers and 
SMEs. 
• Secured access to 4 fund 
managers and SMEs for in-
depth interviews during formal 
PhD fieldwork.  
October -
November 
2017 
• Pre-fieldwork preparation. 
Desk research and follow-up email 
exchanges   
• To develop potential list of 
research participants before 
fieldwork. 
• A list of 30 potential participants 
was developed from USAID 
FINGAP database. 
• Email correspondence to 
participants with attached 
information sheet, sample 
interview questions and consent 
forms were exchanged. 
• Use of informal networks to 
access bank-based participants. 
December 
2017 
Contact with institutional research 
participants 
• To obtain policymaking and 
institutional perspective to the 
study 
• Development of potential list of 
participants 
Source: Authors illustration  
 
4.5.1 Research Setting 
Five regions in Ghana were initially designated as locations for the selection of 
participants due to the concentration of financial institutions and SMEs representing 
Ghana's industrial and economic structure (Aryeetey and Ahene, 2005). However, 
resource constraints meant a review of these regional locations without 
compromising the quality of information gathered. For completeness two criteria 
which informed the selection includes; a region with higher business concentration 
possesses unique opportunities and resources, making those regions investment 
attractive and venture set-up friendly. Also, financial institutions, through their 
relationship management and geographic spread locate in regions with higher 
business concentration for revenue generation and increased market share in 
Ghana. The selected regions correspond with Obeng et al., (2014) SME survey in 
which respondents emerged from these and other regions. 
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Two regions emerged with the most established businesses and spread of 
financial institutions, namely the Greater Accra Region and Ashanti Regions. So, 
impact investment funds, financial institutions and SMEs for the project were in 
these two regions. A third geographic area, the Eastern Region emerged during the 
data collection involving three high growth and established SMEs which had factory 
locations in the region with offices in the Greater Accra. Government of Ghana, Free 
Zones Authority, demarcated lands in the Eastern Region which formed a cluster of 
industries. Chapter 3 evidence detail characteristics of these regions. Figure 4.2 
below shows the map of Ghana with the three Regions also shown. 
Figure 4. 2 Map of Ghana  
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4.5.2 Study Participants and fieldwork  
January - April 2018 – Practical challenges in gaining access occurred during 
the first few weeks of the fieldwork. Emails and telephone calls to bank-based 
officials and capital market-based fund managers were not replied or answered, 
respectively. To avoid cold calling at the offices of these participants, a couple of 
them replied that they were busy with annual reporting and other engagements. At 
an informal visit to a research participant at the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning (MOFEP), the participant recommended the need for me to cold call these 
officials in their offices, which worked effectively. A research participant who was 
contacted and emailed concerning the fieldwork interview on the phone remarked: 
"apologies, I have not checked my email for that past one month because I have 
been out of the office". Ormiston et al. (2015) through semi-structured interviews 
lasting 60- 90 minutes examined how impact investors overcame challenges 
emerging from impact investing. Participants involved a representative of 10 
organizations' in Australia, Europe, and USA. 
Research participants interviewed comprised bank-based fund managers, 
capital market-based fund managers, SME investees and representative of 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) as impact investors in two phases. Phase 
one focused on the local context in identifying bank-based institutions, impact fund 
managers and SMEs in Ghana over a period from January 2018 to April 2018. 
Phase two started in the latter part of May 2018 focused on developing a potential 
list of 20 development finance institutions and networks within the impact investment 
space or sector at the global level. The phase two sought to provide a global 
perspective towards theory development and elaboration. Four representatives of 
DFI's were interviewed with each interview lasting 45-minutes for data triangulation. 
Interviews were conducted via telephone over the month of June 2018 and audio 
recorded for transcription.  
Five bank-based fund institutions were interviewed, and in each of these 
banks, two participants were interviewed except one. Commercial banks in Ghana 
typically have organisational structures comprising the Board of Directors, executive 
management, departmental heads, middle management team, branch managers 
and operational staff. Relationship managers (RMs) who directly engage clients and 
constitute an advocate of clients at credit committee meetings. However, subtle 
differences emerge in some of the banks with Pan-African presence in terms of 
efficiency and scale, resulting in unique reporting lines among some management 
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members. For the purposes of this research, participants interviewed from bank-
based institutions comprised departmental heads and relationship managers. On 
average, these research participants have worked in these institutions for more than 
ten years. Most of these departmental heads have previously held the role of 
relationship managers in their career progression. Interviews with bank-based fund 
managers on average lasted 70 to 90 minutes and audio recorded for transcription 
at the head office of these research participants. Secondary data in terms of reports, 
documents and flow chart illustrating issues emerging or comment from the 
interviews were collected from participants. Departmental heads were first 
interviewed and subsequently RMs on separate dates. Pictures of office location 
and building were taken. Fieldwork notes taken during the interview, and rapid 
participant observation was further developed at the end of the day. Interviews were 
held on separate dates for all research participants. All the bank-based fund 
managers were in the Greater Accra Region and have branch networks in all the 16 
regions in Ghana. 
Similarly, interviews with impact investment fund managers followed the 
same process. Impact investment or private equity funds typically have small 
member teams operating on the ground sourcing pipeline of deals for investment 
committee approvals. These entities have an average staff size of eight (8). Local 
funds have the entire team comprising the board of directors, CEO, and deputy and 
then investment manager with other investment analyst domiciled in the country. 
However, the foreign funds have head offices in the country of incorporation and the 
in-country team source and process deals for consideration at the head office level. 
Regarding this study, the researcher gained access to both local and foreign 
impact funds located in the country and interviewed either the CEO/ Country 
manager or investment managers. In two of the funds, two research participants 
were interviewed. Interviews were audio-recorded, lasting for 70-90 minutes guided 
by an interview protocol. All the interviews were held in the offices of fund managers 
located in the Greater Accra Region. Some of the fund managers provided 
secondary data mainly brochures, leaflets, and other handbills for promotional 
activity. They were, however, reluctant to share even disguised confidential 
documents such as business plans, minutes of meeting with SMEs.  
High growth, missing middle and established SME owner-managers who 
secured impact investment funds or financing from bank-based institutions were 
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interviewed in their offices lasting averagely 90 minutes and manufacturing sites to 
understand their operations. These interviews were held on different dates travelling 
across the country from Greater Accra to Ashanti Region and Eastern Region. 
Secondary data collected from participants were complemented with website 
information, reports from funders and case-studies conducted by the Global Impact 
Investing Network (GIIN). Fieldwork notes from rapid participant observations and 
pictures of operational sites, office building, nearby communities, creeds on notices, 
equipment and machines facilitated an in-depth understanding of these cases. In 
the absence of the founder or owner mangers, the financial managers represent an 
alternative repository of company-wide knowledge. It is important to add that, it is 
not the number of interviews that matter however it is the attainment of theoretical 
saturation as established earlier in the chapter. 
Table 4.5 and 4.6 provides a list of research participants interviewed for this 
study. 
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Table 4. 5 List of bank-based and capital market-based research participants 
  Institution 
Geographical 
location Description 
Position of 
participant(s) Education  
A 
Bank-
based     
1 BBA001 Greater Accra 
Commercial Bank 
rated in the top six 
banks 1. Head, Agri-business Unit 
Masters and 
LLB 
    2. Relationship Manager MBA 
      
2 BST002 Greater Accra 
Top tier commercial 
bank Head, Retail Banking 
CFA and BSc 
Degree 
      
3 BFI003 Greater Accra 
Commercial bank 
within the top six 
banks 
1. Head, Strategic 
Partnership PhD 
    2. Relationship Manager 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
      
4 BEC004 Greater Accra 
Top tier commercial 
bank 1. Senior Accounts manager MBA 
    
2. Head, Digital Banking-
Group level MBA 
      
5 BCA005 Greater Accra 
Indigenous growing 
bank 
1. Deputy head, corporate 
banking MBA 
    2. Senior Financial Manager MBA 
      
B Capital Market     
6 CGF001 Greater Accra 
Private equity and 
impact-oriented 
generalist fund 1. General Manager MBA 
    2. Investment Manager  
      
7 CIP002 Greater Accra 
Private equity and 
impact-oriented 
generalist fund 
operating in 15 other 
African countries Investment Manager MBA 
      
8 CIN003 Greater Accra 
Private equity and 
impact-oriented 
agribusiness fund 
focusing on West 
Africa CEO MBA 
      
9 COA004 Greater Accra 
Private equity 
generalist fund 
focusing on Ghana 
and Cote D'Ivoire 1. Chief Operating Officer MBA 
    2. Investment Manager MBA 
      
10 CAC005 Greater Accra 
Impact oriented 
generalist fund 
focusing on West 
Africa Portfolio Manager MBA 
      
11 CJC006 Greater Accra 
Financial inclusion 
focused fund CEO MSc and BA 
  Source: Authors illustration base on four months PhD Fieldwork 
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Table 4. 6 List of SME research participants 
  Name 
Geographical 
location Description 
Position of 
participant(s) 
1 SPE001 Greater Accra Off-grid energy distributor Chief operations officer 
     
2 SED002 Greater Accra Produce and distribute fresh vegetables CEO /Managing Director 
     
3 SES003 Greater Accra Agri-business technology provider Country Managing Director 
     
4 SIN004 Greater Accra Microfinance institution 1. General Manager 
    2. Financial Controller 
     
5 SGE005 Greater Accra Distributor of soymilk products CEO 
     
6 SPS006 Greater Accra Commerce and warehousing services CEO 
     
7 SYU007 Greater Accra Producer and distributor of yoghurts CEO 
     
8 SFR008 Greater Accra 
Producer and exporters of fruit 
concentrate 
Co-founder/General 
Manager 
     
9 SAG009 Ashanti Region Manufacturer of animal feeds 
Interim Management 
Committee 
Chairman/Accountant 
     
10 SNR010 Ashanti Region 
Rural community financial service 
provider and microfinance Managing Director 
     
11 SFA011 Ashanti Region Producer of organic fertilizer 
Co-founder/ Managing 
Director 
     
12 SEU012 Ashanti Region Manufacturing and agri-business CEO 
     
13 SLI013 Eastern Region Distributor of fuel products CEO 
     
14 SBU014 Eastern Region 
Manufacturer of roofing sheets and 
kitchen accessories CEO 
     
15 SG0015 Eastern Region 
Producer and exporters of fresh 
pineapples 1. Financial Controller 
        2. Farm Manager 
Source: Authors illustration based on four months PhD fieldwork 
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4.6 Data Collection Method 
 
This section details the data collection approach, coding, and methods of data 
analysis. A qualitative data collection approach was applied involving primary data 
collection through a semi-structured interview protocol as data collection 
instrument/protocol to elicit information from participants. Also, rapid participant 
observation technique was adopted with details captured in fieldwork notes. Finally, 
secondary data through documents (reports, leaflets, brochures) were gathered. 
Based on the theoretical framework, investors, fund managers and SME owner-
managers comprised the interview research participants. These research 
participants were key actors whose actions, decisions and interactions in a socially 
constructed manner influence the realisation of social impact and financial returns. 
Besides, regulatory and promoting institutional actors ensure stability within the 
financial and enterprise architecture. Previous social entrepreneurship studies 
examining different concepts for theory building have interviewed managers, 
entrepreneurs, and owner-managers as participants in exploring how they realise 
social impact (Kimbu and Ngoasong, 2016; Ruebottom, 2013; Zahra et al., 2009). 
4.6.1 Primary Sources-Semi-structured interviews 
Fieldwork for data collection in Ghana lasted four months from January 2018 to April 
2018. All 44 formal and 3 informal interviews were conducted in the offices of bank-
based institutions, capital market-based funds and SME investees. Also, interviews 
with regulatory institutions were carried out in their respective officers in the Greater 
Accra Region. Nine interviews were conducted with five (5) bank-based fund 
managers lasting 70-90 minutes with the aid of an interview guide at their head office 
location in Accra. These interviews were audio-recorded. For CMB fund managers, 
eight interviews were conducted with six (6) capital market-based funds for an 
average of 70 minutes face-to-face, audio-recorded and aided by an interview guide. 
Fifteen owner-managers and founders representing fifteen SMEs were interviewed 
averagely 90 minutes. Similarly, interviews with officials of regulatory and promoting 
institutions were on average, 60 minutes comprising five interviews. All these 
interviews were guided by an interview protocol developed before the fieldwork. And 
three interviews with employees of SMEs visited occurred at their sites. The 
interview protocol (attached as appendix 4a- 4d) was modified with additional 
questions based on feedback from supervisor’s midway through the fieldwork and 
emerging themes from previous interviews.  
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Data were collected from three time periods. First, primary data sources were 
adopted to gather data from January 2018 to April 2018, representing four months 
of fieldwork. In exploring such emerging phenomenon as impact investing, the 
interaction and narratives of impact investors, fund managers and SMEs owner-
managers as participants were valuable to significantly appreciate their building and 
dwelling modes of being (Leitch et al., 2013). Prominently, such interactions and 
descriptions align with the ontological and epistemological context of qualitative 
research methodology. In exploring the nuances of how impact investors through 
governance and strategy change influences impact funds and SMEs, an in-depth 
interview was conducted to source primary data. Three benefits emerged from 
adopting an interview as one of the data collection technique (Yin, 2014). Compared 
to other primary data collection approaches such as focus group and ethnography, 
in-depth interviews guaranteed an in-depth study of a phenomenon under 
investigation (Yin, 2014). To uncover themes and other salient factors from research 
participants, interviews permitted probing questions to be asked and follow-up 
questions for clarifications. 
Second, interviews usually face-to-face allow researchers to observe the 
demeanour of research participants and comprehend when answers are not 
satisfactory. Finally, it guarantees detail information and account of how the 
relationship between contracting parties was managed effectively through 
illustrations and stories shared by research participants. Besides, considering the 
time constraints of participants, other primary data collection tools might be less 
useful compared to the interview. Finally, the in-depth interview provides a rich and 
exciting account for detail study which enable researchers to comprehend the 
objectives and phenomena under scrutiny in contrast to the count and classify 
approach in quantitative approaches (Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
Rapid participant observation technique was also employed during the 
fieldwork visits to offices of impact fund managers, manufacturing sites of investee 
SMEs and farms of some of the enterprises. Rapid participant observation captured 
in field notes enabled identification of other themes not previously examined during 
the literature review. Rapid participant observation has been noted to be effective in 
researching small-size businesses (Kimbu and Ngoasong, 2016; Newby et al., 
2003). The technique was helpful during informal visits to regulatory and promoting 
institutions, interaction with staffs of fund managers and investee SMEs to 
triangulate evidence obtained through an interview with participants.  
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Photographic evidence of factory locations, project sites, farms, office 
building as well as promotional tools in the offices of research participants provided 
additional observations captured in fieldwork notes. Emerging diagrams of 
operational activities of some of the investee SMEs demonstrated vital observations. 
Further details of what was observed during these interactions are presented in the 
empirical chapters and discussion.  
Data collected on cases based on theoretical sampling were also discussed 
with supervisors' mid-way through the PhD fieldwork via skype interview and 
feedback through tracked comments on the status report. The first few interviews 
that were conducted were transcribed and discussed with the two PhD supervisors. 
Specifically, 15 representative interview transcripts (3 from entrepreneurs, 10 from 
fund managers and 2 informal interviews) were discussed. Given their expertise in 
the subject area and their knowledge of the research as supervisors, their comments 
were used to clarify gaps in the interviews that needed to be addressed in 
subsequent interviews. By following up on those gaps in later interviews as well as 
collecting data on the main interview questions, theoretical saturation was achieved 
as employed in a previous study (Ngoasong, 2018). In pursuit of the remaining 
interviews toward theoretical saturation, documentary evidence and other sources 
of data were collected.  
4.6.2 Secondary Sources I-Documentary evidence 
 
The secondary data sources were from documentary evidence — reports comprised 
financial statements and other investor reports. A wealth of data about the financial 
position of the banks, strategies adopted, and funding sources are usually captured 
in their annual financial statements. Strategically most banks in Ghana have 
positioned themselves as investor-friendly, so they always advertise their financial 
statements globally through their websites. However, listed banks on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange are obliged to submit these reports quarterly and annually in line 
with the listing rules, (GSE, 2018). 
Concerning impact funds, their financial statements tend to be proprietary. 
Some of the documentary evidence about the background and history of these 
impact or private equity funds were captured in brochures and pamphlets. Besides, 
published reports on private equity growth in Africa from the African Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Association (AVCA) and others developed by development 
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finance institutions served as excellent sources of documentary evidence. For 
example, the private sector arms of development agencies provide information 
disclosure requirements, publish information on all funds and SMEs they have 
supported on their website. Also, reports developed to guide emerging impact, or 
private equity managers are publicly available to develop capacity in the sector. 
4.6.3 Secondary Source II- Websites 
 
The final source of data is a secondary data mainly from the websites of impact or 
private equity funds, development agencies, development finance institutions and 
Association of Venture Capital, Africa (AVCA). Additional data were sourced from 
websites of impact fund managers and development finance institutions which 
corroborated emerging themes from the interviews regarding governance and 
strategies of fund managers to influence SMEs for social impact and financial 
returns. Strategies relating to investment deal sizes, fund profile, sectoral focus, 
typical SME investees, deal structuring for social impact were sourced from impact 
reports, pamphlets, and websites which when combined facilitated triangulation 
between different data sources for data credibility (Ruebottom, 2013).  
To complement data collection from primary participants, informal visits to 
government agencies connected to impact investing were undertaken for data 
triangulation, opportunities, and challenges within the institutional context. 
Perspectives of policymakers connected to impact investing in Ghana deepened the 
explanations provided by research participants. It also uncovered voids within the 
institutional and legislative landscape necessary for the development of impact 
investing. Some of these institutions comprise the Venture Capital Trust Fund 
(VCTF), GIMPA Centre for Impact Investing (GCII), Ghana Free Zones Authority, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), National Pensions Regulatory 
Authority (NPRA) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP). 
Such visits informed contribution of this PhD research to policy in Ghana. Table 4.7 
details institutional research participants interviewed and engaged during the visit. 
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Table 4. 7 Institutional participants, role, issues discussed and documentation type 
Name of 
institution 
Role of the 
research 
participant 
Issues discussed Documentation 
mode 
Ministry of Finance 
and Economic 
Corporation  
The Unit Head, 
African Development 
Bank 
Government funding 
challenges with the 
emergence of impact 
investing 
Tape recording and 
notes were taken. 
Issues requiring 
clarification were 
posed 
Ministry of Finance 
and Economic 
Corporation 
The Head, External 
Resource Mobilisation 
Causes of low flows of 
ODA, growth of impact 
investing, the role of 
policymakers 
Audiotape recording 
and notes taking 
National Pensions 
Regulatory 
Authority 
The Director, Policy 
Planning and Market 
Research 
Role of pension funds 
for long-term financing 
of SMEs 
Audio tape-recording 
and notes were taken. 
Observations and 
pictures of the location 
were captured. 
Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission 
The Head of Policy, 
Research and ICT 
Regulations, financial 
system, private 
equity/VC funds, 
challenges of the 
institution 
Audiotape recording 
and notes were taken. 
Pictures of office 
location 
Ghana Free Zones 
Authority 
Deputy Chief 
Executive, Corporate 
Affairs 
Role of supporting 
export-oriented SMEs 
with dual objectives. 
Promotional role and 
opportunities for 
funders. 
Tape recording and 
notes were taken. 
Venture Capital 
Trust Fund 
General Manager Their role within the 
impact investing 
landscape, funding 
and capacity building. 
Tape recording and 
notes taking 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD fieldwork notes 
Documentation of discussions through notes-taking provided sense-making of the 
context (Mason and Doherty, 2016) and issues under discussion with policy 
implementing institutions. Also, other issues which emerged during the interview 
were clarified and juxtaposed with bank-based and capital market-based fund 
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manager evidence. Data collection technique, instruments and other practices 
relating to ethical guidelines were pre-tested during the pilot study conducted in 
March 2017 before the actual PhD fieldwork. 
4.7 Method of Data Analysis 
 
Typically linking data to theoretical propositions and drawing inferences constitute 
analysis. Broadly Yin (2009, p. 126) suggest that that "data analysis consists of 
examining, categorising, tabulating, testing, or otherwise recombining evidence to 
draw empirically-based conclusions". In respect of this study, examining, tabulating, 
and categorising represented a series of processes in data reduction and coding to 
uncover critical concepts. I applied both deductive and inductive approach in the 
context of the theoretical framework. Moreover, data analysis described as a 
process through which "interpretation and inferences" (Twining et al. 2017, p. A6) 
are captured in search of "explanatory laws" (Stake, 1978, p.7) represents the 
second dimension of the analysis. To this end, in applying the theoretical framework 
within an empirical research setting of Ghana, inferences on governance, strategy 
change, and impacts emerged. Through the two case studies of bank-based and 
capital market-based funds, the phenomenon of impact investing as alternative 
financing to traditional funding represent explanatory laws. Impact funds comprising 
BBF and CMB represented two case studies and unit of analysis while impact 
investors, SMEs, institutions, and documents were sub-unit of analysis. Finally, 
O'Brien et al., (2014) also recommend that data analysis as a process should 
encapsulate methods of processing including data entry, transcription, data 
management and security, verification of data integrity, coding and anonymisation. 
Data analysis processes are documented in the following sub-sections. 
4.7.1 Data reduction and coding  
Drawing on the clarifications in section 4.7 on what constitutes data analysis, a five 
steps process of coding and analysis of the influences of impact funds on SMEs to 
realise the social impact and financial returns in BoP communities were carried out. 
Data coding and reduction draws on Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) and Yin 
(2014) in the context of the developed theoretical framework. Three concepts of the 
theoretical framework comprised governance, strategy change and impact (social 
impact and financial returns). By governance, ownership, control, and board 
representation constituted theoretical dimensions. Another concept, including 
finance-first and impact-first from the theoretical framework were coded to explain 
148 
 
circumstances under which bank-based and capital market-based funds adopt such 
labels. The first step involved source organising of the corpus of data from research 
participants in Nvivo Pro 11. Three sources, namely interview transcripts, 
documentary evidence (reports, brochures, posters, and leaflets) and fieldwork 
notes from rapid participant observation, were imported into NVivo 11 Pro. The 
second step involved, coding of the data using low-level codes or first-order 
concepts under respondent type (e.g. bank-based, capital market-based, SMEs, 
Institutions, and DFIs). The integrated theoretical framework informed the 
development of a coding scheme applied in data reduction and coding.  
 Next step involved identifying second-order concepts or medium-level codes 
based on extant literature to further code and re-classify the first order codes. This 
analytic approach applies grouping and pattern matching, which promote data 
categorisation (Miles et al., 2014). Then the next step involved tabulation of the 
second-order concepts into an aggregated dimension which reflects concepts 
based on the theoretical framework on governance, strategy change and impacts. 
Empirical chapters 5 and 6 illustrate different tables on governance mechanisms at 
the investor-fund manager level and fund manager- investee SME level. The next 
step involved coding of participant responses to specific theoretical arguments and 
triangulating with secondary and rapid participant observations using critical 
phrases as codes. The codes aided analysis and allowed case illustrations to be 
noted as categories of observed constructs of the theoretical framework, especially 
for case descriptions (Yin, 2014).  
The same processes were applied to uncover fund manager-SME investee 
relationship focusing on governance, strategy change and impacts. Keywords, 
phrases, and concepts were deductively coded as first-order concepts. These first-
order concepts were examined critically, grouped, tabulated and re-classified to 
reflect similar concepts. Such an approach reflects the first part of Yin (2014) data 
analysis approach for cases. Based on recoding, reclassification, tabulation, and 
reference to previous literature, the first-order concepts were categorised and 
labelled with second-order concepts from literature. Tabulation of data in empirical 
chapters 5 and 6 include concepts of governance, strategy change, and impacts 
presented according to first-order, second order and third order aggregated 
dimensions. For example, the data structure of investor-bank-based fund manager 
governance is depicted in chapter 5, table 5.2. Similarly, table 6.4 of chapter 6 shows 
the data structure CMB-investee SME governance. Moreover, narratives reflecting 
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the theoretical dimensions of the framework are presented as a case illustration. 
Data reduction and coding applied abductive strategy involving both deductive and 
inductive analytic approach. Finally, the second-order concepts were aggregated to 
evidence the theoretical dimensions of the framework and arguments developed in 
the literature review deductively.  
4.7.2 Adopted analysis methods 
The study drew on different data analysis techniques with a focus on the research 
problem and research question in applying the theoretical framework. The research 
adopts a general analytic approach drawing on content analysis (Krippendorff, 
2013), thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and narrative analysis based on 
pattern matching and case descriptions (Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2014). 
Qualitative content analysis is described as a method of analysis for 
systematically exploring textual data to identify patterns and structures emerging as 
themes (Krippendorf, 2013; Bryman and Bell, 2015). The objective is to determine 
the construct features of a phenomenon under investigation. Quantitative 
researchers apply content analysis for making inferences based on the frequency 
of occurrence. In adopting content analysis as part of data analysis for this study, 
theme discovery processes were more implicit compared to quantitative 
approaches. In addition to the coding in the previous section, the corpus of coded 
data from the three sources (documentary evidence, fieldwork notes from rapid 
participant observation, interview transcripts) were content analysed.  
The content analysis sought to uncover evidence, circumstances, and 
conditions for categorising a fund as finance first and impact first. Moreover, 
evidence of influences at the impact-investor level and fund-manager-investee SME 
level from specific interview questions, documentary sources and fieldwork notes 
for triangulation in line with the theoretical framework. Extant literature (e.g. Moore 
et al., 2012; Ruebottom, 2013; Glänzel and Scheuerle, 2016) applied content 
analysis to identify themes and patterns deployed in empirical studies on impact 
investing and social entrepreneurship. Further, the research applied Braun and 
Clarke (2006) thematic analysis at another stage to uncover strategy change of 
bank-based and capital market-based fund managers in simultaneous pursuit of 
social impact and financial returns. Thematic analysis "is a method of identifying, 
analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within a data…. and interprets various 
aspects of the topic" (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.79). Due to the theoretical 
framework which informed the coding scheme, both deductive and inductive analytic 
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approaches representing "theoretical or deductive or top-down" and "inductive or 
bottom-up" were applied respectively (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Table 4.6 details 
Braun and Clarke (2006) six-phase thematic analysis approach. 
Table 4. 8 Six stages thematic analytic framework 
Phases of Thematic Analysis 
  Phase   Description of the process 
1 
Familiarising yourself with your 
data  
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-
reading the data, noting down your initial ideas. 
    
2 Generating initial codes  
Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic 
fashion across the entire data set, collating data 
relevant to each code. 
    
3 Searching for themes  
Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all 
data relevant to each potential theme. 
    
4 Reviewing themes  
Checking if the themes work with the coded extracts 
(Level 1) and the entire data set (level 2), generating 
a thematic 'map' of the analysis. 
    
5 Defining and naming themes  
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each 
theme and the overall story the analysis tells, 
generating clear definitions, and names for each 
theme. 
    
6 Producing the report  
The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples, the final analysis of 
selected extracts, relating of the analysis to the 
research question and literature, producing a 
scholarly report of the analysis. 
Source: Adapted from Braun and Clarke (2006) 
 
Processes of data reduction and coding approach elaborated in the previous 
section address the first three stages of Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis 
framework. Engaging with the different corpus of for the study, a series of reading 
and re-reading occurred while coding relevant portions deductively and inductively. 
Emerging themes for specific dimensions of the theoretical framework and 
conditions of strategy change by bank-based and capital market-based fund 
managers were tabulated, and patterns matched. Other emergent issues from 
research participants and fieldwork notes through rapid participant observation 
relevant to policymakers and investors were also analysed. Themes definition and 
naming, which represents phase 4 and 5 of Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic 
analysis was carried out to determine evidences capturing salient parts of the 
theoretical framework. Finally, vivid examples and compelling narratives linked to 
literature resulted in the presentation of two empirical chapters on impact funds and 
investee SMEs for social impact and financial returns. 
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Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) recommends that cross-case analysis 
have specific purposes in theory building. The study also adopted cross-case 
analysis, which consists of comparing the two case studies in empirical chapters 5 
and 6. Because the study aims at theory generation or building as detailed in the 
literature review and section 4.2, Miles et al. (2014) approach to cross-case analysis 
was applied. In applying cross-case analysis as an analytic tool, for capturing 
similarities, differences, and unique contents from the two case studies. Further, a 
cross-case analysis approach has been evidenced in literature as catalytic in 
knowledge and theory development (Bruton et al., 2010). Cross case analysis also 
seeks to realise two critical goals, namely to "enhance transferability to another 
context" (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014, p.101). Secondly, the cross-case 
analysis provides an opportunity for researchers to deepen understanding and 
explanation about a phenomenon under investigation. Especially where negative 
cases are identified which strengthen a theory through similarities and differences 
across cases (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana, 2014). Theory building aim of this 
study justify the application of cross-case analysis in undertaking the study. These 
two analytic approaches were finally applied to the study in explaining the 
phenomenon of impact investing through bank-based and capital market-based 
funds in two separate empirical chapters. 
Two empirical chapters of data analysis comprising bank-based funds and 
investee SMEs representing Chapter 5 and Capital Market-Based funds and 
investee SMEs presented in Chapter 6 constitute two sets of cases. These two 
chapters constitute the outcome of data analysis from the data collection. Ethics 
issues are presented next explaining guidelines and requirements from the OU 
ethics approval committee. 
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4.8 Ethics Considerations 
Ethics issue emerges in every business and management research in terms of 
researcher-participant relationship, access to research sites, manner of reporting 
research findings, and how overall implications of findings are disseminated to 
inform policy and practice. Bryman and Bell (2007) note ten ethical principles for 
research:  no harm to participants; respecting the dignity of participants; seeking 
informed consent; privacy of research subjects; data confidentiality; protecting the 
anonymity of individuals or organisations; avoiding deception; declaration of 
affiliations; honesty and transparency; and avoidance of any misleading or false 
reporting of research findings. To conduct the study, I secured approval for ethics 
on two occasions for a pilot and PhD fieldwork. For the pilot study, an ethics 
clearance from the Open University Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
dated 01/03/2017 referenced HREC/2017/2491/Lamptey/1 was granted for the 
study in March 2017. The purpose of the pilot was to test research instruments 
developed and subsequent fine-tuning during the primary fieldwork. The pilot also 
allowed operationalising the testing of the research questions and data collections 
tools drawing on empirical papers from the impact investing discipline including 
Micchelucci (2016), and Glanzel and Sheuerle (2016). An information sheet and 
consent form with anonymity clauses for the audio recording of the interview data 
were provided to participants during the pilot study. Emerging findings and evidence 
from the pilot study informed and enabled a refinement of the actual PhD fieldwork. 
I applied and secured ethics clearance from the Open University Human 
Research Ethics Committee (HREC) throughout October and November 2017 for 
the PhD fieldwork. In applying, I provided salient information about research title and 
objectives. In terms of methodology for the study, I demonstrated that the research 
applies a qualitative case study design to understand and explain the influences of 
impact investment funds on investee SMEs. Expected number of research 
participants for data collection estimated was ten (10) bank-based fund managers, 
ten (10) capital market-based fund managers, twenty (20) investee SMEs and 
selected officials at institutions such as SEC, GIMPA, VCTF and NBSSI. I further 
elaborated on the participant recruitment procedure to involve the use of a database 
developed during the pilot study and referrals from fund managers and network of 
contacts with former colleagues. To show how consent will be secured from the 
research participant, I attached a consent form designed based on standardised 
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requirements from the Open University to the application. The form is attached at 
the appendix to this thesis. 
Further, I submitted that data collection includes three geographic regions of 
Ghana, namely Greater Accra, Ashanti Region and Eastern at the offices and sites 
of research participants. Two essential published ethics and legal guidelines 
followed include the 'OU Ethics Principles for Research Involving Human 
Participants' and the 'OU Code of Practice for Research at the Open University'. In 
terms of data protection and information security, fieldwork notes were sealed, 
stored and in possession of the researcher. Digital data were kept in at least three 
formats online (OneDrive) at the OU, password protected on the OU desktop as well 
as fieldwork laptop in line with policy guidelines of the OU IT security policies and 
procedures. Audio recordings are anonymised during transcription, analysis, and 
writing up immediately after the interview. In anonymising the audio recordings and 
notes taken, I used unique codes for both participant and organisations were used. 
Other vital considerations including research data management, disseminating, and 
publishing research outcomes, deception, risk of harm and debriefing were all 
highlighted in the application.  
The Open University HREC granted a favourable ethics opinion for the 
conduct of this PhD study referenced HREC/2686/Lamptey dated 23/11/2017 
(Appendix 4e). The approval process required clarification on diverse issues, 
including anonymity of participants, informed consent, confidentiality, data 
management processes, as well as security of any confidential data. These issues 
were all addressed through e-mail correspondence with a member of the committee 
based on outcomes of their meetings. 
While seeking the HREC ethics approval, I sought to ascertain any local 
context ethics approval board before conducting such a study in Ghana. E-mails 
were sent to the Bank of Ghana, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MOFEP), Ministry of Trade and Industry and the response was contrary. Other 
research councils, such as the University of Ghana, were also contacted. However, 
it appeared that the remit of the study was outside the mandate of the institution. 
Other research ethics boards were more institution specific.   
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4.8.1 Participants Consent 
I sought informed consent from all research participants in Ghana and officials of 
Development Finance Institutions representing impact investors for the study before 
data collection. Within the local context, research participants were given consent 
forms and information sheet prior to the scheduled meeting date. On arrival at the 
meeting venue, the researcher spent the first few minutes to recap the background 
of the study and how confidentiality, secrecy and anonymity were guaranteed. 
Participants were also informed about the audio recording of the interview before 
the signing of consent forms and the commencement of the interviews. There were 
instances where participants avoided the audio recording of the interview or avoided 
the entire interview. For example, a relationship manager at one of the bank-based 
fund managers upon initial agreement to grant interview hesitated on my arrival. 
She argued that in line with their banks' policy, "they do not talk" and only a 
designated department has the mandate to engage persons conducting academic 
research or media-related activities. I had to explain the study, explain the content 
of the consent form, and how anonymity will be provided during analysis and 
publication. Finally, she agreed to be audio-recorded because of the relationship 
with her boss, whom I had earlier interviewed. Another SME owner told me that he 
wanted to decline participation in the study after initial consent. He changed our 
meeting date with excuses on three occasions before the finally agreed date for the 
interviews. 
While I have had the opportunity of working within the banking industry in 
Ghana, access to participants was obtained through informal channels based on 
trust with a network of professionals in the sector. Previous academic scholars (e.g. 
Mason and Doherty, 2016; Kimbu and Ngoasong, 2016) have effectively applied 
informal networks based on established trust to access research participants. 
Formal processes involved bureaucracy, and sometimes people assigned might not 
have credible information and knowledge about the research area. However, 
informal rules around trust are sometimes more credible than formal processes. 
Access to the bank-based fund managers was secured through an informal network 
of colleagues in different banks who provided e-mail and contacts of the participants 
for a follow-up. I had to reject a participant in one of the banks because, upon 
telephone conversation, I observed that she is a junior in the bank, and her 
information will not be credible. Sometimes informal channel of access has limits in 
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terms of the unwillingness of participants to snowball other participants for their 
insight in the same bank. 
Bryman and Bell (2015) note, issues of privacy, confidentiality, and 
anonymity of research participants as individuals or organisations studied require 
clarifications and assurance to research participants. Privacy relates to control over 
others access to oneself and associated information or preservation of boundaries 
against giving protected information. While confidentiality concern agreements with 
a person or organisation about what will be done with their data, including legal 
constraints. Finally, anonymity is associated with ways of disguising research 
participants so that information provided could not be linked to the individuals or 
organisations (Miles et al., 2014, p. 63). Based on the previous issues on privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity, the following actions were taken before fieldwork, 
during analysis and report writing. In terms of privacy, data obtained from research 
participants which were deemed confidential, example biographical data and role of 
participants within the organisation were all anonymised after the transcription of the 
interview data. Besides, secondary documentary evidence obtained was also 
anonymised using for example fund manager A, B and C with a prefix BBF and CMB 
for bank-based and capital market-based funds respectively.   
Regarding assurance on data confidentiality, prior information was provided 
to research participants that the data would be utilised within an academic context 
and findings would be published in academic journals, conferences and ultimately 
research thesis toward the award of a doctoral degree to the investigator. Besides, 
research participants would be granted the opportunity to attend any conference 
within the local economy after the completion of the program. However, for any other 
usage of the data outside these defined contexts, participants would be engaged for 
their consent. To guarantee anonymity to respondents, the researcher developed a 
coding identifier for each participant before coding of the data. This identifier starts 
with a prefix to identify the distinguish institution, fund and SME. It was then followed 
by the first two letters in the name of the specific organisation as a case and ended 
with a three-digit number (i.e. 001,002, and 003). The idea is to guarantee 
anonymity and facilitate easier recall of the case during the coding and analysis. 
Also, within the text, transcripts, and other documentary evidence where names of 
individual research participants emerge, a pseudonym is used to anonymise the 
information. 
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 Data protection and security measures were implemented through-out the 
fieldwork, analysis and writing-up. To this end, audio recordings of interviews were 
stored on a password-protected laptop of the researcher. Secondly, these interviews 
and transcribed data of research participants were uploaded unto the Open 
University One-Drive cloud-based desktop for data protection. Access to this data 
was only provided through the e-mail account and password of the research which 
guaranteed protection. Any fieldwork notes were securely protected in travelling 
bags of the researcher, enveloped and sealed. In conclusion, I obtained ethics 
approval for the study, which ensured that research participants provided 
appropriate information necessary for theory development for the study. 
4.8.2 Fieldwork challenges and Reflexivity 
As I was reflecting on the PhD fieldwork as someone with a network of contacts 
within the banking industry and officials at some institutions, there were challenges 
worth documenting for other research students to know. First, the need to follow-up 
on participants utilising the different medium of communication to ensure meeting 
agreed dates and venue. E-mail communication, which is useful in developed 
communities, does not work effectively in developing countries. I would not submit 
that it is cultural; however, many participants even though saw e-mails did not 
respond. I had to use informal networks via WhatsApp channel, mobile calls and 
send text messages to follow-up. In some instances, I drove to the offices of these 
research participants and waited to see them and agree on a suitable date for the 
interview. These were participants I interviewed earlier during my pilot in March 
2017.  
Second, sometimes, a researcher will only have one opportunity with a 
research participant, and you must go for it. One incident relates to a CEO of a 
capital market-based fund manager who had funding from CDC Group, UK. The 
CEO postponed the meeting for a late afternoon because of conflicting meeting 
times with an investee SMEs upon my arrival in their office. I left for another meeting 
and on my return encountered some traffic congestion. The administrator called that 
if I do not make the time, the CEO will not be available for about two months because 
of a purported foreign trip. I had to pack my car and hire a motorbike taxi to permeate 
the traffic congestion within 4 km distance for the interview meeting. The interview 
lasted for 45 minutes, and the fund manager had to jump unto skype meeting with 
some investors in the fund. I never had a second chance with this CEO until eight 
months later during discussion of preliminary findings.  
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Thirdly, a research student must prepare for any inconveniences during 
fieldwork involving a last-minute change of interview dates or venue. I travelled from 
Accra to Ashanti Region about 254.61 km journey for an interview. I got to the 
location of the research participant waited for about an hour. The participant 
informed me that due to a series of meetings, he could not grant me the interview. 
The next day, he is travelling to Accra for a meeting with some bankers. We then 
agreed to meet at the offices of the bank in Accra, so that we can interview after his 
meeting. I waited for two hours in the parking area opposite the bank. When I finally 
met the research participant, we must drive to a location and wait for him to take his 
lunch before the interview. The inconveniences were many, but I had to cope with 
the reality of fieldwork. It is essential to look out for different sources of data for 
triangulation.  
I made a strenuous effort to avoid the imposition of my knowledge from 
banking to affect the data from research participants. On many occasions, I avoided 
informing bank-based fund managers about my knowledge and experience within 
the banking industry in Ghana. I sparingly used my previous insight to seek 
clarification, probe critically about an issue emerging during the interview or 
secondary data cited from literature. Such clarification helped to avoid potential bias 
and ask leading questions. I also focused most of the questions on themes, 
concepts, and arguments from the theoretical framework for the study. There were 
instances when I drew research participants' attention to events within Ghana's 
economy for them to clarify statements which appear contradictory.  
4.9 Chapter summary and conclusion 
The chapter aimed at detailing the research design, research philosophy, and 
strategy for investigating the influences of impact investment funds on SMEs in BoP 
communities. Where influences were examined from governance, strategy change 
and impact perspectives. The chapter further explained the sampling technique, 
how research participants were secured, data collection methods, sources of data, 
and analysis adopted for the corpus of data collected. The chapter finally shows 
compliance with ethics procedures and requirements before and after the PhD 
fieldwork in terms of anonymisation of personal and confidential data. 
        In summary, the study adopts an interpretivist ontology of social 
constructionism and subjectivist epistemology informed by critical realism. A 
qualitative case study design is employed to critically investigate how impact 
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investment funds through governance, strategy change and impact influence SMEs 
in BoP communities. A non-probability sampling technique of purposive, theoretical, 
and snowballing was utilised to access research participants for the PhD fieldwork. 
         Three key empirical impact investing studies influenced the adoption of a 
qualitative research design and the methods employed in this research. Michelucci 
(2016, pg.1) who studied social impact investment in Italy aimed at uncovering the 
characteristics of the market or ecosystem in the absence of enablers. The author 
adopted a qualitative case study method, data collection through primary sources 
including observation and semi-structured interviews; and secondary sources (e.g. 
documents). Similarly, to understand the social impact investment market in 
Germany, Glanzel and Sheuerle (2016) employed a qualitative case study 
approach, collecting data through in-depth interviews with different actors within the 
ecosystem. Earlier, Ormiston et al., (2015) who sought to map the global landscape 
of impact investing and understand the perceived challenges of investors employed 
participant observation, interviews, and documents as data collection methods. It is 
important to note that confidentiality, and the fiduciary nature of investors, fund 
managers and SME owners justify the adoption of qualitative case study design. 
Moreover, the probability of these actors providing superficial information using 
surveys further justify the importance of the methodological approach in this study.  
        Research participants comprised nine officials' bank-based funds, eight 
officials of CMB funds, 17-SME owners and managers, 4-officials of regulatory and 
promoting institutions and two officials of policymaking institutions during the PhD 
fieldwork. Interviews with four representatives of DFI's were subsequently 
conducted for investor perspectives. The fieldwork within the research setting of 
Ghana involved four months visit to offices of research participants in three Regions, 
namely Greater Accra, Ashanti and Eastern. The interviews lasted for 70- 90 
minutes guided by a semi-structured interview guide, and rapid participant 
observation detailed in fieldwork notes. Secondary sources of data were also 
collected from research participants. Corpus of data collected were abductively 
coded and analysed based on the theoretical framework and data analysis methods 
of content, narrative and thematic analysis was applied.  
         Research methods for conducting academic studies have merits and 
demerits. The qualitative case study design method employed for this study has 
many benefits for understanding and explaining the phenomenon of impact 
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investing within the research setting of Ghana. Significant advantages of applying a 
case study research design are that it allows in-depth investigation of the 
phenomenon through critical analysis of interviews, rapid participant observation 
and documents to triangulate the data. The level of knowledge and understanding 
gathered on how impact fund managers use governance, strategy change and 
impacts to influence investee SMEs might not be unearthed through reports and 
secondary sources only. Second, the extent of confidentiality that impacts investors, 
fund managers, and SMEs analysed make qualitative case study the most 
appropriate research design to uncover the why and how of governance and 
strategy change among the participants in deliberate pursuit of social impact and 
financial returns in Ghana. Data gathering techniques of interviews, rapid participant 
observation and documents from secondary sources permitted cross-checking of 
data. Moreover, confirmation of preliminary findings post-analysis from fund 
managers and SME participants promoted the reliability and validity of findings. 
         A significant criticism of qualitative research design is the small sample size 
compared to the quantitative research approach. Because the study does not aim 
at the generalisation of the findings to the general population, it does not affect the 
reliability, credibility, and external validity of the study. More importantly, theoretical 
sampling approach adopted meant sample of participants selected were based on 
evidence obtained from previous participants to the point of theoretical saturation. 
The research setting of Ghana, which has many similarities with many countries in 
Africa and even South Asia, warrants the possibility of extending the findings across 
context from an ontological and epistemological perspectives is an added 
advantage. Twining et al. (2017) submit plausibility of extending qualitative research 
findings to context or settings like the context of the study. Critics of quantitative 
study will, however, raise the issue of how the study demonstrated the evidence of 
effects beyond examples and case descriptions which reflect the theoretical 
framework. Empirical chapter 5 is presented next about the analysis of bank-based 
funds and investee SMEs. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Analysis of Bank-Based Funds and SME investees 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to present analysis and findings concerning the 
influences of Bank-based impact funds (BBF) on SMEs, viewing influence in terms 
of governance, strategy change and impacts (social and financial returns). In 
applying the framework, the chapter present detail findings on governance at the 
investor-fund manager level and fund manager-SME investee levels. Subsequently, 
findings on strategy change and alignment at the investor-fund manager level and 
fund-manager-SME investee level. Investor-fund manager level evidences the 
relevance of the theoretical framework in a global context and facilitates its 
application within the African context. Similarly, fund-manager-SME investee level 
showcases the local context-specific dimensions of the theoretical framework and 
possible extension to the regional context. Suffice to add that the case study in this 
chapter is a single holistic case study of bank-based impact investments in Ghana 
with multiple units of analysis. 
Emerging evidence on the analysis of investor-BBF governance revealed two 
fundamental mechanisms, namely control and monitoring. Based on the five bank-
based fund managers analysed, impact investor funding was typically debt for on-
lending to SMEs in different sectors operating in BoP communities. Because of the 
structure of bank-based funds, contractual agreements with impact investors 
resulted in governance control mechanisms stipulated in legal agreements between 
the parties. The control dimension of governance required bank-based fund 
managers to fulfil performance indicators (qualitative and quantitative), financing 
and compliance-related covenants extensively analysed in Subsection 5.2.2. 
Monitoring emerged as the second governance mechanism concerning investor-
fund manager relationship. Monitoring governance mechanisms were enforced 
through reporting (financial and non-financial), quarterly certification of the loan 
portfolio for sectors agreed and percentages allocated, independent third-party 
verification and annual visits. Impact investors (mainly DFI's) as a source of long-
term funding for bank-based fund managers made monitoring a crucial governance 
mechanism. 
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Bank-based fund manager - investee SME governance also revealed control and 
monitoring mechanisms. It also emerged that pre-financing approval processes of 
bank-based fund managers had embedded governance checks which scrutinize 
SMEs before the deployment of post financing control and monitoring mechanisms. 
BBF managers mainly deploy debt financial instruments to support SMEs, which 
does not accrue the rights for ownership interest and board representation on the 
boards of SMEs supported. All the five bank-based fund managers based on the 
analysis presented in Sub-section 5.3.2 confirmed the adoption and application of 
control and monitoring as the important governance mechanism for the contractual 
relationship with SMEs financed before and after the emergence of impact investing. 
Bank-based fund manager C, however, claimed that the organisational structure of 
the bank created a limitation for effective monitoring of SMEs supported in search 
of social impact and financial returns. 
The analysis presented on strategy change shows evidence at the impact 
investor-fund manager level and fund manager-SME investee level. Evidence 
uncovered that bank-based fund managers changed their strategies and attracted 
impact investing capital. Strategy change of bank-based fund managers at the 
investor level facilitated collaborative funding of SMEs, access to long-term capital, 
and catalytic effect of SME financing and exclusive social sector capital initiatives. 
With capital access at the investor level, bank-based fund managers consequently 
changed their strategy regarding the funding of SMEs in BoP communities. 
Evidence revealed four conditions of how strategy change influences of bank-based 
fund managers on SMEs financed in simultaneous pursuit of social impact and 
financial returns. Also, evidence of the 'how' of strategy change include linking 
MNCs, SMEs and farmers in BoP communities, social sector SME financing, 
promoting financial inclusion, and facilitation of agri-business in Ghana. Evidence 
also emerged from the strategy change of SMEs as a for-profit social enterprise in 
BoP communities. Such SMEs had access to subsidised and guaranteed funding, 
technical assistance support, experienced growth and impact, legitimised their 
business and accessed alternative funding. Social impact and financial returns 
represent expected outcomes from impact investors. Evidence of financial returns 
uncovered includes generating enough cashflows, profitability, turnover and growth 
to meet the needs of key stakeholders. Social impact evidence revealed job 
creation, out-grower schemes to facilitate market access, corporate social 
responsibility initiatives and health improvement. Both bank-based fund managers 
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and SME owners viewed their role as agents in finding solutions to societal 
problems. 
Bank-based and SME analysis evidence emerging from the corpus of data 
collected, coded, analysed are presented in different sections of this empirical 
chapter to achieve the objectives and research questions in Section 1.3. However, 
before presenting the analysis in the respective sub-sections, summaries of 
evidence gathered and analysed are presented to facilitate understanding of the 
subsequent sections. An emerging theory based on the application of the integrated 
framework within the bank-based setting in a diagrammatic form about the big 
picture of this chapter enables clarity on the detailed analysis presented in later 
sections of the chapter. Besides, conceptual clarification is essential to guide 
readers concerning explanations adduced in the analysis presented. 
The rest of chapter section is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides a 
summary of the theoretical argument that emerges from analysing the governance, 
structure and strategy deployed by Bank-based funds that invest in SMEs in Ghana. 
Accurately, it depicts the governance mechanisms employed at the investor-fund 
manager level, as well as fund manager-investee SME level. Further shows the 
structure of a fund and strategy change evidence at the investor-fund manager level 
as well as fund manager-investee level in deliberate pursuit of dual goals. All these 
are elaborated in subsequent sections of the chapter. Section 5.3 details evidence 
on governance influences at the investor-bank-based level and how bank-based 
fund managers influence SMEs financed through governance mechanisms. Section 
5.4 presents analyses of strategy change of bank-based fund managers and SME 
investees in pursuit of dual objectives of social impact and financial returns. 
Specifically, it examines strategy change or alignment at the investor-BBF level, 
then proceeds to consider BBF- SME evidence. Section 5.5 focused on impacts 
comprising analysis, presentation and evidence on social impact and financial 
returns. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter highlighting the various findings from the 
preceding sections and subsections. 
5.2 The Governance, Structure and Strategy Change of Bank-
based fund managers 
Governance, structure, and strategy change of bank-based fund managers 
are distinct from other fund managers such as venture capital and private equity 
funds. Because of this, an overview of bank-based funds and where they situate 
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within a commercial bank provides the context of analysis. Bank-based funds from 
the corpus of data analysed represent funds managed by Universal or Commercial 
banks in developing countries or middle-income countries, including Ghana. These 
managed funds tend to be earmarked for specific sectors or categories of SMEs. 
For example, BBF manager A and C represent the commercial banks managing 
funds targeting high growth potential and medium-size enterprises in export-
oriented agri-business. Similarly, BBF manager D disburses $2 million revolving 
funds targeting small and high growth potential SMEs with dual objectives of social 
impact and financial returns in the healthcare sector. A major distinguishing feature 
of bank-based funds is that they are managed on behalf of investors for specific 
purpose autonomous from intermediated funds from the public. Also, bank-based 
funds are distinct from a commercial bank's capital base secured through financial 
intermediation. 
 Intermediation means commercial banks accepting deposits from the public 
and lending same to deficit units such as individuals, firms or businesses and 
government. Three of the commercial banks with assets under management have 
foreign ownership with the remaining two indigenously owned. Based on the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC1) annual banking survey, four of these commercial 
banks ranks in the top-six rating in Ghana over the past three years. Figure 5.1 
below shows an emerging theory of the governance, structure and strategy change 
of bank-based manager and investee SMEs. The figure essentially theorises the 
nature of governance influences at the impact investor-BBF manager level and BBF 
manager-SME level to realise the expected impacts. Structure of a commercial bank 
and designation of fund manager in these institutions is critical to understanding how 
SMEs pursuing dual goals are governed, and strategy change adopted to 
simultaneously realise social impact and financial returns. 
 
 
 
1 PWC is a global accounting and consulting firm that annually conduct banking survey in Ghana ranking 
commercial banks according to capital, asset quality, profitability and other indicators. 
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Figure 5. 1 Governance, Structure and Strategy Change of Bank-based fund Manager 
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Source: Theorising the influences of bank-based funds on SMEs, based on authors’ analysis of governance, strategy change and impacts.
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From the above figure 5.1, a commercial bank typically has a board of directors and 
the structure shows the reporting line from the board to branch managers. The 
management team under the leadership of CEO or Managing Director report to the 
board. Below the executive management team are the departmental positions (e.g. 
Foreign Banking, Marketing, Treasury, Human Resource, Compliance, Audit and 
Internal Control, Finance and Accounting, Corporate and Institutional Banking, 
Commercial/Retail Banking). Building on the integrated theoretical framework 
outlined in Section 2.8, three main theories from the different sets of disciplines are 
applied in theorising the influences of bank-based fund managers on SMEs financed 
based on governance, strategy change and impacts. Agency theory of governance 
from financial intermediation and enterprise/SME financing, strategic 
adaptation/alignment theory from strategic management discipline, and impact 
investing and social entrepreneurship theory from their respective disciplines were 
applied. 
The dotted arrow (             ) shows that based on an impact investment 
strategy change  by bank-based fund manager reflecting strategic adaptation theory 
to access  capital presented  to an impact investor, a governance mechanism is 
deployed by the impact investor to realise impact objectives. The emerging investor-
fund manager relationship results in a principal-agent relationship which leads to 
agency theory of governance mechanisms. Control and monitoring governance 
mechanisms emerge as two main post-financing mechanism deployed by impact 
investors to influence BBF managers at the investor-fund manager level shown in 
figure 5.1. A third governance mechanism which is pre-approval processes also as 
emerged elaborated in Section 5.3.   Strategy change of bank-based fund managers 
at the investor level in line with strategic adaption/alignment theory facilitated 
collaborative funding of SMEs, access to long-term capital, and a catalytic effect of 
SME financing and exclusive social sector capital initiatives exhibited in figure 5.1. 
Similar governance mechanisms, namely pre-approval, control and monitoring are 
applied at the BBF-SME level to realise social impact and financial returns. Based 
on an impact investment strategy change presented and agreed at the investor-fund 
manager level, the ‘how’ of an impact investment strategy implemented at the BBF-
SME level is based on social entrepreneurship. Thus, BBF managers that hitherto 
were agents of private wealth creation, through strategy change linked MNCs to 
SMEs and farmers. Also, findings regarding strategy change reflect integrated, 
embedded, complementary and stand-alone models of realising the deliberate 
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social impact and financial returns based on social entrepreneurship theory. High 
growth, missing middle and established SMEs that adopted an impact investment 
strategy integrating social impact and financial returns in their strategic and 
operational processes secured subsidised funding, achieved growth, expansion, 
and legitimacy. It is the interaction of governance mechanisms and strategy change 
by BBF managers on SMEs which ensure the social transformation in the BoP 
communities as impacts building on the impact investment theory. This is shown 
from the two arrows (        ) from governance and strategy change interconnecting 
with SMEs resulting in impacts evidencing cause-effect relationship in figure 5.1. 
Thus, an impact investment strategy change, and governance mechanism are 
interconnected and applied based on agreement between impact investors and 
bank-based fund managers at two levels. From a governance perspective, 
executive management would typically engage impact investors to manage a 
specific fund. Impact investor conduct due diligence and approves the request after 
satisfactory compliance with conditions precedent. The executive management 
team seeks board ratification for any agreed fund to be managed. These interactions 
occur at the investor- BBF manager level adopting control and monitoring as the 
post disbursement governance mechanism.  
The actual management of the fund resides with a department. Given dual 
control and liquidity management within a banking institution, the treasury 
department generally manages the fund. However, fund disbursers described as 
bank-based fund manager comprise a unit or desk under the Commercial or 
Corporate Banking department depending on the size of transactions and target 
sectors. The interaction exists between the two the treasury and the BBF 
department disbursing the fund. It is in line with this evidence that the bank-based 
fund manager has been depicted under departments in Figure 5.1 above. 
Proceeding from that, branch networks of these commercial banks constitute the 
distribution channel and point of contacts with SMEs who deliver outcomes in BoP 
communities. Governance at the BBF-SME investee level comprises control and 
monitoring. Strategy change dimensions also evidence bank-based fund managers 
positioning themselves as a reliable channel for impact funds. Extant literature 
showed that impact investors (finance first and impact first) deploy capital to SMEs 
through different channels in developing countries (Ormiston et al., 2015). Bank-
based fund managers represent one of the principal intermediaries in developing 
167 
 
countries that impact investors utilise as partners to realise the expected impact in 
BoP communities. 
For this reason, bank-based fund managers engage DFI's for SME funding 
and other social sector funding initiatives with the developmental outcome which 
reflect investor-bank-based fund manager level. Strategy change at the fund 
manager-SME level was analysed and how SMEs have realised expected 
objectives through strategy change. Finally, the interaction of governance, structure 
and strategy change with the emergence of impact investing result in impacts of 
social impact and financial returns in BoP communities. Commercial banks 
constitute key financial intermediaries and source of external funding to different 
categories of SMEs in many developing countries (Beck, 2013; Wang, 2016). With 
an undeveloped capital market, the distribution network of the commercial bank 
makes them attractive to impact investors. Evidence and findings from this data 
analysis focus on five commercial banks in Ghana managing unique impact 
investment funds targeting missing middle, high growth potential as well as 
established SMEs in different sectors of the economy aimed at realising impact. 
These commercial banks by law, capital requirement, asset-based, portfolio and 
profitability growth rates are distinct from Savings and Loans companies and 
microfinance institutions (MFI). The two latter institutions represent lower-tiered 
financial institutions within the bank-based system. Thus, Savings and Loans 
companies and MFI's in the context of this research are categorised as high-growth 
and established SMEs operating in the financial services sector. 
Finance first and impact-first represent two categories of impact investors 
uncovered in the literature review. The type and sources of impact investment fund 
have an implication on how these funds are managed. Fund sources from either 
finance first or impact first investors entails unique modalities and guidelines on 
funds under management and weighing on BBF manager strategy. Also, BBF 
manager as intermediaries for supporting SMEs in BoP communities affect the 
anticipated dual goals of social impact and financial returns expectations of impact 
investors. BBF managers typically designated themselves as finance first due to 
shareholder wealth maximisation from the corpus of analysed data. Overall, Table 
5.1 showed five empirical conditions under which a bank-based fund can be 
described as finance first or impact first. 
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Table 5. 1 Bank-based fund descriptors as finance first and Impact first.  
 Description Finance first Impact first 
1 Funding sources Intermediated or Own 
capital 
Collaborative capital for 
specific sectors 
2 Funding purpose Liquidity management The market building, i.e. 
climate change, renewable 
energy 
3 Returns 
expectation 
Maximize shareholder 
value 
A minimum threshold of 
financial return and high 
impact 
4 Nature of 
investment 
Equity or debt for 
capital base 
improvement or 
portfolio expansion 
Pure social sector funding 
5 Outcomes / Impact 
expected 
Purely commercial  Hybrid, financial returns, and 
social impact 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD data analysis 
 
All the five bank-based fund managers had previously managed different 
kinds of funds targeting SMEs in exports, agriculture, or generally developmental-
driven sectors. Fund manager C and D had a fund under management representing 
impact first fund. BBF C disbursed to high growth and medium-size enterprises in 
agri-business while BBF D targeted small and established SMEs in health, water 
and sanitation sectors. Fund manager E also had a fund targeting women-owned 
businesses in different sectors. However, as a financial institution, a description of 
impact first appears not to permeate the entire organisation. 
Moreover, for all these bank-based fund managers, whether they are 
managing an impact fund or deploying their funds to support SMEs, financial 
returns-first was a pre-requisite in their loan appraisal and approval processes. Fund 
manager A and B relied on intermediated funds reflecting more of finance first. 
These fund managers supported the high-growth and established SMEs in agri-
business sectors, finance, and commerce. All the five bank-based respondents, 
when engaged with the question, answered in the affirmative that they need to be 
financially sustainable before any impact consideration. Responses to the question 
ranged from phrases such as “money for our shareholders” (BBF Manager A) to 
“profit-first” (BBF Manager E) and “assess risk, give loans and get it back” (BBF 
Manager). A few interview extracts illustrated respondent views on finance first 
versus impact first below:  
 “The first objective for any commercial bank is profit… As a bank, it is 
finance first”- (BBF Manager A) 
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 "we as a business we are set up to make a profit, and I do not think there are any 
apologies for that”- (BBF Manager B) 
"We are finance first, money first that is the whole idea”- (BBF Manager D) 
In summary, for BBF managers, the dichotomy or otherwise of finance first or impact 
appear somehow immaterial because their core ethos of providing financial services 
remains unchanged irrespective of the type or source of funding available. Bank-
based fund managers, therefore, view the dual goal of financial returns and social 
impact sequentially and not necessarily simultaneously. Moreover, in circumstances 
where impact investors have guaranteed percentage of funding to SMEs, bank-
based fund managers ensure that financing provided to enterprises were fully 
recovered. 
 
5.3 Nature of Governance mechanisms 
5.3.1 Dimensions of governance 
Bank-based fund manager influences on SMEs to realise the social impact and 
financial returns empirically transpire in different forms. From the corpus of analysed 
data, internal governance mechanism of the bank-based fund represents key 
influences on SMEs. However, to understand and explain how bank-based fund 
managers govern the relationship with SMEs, insight into investor-bank-based fund 
governance would be essential. In other words, impact investor influences on bank-
based fund managers through governance reflected in how fund managers govern 
SMEs financed. The analysis presented evidence about the nature of governance 
at the investor-fund manager level and fund-manager- SME investee level. Two 
main governance mechanisms uncovered from the analysis comprised control and 
monitoring governance dimensions which reflect and differs from the theoretical 
framework. From sub-section 2.8.1, the theoretical framework exemplifies 
ownership, control, and board representation as to the governance mechanisms. 
However, the analysis showed control and monitoring as the primary governance 
mechanisms deployed by bank-based funds. The objectives of adopting such 
governance mechanisms are to ensure established, and high growth SMEs financed 
with dual goals accomplish social impact and financial returns. 
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5.3.2 Nature of Investor- Bank-based fund manager Governance 
Theoretically impact investors channelling funds through bank-based funds deploy 
governance mechanism of ownership, control, and board representation to 
influence bank-based fund managers. Equity investments permit ownership stake 
and board representation, however, not for debt funds. Emerging from the analysis 
of data collected on impact investors and bank-based fund managers, ownership 
stake through equity and board representation is more of an exception than the 
norm. All the five bank-based funds analysed show evidence of debt funds and other 
managed funds channelled through these institutions for SMEs to realise anticipated 
objectives. Governance mechanism of pre-approval process, control embed in 
agreements and post financing monitoring emerged. Moreover, these mechanisms 
permeated through their pre- and post-funding processes. Through financing 
approval processes, impact investors have embedded governance mechanisms to 
mitigate risk and ensure that bank-based fund managers selected fulfils the 
expected mandate. Figure 5.2 provides information on the pre-approval governance 
mechanism that impact investors deploy to govern their relationship with bank-
based fund managers.
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Figure 5.2 Pre- approval governance mechanism 
 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD data
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In terms of governance mechanism of control, the analysis showed that 
impact investors through contractual agreement influence bank-based fund 
managers. These contracts encapsulate covenants which are agreed on before 
funds drawdown. Some of the interview transcripts elucidated the control dimension 
of governance. 
“some of them also would give you certain limits that this you cannot exceed 
this limit in terms of maybe alcohol”- (BBF Manager E) 
“…if you want to fund them; you cannot exceed this limit. They limit such 
products in terms of covenants that we have with them”- (BBF Manager E) 
Table 5.2 depicts the data structure of investor - bank-based fund governance. 
Analysis of the available corpus of data comprising interview transcripts, annual 
financial reports, website information from investors and bank-based institutions 
reveal first-order concepts and second-order concepts culminating in aggregated 
theoretical dimensions. First-order concepts comprised contractual covenants, 
quarterly and annual performance information on portfolio quality, highlights, and 
details of reports to be shared, processes for remedying breaches and certified 
information disclosure. These first-order concepts were subsequently analysed, 
relating them to existing literature to uncover four second-order concepts. The four 
second-order concepts include financing related covenants, performance-related 
milestones, reporting requirements and related compliance conditions. These four 
second-order concepts were theoretically aggregated to constitute the governance 
mechanism of control.  
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Table 5. 2 Data structure of investor- bank-based fund governance 
First Order Concepts Second Order Aggregated 
dimensions 
Contractual covenants, 
facility terms and conditions; 
lead and projected lag 
measures; pre-draw down 
conditions, i.e. sub-loan list 
and amounts. 
Financing related covenants  
Weekly, monthly, quarterly, 
and annual performance 
ratios on portfolio and quality 
Performance-related milestones  
Reports, highlight variances, 
share reports with co-
financier, sub-loan reports 
pre and post disbursement 
Reporting requirements Control 
Ensure covenants fulfilment, 
remedies to breaches; loan 
utilisation for a specific 
purpose; certified information 
disclosure; adherence to 
agreed covenants; those 
things are being respected. 
 
 
Compliance conditions  
   
Field and office visit; sample 
client visit; independent-party 
assessment; certified audit of 
an existing portfolio. 
Due diligence  
 
 
 
Monitoring 
Accountability and tracking 
of results; the celebration of 
milestones achieved; 
Accurate and reliable 
information flow; qualitative 
indicators 
Development-related reports 
Periodic financial results; 
hard information analysis; 
check for variance; quarterly 
and semi-annual reviews 
Financial reporting 
Processes audit; Secure 
facility repayment; liquidity 
measures; assets and 
liability risk analysis;  
Risk-mitigating measures 
Source: Authors illustration from collected data 
 
Monitoring constitutes an essential and operational governance mechanism 
deployed by impact investors to govern their relationship with bank-based fund 
managers to realise expected outcomes of social impact and financial returns. 
Based on the corpus of data analysed, monitoring, which is an aggregated 
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governance dimension emerged after analysis of first and second-order concepts. 
Table 5.2 above depicts the first and second-order concepts. First-order concepts 
included field visit, independent-party assessment, and certified audit of an existing 
portfolio; and more; follow-up on facility repayment, measures of liquidity indicators, 
assets and liability analysis. These first-order concepts were subsequently analysed 
based on the theoretical review to determine four second-order concepts — pre-
approval due diligence, development-related reports, and financial reporting and 
risk-mitigating measures. Altogether, the four second-order concepts were analysed 
to constitute the governance mechanism of monitoring. 
When the question of how impact investors govern the relationship with bank-
based fund managers was posed, respondents provided phrases including: For 
investor C, the governance mechanism of monitoring is essential because "we want 
to see where the loans went just to ensure that our money is being used for the 
stated purpose" (Impact Investor C) 
 Moreover, these purposes are established for ease of monitoring as indicated by 
bank-based fund manager D   
“some of these funds are for specific purposes, and some are for general 
purposes” (BBF manager D). 
Additionally, fund manager B noted the role of monitoring and accountability exerted 
by impact investors.  "it is a combination of at their end, monitoring and ensuring 
that we are executing the lead measures and we are also reporting the lag measures 
accurately without any manipulation of figures. So, there is a lot of accountability 
and tracking of progress from the development organisations" (BBF manager B) 
In summary, the foregone analysis revealed control and monitoring as vital 
the governance mechanisms that investors deploy to ensure that bank-based fund 
managers realise contractual objectives. Emerging from that analysis is the pre-
approval governance mechanism embedded in the internal processes of impact 
investors serving. The internal governance checks facilitate the screening of bank-
based fund managers they partner. All the five bank-based fund managers 
acquiesce to these governance mechanisms irrespective of the impact fund under 
management. The only exception is where investors provide equity capital, which 
then implies ownership and board representation as an additional governance 
mechanism. From the five bank-based fund manager respondents to this research, 
there was no evidence of an impact investor committing equity capital to these 
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institutions. It implies that impact investors usually commit equity capital to private 
equity funds and tend to channel debt funds through bank-based financial 
intermediaries for SME financing. 
5.3.2 The Nature of Fund Manager- SME Governance 
Bank-based fund managers deploy three primary governance mechanism to 
influence high growth and established SMEs to realise the social impact and 
financial returns. These involve pre-approval, control, and monitoring governance 
mechanisms. Evidence uncovered shows that governance mechanisms emerging 
from investor-bank-based fund manager level are equally applied at the fund 
manager- investee SME level. Further analysis of the corpus of data uncovered 
inherent pre-approval governance mechanisms in the loan or credit administration 
processes of bank-based fund managers. Embedded pre-approval governance 
mechanisms represent checks which precede the signing-off on loan/ financing 
agreements. Figure 5.3 present the loan approval process and embedded pre-
approval governance mechanism of bank-based fund managers. Emerging from the 
five-stage loan approval processes is an in-built pre-approval governance 
mechanism in financing SMEs by bank-based fund managers. These processes at 
every stage could result in rejection of an SME loan application with reasonable 
justification including lack of business viability or high-risk factors. Moreover, bank-
based fund managers have credit approval limits for approval committees, 
managers, and departmental heads to the CEO. All these credit approval limits aim 
at governance checks for sustainability and business continuity. 
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Figure 5.3 Governance mechanism in loan approval process 
 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD data 
 
Extant literature explains that the governance mechanism of control 
encompasses terms, conditions and covenants stipulated in legal agreements 
between a lender and borrower (Scarlata and Alemany, 2010). Empirical evidence 
from the corpus of data analysed shows that bank-based funds adopt different 
covenants, terms, and conditions to control the operations and activities of high 
growth and established SMEs financed. Typical phrases from all the five bank-
based fund respondents concerning governance dimension of control ranged from 
"ensure covenants are met”, “it depends on the business”, to “adherence to terms 
of the facility” and “using covenants". While some of the covenants could be generic, 
the majority tends to business and sector specific. Moreover, sometimes emerging 
issues post financing influence subsequent covenants incorporated in additional 
financing to specific SMEs. Extracts of interview transcripts further explain bank-
based fund manager influences through the governance dimension of control: 
“if your clients, your cheques are coming through and they are bouncing…. 
If you are doing cross-firing, that will help us in shaping the covenants”- (BBF 
Manager A). 
"various covenants we have put in place is the responsibility of the 
relationship manager to follow up with the business to ensure that those 
covenants are met"- (BBF Manager B) 
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Governance dimension of control evidenced by the analysed data comprised four 
constituents of higher-order concepts shown in Table 5.3. These four second-order 
concepts relate to first-order concepts from a category of second-order concept 
were formed. 
Table 5. 3  Data structure of Governance: control and monitoring 
First Order Concepts Second Order Aggregated dimensions 
Various covenants, clause 
terms of facility; negative 
pledge; 
Conditions precedent  
Weekly, monthly, quarterly 
and annual covenants on 
portfolio performance and 
quality 
Performance-oriented 
covenants 
 
Reports, highlight 
variances, share reports 
with co-financier, 
Reporting Control 
Ensure covenants are met, 
different business terms, 
business-specific 
covenants; those things 
are being respected. 
Compliance   
   
Field, office and people 
visit; 
Be on the ground; Weekly, 
monthly and quarterly 
visits 
Customer engagement  
 
 
 
Monitoring 
Closer to SME; identify 
early warning signals; 
understand customers; 
close to project and 
people; 
Customer-centric 
Periodic reports; check for 
variance; calls; reviews 
Call reports 
Stay through the 
processes; ensure money 
comes back; follow the 
money; prevent diversion; 
activity analysis 
Risk-mitigating measures 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD data 
 
Bank-based funds deployed governance mechanism of monitoring as the primary 
approach to influence SMEs financed to realise the social impact and financial 
returns. While control tends to be associated with terms, conditions and covenants 
stipulated in offer letters or legal documentation between the parties; monitoring 
occurs as post disbursement mechanism. Analysed data evidence phrases such as 
"we cannot do armchair lending" (BB fund manager A1), "you have to be on the 
ground” “governance mainly through monitoring" (BB fund manager C). Governance 
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mechanism of monitoring though ultimately seek to realise financial returns and 
associated social impact intermediate objectives were noted. Some of these 
intermediated objectives comprised risk mitigation, information feedback to credit 
decision-makers, support to SMEs, and ensuring compliance with agreed terms.  
 Table 5.3 above displays the data structure of governance mechanisms. Four 
second-order concepts of monitoring are further illustrated through interview 
excerpts follow next. 
• Customer engagement- Effective monitoring requires customer engagement 
as a second-order concept to ensure customers fulfil their obligations. 
Analysed data showed calendar-based visits comprising weekly, monthly, or 
quarterly based on the loan type, nature of business of the SME venture and 
sector of operation. BBF managers through customer engagement 
technique of monitoring visited SME owners, management, and employees 
on-site and off-site locations. Sample interview extracts from respondents 
comprised: 
  “We do visit, and these visits are backed by call reports”- (BB fund manager 
A). 
 "most of it has to be reporting, and we do quite a bit of visit"- (BB fund manager C) 
 “it is either monitored monthly, quarterly, semi-annually or annually”- (BB 
Fund Manager).  
Customer-centric- Another second-order concept representing the monitoring 
dimension of governance concerns customer orientation. Proximity to the customer, 
people, SME venture and projects financed enabled bank-based fund managers 
first understand clients and second detect early warning signals. Monitoring plays a 
critical role to effectively provide needed services to SMEs and feedback early 
warning signals into their credit system to pre-empt deterioration in facilities. 
"You should definitely be close to the customer, close to the project, close to 
the people doing it to make sure that what really you saw and financed is 
what is happening”- (BBF Manager A). 
 
 “if you are able to get closer to the SME and get that information, it solves a 
lot of the problems. A lot of the problems, you are able to identify things on 
time, you can fix it before it occurs”- (BBF Manager C). 
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"one of the bases that we set foundation is that we have to understand the 
customers' businesses before can move with them"- (BBF Manager C). 
 
Call reports- Relationship managers (RM) of bank-based funds typically submit call 
report for any customer visit to assist senior managers to make informed decisions. 
Such call reports capture relevant information including compliance with covenants 
and performance-related indices. 
"..RM is the first point of call to the client, and they are supposed to optimally 
manage the relationship that they have with this customer” (BBF Manager D) 
"internally as a requirement my RM, I will require you to visit a customer a certain 
number of times in a month or a week and bring call reports…the quality of the 
discussion is a subject of coaching that we go through every time" (BBF 
Manager C) 
 "they go and do frequent visits…they pick some of this information in a report, 
and they send it back to our credit team…we also want to know what the 
revenue streams are looking like… if it is declining with time, then that is a red 
flag" (BBF Manager D) 
Risk mitigating strategy- Bank-based fund managers seek to mitigate risk in 
financing SMEs in pursuit of the dual goal of social impact and financial returns. 
Perceived risks of financing SMEs have, to some extent, influenced bank-based 
managers to put in a new mechanism to realise investor objectives of financial 
returns while creating the expected social impact. Excerpts of interview relating to 
the second-order concept includes: 
 "Once again we look at the activity on the account and sometimes, we 
monitor, we go out there to visit the customer just to see how they are doing 
and that kind of stuff”- (BBF Manager D) 
 
"the RMs are dedicated, they are responsible for ensuring that the business 
grows, responsible for ensuring that the loan is paid back, and responsible 
for ensuring that whatever they have to do for the businesses succeed" (BBF 
Manager C) 
Case illustration box 5.1 demonstrate an effective governance mechanism for 
realisation of social impact and financial returns. 
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Box 5.1 How Bank based fund through governance support high growth SMEs to 
realise objectives in BoP communities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Case illustration: Box 5.1 
Bank-based fund manager B is a Pan-African bank with a network of branches all over 
Africa. As a signatory to the Feed the Future program, BBF Manager D allocated $5 million 
of the loan portfolio to agri-business finance in Ghana. BBF B financed a farmer group in 
the Northern Regions of Ghana called Masara Farmers Association, which can be 
described as high growth smallholder network. Geographically, the Northern Region is 
among the three most impoverished areas in Ghana where the majority of the people 
leave on less than $2.00 a day. Before the financing, Masara had 1,000 farmers as out-
growers producing maize, rice and soya for MNCs, Wold Food Programme and other 
institutions in Ghana. The financing agreement signed contained covenants and 
conditions which controlled the disbursement of funds. Besides, an off-taker agreement 
with MNCs was signed to ensure that payments from the produce were channelled into 
an escrow account. Dedicated relationship managers were assigned to the farmer group 
and MNCs as a governance monitoring mechanism to guarantee and control financial 
returns. This value chain financing of aggregators (high growth farmer network as SMEs) 
guaranteed market access to the individual farmers in BOP communities. The dual goal 
of financial returns and social impact were realised through income improvement, poverty 
reduction and families of farmers also benefited from the produce. At the macro level, the 
MNC had access to the farmer out through the aggregator, Masara, for their production 
generating financial returns to the MNC and the aggregator. 
 BBF manager B added that “they are doing almost 10,000 farmers. For us supporting 
them is helping improve the standard of living of the farmers. Again, guaranteeing them 
market access. Because as an organisation, they can sell to the bigger corporates. They 
are selling to Wienco, World Food Program and all of that, and for us, that is one clear 
story of impact". In summary, effective governance mechanisms of control and monitoring 
of the MNCs, aggregator SME (Farmer network) and individual farmers facilitated the fund 
disbursement and access to produce in BOP communities. The simultaneous goal of 
social impact and financial returns were paramount to the financing decision, and 
successes accomplished. 
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  In summary, the analysis presented revealed control and monitoring 
constituting the generic governance mechanism that bank-based fund managers 
adopt to ensure SMEs supported realise the social impact and financial returns. 
Governance mechanisms adopted by all the five bank-based fund managers 
focusing on pre-approval mechanism, control, and monitoring (post-financing 
governance) appears to have effectively worked in the past. These governance 
mechanisms seem not to be changing because of the emergence of impact 
investment capital in search of dual goals. Fund manager A and C's establishment 
of dedicated units and departments focusing on SMEs supported with impact funds 
have worked effectively coupled with the existing governance mechanisms. Some 
fund managers, however, bemoan the effectiveness of these governance 
mechanisms, especially when SME entrepreneurs became aware of the availability 
of impact fund under management. Fund managers B and C lamented the difficulties 
encountered to ensure that SME entrepreneurs fulfil the outcome of the financial 
return. Such situations occurred where entrepreneur owners of SMEs had the mind-
set that the impact investors had subsidised the funding. Also, fund manager C 
remarked that the existing organisational structure of the bank hindered effective 
monitoring of SMEs supported in the agri-business sector resulting in relatively high 
non-performing loans.  
 
 
5.4 Strategy Change 
 
Commercial Banks are commercial, profit-oriented and shareholder-value 
maximising organisations channelling funds from deficit units to surplus units. 
Strategically, bank-based fund managers attract capital for funding SMEs and 
businesses which generated the highest returns in terms of interest, commissions, 
and fees. These funds tend to assist in liquidity management, income growth, asset 
earning portfolio, improve shareholder capital and reserve requirements. However, 
with the emergence of impact investment, bank-based fund managers have 
collaborated and positioned their institutions as credible and reliable partners for 
realising developmental objectives. Such evidence of strategy change, and 
alignment were also exhibited through SME financing in specific sectors and 
underserved BoP communities. Strategic value propositions, which enabled bank-
based fund managers to access impact investor funding for SME support comprised 
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demonstrable branch network, risk management system, corporate governance, 
and professional expertise to deliver on expected outcomes. 
 
5.4.1 Existing strategy, change or alignment of bank-based funds 
The nature of bank-based fund manager influences on the strategies of SMEs 
supported emerge based on analysis of the types of impact investor fund under 
management, modalities for disbursement and criteria for financing some of these 
SMEs. Majority of these impact funds had qualifying criteria for bank-based fund 
managers to meet and the funds could either be domiciled with the bank or 
designated account outside the local jurisdiction for drawdown. The drawdown 
process commences post-approval and legal documentation. 
 Before the emergence of impact investments, strategies of bank-based 
institutions, primarily commercial banks, were fundamentally driven by external 
global events, local environmental analysis and internal analysis. Underlying all 
these analyses drawing from a global context, national environmental drivers and 
internal capabilities were risk-return relationships in transactions to finance. The 
ultimate motivation and outcome were shareholder value maximization and profit. 
Given these drivers of strategies pursued, bank-based fund managers financed 
transactions on commercial terms, target corporate organisations, Government 
institutions and Multinational Corporations (MNC) with negligible attention to SMEs 
perceived to be high risk. The primacy of financial returns made any social impact 
incidental to corporate strategy. 
  Financing of development-driven companies and SMEs were perceived as 
the obligation and preserve of government institutions, agencies, NGOs, and 
development finance institutions. Bank-based fund managers viewed enterprises 
that sought to realise social impact together with financial returns in different sectors 
and geographies as high-risk, unprofitable and preserve of alternative financing 
institutions. However, within the past decade, from a strategic adaptation theoretical 
perspective and resource-based view, some of the bank-based fund managers have 
changed or altered their strategies. They have positioned themselves as 
intermediaries of SME funds and attracted impact investor funding. Bank-based 
fund manager positioning explains the ‘why’ of strategy change. Evidence of 
strategy change of bank-based funds and SME investees are presented in 
subsection 5.4.2.   
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Strategic adaption theorist argues that managers of organisations review and 
evaluate environmental conditions and change strategies or align with emerging 
trends for survival and growth. Resource-based theorist also posits that the board 
of directors of organisations tend to be boundary spanners between external 
environment and managers of organisations. In performing this role, the board of 
directors and executive management access key external resources primarily 
financial, human, and technological for organisational growth, profitability and 
expansion and value maximisation. From these two theoretical perspectives about 
‘why' of strategy change or alignment, an analysis of the corpus of data collected is 
presented guided by the second research question. Principally, bank-based fund 
managers at the investor-fund manager level have positioned themselves as an 
attractive destination of impact funds, collaborated with DFIs, secured long-term 
funding, and acted as agents of financing SMEs in BoP communities to manage 
different impact funds.  
5.4.2 Impact investor- bank-based fund strategy change 
Development finance institutions representing impact investors for this research 
have evolved in their financing of transactions. In time past, DFI's financed high 
value and infrastructure-related transactions to the neglect of SMEs serving BoP 
communities. Based on the corpus of data analysed, bank-based fund managers 
and DFI's exhibited strategy change under four conditions elaborated below. These 
strategy changes reflect ‘what’, and ‘why’ of strategy change reviewed in 2.4 
towards the development of the theoretical framework.  
  Collaborative funding of SMEs in BoP communities emerged as evidence of 
strategy change and alignment at the impact investor-fund manager level. Bank-
based fund managers have changed their strategies with a focus on priority sectors 
of DFI's in attracting funding that seeks to support SMEs. Through such a change 
in strategy, DFI's view bank-based fund managers as partners and collaborators in 
development within BoP communities. This strategy changes through collaborative 
funding exemplify Hotchstader and Scheck (2015) impact investment strategy that 
focuses on sectors, geographies, and demography. In pursuit of developmental 
objectives in BoP communities, bank-based fund managers secured long-term 
funding from DFI's through such collaboration. Some of the impact fund models 
discussed in subsection 5.3.2 attest to the extent of collaboration among bank-
based fund managers and DFI in search of such solutions. Excerpts of the interview 
are as follows:  
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“….the primary window through financial institutions is to support SME. Now 
given that we are an institution based out of Vienna with one office, the most 
cost-effective way for us to do that is to work with partners that are on the 
ground who have these relationships with the SME’s we don’t have the 
relationship, so it makes sense to partner with banks and financial 
institutions” (Investor D) 
“The development agencies, they have an impact on the either economic or 
social impact that they are looking at, So, based on the objective that they 
have, they partner with, us” (BBF Manager B) 
 Also, bank-based fund managers positioned themselves to impact investors 
through strategy change to access long term capital for SME growth and impact. 
SMEs, in general, tend to be financially constrained, affecting their growth and 
impact in BoP communities uncovered in Sections 2.2 and 3.2. Development 
finance institutions and bank-based fund managers through strategy change have 
developed models and financing arrangements to curb the financial constraints of 
SMEs, mainly due to the developmental impact. Because of the strategy change, 
bank-based fund managers had guaranteed access to long-term capital to support 
SMEs in pursuit of social impact and financial returns. Interview excerpts include: 
“while they are making the commercial return, we can work with them to 
ensure that the funding is channelled as opposed to only the large 
corporates, sometimes help them channel funding to the SMEs... where we 
come in is that many banks do not have access to long term loans, they are 
not able to get funding on their balance sheet for five to seven years. We are 
as DFI's; we do that, we come and give them a loan for five years” (Investor 
D) 
 
“they (DFI's) make it clear, dictate the reasons why these funds are given, 
and then you make the call that indeed I want to go through this route or that 
route” (BB Fund Manager B) 
 
 Another evidence of strategy changes of bank-based fund managers in accessing 
impact investor capital is the potential catalytic effect SME financing on economic 
growth. SMEs in developing countries play an essential contribution to job creation, 
social cohesion, and economic growth. Extant research (e.g. Abor and Biekpe, 
2010) shows that SMEs contribute at least 70% to employment and about 50% to 
GDP growth in Ghana. SMEs contribute to economic growth through government 
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taxes, the statutory contribution of employees such as pensions, health insurance 
and provident funds. These reflect how high growth and established SMEs find 
solutions to societal problems reviewed in section 3.2. Such contribution of SMEs 
makes the financing by bank-based fund managers catalytic. Accessing funding 
from impact investors to simplify this catalytic effect enable developmental 
objectives to be realised.   
“…..if they have access to long term funding to manage their liabilities and 
pay the money back quickly …. the role that we play is to encourage these 
banks to finance the small and medium-sized enterprises. Also, when you 
finance SME, and that, of course, has a catalytic effect on economic activity 
and growth.” (Investor D) 
 
 Finally, bank-based fund managers have developed products and services that 
exclusively cater to the needs of social sector market segments. Bank-based fund 
managers neglected social sector funding due to the low level of profitability and 
perception of preserve for government and development agencies.  Impact investor 
funding shows strategy change of bank-based fund managers in sectors like 
education, health, water, and sanitation. Excerpt of interview evidence this emerging 
trend 
“we have a fund where, it is a debt fund where we have invested in, but the 
debt fund is mandated to provide loans to banks for on-lending to educational 
institutions or for the bank to provide school loans or education loans. So that 
is the way to help the banks, you know to finance those sectors that would 
not typically be profitable or will not make sense for them purely as 
commercial bank" (Investor D) 
 
“..they (DFI's) open up and say this is what we want to call it, this is what we 
want to see happening now in our part of the world, check that we can provide 
you with the full support that you will be able to correct it.” (BB Fund Manager 
B) 
 
The nature of strategy changes between impact investors and bank-based fund 
managers to a greater extent reflect the different funding models that bank-based 
fund managers deploy. Impact investor-bank-based fund models determine strategy 
change at the fund manager-SME investee level. An analysis of impact investor 
funding models is presented next, which dovetails into the strategy change of bank-
based fund and SMEs with the emergence of impact investing. 
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5.4.3 Impact investor and Bank-based fund models 
Impact investor influences on commercial banks through bank-based funds from the 
analysed data were empirically noted in the different types of impact fund models 
operating within commercial banks. Evidence from this subsection of the empirical 
chapter dovetails into the ‘how' of strategy change reviewed in section 2.4. Further, 
how bank-based funds and established SMEs financed represent agents of 
solutions to societal problems reviewed in 3.2 within the research setting is 
connected to the type of funds under management. Finally, the deliberate pursuit of 
social impact and financial returns uncovered from the social entrepreneurship 
literature largely depends on the funds under management. Apart from the 
intermediated funds of some bank-based institutions, many of the bank-based funds 
fell into six major categories. It was also observed that crucial considerations, 
including funding source and purpose together with the expected impacts were 
determinants of different impact fund model described as a bank- based funds 
domiciled with commercial banks. These six models of bank-based funds include 
managed funds, co-financing, subsidised funding, grants, guarantees and revolving 
loans which are analysed sequentially.  
Managed funds represent one of the significant categories of impact fund 
model sourced from Development Finance institutions (DFI) for on-lending to SMEs. 
These funds typically were not sector-specific but instead targeted different sizes of 
SMEs lacking access to long-term capital. Such funds also tend to provide liquidity 
support and expand loan portfolio-size of the bank-based institution. Generally, for 
transactions up to a maximum of two years, such bank-based impact fund model 
seeks to realise financial returns and social impact at the micro-level. A couple of 
interview extracts further explain this category of bank-based fund model: 
“while they are making the commercial return, we can work with them to 
ensure that the funding is channelled as opposed to only the large 
corporates, sometimes help them channel funding to the SMEs” – (Investor3) 
“You know there are others that will come and invest in the bank broadly and 
say if you invested this amount, and with you we want you to do something 
with SMEs"- (BBF manager, C)  
Co-financing constitute collaborative funding between bank-based funds and 
development agencies. Bank-based funds deploying impact investment funds 
through the co-financing model occur in the form of a 50%-50% funding 
arrangement. Characteristically, subject to an SME applicant fulfilling the terms and 
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conditions of the loan, 50 per cent of bank-own funds and 50 per cent of impact 
investor fund were allocated to finance the transaction. In this model, the bank and 
co-financier conduct a joint assessment of the SME with the bank focusing on 
financial viability and the co-development institution assessing the social impact 
dimension. 
“We have another one with health, with a medical credit fund, that one is also 
slightly different. What we do is that we both find, these are for medical 
facilities, i.e. pharmacies and hospitals. If we identify a hospital that might 
need a loan, we go and do a joint assessment with medical credit fund 
because they hold part of the fund, and we lend 50/50%" (BB Fund Manager 
C) 
Another feature of such a co-financing model tends to be sector-specific with impact 
investors expecting access and improvement in these sectors. For example, 
healthcare in Africa, which is a significant issue, is currently been addressed through 
different innovative financing models, including co-financing impact fund model. 
Consistent with previous literature is the concept of "co-investment" which on a 
larger scale focus on “big-ticket” investments initiative between government, impact 
investors and private investors (Wood et al., 2013, p.84). 
Subsidised funding aims at ameliorating the high-interest burden 
encountered by high growth and missing SMEs in health, education, water and agri-
business sectors as agents of development. These high impact sectors in BoP 
communities is what Hoctstadter and Scheck (2015) finds that impact investor 
strategy encompasses different geographies, sectors, and demography. Subsidised 
funding model occur in the form of some percentage interest or principal pay-off on-
behalf of the SME. In a typical subsidised funding model to promote Agric 
technology transfer in certain parts of Ghana, the bank-based fund received 15% 
interest pay-down for every SME financed from the development agency 
implementing the model. BBF manager A noted that 
“Their focus is on the transfer of technology, and they look at seed 
development and those involved in smart climate agriculture, for any client 
we finance in that value chain, they offered 15%... it used to be 15% interest 
rate buy-down, but now they have reduced it 15% of the principal” 
In effect, the SME client repaid 85 per cent of the principal borrowed from the bank-
based fund subject to critical criteria such as geography and size of SME. 
Grants and guarantee models from the analysed data come in different forms 
and with different investor objective to be realised. First, ‘market-testing' grants to 
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bank-based fund managers ensure capital availability to enable fund managers to 
test specific funding models in emerging sectors or unproven markets. As noted in 
the literature review and section 3.2 of the historical context of impact investing in 
Ghana, SMEs as agents of the solution to wicked societal problems require 
alternative entrepreneurial financing for societal transformation. Bank-based fund 
managers, therefore, use grants and guarantee financing models to support SMEs 
in such unproven markets and sectors. Ultimately with the exhaustion of the grant, 
bank-based fund managers were expected to develop loan products for these 
market segments. Grant funding reduces the learning curve and the risk of utilising 
bank capital for such market testing initiatives. 
As explained from the excerpts of interview extracts,  
"….I think that those sorts of models, they are better in the sense that, 
sometimes they are good for building markets. You know you want to build 
the market, if you tell the bank that I should risk depositor's capital, to go and 
do this, what if it does not pay off” (BB fund manager C) 
“We also did, 50% cover. If you want an amount of $50,000 the value of the 
security must be up to 50% as the agent and the difference will be that of the 
Gates Foundation…, so those models are to help us go through the 
unforeseen and unknown circumstances within greenfield” (BB fund manager 
D). 
Secondly, grants to bank-based funds also occur in the form of incentives to fund 
managers to ameliorate the monitoring cost of SME financing. Grants assist 
recruitment of developmental-oriented staff to design products for the emerging 
target market that hitherto were unprofitable. Consistent with the findings of Wood 
et al., (2013, p. 90) grants and guarantees primarily "reduce the risk for unfamiliar 
products" and can catalyse development. 
For example, bank-based fund manager A explained that  
"for the USAID FINGap collaboration, they incentivise us with grants…The 
point I am making is for every financing you do, and they give you some 
reward. Also, that reward is not meant for investees but meant for the internal 
use of the banks. So, for that matter, the Agric desk. 
Moreover, what in the past, we have used that money is for monitoring and 
control to reduce risk and mitigate some of the agricultural risks that are 
inherent in the market." 
Guarantee models, however, relate to first loss-provision funding to empower and 
incentivise bank-based fund managers to increase loan portfolio to SMEs in specific 
sectors or value chain. Such initiatives were aimed at financial returns, social impact 
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and economic development. Analysed data showed development agencies and 
philanthropic organisations partnering with bank-based funds to finance SMEs in 
agriculture and health sectors through guaranteed schemes. 
"…maybe we have no experience in maybe football financing. So if 
somebody comes in a say hello, as a bank you will be able to get A, B and 
C, and we are going to provide this support to get you to understand the 
industry and support them financially. Also, then we will say yes, at least our 
risk is 50% or a certain percentage is taken off, so we can take the difference 
instead of just taking the full 100% risk”- (BB fund manager D) 
“What this brings into the mix is that it enables us to relax the collateral 
requirements. So what USAID is saying is that if you give a facility with this 
kind of characteristics in loan facility, straight away 50% of the loan you have 
given to the person, I am guaranteeing that for you” (BB fund manager C). 
Most of the bank-based respondents claimed they tried not to call-in the guarantees 
though they existed. Such impact funding model boosted substantially financing to 
high growth and established SMEs in these specific sectors from bank-based funds. 
“For us, we are also very wary of that, so we also make sure that whatever 
deal that we have is perfect in terms of the structure, quality of the credit. For 
us, we expect that we will not claim on the guarantee” (BB fund manager C) 
A revolving fund or loan model encompass funds set aside through capital from a 
development agency to be managed by a bank-based institution for on-lending to 
SMEs in specific sectors. Typically, these funds were lent to SMEs within specific 
sectors and geographies with repayment and interest recycled as new loans to other 
SMEs. Bank-based fund manager C explained how it worked: 
“The money was not a guarantee, and it was not 50/50, they gave us the 
money in tranches. We put it in a revolving loan fund, and we lend out of that 
money…, if you try and push money through commercial terms, you would 
always have a problem because you are lending to a person who is critical in 
the social area, It is called P2P for WASH, water, sanitation and Health". 
Analysed data showed evidence of funding from development agency (investor) 
releasing capital to the bank-based fund in tranches over a specific time. In effect, 
disbursement, and repayment of the first tranche result in the release of subsequent 
tranches. To promote and support SMEs in specific developmental sectors, interest 
rates on these loans were relatively low because these sectors were unattractive to 
commercial capital. 
“We created the revolving loan fund methodology. Which means we are not 
lending {Bank's} money, we are lending the development money that is 
comings…. An interest rate of about 10%” (BB fund manager D) 
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Revolving fund model usually entails the bank-based fund manager partnering with 
an NGO to facilitate the assessment and approval process. The partner NGO 
executed a social and developmental assessment of the SMEs and MFI's 
supported. The bank-based fund manager then focused on financial viability 
appraisal and bank product distribution channel within the expected geographical 
parameter. Typically, SMEs targeted and supported were within BoP settings, 
namely rural, district and peri-urban communities. The partnered NGO addressed 
the social impact assessment during the appraisal and post financing social impact 
measurement. 
5.4.4 Strategy change of bank-based fund managers and SMEs  
Subsection 5.4.3 on models of impact funds under management by bank-based 
fund managers dovetails into this subsection. Explanation and insight about impact 
investor funding models on the ground facilitate illustration on strategy change 
evidence. The following presentation shows analysis and findings on strategy 
change of bank-based fund managers in financing SMEs, which pursued dual goals. 
  When I posed the question, respondents gave different answers, which 
showed evidence of strategy change with the emergence of impact investing. For 
example, bank-based fund manager D suggested the establishment of a unit within 
a department called "Strategic Partnership Unit" to attract alternative funding for 
SMEs, especially impact investor funds. As expressed in the interview extract: 
 
“We have our own unit. I do not think there is any bank that has a partnership 
unit dedicated to working with these DFI's to make this thing work. So 
certainly, the team has become better at doing it” (BB Fund Manager D1) 
 
Bank-based Fund manager D explained that strategic allocation of finance to 
agricultural enterprises was not their core area of business. As noted by Hochstadter 
and Scheck (2015), the impact investment strategy can be observed from sectors 
and demography financed. Further, Wood et al. (2013) earlier alluded to an 
integrative strategy of investors and fund managers, focusing on deal pipelines in 
their portfolio manifesting high social impact. This specific bank-based fund 
manager, therefore, sought opportunities to grow their loan portfolio to the sector 
perceived as high risk. 
 
“Agric is risky or perceived to be risky. Also, the whole thing was, we sat down 
and said no it is simple, we do not understand Agric….So, when this 
discussion about getting the USAID guarantee for Agric value chain financing 
came, we just jumped to it…. there was also a technical support side attached 
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to it, and that has been delivered” (BB Fund Manager D2) 
 
However, for bank-based fund manager A, strategic change at their global business 
level permeated the local organisational level resulting in a focus on agri-business 
value chain which hitherto had been neglected. Through internal funding called 
“financial intermediation” and impact investment incentive, fund manager A over the 
past three years allocated almost $60 million to agri-business sector, which hitherto 
was neglected. 
“My bank does not chase those funds because we are self-sufficient when it 
comes to funding. I have had offers from agencies who want to give us those 
monies but because we have excess funds …. We have just hit the $ 60 
million-dollar total loans.” 
An elaboration of five conditions evidencing strategy change and alignment of bank-
based fund managers and SMEs financed are presented next. These conditions 
further evidences deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial returns in BoP 
communities in line with research objective 2 of Section 1.3. Social entrepreneurship 
literature (Battilana et al., 2012; Peredo and McLean, 2006; Serlos and Mair, 2005) 
explains how organisations and ventures adopt different strategies for realising the 
simultaneous social impact and financial returns. 
  An integrated strategy of linking MNC, SME (aggregators) and farmers in 
BoP communities Hitherto, Multinational Companies (MNC's) in Ghana sourced 
inputs globally with little regards to local communities. However, in recent years, 
some MNC's financed by bank-based fund managers expressed intentions and 
strategically sourced raw materials from the local economy. To promote social and 
financial returns through SMEs, bank-based fund managers developed value chain 
financing model linking MNCs, SMEs and farmers. This strategy changes 
evidencing integrated impact investment strategy satisfy Wood et al. (2013) and 
Ormiston et al. (2015) approach for deploying impact investment capital. Further, 
bank-based fund managers strategy changes in attracting impact investment funds 
is demonstrated through the financing of SMEs who deliberately source materials in 
BoP communities for income and poverty reduction. This model integrates MNC 
seeking to source locally with SMEs as aggregators to farmers in BoP communities 
to realise the simultaneous impact and pursuit of inclusive development over the 
past few years. In effect, the value chain financing model enabled the MNC to 
reduce operational cost and increase profitability while supporting BoP 
communities.  
 Similarly, the SME aggregators simultaneously promoted social impact and 
192 
 
financial returns for farmers. Such evidence of social impact and financial returns 
reflect what Battilana et al. (2012) refer to as integrated strategy from the social 
entrepreneurship literature. Extracts of the interview show how BB fund manager A 
financed two SME aggregators to support farmers in BoP communities to fulfil 
supply requirements of an MNC.  
  
“In 2014 or 2015 we did one too with GGL. I think Government to encourage 
businesses in Ghana came up with an incentive…, you get a tax rebate for 
local market purchase. So GGL (MNC) sought to now source sorghum 
locally. Also, they had a perfect variety from the North. So they introduced 
two of their aggregators if you like the suppliers to us…….  and we supported 
them with GHS 6.2 million to be able to mop up the Soghum from smallholder 
farmers, aggregate it clean, bag and then transport it all the way to GGL." 
 
In structuring the value chain financing model, the MNC signed a supplier 
agreement with the SME aggregator companies. These selected SME aggregators 
enter into a production agreement with farmers in groups to produce specified 
quantities of products and specific quality. Financing is provided by the bank-based 
fund manager to assist the SME aggregator to support the farmers and mobilise the 
produce from the farm gate. SME aggregator mobilised the produce from the 
farmers after harvesting and supplied to the warehouse of the MNC for certification 
and acceptance. Subsequently, invoices issued to the MNC which usually is subject 
to 60-day credit were submitted to the bank-based fund manager for discounting. 
 
 Social sector SME financing exemplify an impact investment strategy 
focusing on sectors, geography, and demography (Hochstadter and Scheck, 2015; 
Rajan et al., 2014). Thus, evidence of strategy changes and alignment among bank- 
based fund managers relate to an upsurge in financing SMEs operating in social 
sectors such as health, education, water, and sanitation. Further, social sector SME 
financing reflects an "embedded social purpose" (Austin et al. 2006) model of 
strategy change of deliberately realising financial returns with automatic social 
impact. Because of demography and geography (Hochstadter and Scheck, 2015). 
The emergence of impact investment funds facilitated access to such funding and 
motivation for bank-based fund managers to finance SMEs in these sectors. In 
financing such SMEs, bank-based fund managers were mindful of the expected 
impact in BoP communities and financial returns to meet impact investor 
expectations. An extract of a financing initiative to bank-based fund manager D with 
support from an impact investor (USAID) to promote health care in rural 
communities in Ghana. 
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“And the whole idea is that you know they wanted us to grow a portfolio in 
the health sector progressively, but then you are looking more at rural 
communities. So instead of doing the urban side, we are trying to build the 
capacity of health facilities that are in the rural areas to be able to provide 
these health services to the rural folk”. 
  
Similar evidence of strategy changes in financing social sector SMEs emerged 
where bank-based fund managers previously allocated paltry sums of the loan 
portfolio to such sectors because of the profit maximisation orientation. 
 
“Recently, we had issues in Komfo Anokye where you could not even get a 
place for children in terms of maternity block. So, the whole idea was to look, 
let us try and promote quality care for those who are dealing in child and then 
maternal health" (BB Fund Manager D2) 
 
Another support in the social sector, which evidence strategy change aided by 
impact investment funding is the promotion of quality water access, sanitation, and 
health improvement. Typically bank-based fund managers avoided such sectors if 
the business case did not justify financing and profitability. As BB fund manager D1 
sought to articulate from the interview extract: 
“…Once its donor-led sometimes it becomes difficult because you have to 
prove a business case for the unit. You know, the business must decide I 
want to do Agric, [Water, Sanitation]. You know, and really, I feel that there 
is a business case here and feel that if I go and I lend in this market, I can go 
and make money out of it”. 
 
Financing of these sectors by bank-based fund managers is against the backdrop 
of low allocation of capital from Government and public sector-led agencies in 
curbing societal problems as uncovered in Section 3.2 and 3.4. Indeed, access to 
water and poor sanitation constitute key challenges confronting BoP communities 
in Ghana. Lack of government finance to these essential sectors and lack of 
business case from banks to finance resulted in a quick-fix solution. The perception 
of risk, unprofitable business segment and financial constraints affect SMEs in the 
Water, Sanitation and Health (WASH) sector. 
“…Back in the day, I remember before we were introduced to WASH, there 
was a client like that who said he had a chain of toilet facilities and he wanted 
to build another one. I mean people who came into contact with him, I was 
one, we are wondering, is this thing viable, sustainable, how will he generate 
cash flow to repay the loan?" (BB fund manager D2) 
 
Such speculation, doubt about cashflow abilities of SMEs in the WASH sector were 
dispelled when an impact investing agency (Embassy of the Kingdom of the 
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Netherlands (EKN), committed some impact capital. Bank-based fund manager D 
was mandated to manage the fund and collaborated with an NGO to assess and 
facilitate financing to high growth and missing middle SMEs in the sector for 
simultaneous social impact and financial returns.  
“…after going through the whole dynamics and then getting this technical 
support from our partners SNV, we realise that you can build the business 
model out of this client. Because I gave him a loan at 10% per annum, highly 
subsidized interest rates, he actually worked with it. He pays back... If I gave 
him a loan, he has a truck. If I gave him a loan, he might say, I want to buy 
two additional trucks” (BB fund manager D2) 
 
Significantly, financing SMEs in the WASH sector, which were neglected due to 
perceived risk and low profitability guaranteed both social impact and financial 
returns to the bank. It was succinctly expressed by bank-based fund manager D in 
the following extracts: 
“…..number one, you have increased his reach, and that is the social side. 
Now he can go out there and pick more rubbish from households. Also, 
number two, the commercial side, he is proving to you that look, I can get 
cash flow, and I am paying back your loan…. once this person now has built 
'wealth' and has paid off the loan, ploughing back all the money into his 
business, now you have actually built capacity for this guy to go and borrow 
at a commercial rate” 
 
The third evidence of strategy change is the upsurge in promoting financial inclusion 
through SMEs via agency banking. A review of the historical context of impact 
investing through financial architecture reforms in Section 3.3 uncovered how the 
technology context has changed and the extent of financial inclusion. Bank-based 
fund managers, therefore, through the support of impact investors adopted strategy 
change to promote financial inclusion through high growth and established SMEs to 
reduce poverty, improve livelihood and access to finance for hitherto unbanked BoP 
communities. Evidence of financial exclusion of most of the Ghana's population is 
well documented in the literature and commissioned reports (e.g. World Bank). Due 
to inadequate distribution networks of commercial banks, some of the bank-based 
fund managers developed strategies and business models to promote financial 
inclusion. These models were designed and implemented through impact investor 
financing to enable bank-based fund managers to build capacity, engage SMEs as 
agents to deliver the services in BoP communities. Extract from the interview from 
a bank-based fund manager  
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"We actually had funds from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, but that 
was geared towards supporting or promoting savings for individuals. 
However, the other bit that was SME related was providing the cover or 
support for the bank to extend facilities to agents who will be providing 
financial services in the communities of these individuals that traditionally will 
be financially excluded” (BB fund manager B) 
 
To realise the anticipated financial inclusion through an agent network, SMEs were 
identified, capacity developed and financially supported through the funding from 
the impact investor. 
 
“the retail shop next to the house can receive the consumers' deposits and 
directly credit it into his/her account…. in trying to deepen financial services 
we then needed to empower the agents with liquidity support. Because they 
can only deposit what they have, they cannot deposit what they do not have. 
So, we then needed to empower these guys with liquidity support, hence the 
support from Bill and Melinda Gates" (BB fund manager B). 
 
 The fourth evidence represent digitisation broadly including mobile money 
services and MFIs funding were pursued as a complementary strategy to provide 
both financial inclusion and development in BoP communities. Battilana et al. (2012) 
find that a unified hybrid strategy of deliberately realising the social impact and 
financial returns are exemplified through MFIs. Peredo and McLean (2006, p.63) 
earlier suggested an integrated strategy of commercial exchange and profits directly 
to a social benefit based on Grameen Bank MFI model. Microfinance institutions 
which represent established and high growth SMEs constitute another channel that 
bank-based fund managers utilise evidencing strategy change for societal 
transformation in BoP communities. To promote financial inclusion and access to 
finance by SMEs in rural communities, BBF manager D used MFIs in BoP 
communities. SMEs engaged in water, sanitation, and health sectors in rural, district 
and peri-urban communities were directed to access funds through MFI's in their 
communities. A co-appraisal of the MFIs were conducted. Subsequently, these 
funds were disbursed to small enterprises engaged in the WASH sector while 
providing opportunities for their inclusion in the financial system. 
“Because you are also trying to bring peoples mind to banking. If the person 
is not banked, we need to bring him into the financial system… It was going 
to be expensive if the bank was going to that on our own. (BB Fund Manager, 
D2) 
 
“…we are using digital to drive financial inclusion because that is typically if 
you need to provide better and low-cost financial services to everybody in all 
the parts of the country…to ensure that the mobile becomes the driver for 
achieving financial inclusion in our part of the world….For the merchant, we 
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are developing a model where a certain cashflow of yours becomes 
automatically accessible when you request for it to support the liquidity of the 
business (BBF Manager B) 
 
Case illustration box 5.2 below depicts another ‘how’ of strategy change of BBF D 
in deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial returns. 
 
 
Box 5.2 BBF manager D, strategy change and financing of a missing middle SME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Finally, another evidence of strategy change is the facilitation of agri-
business financing in Ghana. Agri-business is a significant sector that impact 
investment strategy automatically realises the expected objectives due to the 
connection with the global value chain of food security. Hotstadter and Scheck 
(2015) and Addis et al., (2013) finds that societal problems including poverty, poor 
livelihood and low income in BoP communities can be alleviated through financing 
sectors including agriculture and agri-business. Impact investment funding to bank-
based fund managers over the past five years has guaranteed growth in funding 
Case illustration: Box 5.2 
A World Bank (2013) report shows that Ghana lags in terms of health outcomes and 
evidence of a high incidence of communicable diseases exist. Water and sanitation 
constitute a significant challenge confronting the Government of Ghana, especially in 
peri-urban and rural areas. Inadequate access to water and sanitation facilities compound 
the incidence of communicable diseases in Ghana. To reduce these challenges, BBF 
manager D secured an impact investment fund of $2 million to finance established and 
missing middle SMEs in urban, peri-urban and rural areas. BBF manager D had 
previously turned down the financing of SMEs in the water and sanitation sector based 
on perceived risk, unprofitable market segment and unwillingness to commit own funds. 
However, impact investment capital caused BBF manager D to change strategy. The 
objective was to target these categories of SMEs directly or indirectly through 
Microfinance Institutions (MFI) in peri-urban and rural communities for social impact and 
financial returns. These peri-urban and rural communities represent BOP communities, 
financially excluded and lack access to infrastructure. As explained, “we have some 
MFI's too that we give money to and they on-lend to these people to get the toilet. 
So, for the MFI you are looking at an average loan size of about GHS 118,000's 
[$29,5001], but the maximum we have done so far in terms of disbursement is 
GHS 500,000.00[$125,000.00] to an MFI" (BBF Manger D). 
MFI's supported represent established SMEs engaged in financial services targeting 
small businesses providing solutions to societal problems, i.e. water and sanitation. Small 
enterprises accessing these funds become an incentive to provide access to water and 
improved sanitation further while making a profit from their ventures. Impact investment 
funding has, therefore caused strategy change among BBF managers to support different 
categories of enterprises in BOP communities. 
197 
 
towards the agriculture sector. Key impact investment agencies and institutions 
including USAID, AGRA and DANIDA have collaborated with bank-based fund 
managers through incentives for agri-business funding. Real and perceived risk in 
the agriculture value chain financing, as well as lack of technical expertise within 
bank-based institutions, led to the neglect of the sector previously. Some 
commercial banks in time past had weak loan portfolio within the sector resulting in 
only Government-owned banks purportedly supporting the sector as shown in 
Section 3.3. Under the United States of America (USA), "Feed the Future" program, 
USAID FinGap (Financing Ghanaian Agricultural Project) incentivised bank-based 
fund managers to support agri-businesses with finance. The incentives were in the 
form of grants and guarantees for increase funding to SMEs in the maize, rice, and 
soy value chain.  
"….The point I am making is for every financing you do, and they give you 
some reward. Also, that reward is not meant for investees but meant for the 
internal use of the banks” (BB fund manager A) 
 
“They were trying to incentivise financial institutions to lend more to 
businesses in the maize soya, rice value chain called MRS value chain… 
they give you the grant, and the SMEs are expected to pay you based on 
your credit assessment. It is just to encourage us to write more deals. It is an 
incentive" (BB fund manager C) 
 
“….when this discussion about getting the USAID guarantee for Agric value 
chain financing came, we just jumped to it. Because there was also a 
technical support side attached to it and that was being delivered by FinGap" 
(BB fund manager D1). 
 
Thus, through incentives of grants and guarantees, participating bank-based fund 
managers financed and grew their loan portfolio to Agri-businesses. Besides 
supporting agri-business financing within the value chain, these SMEs supported 
were operating in BoP communities, thereby realising social impact and financial 
returns. Four bank-based fund managers participated in the USAID FinGap with 
different degrees of success. BB fund manager A over the past two years was 
adjudged best bank in Agri-business financing noted through the grants and 
guarantees, they have grown their loan portfolio. 
 “We have just hit the $ 60 million-dollar total loans…… on the top of my head, 
we have financed more than 30 businesses. We have financing as low as GHS 
500,000.00 and as high as $10 million" (BB fund manager A) 
 
 Based on the analysis presented on how bank-based fund managers and SMEs 
supported changed their strategies as agents of social impact and financial returns, 
the following findings emerge. Bank-based fund managers which hitherto 
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strategically financed Corporates, MNC's, Governments and Quasi-government 
entities changed their strategies. The analysis evidenced that bank-based fund 
manager A changed their strategy to finance SMEs in the agricultural value chain 
with the emergence of impact investing. Besides, to realising the social impact and 
financial returns in BoP communities, they connected two MNC's to SMEs and 
farmers a value chain financing model. Bank-based fund manager B strategy 
change, and alignment enabled the attraction of impact funds to promote financial 
inclusion and finance SMEs in agri-business for impact and financial returns. 
 Similarly, bank-based fund manager C supported SMEs in the agri-business 
sector. Setting up a dedicated unit, bank-based fund manager D evidence strategy 
change. They allocated funding to SMEs operating in social sectors including water, 
sanitation, and health. In pursuit of this new strategy due to impact investment funds, 
fund manager D also promoted financial inclusion in BoP communities through MFI's 
for financial support to SMEs and individuals. While strategy change of promoting 
financial inclusion can be termed transformational, it cannot be emphatically said 
about social sectors and other sectors considering the considerable investment 
capital requirements. 
 
 
5.4.5 Investee SME strategy change as social enterprises 
 
Existing literature on bank financing (Beck; 2013; Kuntchev et al., 2012; Ayyagari et 
al., 2011) indicates that SMEs, in general, are financially constrained and 
consequently unable to grow and positively affect economic growth. Financial 
constraints of SMEs are due to information asymmetry, perceived risk, lack of 
technical know-how and high failure rate. Strategy change of SMEs as for-profit 
social enterprises have enabled access to subsidised funding, growth and 
expansion, capacity development and secured legitimacy for alternative funding 
based on data analysis reflect impact in BoP communities. 
 High growth, missing middle and established SMEs with embedded social 
impact strategy that hitherto were financially constrained now have access to 
subsidised funding, thereby reduces their financial constraints. Typically, high-
interest rates affected the ability of high growth SMEs to fulfil their obligations to 
bank-based institutions. However, impact investment funding models at a reduced 
interest rate, and sometimes guarantees minimized the financial constraints of these 
SMEs.  
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“There was one facility here at Nkawkaw. We gave the clinic GHS 300,000 
and it was to finance the purchase of consumables, medical consumables 
i.e. drugs, CDs, gloves and stuff…..the collateral they had available was way 
in excess of even the loan amount.. but the assurance here is that if anything 
goes wrong, USAID is going to reimburse us with 50% of whatever is owed, 
and we can pursue the client for the rest" (BB fund manager D1) 
 
Secondly, strategy change, which entails providing commercial exchange and 
complimentary social purpose (Peredo and McLean, 2006) enabled missing middle 
SMEs to benefit from capacity development through technical assistance facilities 
from fund managers. Bank-based fund managers through technical assistance 
provided by impact investment institutions for managerial and operational capacity 
building of these SMEs to impact BoP communities. 
 
"After financing sometimes, I remember one-time [BBF manager A] came up 
with a consultant to assist sometimes they come with advice, they have also 
opened their doors for I mean any difficulty or challenge, we can seek advice 
from them to get the results needed” (SME15) 
 
"..We have an academy. That is something that … runs on the side, where 
we train SME. So what we did was kind of integrate that academy into the 
P2P project. Also, so the SME customers…. we profile them. We have 
designed a template with a consultant, and they are IFC certified trainer. So, 
we have designed a template, and what the template does is, it picks the 
information that the customer brings" (BB fund manager D1) 
 
  
Thirdly, SMEs were also constrained to realise anticipated growth and consequently 
impact due to inadequate funding focusing purely on financial returns modified their 
business strategies and models. Impact investment funding and incentives already 
analysed provides entrepreneurial financing options, the impetus for business 
growth and social impact, which occurred through an integrated strategy. An 
example of such established SME that realised growth, impact and financial returns 
through an integrated strategy change is Masara. The SME secured access to 
funding, expanded an out-grower farmer group operating in BoP communities, 
purchase the product and subsequently sold their produce to global purchasers. As 
captured from the interview extract from bank-based fund manager B1 
"…., we invested about $3 million in a farmer group called Masara. This 
farmer group in 2013 was reaching just about 1000 people. Today they are 
doing almost 10,000 farmers. For us supporting them is helping improve the 
standard of living of the farmers. Again guaranteeing the market access. 
Because as an organisation, they can sell to the bigger corporates. They are 
selling to Wienco, World Food Program and all of that” (BB fund manager B1) 
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The ability of the above farmer organisation to secure market access and impact 
many people was enabled through the adoption of an operating model involving 
more farmer stakeholders farming in groups. 
 
Finally, SME owner-managers that responded to this research acknowledged the 
effect of strategy change adopted in their operations. It resulted in legitimacy and 
created avenues for alternative funding sources given the high interest on loans in 
the country. The next section presents an analysis of how bank-based and SMEs 
financed simultaneously realise the social impact and financial returns in BoP 
communities in Ghana.  
 
5.5 Impacts (social impact and financial returns) 
Impact investment resources were utilised to support SMEs in different sectors, 
geographies, market segments to realise the social impact and financial returns. 
The governance mechanisms deployed, and strategy change of bank-based fund 
managers directly ensured that SMEs that hitherto were agents of private wealth 
creation facilitated access to products, services, and improvement in BoP 
communities about research objectives in Section 1.4. In this section 5.5, analysis 
of available evidence from the corpus of data collected is presented on the impacts 
(social impact and financial returns). Deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial 
returns as uncovered in the impact investing strategies in Section 2.4 and social 
entrepreneurship literature in Section 2.6 occur in different forms based on evidence 
from this empirical analysis 
Evidence of strategy of the deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial 
returns include commercial activities plus CSR. Peredo and McLean (2006) 
describe such strategy as complementary where commercial profits are used to 
support social goals. Social impact represents an important objective for most SMEs 
considering the myriad of developmental challenges confronting the country. SME 
entrepreneurs were unanimous on responses to the question of impacts in terms of 
social impact and financial returns. Social impact comprises job creation, corporate 
social responsibility activities, and suppliers involved in out-grower schemes. 
“ …our motive first is to make a profit. You see, but we do social good. We 
build schools, ICT centres; we have a scholarship scheme where we pay not 
less than 100 student fees per annum” (SME 15) 
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“…where I am living if I did not bring the job to jobless people, they will attack 
me… that is why I am struggling to get a job done for all these societies….. 
Through me so many poor people, so many lower-income people, they have 
built one-bedroom and two-bedroom houses because they work through my 
farm” (SME4) 
“We support young kids in sports, talking of soccer… We do it yearly, and we 
make blood donations…. Moreover, then we also take care of, we have a 
team, hospital surgery team that comes down from USA and Canada to 
Ghana every year, to do free hip and knee operations for the poor men and 
women” -(SME8) 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of MNCs and other corporates have 
been adopted and spearheaded by some SMEs. Specifically, formalised support to 
underprivileged communities through foundations as part of CSR. For example, the 
CEO of SME8  
"this malnutrition is a whole chain on its own which we have a board chairman 
and other board members…. it is a project that it has run on its own…I am 
financing it, and that is our target as free stuff for the kids….We cannot say 
that ohh we are making money, then the kids are dying. … Our focus is on 
the child malnutrition because at least since we started, we have been able 
to take care of many kids, they survive through that kind of intervention. So 
that is the most area of impact" (SM8) 
Established SMEs also initiated out-grower scheme as an impact strategy 
enhancing market access and sourcing materials from BoP communities, thereby 
promoting inclusive growth, income improvement and poverty alleviation. It reflects 
what Battilana et al. (2012) describes as a unified hybrid strategy   
"….In 2016 we engaged some farmers in the five regions of Ghana…., we 
give you the seed, the high yielding seed, gave you the fertilizer, supply the 
insecticides… with the seeds, fertilizer and the chemicals, we expect that if 
for nothing at all, one acre, you can get 32 bags. So, you will give [us] 15 
bags and then 17 bags will be your profit. Each farmer has ten farmers who 
work under him or her. In the three Northern Regions, we engaged 14... We 
were able to make on the average 95% recovery... We continued from then, 
2017” (SM5) 
Profitability, expansion of business, growth, and contribution to economic growth as 
indicators of financial returns were pivotal to the sustainability (Blundel et al., 2018) 
of SMEs analysed. Financial returns included generating enough cash flows, 
profitability, turnover and growth to meet the needs of critical stakeholders. These 
stakeholders comprised funders and investors, government through taxation, 
statutory obligations such as a pension, health insurance and utility providers. For 
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some SME owners, the profit motive was essential for sustainability. Excerpts of 
interview extracts comprised: 
“And the reason that we are for-profit is that I think it creates more of social 
impact than been a non-profit. I like been a for-profit because, first of all you 
know if you charge people something for what they are getting, then it is much 
more empowering to them” (SM1) 
“….as I said that we are running a sustainably profitable business…... in as 
much as we are helping people, we are also driving and generating revenues 
for the company ourselves" (SM3) 
"I am this business to make money and create an impact because it is not all 
of us that God gave us a chance. So, I always tell people that if God gives 
you a chance, you need to have it that it is not because you are special” (SM9) 
In addition to social impact and financial returns outcome realised by SMEs, the 
entrepreneurs and bank-based fund managers view themselves as agents. By way 
of finding solutions to societal problems, bank-based fund managers and SME 
owners individually and collectively catalyse solutions to societal problems. To 
summarise, evidence of the ‘how’ of strategy change that bank-based fund 
managers deploy as influences on high growth and established SMEs can be 
summarised as integrated, embedded, complementary and stand-alone. Evidence 
in subsection 5.5.1 illustrates the role of bank-based fund managers and SME 
owner-managers in BoP communities as agents of social transformation. 
 
5.5.1 Social transformation role of Bank-based fund managers and SME 
owners  
Social entrepreneurship theory suggests that entrepreneurs that innovatively 
through hybrid financing and business models which aims at social transformation 
represent social entrepreneurs (Kimbu and Ngoasong; 2016; Ruebottom, 2013; 
Zahra et al., 2009). Bank-based fund managers view this role as crucial because of 
the opportunity cost of such funding vis-à-vis risk-free investments and MNC 
financing. Some of these bank-based fund managers view it as a strategic policy of 
their banks in promoting citizenship agendas in Africa through such supports. 
At the individual fund manager level, motivation as agents of solutions to societal 
problems is at the root of their financial decision making as well as the corporate 
level. Extracts of some interviews: 
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“And for me, changing people's lives is important to me. Then for the Bank, 
you know hearing what our management say, they are also massive on social 
impact ventures” (BB fund manager D) 
“People bring their money; we should find a way of also trying to solve the 
problems of people, It is not just about money” (BB fund manager D) 
Board level of the respondent banks also indicates a commitment to social impact 
and financial returns through SMEs as agents of solutions. 
"I think especially in the Agric space, one of the things that transform that 
when we first make the opportunity to use blended finance. If we have social 
interventions that allow us to triple or quadruple our private funding" (BB fund 
manager A) 
"So we have a dual mandate to contribute the economic development and 
integration of the sub-region as a global objective. Moreover, on the local 
scale as well to commit to helping alleviate poverty" (BB fund manager B2) 
"We have identified five critical strategic value drivers, which are supported 
by the under-listed performance metrics to grow the bank.  1. Client focus 2. 
Employee engagement 3. Risk and conduct 4. Financial outcome, 5. Social, 
economic and environmental outcome2” 
In addition to the above, bank-based fund managers view their role as extending 
beyond job creation to include corporate social responsibility. An extract from bank-
based fund manager reflects such a position. 
“ ...we are employing people, we are contributing, we are doing our own 
CSR's, you know we are supporting businesses to be part of the PPP's,” (BB 
fund manager B1) 
“The shear butter is currently about 30, and pub boilers are about 40 to 45 
women. Even though they take the loans individually, they are in a group. 
They are assessed individually based on their loan application, but we put 
them in a group when we are dealing with them. These women have a whole 
warehouse built for them by the [aggregator] who buys the products. So, they 
come there in the mornings, the straw is paid for in advance, and so they 
come, and work and they go home. So, depending on the number of baskets 
you weave in a day, you get your money and move" (SME7) 
Social entrepreneurship literature and evidence from this section of the empirical 
chapter shows the role of bank-based fund managers and SME owners in finding 
solutions to societal problems. Overwhelmingly, these roles are catalytic represent 
important motivation and agency of these actors as social entrepreneurs in BoP 
communities. Section 5.6 summarises and concludes the chapter based on the 
objectives and emerging findings as they relate to theory. 
 
2 Quotation from the Annual Report, 2017 of Bank based fund manager C, pp.6   
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5.6 Chapter summary and conclusion 
The chapter sought to present analysis and findings on the influences of bank-based 
impact funds on SMEs with the notion of influences from governance, strategy 
change and impacts (social impact and financial returns). Three theoretical 
arguments inform this study based on the theoretical framework. Firstly, as reviewed 
in Chapter 2, this research argues that the influences of impact investors can be 
analysed by examining the ways in which impact fund managers deploy governance 
mechanisms of ownership, control and board representation that are agreed 
between impact investors and BBF managers as the basis for ensuring that SME 
investees realise the dual goals of financial returns and social impact.. Secondly, 
with the emergence of impact investing, bank-based fund managers have changed 
their strategies or aligned to secure impact investor funding and financed different 
categories of SMEs which support BoP communities. Finally, the expected impact 
objectives from impact investors and bank-based fund managers consist of the 
deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial returns. This chapter has applied 
these theoretical arguments to the case of bank-based impact investments into 
SMEs in Ghana. While the objective of the study focused on bank-based fund and 
SME investees, evidence at the level of impact investor-fund manager was also 
presented. The reason is that bank-based fund influences on SMEs financed 
emanates from investor-fund manager influences. 
The study uncovered two primary governance evidence, namely control and 
monitoring that impact investors deploy to influence BBF managers as agreed after 
the drawdown of capital commitment. These evidence on governance are expected 
compared to the theoretical arguments premised on ownership, control, and board 
representation, which is more associated with equity financing. Governance 
mechanisms deployed follows the strategy that impact investors seek to implement 
in achieving objectives of social impact and financial returns. Moreover, bank-based 
fund manager strategy change relating to how the impact fund will on-lend to SMEs 
in different priority sectors determine the type of financing instruments requested. 
Based on the five bank-based fund managers analysed, impact investor funding 
was typically debt for on-lending to SMEs in different sectors, especially BoP 
communities. Such evidence is not surprising because of regulatory and legislative 
requirements of the Banking Act 2004, now amended Act (930) 2016, which 
provides that commercial banks with universal banking license provide only debt 
capital. Governance findings uncovered that bank-based fund managers through 
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covenants and terms in financing agreements limit significant decisions and choices 
of SMEs financed with rights of prior consent. 
Further, post financing relationship management through on-site visits and 
off-site telephone conversation, analysis of reports and transaction analysis ensure 
effective monitoring. The reason is because of the debt funding provided by bank-
based funds, which are to be expected, determines the nature of governance 
mechanism applicable. Additionally, it emerged that pre-financing approval 
processes of bank-based fund managers had embedded governance checks which 
sift SMEs before the deployment of post financing control and monitoring 
mechanisms which has received little attention in academic literature. The 
unsurprising governance findings also indicate that bank-based cases studied do 
not have capital adequacy challenges which impact investment capital fills, as 
indicated in the introduction to the context.  
Plausibly, access to debt capital from impact investors enabled them to 
improve liquidity and increase loan portfolio to SMEs that hitherto were constrained. 
Further, perhaps lower-tiered bank-based funds such as NBFI, RCBs and MFIs 
would have provided alternative findings. It might not be the case due to a regulatory 
cap of 20% maximum equity in lower-tier bank-based institution in Ghana by a 
foreign investor to protect the sector from acquisitions and takeovers. In terms of 
SMEs, these governance findings re-affirm the status quo that many SME owners 
in Ghana prefer debt financing and are sceptical of equity due to the perception of 
potential take-over by the investors. 
The analysis presented on strategy change shows evidence at the impact 
investor-fund manager level and fund manager-SME investee level. Strategy 
change or alignment findings uncovered that bank-based fund manager’s secured 
impact investor capital including managed funds, co-financing, and subsidised 
funding, grants, guarantees and revolving loans. Strategy change of bank-based 
fund managers at the investor level facilitated collaborative funding of SMEs, access 
to long-term capital, and catalytic effect of SME financing and exclusive social sector 
capital initiatives. Strategy change findings reflect integrated, embedded, 
complementary and stand-alone models of realising the deliberate social impact and 
financial returns based on social entrepreneurship theory. These manifested at the 
fund manager-SME level in four ways of SME financing. These include linking 
MNCs, SMEs and farmers in BoP communities; social sector SME financing, 
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promoting financial inclusion, and facilitation of agri-business in Ghana. These 
findings, in one way, was surprising especially the agri-business sector, which 
declined within the past two decades due to foreign competition as a result of trade 
liberalisation, low funding allocation and lack of government support.  
The transformational nature of this funding is still unclear considering the 
myriad of societal problems in Ghana reviewed in section 3.2. High growth, missing 
middle and established SMEs as for-profit social enterprise revealed strategy 
change. Such SMEs had access to subsidised and guaranteed funding, technical 
assistance support, experienced growth, and impact, legitimised their business and 
accessed alternative funding. The strategy of financial inclusion can be termed 
transformational. It is because of the upsurge of telecommunication companies 
setting up spin-off mobile financial services (MFS) companies and massive 
investment capital creating intense competition. Evidence from data emerging 
shows huge up-take in the adoption and usage of mobile financial services, 
digitisation, and linkages to other lower-tier institutions in financing. Government 
policies and regulations spearheaded by the Bank of Ghana in enhancing payments 
systems also aided this transformation in financial inclusion.  
Impact investor expectation in terms of impacts (social impact and financial 
returns) analysed and presented includes the role of bank-based fund managers 
and SME owners in BoP communities. Evidence of financial returns uncovered 
includes generating enough cash flows, profitability, turnover and growth to meet 
the needs of critical stakeholders. Social impact evidence revealed job creation, out-
grower schemes to facilitate market access, corporate social responsibility initiatives 
and health improvement. Deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial returns 
manifested in different types of strategy implementation by bank-based fund 
managers and SMEs including integrated, embedded, complementary and 
standalone (Battilana et al., 2012; Austin et al., 2006; Peredo and McLean, 2006; 
Seelos and Mair, 2005). While these strategies were not explicit from bank-based 
fund managers analysed, the corpus of data from SMEs financed in different sectors 
and geographies as well as how these SMEs are creating social impact reflected 
these strategies. These, therefore, raises the critical issue of whether social impact 
constitutes a significant consideration for bank-based fund managers that secured 
impact investment capital. 
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Critically, bank-based fund managers from the analysed data prioritise 
financial returns while the social impact in some of their transactions seems 
incidental and not deliberate. It reveals the notion of finance first investors from the 
impact investing literature (Hotchstadter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston el al., 2015). 
Even in social sector financing, where social impact appears automatic and 
presence of impact investor guarantee incentives, minimal effort is made for relaxing 
any funding requirement. SME owner-managers explained the extent of bank-based 
fund manager fixation on financial returns. Social impact initiatives of SME 
entrepreneurs were commended by bank-based fund managers and sometimes 
celebrated in newsletters, promotional documents, and award ceremonies. 
Considering the wicked intractable problems reviewed in Section 3.2 of the 
institutional context, societal transformation is quite distant based on these funding. 
Indeed, these key sectors are receiving an allocation of impact investor capital 
through bank-based funds, especially the agri-business sector. The 
transformational effect required in terms of funding allocation for health, education, 
water, and sanitation to cause a systemic change in Ghana makes the current 
capital allocation negligible. Annual investment in each of these sectors to cause 
societal transformation exceeds $2 billion compared to less than $ 350 million 
annual capital allocation based on gross loans of 4.8% to agri-business sector 
(BOG, 2019). For transformational private sector-led development, infrastructure 
financing and funding of education, health, agri-business, and energy require 
substantial capital allocation by bank-based fund managers. 
For impact investments through bank-based funds to realise the sea change 
of societal transformation which will reduce unemployment, provide more job 
opportunities and facilitate the growth of manufacturing businesses while reducing 
SME financing constraints, a private sector-led development banking model might 
be necessary, discussed in Chapter 7.  The next section presents empirical analysis 
on capital market-based fund managers and investee SMEs 
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CHAPTER 6  
Analysis of Capital Market-based Funds and investee 
SMEs 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter applies the theoretical framework developed in Sub-section 2.8.1 of 
chapter two to uncover the influences of Capital Market-based (CMB) funds on 
investee SMEs through governance, strategy change and impacts. In applying the 
framework, the chapter present analysis and findings on governance at the investor-
fund manager level and fund manager-SME investee levels. Besides, analysis and 
findings on strategy change and alignment at the investor-fund manager level and 
fund-manager-SME investee level were presented. Investor-fund manager level 
evidences the relevance of the theoretical framework in a global context and 
facilitates its application within the African context. Similarly, fund-manager-SME 
investee level showcases the local context-specific dimensions of the theoretical 
framework and possible extension to the regional context. 
At the investor- fund manager level, findings showed that investors influence 
fund managers through the governance dimension of ownership. Governance 
dimension of ownership occurred in the form of minority ownership in funds, 
shareholder rights through a partnership agreement, and equal voting rights. 
Furthermore, the governance dimension of control emerged in the form of investors, 
limiting fund managers to sectors, geographies, and deal size. Clauses such as 
most- favoured nation clause emerged. Also, fund manager removal authority 
exemplified some of the control rights of impact investors on fund managers. Board 
representation at the fund level through the appointment of nominees or 
independent directors granted impact investors board and voting rights through the 
LPAC as the final governance mechanism. These rights enabled the most significant 
investors to appoint board nominees, LPAC approved conflict of interest issues and 
require fund manager compliance with the partnership, investment policy and other 
related agreements. Voting rights were available to all shareholders in the fund on 
matters that affect the partnership and shareholders agreement through a simple 
majority or 75% in situations such as accepting new investor to the fund.  
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Similarly, governance at the fund manager-SME investee level revealed 
essential findings. From ownership dimension of governance, CMB fund managers 
took minority interest with equity investment, secured voting rights and power to 
remove CEO in exceptional cases. Governance through control revealed control 
rights that CMB fund managers accrue and exert by way of minority protection 
clauses, milestone investments, right of first refusal for entrepreneur's equity stake 
and vesting to influence SME investees. Board representation constituted the third 
dimension of governance those fund managers deployed to influence SME 
investees. Findings indicated that board representation empowers fund manager 
voting rights and board rights when equity capital was invested in SMEs. These 
rights enabled fund managers to reduce information asymmetry, influence strategic 
decision, formalisation of governance systems and enhance the legitimacy of the 
investee for access to other resources from the financial landscape. 
The analysis presented revealed evidence on investor-fund manager level 
strategy change and alignment where CMB fund managers aligned strategies to 
DFI's. Emerging findings from the analysis are evidence which reflects more of 
strategy alignment of fund managers rather than strategy change as suggested in 
the literature review. Fund Managers A, B, D and E, showed evidence of strategic 
alignment. The chapter also presented evidence on CMB fund manager influences 
on SME investee strategies to realise the social impact and financial returns. 
Findings uncovered that CMB fund managers modified and shaped strategies of 
SME investees through investment processes, post-investment monitoring and 
support, embedded ESG and social impact initiatives, as well as the integration of 
social impact and SDG alignment. 
In terms of impacts (social impact and financial returns), analysis shows 
some evidence. The principal evidence of social impact is the focus on job creation 
by SME entrepreneurs and CMB fund managers. In addition, poverty reduction 
through access to credit, improved income through an aggregator and out-grower 
schemes and market access to clients in BoP communities were also uncovered. 
Financial returns evidence indicates revenue growth, profitability, repayment of 
capital deployed and interest for debt funds and contribution to economic growth 
through taxes, pension, and insurance schemes. Interrogating the role of 
entrepreneurs and CMB fund managers in search of a solution to societal problems 
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uncovered catalytic role, filling an institutional void, and support to BoP communities 
while promoting inclusion through access to information, credit, and energy.  
The structure of the remaining sections of the chapter are as follows: Section 
6.2 provides a summary of the theoretical argument that emerges from analysing 
the governance, structure and strategy deployed by CMB funds that invest in SMEs 
in Ghana. Specifically, it depicts the governance mechanisms employed at the 
investor-fund manager level, as well as fund manager-investee SME level. Further 
shows the structure of a fund and strategy change evidence at the investor-fund 
manager level as well as fund manager-investee level in deliberate pursuit of dual 
goals. All these are elaborated in subsequent sections of the chapter. Section 6.3 
present analyses and findings on governance influences at the investor-fund 
manager level and between CMB fund manager and investee SMEs. Section 6.4 
examines strategy change of CMB fund managers presenting evidence on investor- 
CMB fund manager influences and between CMB fund and investee in deliberate 
pursuit of social impact and financial returns. Section 6.5 presents evidence on how 
CMB fund managers and investee SMEs simultaneously pursue social impact and 
financial returns. Specifically, evidences on the nature of the social impact, variants 
of strategy on dual goals deployed and the role of the individual actors. Section 6.6 
provides chapter summary and conclusion based on the objectives spelt-out at the 
beginning.  
6.2 The Governance, structure and strategy change of capital 
market-based funds 
This section outlines the governance arrangements, fund structure and strategy 
change process for CMB funds. It also identifies the key actors and how they are 
inter-related. It is the aim to provide the necessary context/background to the more 
detailed analysis that follows. Figure 6.1 represent an emerging theory depicting the 
influences of impact investors on CMB fund managers and SME investees from the 
perspective of governance, strategy change/alignment and impact, forms the 
foundation of the fine-grained details in the subsequent section. 
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              Figure 6. 1 Capital Market Based Fund Governance, Structure and Strategy Change 
       Governance Mechanism                Fund Structure      Strategy change 
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Capital Market-based (CMB) funds are incorporated as investment funds to realise 
critical objectives of the actors, namely financial returns, social and environmental 
impact. The emerging theory on CMB funds were based on an analysis of five fund 
managers and four investors representing Development Finance Institution (DFI). 
Figure 6.1 exhibit the typical structure of an impact investment fund, capital 
commitment from investors (LP), fund managers (GP) to set up the fund and theory 
of how CMB fund managers influences investee SMEs.  
Recalling from the integrated theoretical framework which draws on four 
theories from six sets of disciplines in Section 2.8, the study argued that a theoretical 
relationship exists whereby a governance mechanism of ownership, control and 
board representation is applied by impact investors based on strategy change 
agreement with fund managers. Subsequently, fund managers employ the agreed 
governance mechanism with impact investors for investee SMEs to realise social 
impact and financial returns. Besides, impact investors expect strategy change by 
fund managers and investee SMEs in a deliberate pursuit of impacts in BoP 
communities which manifest at the fund manager- investee level. Having empirically 
applied the integrated theoretical framework within the research setting of Ghana, 
the study theorises the influences of CMB fund managers on investee SMEs in 
figure 6.2. The emerging theory builds on four main theories; agency theory of 
governance, strategy adaptation/alignment theory, social entrepreneurship theory 
of integrated/hybrid strategy and impact investing theory. 
The dotted arrows (              ) means that based on an impact investment 
strategy change presented to impact investors by CMB fund managers, capital is 
committed to a fund post-signing of shareholders agreement, stipulating the 
governance mechanism (ownership, control and board representation) to be 
deployed in line with agency theory. Agency theory of governance between impact 
investors (limited partners) and CMB fund managers (general partners) emerge at 
the fund level. Impact investors as majority shareholders commit capital to the fund 
as principals exert influence on CMB fund managers through the governance 
mechanism depicted in figure 6.2. These governance arrangements are deployed 
based on an impact investment strategy change presented by CMB fund managers 
and agreed among the parties at the fund level. Strategy change builds on strategy 
adaptation/alignment theory by CMB fund managers to secure impact investor 
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capital through investment philosophy, strategy-mandate fit among others. These 
evidences apply at the global level and country-specific level. The various arrows in 
the emerging theory include: ( ) shows interaction, cause-effect relationship and 
reporting lines; (  ) direct effect and manifestation in relationship. For example, in 
Figure 6.1, strategy change at the investor-fund manager level, manifest at the fund 
manager-investee SME level. The bolded arrow (    ) reflect capital commitment by 
investors to the fund and (      ) illustrate mandate from investors to CMB fund 
manager in accordance with shareholders agreement. Similar, governance 
mechanisms (ownership, control, board representation) agreed at the fund level is 
applied at the CMB fund manager level to influence SMEs to realise social impact 
and financial returns. Internally, CMB fund managers establish core teams and 
structures as enablers for deploying the governance mechanisms agreed and 
effective implementation of strategy change at the fund manager-investee level. 
Social entrepreneurship theory provides insights on how CMB fund managers 
deploy strategy change that embed social impact and financial returns as influences 
on SMEs in BoP communities. Thus, strategy change at the fund manager-investee 
level reflect manifestation of finance-first, impact-first intentionality, selectivity of 
SMEs that integrate social impact and financial return strategies and support 
through technical assistance to enable investees to deploy an impact investment 
strategy. Finally, the interaction from CMB fund managers and investee SMEs 
through governance and strategy change ultimately creates impact in BoP 
communities. This is central to an impact investment theory which posits that an 
investment that deliberately seeks measurable social impact and financial returns 
could transform societal problems in poorer communities. Thus, impact investment 
capital committed via CMB fund managers for investment in high growth, missing 
middle and established SMEs can potentially realise the expected social impact and 
financial returns. 
The analysis showed that investors to these funds comprising DFI's, private 
investors, investment banks, pension funds were situated across the world and 
incorporated funds were registered in Mauritius and other tax havens for fund 
managers with a regional and country-specific focus to invest. The purported reason 
for registering funds in tax havens from the perspective of one investor respondent 
"it is typically Limited Partners and incorporated in a jurisdiction that is sort of 
protected from double taxation, i.e. Mauritius and the likes" (Investor, D). 
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Usually, the fund has a life cycle of ten years, consisting of five years investment 
period and another five years for harvesting (payback) the invested capital. CMB 
funds can be categorised as debt or equity fund and generalist or specialist fund. 
Typically, an asset management company called the general partner (GP) initiates 
the setting up of the fund and solicited investments from local and global institutional 
investors, generally known as limited partners (LP's). Three essential distinctions 
were noted between the fund and the fund manager governance. First, the fund has 
a governing board referred to as Limited Partners Advisory Council or Committee 
(LPAC) comprising the limited partners who contributed to the fund which is 
separate from the governing board of the fund manager. Second, the fund entrusts 
investment mandate to the general partner or fund manager subject to the signing 
of limited partnership agreement among the limited partners and the fund manager. 
Finally, critical decisions were the preserve of the LPAC, such as the extension of 
the investment horizon, transactions outside the scope of investment policy and 
more significant transactions exceeding the deal size of the fund. For this study, the 
term, limited partners, and impact investors were used interchangeably, while fund 
manager and general partner were synonymously applied.  
Finance first and impact first represents two distinct categories of investors 
reviewed in Subsection 2.1.1 of chapter two. These categories of impact investors 
have different expectations from intermediaries, and SME investees explained in 
the literature review. Evidence of CMB funds described as finance first or impact 
first based on analysis of data from five CMB fund managers and four investors 
overwhelmingly consist of seven conditions: 
1. Returns expectations ii) Fund structure iii) Ticket sizes iv) Funding sources 
v) Geographies vi) Sectors and vii) Technical assistance (TA) facilities. Table 
6.1 shows the distinctive characteristics of finance-first and impact-first CMB 
funds. 
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Table 6. 1 Distinctive Characteristics of Finance first and Impact first CMB funds 
 Description Finance First Impact first 
1 Returns expectation Market returns usually internal 
rate of return (IRR) of 20%-30% 
Below market returns, typically 
maximum IRR of 15% and 
relatively high social impact 
2 Fund structure Debt and infrastructure fund 
exceeding $50 million  
Equity fund, relatively smaller 
fund size, up to $20 million 
3 Ticket Sizes Average ticket size exceeds $5.0 
million USD 
Ticket size of  
$0.5 m to $5 m USD 
4 Funding Sources Development Institutions (DFI’s), 
Private Investors, Global 
Universal Banks, Pension Funds 
DFI’s, Foundations, Family 
Offices, Social Venture Funds, 
Philanthropic, Development 
Agencies 
5 Geographies Regional i.e. West Africa, East 
Africa, North Africa 
Single or multiple countries 
6 Sectors Infrastructure, Commerce, 
Distribution, Housing, 
Transportation. 
Education, Healthcare, 
Microfinance, Agri-business, 
Manufacturing, Water/Sanitation 
7. Technical Assistance 
(TA) facilities 
Relatively low High component of TA for 
capacity building of fund 
manager and SME investees 
Source: Authors illustration from reports (DFI’s and fund managers), and websites. 
Derivation of these seven variables comprised a series of steps, processes, and 
judgment. First, an examination of the impact investing literature (Rajan et al. 2014; 
Hotchstader and Scheck, 2015; Glanzel and Scheurle, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015) 
were conducted. Then evidence from this previous literature was contrasted with 
coded documentary3 evidence mainly impact reports from CMB fund managers. 
Some of these documentary data coded and analysed comprise annual report 2016, 
impact report 2017 and ESG report 2017 of Fund Managers A and B accessed from 
their website. Other reports and secondary of fund managers B, D and E were also 
analysed. Insightful observation from these seven variables from the empirical data 
concerns the extent of investor-driven variables such as their priority sectors, 
expected impact and motivation for committing capital to a fund. Moreover, some 
fund managers had different funds or asset under management (AUM) either 
 
3 Documentary evidence utilized comprised: 
Fund Manager B- Annual ESG and Impact Report 2018 sourced on 20/09/2018; Leaflet about the group 
dated Nov. 2016 sourced from their website on 25/12/2017; Poster about the group’s operation dated 
March 2016 sourced on 25/12/2017 from their website 
CM4- Website information pertaining to their operations, investment approach and strategies sourced on 
23/12/17. 
Emerging Market Private Equity Association (EMPEA) ESG community case study reports on private equity 
funds 
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concurrently or sequentially with different concentration of finance first and impact 
first investors.  
These categories were empirically interrogated because such positioning 
and framing by investors operationally affect CMB fund managers in terms of 
governance, the strategy pursued, and impacts (financial and social impact) 
expected. Impact investors commit capital to various funds and delegate the 
investment mandate to CMB fund managers. It is therefore essential to understand 
the type and categories of impact investors committing capital to these CMB fund 
managers. This, in turn, reflects how CMB fund managers positioned themselves in 
practice. The composition of these categories of impact investors and respective 
capital commitments directly influence the governance, strategies, and outcomes of 
CMB fund managers. To this end, analysis of finance first and impact first capital 
commitment to the respective funds reveals that investors in a fund typically have 
different investment objectives and expected outcomes. For these latter reason's 
literature uncovered two categories of impact investors, namely finance-first and 
impact-first (Hotschtedter and Scheck, 2015, Ormiston et al., 2015). Empirically, 
three out of the five CMB fund manages labelled themselves as finance first 
investors based on the type of investors who committed capital to the funds.  
“The previous fund was a bit of finance or returned oriented. The ideology 
around it was to meet the investors return expectations”. – (Fund Manager 
A) 
“…aims to partner with business founders and management teams that 
embody this great entrepreneurial spirit to grow SMEs into profitable 
sustainable businesses that contribute to economic growth”- (Fund Manager 
C4) 
“As a matter of fact, we don’t brand ourselves as impact investors. We invest 
to make financial returns, but we believe that the sectors that we invest in 
whether you like it or not will be making impact.  Finance first, impact will 
follow.”- (Fund Manager D) 
 
The remaining CMB fund managers positioned themselves on the equal pegging of 
a balance between finance first and impact first. These managers acknowledged 
the possibility of some investees generating more financial returns than impact. The 
following excerpts of interview transcripts provide evidence: 
 
“I would say it’s balanced. I don’t think we have defined ourselves along that 
spectrum. I think we, to our investors, they know we are impact fund, but they 
 
4 Source of the quotation is from the website of the CMB fund manager anonymised as Fund Manager C. 
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also know that we deliver returns. And we deliver returns net IRR of about 
10% to 12% to 15%, it’s a range”- (Fund Manager B). 
 
“They are all equal for us, they are the same. We always try to balance them, 
impact and financial returns.. …. But across board, what we want to see is 
that aggregately we have 50%/50% but obviously some companies are 
having better returns financially than others”- (Fund Manager E) 
 
For one CMB fund manager, the issue of labelling as finance first or impact first 
depends more on the type, categories and return expectation of investors towards 
a fund under management. Consequently, if the fund under management is more 
financial return-oriented due to more investments from private investors, then it 
becomes finance first. However, in circumstances where a mix of investors, then a 
balance of finance first and impact first strategies become applicable.  
 
“But the current fund has a balance. So, we drive the two hence the sectors 
that we have chosen. We are putting money in areas where we think that 
there will be automatic impact”.- (Fund Manager A) 
 
In summary, investor motivation, priority sectors or impact-focused areas 
ultimately influenced the remaining variables evidenced in Table 6.1 above. 
Emerging from the analysis, labelling as finance or impact first by a fund 
management company appears to differ from reality. Fund manager B, for instance, 
explored impact-first objective and outcomes in African countries targeting early-
stage investee SMEs through their first fund. However, with substantial capital 
commitment from private investors and some DFI's for long-term infrastructure 
projects, finance-first objective and outcome dominated. Another example is Fund 
manager D, who previously represent more of finance-first when they managed 
$11m size Fund I. Early-stage SMEs in sectors such as housing, education, building 
accessories, financial inclusion constituted priority sectors. In managing Fund II, 
Fund manager D still labelled themselves as finance first; however, they represent 
more of an impact first fund manager with substantial technical assistance facilities 
and other indicators evidenced in Table 6.1. Finally, interview transcripts and 
secondary data of CMB fund managers categorised as finance first and impact first 
and investees analysed are summarised in the following text. 
Finance First CMB fund managers 
Fund Manager A-  
“The previous fund was a bit of finance or returned oriented. The ideology 
around it was to meet the investors return expectations”.. In terms of the 
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sectors, under the previous we used to have an open or open to most 
sectors as long as they are not no-go areas…deal size was $50,000 to $1.5 
million “Our clients5 represent businesses in a variety of sectors including 
health, education, energy, wholesale, and manufacturing”. 
Fund Manager B- [Fund III] is “a long-term impact investment fund designed 
to develop and fund smaller size new infrastructure projects. Tackling the 
missing link in smaller infrastructure (€10m<Capex<€50m)” 
Fund Manager D – “Finance first, impact will follow… You need sustainability 
absolutely, so you will not just go around saying that you are impact investors 
Impact First CMB fund managers 
Fund Manager A- “For these sectors, education, health manufacturing, Agro- 
business and other key sectors. Principally, the impact is more. Because they are 
impact-driven sectors. We are putting money in areas where we think that there will 
be automatic impact…. the focus is mainly education because we see a lot of impact 
there, we look at health, Agro business and manufacturing, we see a lot of impact. 
Deal size ... $100,000 to $1.5 million” 
” 
Fund Manager B - [Fund I] is an evergreen and “impact-first” company with a 
solid financial track record in Africa. Since 2002, [it] has invested EUR 11 Million in 
25 SMEs and in 8 micro-finance institutions (MFIs) in 10 African countries. The 
portfolio has performed well and is highly diversified: agribusiness, essential 
services, manufacturing and more. 
Fund Manager D - “The reality is that if you look at our model, in pursuing the 
financial returns automatically, there is impact…… we say money first however, 
before you can achieve that money, it will come with an impact story as well. And 
as we have said the sectors we have chosen…, private education, financial 
services, health, housing, hospitality and food services… are impact sectors” 
Fund Manager E- “…whole idea is to identify social enterprises that are 
addressing the needs of the poor, early stage businesses that are typically very 
risky, to achieve two objectives, financial returns and also we create a social impact 
dimension…..for now we are focusing on Agriculture and Renewable energy… 
starts from $350,000 dollars up wards and we invest up to about $2,000,000.00” 
 
To conclude, emerging evidence from the analysis presented so far indicated 
that fund manager A and D represent finance-first investors. Fund manager E is the 
most qualified impact-first investor. The remaining fund managers C and B 
represent a hybrid of finance-impact first. 
These categories of finance-first, impact first and hybrid impact investors are 
also reflected in the types of investee SMEs targeted. Finance first CMB fund 
 
5 Fund Manager A SME leaflet 
219 
 
managers target missing middle or established SMEs generating stable cash flows, 
revenues and returns on invested capital with little social impact. Impact-first focus 
on early-stage and high-growth potential SMEs in agribusiness, education, water, 
renewable energy sectors. For example, Fund manager E committed equity capital 
of $1 million to an established and high growth potential SME engaged in off-grid 
energy distribution in Ghana. Hybrid finance-impact first fund managers have a mix 
of investee SME portfolio contributing differently to financial returns and impact in 
defined sectors and geographies. Fund manager C invested almost $0.9 million 
equity capital, and additional debt capital of $2 million in an established SME is 
engaged in pineapple exports to clients in Europe, experiencing debt-burden from 
banks in Ghana. Fund manager D committed $0.9 million to relatively small and high 
growth potential SME providing market access to farmers in BoP communities. 
These categories of SMEs targeted by CMB fund managers operate in high impact 
sectors with embedded financial returns and social impact in their strategy. Section 
6.3 document further analysis of investor influences on fund managers to realise the 
social impact and financial returns from governance.  
6.3 Nature of Governance mechanisms 
6.3.1 Dimensions of governance 
Governance of CMB fund refers to ownership, control and board 
representation (Cumming et al., 2010; Connelly et al., 2010; Gompers et al., 2016) 
with analysis of five CMB fund managers. These governance dimensions 
encapsulated through the signing of different sets of agreements stipulating 
ownership, control and board representation (Gompers and Lerner, 2001, Cumming 
et al., 2010; Connelly et al., 2010; Gompers et al., 2016) were examined at the 
investor-fund manager level in subsection 6.2.2. Similarly, subsection 6.2.3 also 
examines the governance dimensions mentioned above at the fund manager-SME 
investee level.  
To realise fund objectives, analysed data shows that investors to a fund 
authorise fund managers to deliver on specific mandate concerning expected 
outcomes of social impact and financial returns embedded in different sets of 
agreements. Such agreements stipulate the governance mechanism through which 
investors influence fund managers to deliver on the expected mandate. Based on 
the corpus of data analysed from primary interview transcripts and documents, 
major investor-fund manager agreements include the shareholder's agreement, 
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legal documentation, investment policy, subscription agreement, management 
agreement and other subsidiary agreement. Two primary governance mechanism 
that investors deploy to influence fund managers comprised the shareholders, and 
LPAC with provisions explicit stated in the shareholders' agreement. 
Responses from two institutional investors and documentary evidence 
illustrates the role of limited partners as shareholders. According to these 
respondents and documentary-evidence examined, shareholder approval authority 
address issues which require modification or permanent change to the fund. 
Besides, issues relating to changes to the limited partnership agreement, 
investment policy and admission of new shareholders to the fund falls within the 
domain of shareholders. Necessarily, as the highest governance approval authority, 
any issue which would cause a material change to shareholders agreement 
warrants their authorisation. In executing their mandate, a minimum of 75% of 
shareholders and sometimes a simple majority of 51% approval is expected based 
on the corpus of data analysed. The Institutional Limited Partnership Association 
(ILPA, 2018) principles of stipulate that  
“The LPAC generally should be made up of seven to eight voting 
representatives of limited partners, with larger funds having as many as 12 
members, representing a diversiﬁed group of investors. A reasonable 
number of non-voting observer seats should be made available to certain 
limited partners” (ILPA) 
The next Subsection 6.2.2 present analysis and findings concerning impact investor 
influences on fund managers along the governance dimensions of ownership, 
control, and board representation. Similarly, Subsection 6.2.3 present analysis and 
findings on governance mechanisms at the fund manager-SME investee level.  
6.3.2 Investor - Fund manager Governance 
The impact investor-fund manager relationship as already established in 
earlier sections are structured within a governance framework towards realising 
objectives of financial returns and social impact. Three governance dimensions of 
ownership, control, and board representation that investors deploy to influence fund 
managers were analysed and presented as follows. Table 6.2 represents the data 
structure at investor-fund manager level reflecting governance dimensions of 
ownership, control, and board representation. 
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Data analysis proceeded through content analysis of keywords using N Vivo 
11 Pro, recoding, reclassification, and examination of concepts representing 
governance. Further details are elaborated in section 4.7.1.  
Table 6. 2 Data structure of Investor-Fund manager Governance Dimensions  
First Order Concepts Second Order 
Concepts 
Aggregated 
Dimensions 
Shareholder; the amount of committed capital; 
part-owner of the fund; voting rights; 
participation in voting; fund manager selection 
decision-making; signing of subscription 
agreement. 
 
Shareholder mandate 
 
 
 
Ownership 
Opportunity to appoint nominees to LPAC; 
serve on board subsidiary committee e.g. audit, 
investment, impact; demand for accountability; 
conflict of interest resolution. 
Board appointment 
mandate 
   
Parameter setting, limit on maximum deal size, 
authorization for excess deal size, agreed 
sectors and geographies, exclusion list, 
removal of fund manager 
Investment policy 
related 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
risk factors, compliance with IFC performance 
standards, ESG action plans implemented, 
Institutionalised ESG 
standards 
Quarterly, semi-annual and annual reports; 
different types of reports, generic and specific; 
financial and non-financial; impact and ESG 
report on investees 
Reporting and 
accountability  
Unique covenants for different investors, side 
letters or agreement, investor country of origin 
preference, most favoured nation clause 
Special rights 
   
Board seat; attendance of quarterly meeting; 
acting in fiduciary capacity; limited partner 
protection; 
Shareholder rights  
 
 
Board 
representation 
Approving conflict of interest transactions; 
adherence to investment policy; demanding 
agreed reports and timing; ESG and impact 
standards; quarterly portfolio review; one 
annual on-site visit 
Compliance with 
Shareholder agreement 
Partnership, contractual and transactional 
roles; promoting fund transparency; access to 
auditors; disclosure on general partner 
operations 
Board member role 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD data analysis 
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Ownership of a fund typically involves committed capital which grants rights 
of part-ownership to a fund through a stake in the future returns and principal 
invested at the maturity of the fund. While respondents failed to provide evidence of 
the percentage of ownership in a fund, key phrases comprising "invest in funds as 
a limited partner" (Investor A), to "subscription agreement" (Investor A), and "some 
institutions that has 10% of the fund" (Fund Manager B) were evident from the data. 
Consequently, limited partners and the general partner make claims to the returns 
from the fund based on the amount of capital committed. This is based on the 
structuring of a fund as evidenced by these interview transcripts. 
“the fund is typically structured as limited partnership where assuming the 
fund has ten investors, so they have ten limited partners (LP). Then you have 
one of the LPs which is called the General Partner (GP). The GP will typically 
have a part of the fund as well, maybe 5% of the overall fund”- (Investor D), 
“At the apex is the shareholders i.e. the investors of the fund”- (Fund Manager 
D)  
Altogether, analysed data showed that the investors to the fund constitute the 
shareholders of the fund, which entitle them to ownership stake. Accruing rights of 
ownership through shareholding entitle largest shareholders to appoint nominees to 
form the LPAC, which represent the board of the fund.  
Shareholding, which guarantees ownership stake in a fund from the analysed 
data, is secured through a subscription agreement. Based on the analysed data, 
subscription agreement captures the ownership rights of shareholders to the fund 
indicating the amount of capital committed, class of shares, early call date for the 
first tranche of capital and last call date for the final amount committed. Excerpts of 
interview transcripts include 
“the subscription agreement which is the kind of forms that you sign to get 
your investment in the fund for each person”- (Investor B) 
“Investors respond to the capital calls on time, accounts are delivered on 
time”- (Fund Manager D) 
Finally, the subscription agreement provides financial returns and social 
impact expectation from fund managers. Table 6.3 shows the first-order, second-
order concepts of coded data with aggregated third order concept dimension of 
ownership. 
To conclude, three primary evidence emerged from the analysis in terms of 
the ownership dimension of governance at the investor-fund manager level. First, 
223 
 
all impact investors with a capital commitment to a fund had ownership which 
warrants equal voting rights. None of the investors had a veto on voting as 
shareholders. Second, largest investors to the fund had the right to appoint 
representatives or nominees to the LPAC of the fund. Third, shareholders had final 
approval on matters relating to amendments of the shareholders' agreement 
through a supermajority of 51% or sometimes 75%. 
Extant literature shows that investors control fund managers through 
restrictive clauses and covenants in the partnership agreement (Gompers and 
Lerner, 1996; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Scarlata and Alemany, 2010; Metrick 
and Yasuda, 2011). Consistent with the literature, governance dimension of control 
from the analysed data at the investor-fund manager level reveal unique conditions 
and covenants stipulated in separate agreement among the actors. Notable phrases 
consisting of "the limit that we can operate" (Fund Manager D), "investors set the 
parameters" (Fund Manager A), to statement as "in that agreement, there will be the 
dos and don'ts from the investors to the fund manager" (Fund Manager A) "how 
much percent they can invest in this sector" (Investor B) empirically evidenced 
investor control. 
The results showed that shareholders agreement which embodies other 
subsidiary agreements limit the behaviour, actions and activities of fund managers 
reflecting the governance dimension of control to realise the social impact and 
financial returns.  
"For instance, setting limits, they have a reason for setting that limits, upper 
and lower limits, so you do not exceed the target market…. you are given 
that latitude within the confines of the agreed parameters which has been 
pre-discussed with the fund."- (Fund Manager A) 
"particularly also around the ESG, you know, we are very much around 
saying that this is our minimum benchmark of what we require, can you meet 
or be able to execute an investment for us, you need to reach the minimum 
benchmark we have"-(Investor, B) 
In analysing the corpus of data, keywords and concepts reflecting control 
were coded as first-order concepts from interview transcripts from investors and 
fund managers, documentary reports and brochures from the Institutional Limited 
Partnership Association (ILPA). These first-order concepts were further grouped 
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into unique categories in a tabular form, reclassified to ensure that they described 
and explained the evidence of control. These groupings and categories were further 
coded into higher and second-order concepts based on existing literature. After a 
coding and thorough examination of these second-order concepts, four significant 
categories showed evidence of control. These four categories of control comprised 
clauses in investment policy, the institutionalisation of ESG risk (known as IFC 
performance standards), reporting obligations and exclusive rights. Finally, the 
aggregated dimension of control was assigned to the four second-order concepts, 
as shown in Table 6.2 above.  
Four primary evidence emerged from the data analysis on the control 
dimension of governance. First, impact investors through restrictive clauses limit 
fund managers to specific sectors, geographies, and transaction amounts. Second, 
through reporting and accountability requirements, investors demand annual reports 
on fund valuation and performance, portfolio performances and impact reports and 
general partner information. Third, the power to remove the fund manager for 
material breach of partnership and shareholders agreement. Finally, special 
reporting arrangements "most favoured nation clause" impose responsibilities on 
fund managers to provide unique reports to some investors.  
Evidence from respondents concerning the governance dimension of board 
representation from institutional investors and fund managers were consistent with 
extant literature. Overwhelming responses from three investor participants and four 
fund managers concerning governance mechanism at the investor-fund manager 
level centred on shareholders and limited partnership advisory committee (LPAC). 
Some responses noted ranged from "shareholder decision body" (Investor A) and 
"limited partner advisory committee" (Investor B), to "separate board for the fund" 
(Fund Manager D) and "pool of investors" (Fund Manager A) as the fundamental 
governance mechanisms. Boar representation comprises nominees of investors or 
appointed independent directors. 
Shareholders constituted the highest governance decision making authority 
that investors deploy to influence fund managers. More importantly, the governance 
dimension of board representation consisted of representative of shareholders 
constituting what is known as the limited partnership advisory committee or the 
board. Typical interview transcripts worth noting were: 
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"…there are essentially two kinds of channels of action. One of them is the advisory 
board, and the other one is shareholder decision... the advisory committee is a body 
of appointed nominees usually from the larger investors in the fund or the let us say 
the sort of strategic, sensitive ones…Their responsibility is to act in the fiduciary 
interest of the fund, and they are there to make sure that the fund is operating 
properly and per the documentation and that sort of things" (Investor A) 
"The investors appoint a board" (Fund Manager D) 
“And governance really happens via what we call the Limited partner advisory 
committee (LPAC) or limited partner advisory board (LPAB)… you know the way the 
funds are set up, the limited partners are the investors, when they secure a seat on 
those boards, that meet quarterly to review the portfolio and essentially that is how 
we govern the fund" (Investor B) 
"We have a governing body in the investors which from time to time, meet the 
management of the fund. …. it is like a pool of investors coming together. … the 
fund is accountable to those investor representatives that have been appointed" 
(Fund Manager A) 
From the analysed interview transcripts, it was evident that the LPAC of the 
fund on average is limited to nine nominees of large investors (comprising nominees 
or appointed independent directors) acting in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of all the 
limited partners and or shareholders to the fund. However, for more substantial 
funds, a maximum of twelve (12) nominees of large investors pertain as an 
acceptable best practise6.  
LPAC address issues that affect effective delivery of investment mandate of 
the general partner and members have voting rights from the analysed data. Two 
institutional investors highlighted the core LPAC responsibilities which entails 
approving conflict of interest transactions and ensuring that fund managers actions 
are investment policy compliant (i.e. sectors, maximum ticket size, agreed 
geographies or countries).  
 
6 Institutional Limited Partnership Association (ILPA), Private Equity Principles 
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"an attribute to the fund is a limited partnership agreement or the 
shareholder's agreement that stipulates, the 100- or 150-page agreement which 
stipulates everything related to the fund and its governance" (Investor B) 
"Limited Partner Advisory Committees should have the core responsibilities 
of approving transactions that pose conﬂicts of interest, such as cross-fund 
investments and approving the methodology used for portfolio company valuations" 
(ILPA, 2018) 
"LPAC meetings should be held in person at least twice a year with an option 
to dial-in telephonically"- (ILPA, 2018) 
Documentary analysed evidence further showed that LPAC has authority for 
approving partnership expenses, disclosure on how fund managers are adding 
value to SMEs through technical assistance facilities. Moreover, the LPAC influence 
fund managers to comply with reporting requirements, quarterly, a semi-annual and 
annual report on the fund and impact. In analysing the data, contrasting the function 
and responsibilities of these two-governance mechanisms further explains how 
investors deploy governance mechanism to influence fund managers. Thus, the two 
levels of governance decision-making mechanisms focus on a specific aspect of the 
fund and responsibilities of fund managers aimed at realising the expected 
objectives of financial returns and social impact.  
In conclusion, based on the evidence presented above, four primary 
evidence about board representation at the investor-fund manager level were 
uncovered. First, largest investors to the fund appoint nominees or independent 
directors to the LPAC acting in a fiduciary capacity for all investors and have voting 
rights. The LPAC is distinct from the board of the fund manager. Second, the LPAC 
of the fund approves conflict of interest transactions and do not participate in 
investment decision making of the fund manager. Third, the board of the fund or 
LPAC ensures fund manager compliance with the partnership agreement and 
review the performance of portfolio investees. Consequently, the board can 
recommend to shareholders for fund manager removal when material breaches 
occur. Finally, LPAC approves fees and carry-interest of fund managers subject to 
independent auditor certification.  
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6.3.3 Nature of Fund Manager - investee SME Governance 
Governance at the fund manager-SME level primarily aims at ensuring prosecution 
of investment objectives of financial returns and social impact. Mainly, SMEs 
providing products and services to meet the needs of BoP communities (Ashta, 
2012; Rajan et al., 2015) constitute key priorities of impact investors (Ormiston et 
al., 2015; Daggers and Nicholls, 2016). Responses to the question of governance 
mechanism to influence SMEs focused on board appointment by four out of five 
fund managers interviewed. Similarly, many of the SME participants explained how 
fund managers have guaranteed improvement in their governance system. Analysis 
of the available data showed such phrases ranging from the "right governance 
checks" (Fund Manager B), "formalisation of governance" (Fund Manager A) to "we 
insist on a board seat" (Fund Manager D) were provided by respondents. The 
ensuing presentation and analysis focus on how CMB fund managers through 
governance dimensions of ownership, control, and board representation influence 
SMEs to achieve social impact and financial return objectives. Table 6.3 shows the 
data structure of how CMB fund managers influence SME investees through the 
governance dimensions of ownership, control and board representation explained 
earlier in subsection 4.7.1 
Table 6. 3 Data structure of CMB-SME governance 
First Order concepts Second Order 
concepts 
Aggregated 
Dimensions 
Minority interest, equity, profit sharing, 
minority protection clause, board seat 
Shareholding  
 
Ownership Agreed valuation, equity investment, quasi-
equity instrument, 50% debt and 50% equity; 
Valuation and stake 
Consent requirement; impact clauses; 
minority protection; right of first refusal; pre-
emptive rights 
Control structure  
 
Control 
Staged financing; milestone investment; 
metrics attained 
Control allocation 
efficiency 
Right governance processes; board seat; 
governance checks; formalisation of 
governance; board level influence; board 
restructuring; increase formalism; 
 
Member role 
 
 
 
 
Board 
representation 
Voice on strategic decision; approve 
decisions; discuss strategy; removal of MD; 
implement accounting system 
Strategic level 
influence 
Reporting-quarterly, semi-annual and 
annually; operational and management 
reports; organisational transparency; 
financial reports; MIS for decision-making; 
strengthening accounting infrastructure; 
regular reporting 
Reduce information 
asymmetry 
ESG risk assessment and action plans; 
social impact; regulatory compliance 
Risk assessment and 
mitigation 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD data  
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Four out of five of capital market-based respondents representing 80% CMB 
sample and documents analysed showed that fund managers acquire only a 
minority interest in SMEs. Presumably, minority stake in SMEs eliminate the 
perception of take-over or acquisition of these SMEs, which warrant undertaking the 
day-to-day management of operations like early-stage ventures (Bhatt and Ahmad, 
2017). Besides, many of these SMEs are at the expansion stage of growth and 
managed by an established entrepreneur with more in-depth insight into the venture. 
Four of the five fund managers acquire minority equity investments in the SMEs 
supported. Extracts of interviews include: 
"As an equity holder, you have to because you have ownership you are 
compelled to create value"- (Fund Manager, B) 
"They [Fund Manager, C] hold almost 48%. For them, it is in two folds. The 
investment in debt and that of equity" (SME5)  
"…. we are always minority investors…. we use a combination of equity and 
quasi-equity instruments…and it is a function of the size of the company we 
invest in and its cash flow that determines which instrument we use" (Fund 
Manager, D) 
Equity investments and quasi-equity instruments deployed from four out of 
five capital market-based fund managers as minority shareholders facilitated access 
to a board seat and appointment of independent directors stipulated in conditions 
precedent.  
Fund managers further alluded to significant reasons for a minority ownership 
stake in SME investees. 
"We usually insist on that as a minority interest position, and so this is 
important for us so that we can have a say on some key strategic items" 
(Fund Manager, B) 
“We are always minority investors…relationship is very key in what we do in 
order for you to add value…. We do not sign an agreement with you or invest 
in the company and leave and just expect you to deliver."- (Fund Manager, 
D) 
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"Typically, because of the strategy we have, it is more of equity than 
debt…we are trying to, what we are doing is to help early-stage businesses 
to scale. Without our support, it will be challenging for them to use the typical 
corporate high street facilities that is available"- (Fund Manager, E). 
Primary evidence emerging from the ownership dimension of governance at 
the fund manager-SME level comprised: First, for equity funds, fund managers take 
significant minority interest or stake in SME investees. Second, minority interest in 
these SME investees is up to 49% shareholding and fund managers have voting 
rights on strategic decisions at the board level based on their minority interest. Third, 
a combination of minority equity stake and debt investment guaranteed fund 
manager C majority rights in some SME investees. Such majority rights enabled the 
fund manager to pass a vote of no confidence in the CEO and subsequent removal 
at the AGM of the SME investee. 
Previous literature shows that investors in high growth and missing middle 
SMEs embed key clauses, restrictive terms and conditions in shareholders' 
agreement that assure control over critical issues over the investment period 
(Cumming et al.,2010; Scalata and Alemany,2010). Ultimately, the inclusion of these 
terms and conditions are aimed at curbing opportunistic behaviours of 
entrepreneurs, avoid mission drift, and realise investment objectives. While CMB 
fund managers did not elaborate much on control mechanism such phrases as 
"consent requirement" (Fund Manager, B), "minority protection clauses" (Fund 
Manager, E), to "milestone investment" (Fund Manager, D) and statement like 
"funding subject to key metrics attainment" (Fund Manager, D) were standard. 
Excerpts of interview transcripts from fund managers comprised: 
"There are maybe these key security decisions that we will want to have a 
say in because we are a minority…. These are our way of influencing things, 
this way or that way. 
“Moreover, these are our terms" (Fund Manager, B) 
"so, our agreement will typically have minority protection clauses; we are 
always minority investors…. Which will have certain things that will require 
our consent before that can be carried out" (Fund Manager, D) 
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"the other thing that we try to do as part of the agreement and part of board 
members is to cap the expenditures of management"- (Fund Manager, E) 
Based on the governance dimension of control presented, key evidence 
includes: First, restrictive clauses and terms protect fund managers and compel 
SME owners to deliver on shareholder agreement. Second, staged investment 
terms subject to milestones curb mission drift and opportunistic behaviours of SME 
investee owners and management. Finally, agreed contractual terms and covenants 
enable fund managers to deliver on their investment mandate from investors and 
report SME investee performance.  
Majority of CMB respondents explained that board representation through 
the appointment of independent directors and fund manager representation was 
vital for them to realise objectives of the investments, namely financial returns and 
social impact. Phrases and statements ranged from "implement right governance 
checks", "improve formalism", to "voice on strategic issues" and "ensure regulatory 
compliance" were common. Entrepreneurs of missing middle and established SMEs 
with high growth potential from the analysed data appear receptive to long term 
capital investment from capital market-based funds. This perhaps can be attributed 
to the finance gap confronting missing middle SMEs estimated at $70 billion to $90 
billion (IFC, 2013).  
Extracts of interviews from fund managers and SME entrepreneurs reveal 
the importance of governance towards realising investment objectives. For 
example, a fund manager explained that  
"one of the main value adds that we think we bring to the table is the ability 
to implement governance checks…we insist in all or most cases that we have 
a board seat … that represent both the entrepreneurs' interest and our 
interest" (Fund Manager B) 
Similarly, another fund manager stated that  
"as part of our funding requirement, we will always be on the board as 
well…we do not use the board as the main tool to direct on what we do, of 
course" - (Fund Manager D).  
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Uniquely fund manager D added that board seat is a necessary condition for 
investments irrespective of the type of financial instrument deployed.  
"Even if we invest in debt only, we will be on the board, even if it is just 
convertible debt we will be on the board. Because at the end of the day, we 
expect a positive return and that return. We tell people that we give money 
and more" (Fund Manager, D) 
To confirm the explanation from capital market-based funds, some investee 
SME owner-managers alluded to the presence of fund managers on their boards. 
"Some of the investors are on the board. It sorts of depending on what 
percentage of the capital they have that are eligible for a board seat. …The 
CEO and I share one board seat and the other ones all come from investors"- 
(SM1 ) 
"I would imagine that anyone who would invest would want to be on the 
board…. the current structure is that [investor] has 48 per cent and I have 52 
per cent"- (SM2) 
Consistent with previous literature, board representation was, however, not 
a significant requirement for fund manager ‘A’, that invested debt capital in SMEs 
based on the analysed data. Extracts of interview transcript below: 
"Nobody sits on the board of those SMEs…we deal with entrepreneurs 
themselves like the owners of the business… You know most of the business 
we deal with are not kind of business that has independent shareholders." - 
(Fund Manager A) 
Table 6.4 further above illustrate the coding structure of CMB fund manager 
influences on SMEs through governance mechanisms of ownership, control and 
board representation in simultaneous pursuit of social impact and financial returns. 
In conclusion, four primary evidence emerged from the nature of governance 
through board representation at the fund manager-SME level. First, board 
representation guaranteed access to and reduces information asymmetry that 
affects access to capital and constrains SME growth for most of the fund managers. 
Second, influences on crucial decisions of SME owners and managers were better 
executed through board representation. Third, board representation facilitated the 
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formalisation of governance structures and provided legitimacy to the management 
of the SME investee to access capital from other sources. Fourth, technical 
assistance to SME investees through risks identified during due diligence and 
review of reports at the board level. Finally, debt fund managers do not appoint 
representatives to SME boards and utilise business support services to enable SME 
owners to fulfil the expected objectives. By way of summary, in applying the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2.0, findings from the analysis of seven 
conditions under which a CMB fund can describe as finance first or impact-first 
investor were presented. Subsequently, presentation on how investors through the 
governance dimension of ownership, control, and board representation influence 
CMB funds were addressed. Also, the results of how CMB funds through 
governance mechanism empirically influenced SME investees towards realising the 
social impact and financial returns. 
Case illustration box 6.1 below illustrate CMB fund manager B influences on 
investee missing middle SME based on governance. 
Box 6.1 How CMB Fund managers govern missing middle SME investees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Case illustration: Box 6.1 
 
SM1 is an established agri-business company that produce and distribute fresh 
vegetables, herbs, fruits for homes, supermarkets or shopping malls and Airlines in 
Ghana. Established over twenty years ago, SM1 remained relatively small-size due to 
challenges with access to financing from bank-based institutions. With an equity 
investment of almost $ 1 million USD, technical assistance facility and access to a 
network of global entrepreneurs in 2016 from a Capital market-based fund (CM4,), SM1 
expanded and became a medium sized enterprise. Through the governance mechanism 
of ownership, control and board representation, CM4 influenced the strategic decisions 
of SM1 through the creation of an out-grower scheme, procurement and implementation 
of accounting system, creating market access to rural farmers and employing young 
women for sorting, sanitizing, packaging and then distributing it to clients. SM1 currently 
employs 70 permanent staff and has created market access for over 1, 500 rural famers 
in Ghana. “I will describe it that we are partners and they [fund manager B] are partnering 
with us to scale-up. Otherwise we will remain small which is a shame” (CEO, SM1). 
Evidence from corpus of data analysed uncovered that CM4 invested in SM1 because 
of the high growth potential and social impact of its operation through provision of market 
access to farmers in BoP communities. 
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In the next section 6.3 of this empirical chapter, presentation of analysis and 
findings will cover strategy change and alignment by CMB fund managers. These 
presentation focuses on strategy change and alignment at the investor-fund 
manager level and secondly at the fund manager-SME investee level aimed at 
realising impacts (social impact and financial returns). 
6.4 How impact investing influences Strategy Change in CMB 
funds and investee SMEs 
6.4.1 Introduction- strategy change and alignment  
Theoretically, strategy change arises from misalignment of environmental 
conditions and current operating strategies of organisations (Vicente-Lorente and 
Zuniga-Vicente, 2006; Porter, 1980). Consequences of changing environmental 
conditions, turbulent or gradual, negatively affect organisational performance, 
access to resources and survival. Impact investments have emerged as a new 
phenomenon of direct and indirect investments through bank-based and capital 
market-based funds to realise the social impact and financial returns. This emerging 
phenomenon of impact investing represents an environmental change within the 
investment landscape, causing a misalignment in the operating strategies of capital 
market-based funds. CMB fund managers existed as agents of private wealth 
creation before the emergence of impact investing and therefore encountered the 
challenge of total strategy change or alignment of existing operating strategies to fit 
impact investors. Global impact investment misalignment with operating strategies 
impelled CMB fund managers to either align or change strategies to facilitate access 
to investment resources.  
These funds existed and operated in a certain way, including commercially 
oriented, returns-based and high-value transactions driven by market-returns 
expectation before the emergence of impact investing. The key challenge for them 
is to re-align or change strategies to fit the demands of impact investors. Existing 
literature shows that CMB fund managers have either altered their strategy or 
aligned their strategies to facilitate investment flows to SMEs serving BoP 
communities (Addis et al., 2013; Rajan et al., 2014). Evidence gathered from 
interviewing five fund managers and four officials of DFI's representing investors as 
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well as documents analysed showed strategy alignment and change of CMB fund 
managers. 
6.4.2 Investor and CMB Fund manager level 
Development Finance Institutions (DFI's) comprised major actors in the impact 
investing landscape globally and a source of a long term or patient capital for CMB 
fund managers for investment. Corpus of analysed data from respondents of DFI's 
representing investors and CMB fund managers reveal evidence of strategy 
alignment by CMB fund managers to attract investment capital from DFI's for social 
impact and financial returns. CMB fund managers were aligning their strategies to 
DFI's evidence the classic strategy adaption perspective in extant literature which 
argued that managers align strategies in conformity with external environmental 
conditions (Singh et al., 1986; Vicente-Lorente and Zuniga-Vicente, 2006). 
Consequently, adequate "alignment with the institutional and industrial 
environment" guarantee survival and growth (Zuniga-Vicente and Vicente-Lorente, 
2006). Analysis from the empirical data showed evidence of strategic alignment as 
an attractive intermediary of impact investing to DFI's. Typical phrases and 
statement from the interview transcripts range from "they [CMB funds] need to be 
aligned with us"(Investor A), "to raise [capital], you need DFI's"(Fund Manager C) 
and "looking at Africa Region, E and S is a catch" (Investor A) to "positioning 
themselves [CMB fund managers] as interested in E and S". 
The question of strategy alignment to DFI's respondents and CMB fund 
managers showed both explicit and implicit acknowledgement of this evidence in 
the impact investing landscape. For DFI respondents, developmental orientation, 
Sustainable Developmental Goals (SDG's) and ‘E and S’-driven dimension of 
impact were requisite for CMB fund managers to align their strategies to source 
capital from them. Typical extracts interview extracts include: 
"We ask fund managers to come up with proposals, we consider them, we 
consider that they fit-our mandate or not, or whether they are interesting or 
not and then we move forward." (Investor B) 
“. people set up funds, particularly places like African context, I think a lot of 
them know that one of the ways of raising money is to go to DFI's. Also, in 
many cases, you need to go to DFI's if you want to get capital at all" (Investor 
A) 
235 
 
Another reason for CMB fund managers aligning their strategies to DFI's is for the 
confirmation or "seal of approval" effect: 
"DFI's provide a significant source of funding for PE funds. They typically 
provide also that seal of approval, so the way you have a lot of funds which 
first close with primarily DFI funding and then subsequent close, they are able 
to raise money from commercial investors" (Investor D). 
"DFIs are very developmentally-oriented, so they want to see the 
impact…they lobby people who are coming looking for money…." (Investor 
A). 
CMB fund managers expressed insight regarding evolution within the 
external environment. They essentially positioned their strategies to incorporate 
environmental and social (E and S) action plans as well as impact objectives vis-à-
vis pure focus on financial returns. Extracts of interview transcript illustrate empirical 
evidence of strategy alignment 
"When it comes to as I said the ESG requirements, they are things we have 
signed onto… We believe in it, our investors believe in same, so it is not if 
you like we are aligned and not an undue influence on their part for us to do 
that" (Fund Manager D) 
"The key thing in this game…. not to have any maligned relationships 
because it is a very small world. The investor universe is very small"- (Fund 
Manager B) 
Also, within a resource constraint-environment like the African context, CMB 
fund managers understand DFI's importance in response to the question by a fund 
manager. 
"If you are talking about the African context, then the answer is absolute, yes. 
There is not an oversupply of capital…in Africa, especially if you are looking 
at a relatively new field like impact investment, the only people or majority of 
capital in the game are the DFI's"- (Fund Manager C) 
The evidence presented so far shows ‘why’ CMB fund managers align strategies to 
fit the mandate of impact investors consistent with the classic strategic management 
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(Andrews, 1971; Porter, 1980) and resource-based view (Barney 1991) of the 
strategy adaptation theory.  
Strategy alignment of CMB fund managers for mandate-fit with investors 
precisely DFI's were also uncovered in the analysed data. Four conditions under 
which development-oriented investors through strategy alignment influence CMB 
fund managers to realise the social impact and financial returns. Suffice to submit 
that when the question of influence through strategy alignment was posed to DFI 
respondents and CMB fund managers, different answers surfaced. Typical answers 
ranged from "we don't define strategies for fund managers" (Investor, B), "the 
answer is absolute yes"(Fund Manager C), "not an undue influence"(Fund Manager, 
D), "PE funds are increasingly focused on things that DFI's prioritise"(Investor, A) to 
"the investors set the parameters" (Fund Manager, A). Evidently, some hesitation 
from DFI respondents regarding the nature and extent of influence. Nevertheless, a 
critical analysis of interview transcripts, documents accessed and fieldwork notes 
from rapid participant observations showed the following four conditions that DFI's 
influence CMB fund managers through strategy alignment: 
1. Institutionalised ESG  
2. High impact priority sectors  
3. Multi-country or Regional Focus 
4. A broad commitment to SDG. 
Institutionalised environmental, social and governance (ESG) risk and impact 
together with action plans have become industry standards in the impact investing 
space. Because of global environmental effects such as climate change, flooding, 
deforestation, famine, access to water with attendant health challenges, most of 
these DFI's have incorporated these requirements in their criteria for committing 
capital to be regional and local funds. Evidence of social impact assessment of any 
potential funding to SMEs from the analysed data would require before and after 
analysis funding in terms of social impact. Consistent with social entrepreneurship 
and impact investing literature, social impact factors including job creation, impact 
on women, household touched, number of people taken out of poverty, income 
growth of beneficiaries (Seelos and Mair, 2005; Addis et al., 2013) requirements 
have been institutionalised for accessing capital funding.  
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In terms of governance, evidence of action plans for any risk factors identified during 
due diligence and measures to enhance formalism, control, checks and board 
representation to promote transparency were pre-requisite for capital commitment. 
Fund managers imbibed and inculcated ESG strategies in their investment thesis 
when pitching for capital from investors also signal evidence of strategy alignment. 
To further ensure uniformity and consistency in the application and 
institutionalisation of ESG, analysed data showed what is known and generally 
accepted in the private equity industry as "the IFC ESG Performance Standards" 
(Fund Manager, D). 
Table 6. 4 IFC Performance Standards on ESG 
 Indicators  Description 
1 Performance Standard 1 Assessment and Management of Environmental and 
Social Risks and Impacts  
2 Performance Standard 2 Labor and Working Conditions 
3 Performance Standard 3 Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention 
4 Performance Standard 4 Community Health, Safety, and Security 
5 Performance Standard 5 Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement 
6 Performance Standard 6 Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management 
of Living Natural Resources 
7 Performance Standard 7 Indigenous Peoples     
8 Performance Standard 8 Cultural Heritage 
Source: IFC, Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, 2012. 
 
The following excerpts of analysed interview transcripts attest to the 
institutionalisation of ESG by DFI's for CMB fund manager strategy alignment. 
"there is incentivisation there for a manager to portray themselves as an 
impact manager or to portray themselves as particularly interested in E and 
S because they know that they can do that to get the money"- (Investor, A) 
"There is I think some kind of tacit institutionalization of impact orientation"- 
(Investor D) 
DFIs have established high impact priority sectors for funding allocation. 
Beyond job creation, these sectors in most African countries drive developmental 
objectives and sources of societal problems established in section 3.2 of the context 
chapter 3. Unfortunately, public-sector support for enterprises in these sectors 
hitherto was neglected while large private sector companies deemed these sectors 
as unprofitable. For instance, fund managers A, B, C, D and E focus on at least two 
of these sectors namely agriculture and agri-business, microfinance, education, 
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health, renewable energy, housing, and manufacturing. In analysing the interview 
transcripts and documents, priority sectors of DFI were explicit and CMB fund 
managers invariably aligned strategies in their investment thesis to some of these 
sectors. For example, a comparison of responses from CMB fund managers and 
sector priorities of DFI's show the evidence of a focus on high impact priority sectors.  
Transcripts of interview excerpts noted were:  
"You cannot invest in education without making an impact. You cannot invest 
in health without making impact…. …. there is impact all around us"- (Fund 
Manager D) 
"…where there are clear impact outcomes…In health education, food 
security, basic infrastructure, energy, these are market-driven factors and 
real-needs"- (Investor B)  
A mapping of the priority sectors of DFI's and that of CMB funds shows the 
extent of strategic alignment to high impact priority sectors. Table 6.5 shows how 
DFI's influence CMB fund managers through strategic alignment to focus on high 
priority sectors. 
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Table 6. 5 Mapping of CMB funds sectors and DFI’s priority sectors 
CMB funds DFI’s 
Fund  Sectors CDC Group (UK) 
(Priority Sectors) 
Proparco (France) 
(Priority Sectors) 
Obviam (Swiss) 
(Priority Sectors) 
Fund 
Manager B 
Nutrition and 
Agribusiness; 
Microfinance; 
Health; 
Renewable 
Energy. 
Financial 
Services, 
Infrastructure, 
Health, 
Manufacturing, 
Food and 
Agriculture 
Education (Fund 
Manager D) 
Agriculture and  
Agro-industry, 
Education (Fund 
Manager D); 
Health; 
Microfinance; 
Industry and 
Services 
Healthcare; 
Education (Fund 
Manager D); 
Basic 
Infrastructure; 
Renewable 
Energy; Access 
to Finance 
Fund 
Manager C 
Agriculture and 
agri-business 
Fund 
Manager D 
Education, 
Financial 
services, 
Health, 
Housing, 
Hospitality and 
Food services 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD data 
 
Table 6.5 shows the mapping of the sectoral focus of CMB Funds and three 
DFI's. To explain how CMB fund managers have aligned their strategies through a 
focus on high impact sectors, fund manager D sectoral focus and priority sectors of 
these DFI succinctly illustrate alignment. Fund Manager D targeted sectors include 
education, strategically aligned and target all the DFI's as shown in the table with 
the bold font size. 
Multi-country or Regional focus evidence another dimension of strategy 
alignment shown from the analysed data. It is evident that DFI's focusing on Africa 
and other Regions through risk diversification impact countries designated as 
"fragile states" expect fund managers to align strategies to focus on multiple 
countries. Excerpts of interview transcript and website information shows this trend 
of alignment: 
"We tend to look at something with Regional exposure precisely because 
some of the countries in which we operate can be quite volatile" - (Investor 
A) 
Another typical illustration is from the Dutch Good Growth Fund, which mostly 
expects fund managers to focus on multiple countries with some designated as 
"fragile countries 
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“DGGF7 is a 'fund of funds': it is building up a portfolio of intermediary funds 
that are catalysts for local economic growth. The DGGF8 has set specific 
targets for intermediary funds that invest in young or female entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurs in fragile states” 
To access such a fund, Fund Manager D had to diversify from a single country to 
multiple countries through strategy alignment. Furthermore, the analysed data 
shows that DGGF was the anchor investor to the current fund of Fund Manager D. 
Social impact orientation strategy - A primary underlying assumption from 
impact investors relate to development and to that extent social impact expectation 
is relatively high with a threshold of financial returns (Ormiston et al., 2015; Rajan 
et al., 2014). Strategy alignment of CMB fund managers shows evidence of social 
impact orientation in their strategies. Job creation, improved standard of living, 
household lives touched, income generation, improved healthcare, access to 
education and access to energy constitute examples of social impact orientation 
strategy change. Such evidence from interviews with four DFI's support how these 
fund managers had to align to conform to environmental conditions strategically. 
Excerpts shows 
".. the underlying development logic is a very fundamental driver"- (Investor 
A). 
"an SME fund focusing on West Africa, with income and job creation as its 
main impact objectives, Fund Manager D strategy is in line with the overall 
DGGF impact mandate"- (Fund Manager D) 
"I think there is a kind implicit interest which comes which kind of say if you 
want to get money from us, you need to position yourself in this way in order 
to mobilise capital"- (Investor A). 
Inherent in the strategic alignment of fund managers towards social impact is 
the link to sustainable development goals. Social impact indicators evidence shows 
that these strategies reflect direct effects on the 17 sustainable development goals. 
Therefore, fund managers, in addition to incorporating social impact strategies, 
demonstrated how these impacts were connected to the SDGs in developing 
 
7 Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) is a development fund for SMEs accessible through intermediary fund 
managers established by the Dutch Government as part of its development co-operation with African 
countries. 
8 https://english.dggf.nl/who-can-apply/investment-fund 
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countries. Some excerpts of interviews from DFI respondents below showed this 
finding. 
"The idea is to try and make the most impactful investment as possible by 
investing in sectors that are able to meet the SDGs and higher impact."- 
(Investor B) 
"We also have the SDGs focused sectors that are trying to help African 
countries achieve or improve the economic and social impact"- (Investor, D) 
The 17 United Nation Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's) constitute another 
broad commitment which DFI's are enforcing for CMB funds to align their strategies 
to secure funding from them. As noted by one CMB fund manager "the only people 
or majority of capital in the game is the DFI's" complemented by a DFI respondent 
"you need to go to DFI's if you want to get capital at all". From the perspective of 
DFI's, if a fund manager requires capital from them, then a commitment to these 
SDG's is a pre-requisite which would be measured and reported. Likewise, from 
fund managers perspective, ‘give them what they want' reflecting how strategically 
fund managers had to align to the mandates of DFI's within the emerging impact 
investing space. Table 6.6 show examples of some of the SDG's and how fund 
managers are aligning their strategies through investments in SMEs that aims at 
realising these objectives. 
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Table 6. 6 SGDs and CMB fund contribution 
SDGs Contribution to SDG9- Fund Manager B 
Goal 3 Good Health and Wellbeing Extended health coverage to all companies in the 
portfolio. As a result, 90% of the fund’s portfolio 
companies provided health insurance. 
Goal 5 Gender Inequality Promote women entrepreneurs and women’s 
access to leadership positions: as of 2017, 20% of 
portfolio companies were owned or led by women 
(compared to an average of 5% of African 
companies with female CEOs per McKinsey’s 
August 2016 
Goal 8  Decent work and Economic 
Growth 
Accounted for more than 5,500 jobs created or 
maintained. The average net monthly wage of its 
portfolio companies’ employees was 70% higher 
than the average wage in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Goal 10 Reduced Inequality The majority (80%) of investments were allocated 
to the least developed and most fragile countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, as defined by the United 
Nations and the World Bank. 
 
Source: Authors illustration from impact fund manager reports 
 To summarize, in terms of strategy alignment, what is emerging from the 
analysis is evidence of CMB funds that hitherto were agents of private wealth 
creation aligning to impact investors. CMB fund managers were aligning to ESG 
requirements which have been institutionalised through the IFC performance 
standards. Secondly, CMB fund managers have aligned to the high-impact priority 
sectors of impact investors comprising health, education, renewable energy and 
agri-business that generate threshold of financial returns and high social impact. An 
emerging explanation was that investing in such sectors automatically generate 
impact, and they constitute market-driven sectors with real needs. Thirdly, alignment 
through a focus on multiple countries and regional level due to the demands of 
impact investors for investment in entrepreneurs in fragile states and as part of risk 
diversification. Fourth, adoption of social impact orientation as a positioning strategy 
to access resources from impact investors. Finally, interconnected to the social 
impact is fund manager alignment to impact investors through a commitment to 
sustainable development goals. 
 
9 https://www.empea.org/research/empea-esg-community-case-studies-alignment-sdgs/ 
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Strategy change of CMB fund managers was implicit from the interview transcripts 
analysed; however, a critical examination and analysis of secondary data including 
documents, impact reports, websites and GIIN case studies showed a remarkable 
trend. Typical responses to the question posed to fund managers comprised "we 
don't brand ourselves as impact investors" (Fund Manager D), "same model" (Fund 
Manager B), "same investment approach" (Fund Manager E), to "increase fund size 
and investment amount" (Fund Manager D) and "more ESG tracking" (Fund 
Manager D). The empirical literature on ‘why' of strategy change showed a positive 
relationship between environmental variables (i.e. uncertainty, complexity and 
industry concentration) and changes in firm strategies in line with the adaptive 
theories (Amburgey et al., 1993; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Zuniga-Vicente 
et al., 2005). Extending this view to the strategy change of CMB fund managers, 
environmental uncertainty appears to be driving strategy change. For instance, 
emerging trends within global, institutional, impact investment and enterprise 
landscape evidence uncertainty which could affect CMB fund manager survival 
without strategy change. 
To conform to the emerging external environmental changes, CMB fund 
managers had to change strategies to incorporate ESG, sustainable developmental 
objectives, social impact together with financial returns to access capital from 
promoters of impact investing. Based on the analysed data, the findings presented 
below shows five circumstances of strategy change of CMB fund managers with the 
emergence of impact investing phenomenon. Table 6.7 shows how CMB Fund 
managers A and B have changed strategy through an examination of fund I and 
fund II along the lines of fund composition, fund size, access to technical assistance, 
funding sources, regional and multiple country expansion, and social impact 
orientation.
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Table 6. 7 Impact investment and strategy change of CMB funds 
 Fund Manager A Fund Manager B 
 Fund I Fund II Fund I Fund II 
Fund size $100 m $150 m $13.2 m $ 65 m 
Year 2008 2014 2002 2012 
Ticket size $0.05m to $1.5m $0.1 m to $1.5 m $0.06m to $0.78 m $0.36 m to $1.8 m 
Fund Type Debt Fund Debt Fund Growth Equity Growth Equity 
No of investees 317 166 and on-going 33  29 (40 expected) 
Objective Finance start-ups and SMEs 
across Africa 
Impact investment vehicle for 
SMEs 
Target small and fast-growing 
SMEs 
Target missing middle and matured SMEs 
Funding Sources DFI’s (AfDB, European 
Investment Bank (EIB); 
Norfund; CDC, IFC, FMO, 
Proparco); and Shell 
foundation 
Foundations (Shell, Calvert, 
Skoll), DFI’s (KfW, Norfund and 
the Dutch Good Growth fund 
(DGGF); Anthos; Elma Investment  
Private Individuals, 
DFI (EIB and Proparco) 
DFI’s (FMO, AfDB, Proparco, EIB); Private 
Investors (Bank of Africa, CFAO, PhiTrust, 
BRED, Credit Cooperatif), foundations and 
individuals (Wendell) 
Sectors Education, Agri-business, 
manufacturing and key 
services 
Education, Healthcare, Agri-
processing, Manufacturing, 
Energy, Services 
Agri-business, essential services, 
manufacturing 
Agri-business, Microfinance, Construction, 
Transport, Health 
Geographies West Africa (Ghana, 
Nigeria); East Africa (Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia),South Africa 
North Africa (Egypt); West 
Africa (Ghana, Ivory Coast, 
Nigeria, Senegal); East Africa 
(Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia); South Africa 
West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Senegal);Central Africa 
(Cameroon, Gabon, Uganda): 
Indian Ocean (Madagascar) 
West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Ghana, Mali, Senegal);Central 
Africa (Cameroon, Gabon, Uganda); 
Indian Ocean (Comoros, Madagascar) 
Social impact Job10s created and sustained 
43,600; Entrepreneurs 
supported: 6,090; Livelihood 
impacted: 218,000 
Jobs created and 
sustained:35,250; 
Entrepreneurs supported: 1,360; 
Livelihood impacted: 176,000 
Jobs:  created-1,300 sustained-
1,646 People impacted:19,149 
Entrepreneurs supported: 26   
 
Jobs created and sustained: 4,374 
People impacted: 30,370 
 
Source: ESG and Impact Reports 2017 and 2018 of Fund Manager 
 
10 Figures extracted from impact report as at December 2017 
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Capital commitment from investors described as limited partners constitute a 
fund for realising specific objectives through SME investments. Prior to the 
emergence of impact investing, CMB funds analysed from the data collected 
showed fund composition consisting of private institutional and commercial 
investors relative to development-oriented investors. Because of high returns 
expectation. However, because of the strategy change of fund managers, current 
funds incorporated evidence higher concentration of development-oriented 
investors and philanthropy organisations with a relatively higher expectation of 
social impact with threshold financial returns.  
Considerable fund size evidence referred to as asset under management 
(AUM). Strategy change of fund managers facilitated access to a large pool of 
capital from foundations, DFI's and family offices that hitherto committed little or no 
capital for funds focusing on private wealth creation. This evidence can be observed 
in the fund I and Fund II of three of the CMB funds analysed for this research. 
Because of the larger fund size, these funds have increased their average 
transaction size and focusing on missing middle and established SMEs. For 
example, Fund Manager B incorporated their fund I of $13.2 million in 2002 with 
relatively fewer investors and size. However, post-investment of fund I for ten years 
in 2012 and emergence of impact investing, Fund Manager B sourced fund II of $65 
million size representing a multiple of almost 4.5 times of fund.  
Access to technical assistance (TA) facilities represents one of the significant 
evidences of strategy change by CMB fund managers. TA's are aimed at supporting 
the funds and SME investees. Hitherto, technical assistance facilities from DFIs 
were channelled to government-funded projects in developing. The phenomenon of 
impact investing has changed the trend arising from the strategy change of CMB 
fund managers. Some of these institutions assisted through their in-house ESG 
teams, technical assistance facilities and other support services to build capabilities 
of team's fund managers to deliver on developmental objectives through SME 
investments. Excerpts of interview extracts illustrate the investor influences as 
enablers of strategy change:  
"When they are handling E and S issue, and we encourage them to let us 
know so that our in-house E and S team can recommend a solution" (Investor 
A) 
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"The TA program is based on grants from the European Investment Bank 
and FISEA (€1.5M). It co-finances a great variety of support missions being 
carried out by independent specialists"- (Fund Manager B). 
Strategy change of CMB fund managers also manifests in-country or regional 
focus of predecessor fund and current fund under management. Analysed data 
shows three evidence of change in country focus. First, one Fund Manager D that 
initially focused on a single country transitioned to a regional focus fund through the 
addition of a second country in their current fund. Second, fund manager C that co-
incidentally established fund I with sub-regional focus strategically positioned 
themselves as impact investing fund for agriculture. Third, fund managers A and B 
with presence in three sub-regions of Africa expanded to other sub-regions in Africa 
and the Middle East. Scale-up of Fund Managers A and C were at the instance of 
impact investment capital from DFIs supporting developmental objectives in 
different sub-regions in Africa. Principal actors in this strategy change of CMB fund 
managers were the development finance institutions seeking to alleviate poverty, 
increase the income level of people in BoP communities and facilitating access to 
finance. Without mincing words, typical phrases from interview transcripts revealed 
the following: 
"We tend to look at something with Regional exposure…. it is somehow 
protective on a risk management front to have a broader range of exposures. 
- (Investor A). 
To summarise, CMB fund managers changed their strategies with the 
emergence of impact investing. Consequently, they became agents of development 
through SME investment relative to their prior status as agents of private wealth 
creation. Evidence of CMB funds strategy change were uncovered through fund 
composition, larger fund size, access to technical assistance facilities, and regional 
and multiple country focus. 
In conclusion, strategy change and alignment at the investor- fund manager 
level analysis presented earlier indicates the influences of investors within the 
changing impact investment landscape. In terms of strategy alignment, the evidence 
shows five conditions under which fund managers aligned their strategies. These 
conditions comprised institutionalised ESG, high impact priority focus, multiple 
country and regional focus, social impact orientation and broad commitment to 
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SDGs. Similarly, the evidence presented shows four circumstances of strategy 
change among fund managers. These conditions included fund composition, larger 
fund size, access to technical assistance facilities, regional or geographical 
expansion. 
Based on this evidence presented, critical examination and critique of the 
analysed data, what is emerging is more of strategy alignment of fund managers 
rather than strategy change based on the theoretical framework developed in 
section 2.8 of chapter 2. Fund Managers A, B, D and E, have aligned their strategy. 
For fund manager C, the evidence shows more of a coincidence that their first and 
only fund under management was consistent as investor B phrased "mandate-
strategy-fit" with the emergence of impact investing. Fund Manager A is deploying 
the same investment model, operational strategy, and post-investment support 
services. However, because of track record and implementation of their business 
model for almost two decades, fund manager A aligned their strategy and presented 
an investment philosophy of social impact and financial returns to access a large 
pool of capital. Fund Manager B utilized the first phase of their set up to experiment 
their investment model with an embedded impact strategy basically from funding 
from private investors. Subsequently, they attracted a couple of DFI's in their second 
fund while expanding regionally.  
The strategy alignment evidence became pronounced in their third fund with 
the emergence of impact investing where they demonstrated to DFI's, family offices, 
philanthropic organisations. While fund manager E showed some evidence of 
strategy alignment, they sort of build and consolidated their investment strategy and 
operating model. 
6.4.3 How CMB fund managers deliberately influence investee SMEs through 
strategy change 
Evidence of strategy alignment and change of CMB fund managers presented in 
subsection and section 6.4.2 reflects in the level of influence on SME investees to 
realise anticipated objectives. Analysis and findings are presented on the influences 
of CMB fund managers on SME investees in line with the notion of strategy 
adaptation perspective of strategy change (Zuniga-Vicente and Vicente-Lorente, 
2006). Strategic management theory explains the ‘why’ of strategy change or 
alignment as uncovered in Section 2.4. Strategy adaptation view suggests that 
managers align or change strategies in conformity with external environmental 
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events. Based on this perspective, CMB fund manager influences on SME investee 
strategies were uncovered. Analysis of interview transcripts, documents and 
associated secondary reports show evidence of how CMB fund managers through 
strategy change and alignment influence SME investees to deliberately realise the 
social impact and financial returns linked to social entrepreneurship theory.  
The question of how CMB fund managers influenced SMEs through strategy 
change or alignment from respondents were quite insightful. Few extracts from the 
interview transcripts included: 
"Of course, the investors, all the investors that we work with are also social 
impact investors. Also, so, we cannot do certain activities if it does not serve 
their ultimate objectives"- (SM3) 
"We had some people in the past who were less likely, and we have tried to 
really focus on getting investors that are aligned with the way we want to do 
things"- (SM1). 
"They will make sure they will drive you to not coercing you, but they will 
direct you to whatever they want to achieve…they will direct you, and it was 
also helpful for us."- (SM6) 
Like the above, CMB fund managers expressed how they have utilized 
strategy alignment to influence SMEs. Two excerpts from an interview transcript 
provided indication: 
"Just as we went out fundraising, and we had feedback from investors that 
shaped our model. We also can shape, we do not change it, but we can 
shape" – (Fund Manager D) 
"We try to use our understanding of the bottom of the pyramid and also 
understand what the company is supposed to do to help them align to that 
mission" – (Fund Manager E) 
A critical analysis of data collected for this research uncovered four findings 
of how CMB fund managers through strategy alignment and change influence SMEs 
to realise the social impact and financial returns. These findings comprise 
investment processes, post-investment relationship, embedded ESG and social 
impact initiatives, and impact-driven and SDG alignment.  
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Investment processes represent opportunities for CMB fund managers to selectively 
invest in high growth and established SMEs with heterogeneous strategies. Social 
entrepreneurship theory avers how SMEs can deliberately realise social impact and 
financial returns through adoption of integrated, unified hybrid, commercial plus 
CSR, complementary and embedded strategy (Battilana et al., 2011; Austin et al., 
2006; Peredo and Mclean, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005) Analysed data showed 
unique approaches adopted by fund managers as investment processes for 
selecting and investing in SME. In the main, five stages were identified namely 
screening, due diligence, contracts and disbursement, monitoring and exit. Typical 
deal selection and structuring process of private equity and venture capital literature 
(Gompers et al., 2016). Strategy change of CMB fund managers, now as agents of 
social impact and financial returns implied rigorous selection processes of SMEs by 
CMB fund managers to meet impact investor objectives (Ormiston et al., 2015). Two 
investment processes were deployed to influence SME investees through strategy 
change and alignment comprising screening and due diligence. 
CMB fund managers through screening processes select SME investee that 
strategically imbibes social impact and financial return objectives. Hitherto, fund 
managers could identify SMEs in preferred sectors with higher expected returns 
without recourse to the investor objectives. However, a thorough and laborious 
screening processes including entrepreneur assessment, entrepreneur strategy and 
fund manager mandate fit, which could last about three months prior to due diligence 
phase. As one CMB fund manager notes in the following interview extract  
"Sometimes, people come with their passion, they want to do something wild, 
and that is fine. We do not invest in big dreams; we invest in the business"- 
(Fund Manager D) 
Due diligence phase also evidenced the selectivity of SME by CMB fund 
managers in pursuit of social impact and financial returns objectives. Business 
viability test, entrepreneur personality test, financial viability, legal and regulatory 
compliance assessment conducted to ensure SME venture can deliver on social 
impact and financial returns objectives. Strategy change resulted in fewer SME 
investee selection from initial screening to due diligence realise for mandate-fit as 
noted by CMB fund managers. 
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"I mean if we start with 100 companies, by the time we get to the investment 
committee level we probably get like just twenty companies or 15 
companies"- (Fund Manager B) 
"We can only invest in just a few… we go for the one that we think we can 
really make money and impact as well… before, for example, we would invest 
in one hospital, we probably will be looking at four hospitals"- (Fund Manager 
D) 
Post investment monitoring represents another process. CMB fund 
managers now provide different support services to influence investee SMEs to 
realise the expectations of investors to the fund. Typical post-investment 
management support includes financial management, capacity building, training 
and networking, strategy fine-tuning, human resource capacity building and 
budgeting.  
Technical assistance funds accessed from investors assist fund managers 
influence SME investees to implement actions plans for ESG risk indicators 
identified during due diligence. These business support services and assistance to 
SME investee catalyse fulfilment of social impact and financial returns objectives 
expectation from investors. Fund Manager B noted that technical assistance "is 
used for capacity building, skills transfer and training". Similarly, for the upgrading 
of strategic plans and processes, Fund Manager E explained "We do have a look at 
their strategies and plans and where we think that there is a need to improve upon 
it we do so. Also, we do that with a lot of technical assistance support."  
SME entrepreneur founders and investees also heralded how CMB fund 
managers through technical assistance funds have catalysed their growth through 
enabling new product launch, scale-up and expansion to other countries. Post-
investment management support to SME investees ensured growth. 
"Fund Manager B had a technical assistance fund and what the fund does is 
that it locates the expertise that your company needs and they put that 
expertise into the company"- (SM2 ) 
"…..they provided the resources to drive our agenda"-(SM6) 
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Intentionality or deliberateness in pursuing a strategy of social impact and 
financial returns imply the adoption of ESG and social impact strategies by CMB 
fund managers and investee SMEs. Investors to CMB funds with the emergence of 
impact investing are prosecuting ESG and impact agendas in line with Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG). As part of strategy change and alignment of CMB fund 
managers, ESG and social impact strategies were demonstrated through SME 
investees. First, ESG risk assessment and social impact objectives were 
incorporated in the strategies of SME investees at the contract signing stage before 
disbursement. Second, action plans on ESG risk factors identified by CMB fund 
managers with SME investee management team were implemented. For instance, 
social protection, safety at work and gender consideration. Finally, reporting on ESG 
and effect on value creation to fund managers and investors were performed.  
ESG risk assessment and implementation of action plans were linked to 
social impact objectives expected from SME investees. Consistent with existing 
literature and environmental sustainability (Blundel et al., 2018), implementation of 
risk management positively affects value creation through social impact. For 
example, Fund Manager B ensured that SME investees provided health insurance 
for all employees as part of the social risk factor identified. Evidence was also 
uncovered in situations where SME investees guaranteed inclusive growth through 
the establishment of out-grower schemes based on the advice of Fund Manager B. 
Reporting of these dimensions of social impact to investors were critical to 
accessing other funds from investors by fund managers as shown in the impact 
report of Fund Managers A, B and E.  
Alignment of social impact to SDG also emerged.  Evidence from the 
analysed data of annual impact reports of Fund Managers A, B, C and E showed 
how CMB fund managers through strategy change influenced SME investees to 
demonstrate social impact aligned to sustainable development goals (SDGs). First, 
SMEs providing goods and services in specific sectors designated impact-driven 
sectors comprising health, education, renewable energy, agriculture and agri-
business, hospitality were targeted. Second, evidence was uncovered concerning 
the interconnectedness of social impact realised by SME investees and alignment 
with SDG attainment. For example, SME investee providing off-grid electricity to 
rural consumers in Ghana and Cote' D’ivoire in terms of social impact guaranteed 
access to electricity in BoP communities evidenced in the 2018 annual impact report 
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of Fund Manager B. Linked to SDG, investee SMEs promoted renewal energy 
access and reduced carbon footprint to mitigate environmental effects (Blundel et 
al., 2018). Simultaneously, the provision of off-grid electricity was aligned to SDG 7 
(affordable and clean energy) and SDG 5 (Gender equality) through women as a 
field sales representative.  
In conclusion, some of the evidence resembles pure private equity and 
venture capital deal selection and structuring processes. However, through the 
dimensions of ESG and social impact strategies, technical assistance support, and 
social impact and SDG alignment, separate evidence within the impact investment 
landscape can be observed. In the next section, analysis, and evidence of the 
deliberate pursuit of social impact in line with research objective two and strategy 
change from social entrepreneurship theory. 
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6.5. Simultaneous pursuit of Impacts (Social impact and financial 
returns) 
6.5.1 Introduction 
CMB fund managers that hitherto were agents of private wealth creation aligned 
their strategies to attract resources from impact investors to invest in SMEs for social 
impact and financial returns. This reflects the 'why' of strategy change uncovered in 
section 2.4 and evidenced in section 6.4.  Simultaneous pursuit of social impact and 
financial returns as incorporated in the investment models of CMB fund managers 
were executed through SME investees to reflect impact investment strategy 
(Hotchstadter and Scheck,2015; Ormiston et al.,2015). In this section, analysis and 
findings focused on the nature of impact realised through SME investees, the role 
of SME owner-managers as social entrepreneurs and CMB fund managers as 
agents of social transformation. These impacts (social impact and financial returns) 
were analysed from the interview transcripts and documents secured from impact 
investors, fund managers, SME investees and impact investment promotion 
association. 
6.5.2 Demonstrating social impact 
Extant social entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Seelos and Mair, 2005; Paredo and 
McLean, 2006) and impact investing (Rajan et al., 2014; Addis et al., 2013) shows 
that social impact through SMEs vary including supplying products to BoP 
communities, poverty reduction, increased income, job creation; improved access 
to education and health; and access to reliable energy. These varied dimensions of 
social impact are critical to the promotors of impact investing (Jones and Turner, 
2014; Hotchstder and Scheck, 2015) which underpin the developmental objectives 
of impact investors (Rubin, 2009; Bhatt and Ahmad, 2017). Case illustration 6.2 
evidence how a high growth and established SME pursued social impact and 
financial returns simultaneously representing what Austin et al., (2006) called an 
embedded social purpose strategy. 
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Box 6.2 High growth SME, intentionality of social impact and financial returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SME respondents provided similar answers on the nature of social impact through 
their operations and services rendered in BoP communities. These impacts 
comprised direct and indirect jobs and market access opportunities. Excerpts of 
these transcripts comprised focusing on job creation: 
"We 305 full-time staff in both countries and then we have probably another 
300-400 direct sales representatives"- (SM1)  
"Currently our staff strength is around 250… the full time is 168, and the rest 
are casuals who are needed for planting and during harvest. If they mature 
and you do not harvest within a certain period, they go bad"-(SM9) 
Thus, an embedded social purpose strategy adopted by some of the investee 
SMEs facilitated access to impact investment capital for their businesses. Table 6.8 
depicts the coding structure of the impact variables of social impact and financial 
Case illustration: Box 6.2 
Simultaneous pursuit of social impact and financial returns represent major outcomes 
for impact investors when they commit capital to for-profit SMEs that pursue dual goals. 
As noted by the MD of SME3 “…as a social enterprise, we are not necessarily driven by 
profits, but we are also driven by helping society to improve what they are able to do., 
solving a challenge that faces smallholder farmers… And that of information asymmetry”. 
An established and high growth SME providing technology solutions to farmers (i.e.  
market prices, weather information, bid-sell platform) as well as project management 
services, SME3 attracted impact investment capital from different sources to pursue 
social impact and financial returns in Ghana. In providing solutions to the needs of 
smallholder farmers for planting, fertilizing, harvesting and market-related prices at 
relatively affordable rates, SME3 simultaneously pursued social impact and financial 
returns in BoP communities. In addition, through GIS and Remote Sensing technology 
platforms developed, SM3 provided services farmers under the auspices of institutions 
including Vodafone Ghana, Government of Ghana, AGRA, and UNICEF generating 
financial returns while addressing the needs of BoP communities for social impact. With 
employee strength of 35 full time, 43-part time and an estimated 500 field representatives 
for project execution, SM3, a mobile and digital solution provider for smallholder farmers 
attracted impact investment capital. Impact funding from IFC, AHL Fund manager E, 
McDavies International and Soros Economic Foundation enabled realisation of social 
impact and financial returns simultaneously. In addition to these equity investments, 
SME3 secured grant funding of over $800,000 USD from the Alliance for Green 
Revolution (AGRA) to support the deployment of an innovative technology solution to 
farmers in Ghana expected to help more than 80,000 farmers from 2016-2019. 
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returns. Data from secondary sources garnered during the data collection and 
reports from institutions such as World Economic Forum, Global Impact Investing 
Network (GIIN), EMPEA and the Financial Times were consulted.  
 Table 6.8 below exhibits the coding structure followed detailed earlier in 
Subsection 4.7.1. All three second-order concepts were aggregated to represent the 
theoretical dimension of social impact and financial returns. 
Table 6. 8 Data Structure of Impact investment impacts (Social impact and Financial 
Returns) 
First Order Concept Second Order Concepts Aggregated dimensions 
Job creation, indirect and 
direct jobs, employment 
opportunities, casual work, 
sub-contracting work, 
loading and off-loading job, 
enumerators 
Employment related  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social impacts 
Weather information; 
planting, fertilizing and 
pesticides spraying 
information, free-rider 
community effect, technical 
support, better product 
pricing 
Market access and BoP 
growth 
Access to loans; income for 
children medical bills and 
school fees; start-up support; 
women business support; 
capacity and mobile money 
access 
Financial inclusion 
Off-grid energy access; 
health improvement; 
productivity improvement; 
drive inclusion; reduce 
underserved population 
Energy access 
   
Revenue generation; cash 
flows; sales growth; returns 
to investors; return on 
investment 
Investor-determined 
indicators 
 
 
 
 
Financial returns Profitability, sustainability, 
survival; loan repayment; 
Firm specific viability 
Statutory contribution, taxes; 
pension; employee 
insurance contribution; 
economy-wide benefits 
Economy-wide contribution 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD data 
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6.5.3 Variants of deliberate social impact and financial returns 
 The financial return anticipated is essential to fund managers and investee 
SMEs just as social impact shown in Table 6.8. Thus, financial return is a crucial 
motivator for CMB fund managers investing in SMEs. Similarly, entrepreneur 
managers of SMEs receiving investment flow prioritise profitability, cash flows and 
revenue growth as a critical operational goal while aiming at poverty reduction in 
BoP communities. Financial inclusion represents a primary context-specific factor 
under the financial architecture reforms reviewed in section 3.3 in changing the SME 
financing landscape. It ensures that women who hitherto were unable to access 
funding for their small business secure such opportunities. The effect is that financial 
inclusion becomes an enabler for families to secure access to credit and generate 
income to meet educational and medical bills. These aggregately represent the 
theoretical dimension of social impact and evidence of societal problems noted in 
section 3.2, which impact investors are seeking to alleviate. 
An integrated or unified hybrid strategy (Battilana et al., 2012; Seelos and 
Mair, 2005) from the social entrepreneurship literature can be uncovered in Non-
Bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and MFIs. The interview excerpts below reflect 
this strategy. 
"So, for instance, you are trading, we have this group in Bolga … weaving 
baskets…. Also, we have put them into a co-operative, and we have found a 
company that comes, and we have negotiated rates for them. That company 
pre-finances…. Moreover, we have linked them to the market. They are about 
sixty (60) entirely women."- (SM7) 
"You know we deal with the active economic population and so somebody 
who could not look after the kids at school, once he gets a loan, he is able to. 
In fact, We are biased towards women. Many women look after their 
children…... It is the women that shoulder all these burdens"- (SME6) 
"Some of them have ideas, but they do not have the financial muscles when 
they come, and then we look at what they have, we give them first cycle, 
second cycle, and then they improve upon their performances" (SME6) 
Another form of deliberate realisation of social impact and financial returns 
occurred by way of high growth and established SMEs in agri-business of farming 
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and manufacturing. It emerged that established and missing middle SMEs engaged 
in commercial activities generating financial returns simultaneously realise high 
social impact through direct and indirect job creation, income improvement to out-
grower farmers and other CSR support to the communities.  
"….As an SME fund focusing on West Africa, with income and job creation 
as its main impact objectives"- (Fund Manager D) 
"We see ourselves as agents of change and development in the sense that 
the private sector just like President Kufuor put it as the engine of growth 
must be encouraged to do a lot so that it will be able to engage a lot of the 
youth in terms of employment generation" (SM5) 
"… Our products support a healthy lifestyle. I can say that we work 
approximately maybe about 50 to 100 out-growers. However, beyond that, 
we work with farmers who are not out-growers"- (SM2). 
Sourcing products from BoP communities while making financial returns or providing 
products and services to them to improve their livelihoods reflect an embedded 
social purpose strategy. The strategy of the deliberate pursuit of social impact and 
financial returns from the social entrepreneurship literature (Austin et al., 2006; 
Peredo and McLean, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005).The following excerpts 
elaborate on this theme: 
"Social impact… it is the big goal; I will say... the whole reason that we got 
into this business and the real end for me anyway is the social impact. We 
have 30,000 customers"-(SM1) 
"When we are profitable, then it means that we can continue to grow. If we can 
continue to grow, then it means that we can employ more people, we will also be 
impacting wider consumers."- (SM2)  
"There was another study done by the New York study, also want to 
understand the impact of [SME] price information and livelihood of the 
farmers' income… They also found that for the farmers who are receiving the 
[our] information services, they are also getting 9% more …They also found 
that there was a 200% return on investment for those farmers"-(SM3) 
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Evidence from SME1 and SME3 reflect an embedded social purpose strategy from 
Austin et al., (2006) in the simultaneous realisation of social impact and financial 
returns. Furthermore, to guarantee that individual lives are positively impacted, 
some of the SME investees providing financial services support their clients and 
require them to register for the National Health Insurance for improved health. 
"they get some economic activity; it relieves them from the hardships, some 
medical bills they are able to pay. So economically they can look after their 
kids, they can send them to school. We make them register for National 
Health Insurance to make sure that you know when you are sick, you would 
not take the money that you have been given as loan"- (SM6). 
From the analysis presented, emerging findings from the evidence about 
nature and how SME investees and CMB fund managers realise social impact 
consist of the following: 
1) Job creation, direct and indirect jobs are the primary dimension of social impact 
for SME investees and CMB fund managers.  
2) The improved income of BoP communities via out-grower and aggregator 
schemes.  
3) Market Access through filling gaps from poor government initiatives and 
disinterested.  
4) Poverty reduction through access to credit. 
5) Products and services to underserved customer segments. 
Majority of the investee SMEs prioritise financial returns in their strategy and 
find alternative ways of demonstrating impact. The impact of financial returns from 
the analysed data tends to be integrated or separate from social impact in some of 
the investee SMEs. Thus, financial return is a key motivator for CMB fund managers 
investing in SMEs. Similarly, entrepreneur managers of SMEs receiving investment 
flows prioritise profitability, cash flows and revenue growth as a critical operational 
goal. Understandably, the justification of financial returns forms the approval of 
impact investment capital by CMB fund managers. Some of the reasons given 
comprised sustainability, survival, growth, and expansion expectation and to some 
extent taking on the legal form of for-profit social enterprise.  
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Few responses from participants include: 
"We are a for-profit company and would want to make a return for our 
investors.... I like been a for-profit because, first of all you know if you charge 
people something for what they are getting, then it is much more empowering 
to them." (SM1). 
"….if we do not make money, we will not survive. It means that we will wind down. 
So, we need to be profitable to carry on. When we are profitable, then it means that 
we can continue to grow" - (SM2) 
"….as I said that we are running a sustainably profitable business…… we are 
not necessarily driven by huge profits, we are also driven by the impact of 
what we are doing. Moreover, in as much as we are helping people, we are 
also driving and generating revenues for the company, ourselves."- (SM3) 
Financial returns were integral to the operations of investee SMEs in 
returning the invested capital to CMB fund managers and ultimately to investors as 
well as for expansion and growth. The expectation of financial returns by CMB fund 
managers from SME investees is directly linked to the expansion and growth 
potential of these businesses. Many SME owner-managers prioritise financial 
returns as illustrated earlier. The primary attributable reason is the issue of 
sustainability or survival. For SM2 
"if we do not make money, we will not survive. It means that we will wind 
down. So, it is important for us to be profitable to carry on. When we are 
profitable, then it means that we can continue to grow." 
This evidence of financial outcome expectations and to a more considerable extent, 
potential trade-off (if any) with social impact can be traced to the investment criteria 
of CMB fund managers. For example, CMB fund manager D expressed the 
importance of financial returns in the excerpts below: 
"You must have a financial return really at the forefront. As my Professor will 
say, it is not at the back of my mind; it is at the front of my mind." 
In addition to the financial outcome of profitability and cash flows generated 
through the SME investees, economic contributions of the investment reflect 
economic or market effects. Finally, analysed documents and reports specifically 
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from Impact report (2018) from fund managers A and B revealed contributions to 
government revenue through taxes, both income and corporate. 
Emerging from the analysis presented, financial returns as the second 
dimension of impacts expected by CMB fund managers, key evidence constituted: 
1) Profitability and revenue generation is a significant financial impact from SME 
investees. 
2) Repayment or liquidation of invested capital and interest/returns through self-
liquidating instruments or share trading to new investors.  
3) Statutory contribution and effects on the national economy (SME investees and 
CMB fund managers). 
 
6.5.4 Role of individual fund managers and SME owner managers 
Literature reveal evidences of entrepreneurs and capital providers playing essential 
roles in developing countries as agents of the solution to societal problems (Addis 
et al., 2013) from a developmental perspective (Jones and Turner, 2014). Their role 
as agents of societal transformation received affirmative responses. These 
responses varied from "helping society" (SM5), "driving change and inclusion" 
(SME3)," group lending to women to process shear butter" (SM7), "changing lives" 
(Fund manager, E). Excerpts of interview transcripts detailed below: 
"I mean we are looking out for ways to drive change, ways to drive 
inclusion…our main target customers are the rural people, but anybody who 
lives in the rural areas… can we use technology and our experience to drive 
that kind of inclusion at the community level."- (SM3) 
CMB fund managers viewed their role as agents of the solution to societal problems 
from the perspectives of catalytic effect, serving BoP communities through 
investees, support for sustainable businesses. For example, fund manager D, view 
their role as a catalyst: 
"We are serving as a catalyst to if you like to bring about significant growth in 
the economy by helping businesses to grow beyond if you like their limits. Do 
not forget that it is not that easy to access funding in our part of the world." 
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"We see ourselves as agents because we form one part of the group of 
participants within the spectrum…. trying to match the investor and the 
investee, you become more or less like a middle man" (Fund Manager A) 
Supporting sustainable business was the notion of fund manager B from a system 
perspective in their role as agents of societal solution. Besides, fund manager E 
views support to early-stage businesses as critical for livelihood enhancement. 
"I believe that businesses must be sustainable; I also believe that they must 
generate impact. Also, the way they are sustainable is incentives; I mean 
profits. Moreover, so, my role is to find these sorts of businesses that can 
provide opportunities especially in terms of employment, in terms of taking 
care of the environment…."- (Fund Manager, B) 
"if you are selling to the BoP, you are selling to make money, but at the same 
time you are changing their lives without you selling the product, you cannot 
make money, and you cannot change their lives"- (Fund Manager, E) 
Emerging findings from the role of CMB fund managers and SME investee owner-
managers as agents of social transformation consist of the following: 1) Catalytic 
role 2) Filling institutional void 3) Support to BoP communities 4) Promoting inclusion 
through access to information, credit, and energy.  
CMB fund manager operational strategy deployment through investee SMEs 
also focused on job creation metric as a critical social impact indicator. Curiously, 
the issue of job creation is directly linked to the social impact measurement 
challenges in literature, which suggests a lack of standardisation. The metric of job 
creation was divided into two segments consisting of new jobs created and existing 
jobs sustained through the investments. Other dimensions of impact relate more to 
contribute to economic development through SME investees, taxes, and market-
wide effects. Table 6.9 below illustrates job creations by CMB fund managers 
through SME investees with other funds under management. 
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Table 6. 9 Job creation matrix of CMB fund managers through SME investee 
Social impact Fund Manager A Fund Manager B Fund Manager 
D 
Fund type Fund I Fund II Fund I Fund II Fund I Fund11 
II 
Jobs created and 
sustained 
43,600 35,250 2,946 4,374 1,000 4,000 
Entrepreneurs 
supported 
6,090 1,260 26 20 8 2 
Livelihood 
impacted 
218,000 176,000 19,149 30,370 4,000 1,000 
Source: Authors illustration from PhD data 
 
In summary, evidence of investee SMEs that strategy of social impact and 
financial returns were uncovered. These strategies reflect integrated, single unified, 
embedded, and complementary. There were also high growth and established 
SMEs that were more financial returns oriented with social impact incidental to their 
goals. Moreover, CMB fund managers and owner-managers of SMEs viewed their 
role as agents of social transformation in allocating capital and serving BoP 
communities, respectively. Job creation, which represents an easy to measure 
evidence of social impact forms a fundamental matrix for all CMB fund managers. 
While the evidence presented shows that CMB fund managers are ensuring that 
investee SMEs realise a dual goal, critically it can be noted that sectors targeted 
automatically realise the social impact. The financial returns priority of CMB fund 
managers is the first justification for investment. Hence, job creation metric is mostly 
measured — moreover, there is selectivity of SMEs in sectors that exhibit high 
growth, scalability, and automatic impact. 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at applying the theoretical framework developed in Sub-section 
2.8.1 of chapter two to uncover the influences of Capital Market-based (CMB) funds 
on investee SMEs through governance, strategy change and impacts. Three 
theoretical argument informs this study based on the integrated theoretical 
 
11 Fund II was mobilised at end of 2017 with investment starting in 2018. Jobs created, entrepreneurs 
supported, and livelihood impacted are estimates sourced from documents of the Dutch Good Growth 
Fund. 
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framework. Firstly, this study argues that the influences of impact investors can be 
analysed by examining how impact fund managers deploy governance mechanisms 
of ownership, control, and board representation. These governance mechanisms 
are agreed between impact investors and CMB fund managers as the basis for 
ensuring that investee SMEs realise the dual goals of financial returns and social 
impact. Secondly, further influences can critically be examined through analysis of 
strategy change or alignment of CMB fund managers agreed with impact investors 
during fund structuring for the deliberate realisation of social impact and financial 
returns through investee SMEs. Finally, the expected impact objectives from impact 
investors and CMB fund managers can be understood based on the deliberate 
pursuit of social impact and financial returns. This chapter has applied these 
theoretical arguments to the case of CMB impact investments into SMEs in Ghana.  
First, the study reveals the influences of impact investors on CMB fund 
managers through an analysis of governance and strategy change by applying an 
integrated theoretical framework from different disciplines. This research contributes 
to the debate in the impact investing literature on how impact investors govern fund 
managers (Geobey and Harji, 2014), how institutional investors implement impact 
investment strategies (Hotchstadter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Wood 
et al., 2013). By developing a framework (Fig. 6.2) detailing how impact investors 
influence CMB fund managers in deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial 
returns in BoP communities. By analysing DFI's (representing impact investors) and 
CMB fund managers in Ghana, an essential destination of impact investment 
capital, significant findings emerge. The findings demonstrate that impact investors 
through governance mechanism of ownership, control and board representation 
influence the pre- and post-investment strategies of CMB fund managers based on 
the agreement during fund structuring. These influences aim at the implementation 
of impact investment strategies (Hotchatdter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 
2015) by CMB fund managers. 
Second, the research uncovered influences of CMB fund managers on 
investee SMEs based on governance, strategy change and impacts. The research 
contributes to the debate in the impact investing literature on how impact investors 
govern investee SMEs (Geobey and Harji, 2014.) in deliberate pursuit of social 
impact and financial returns (Peredo and Mclean, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005). By 
developing a framework (Fig 6.1) which depicts the influences of CMB fund 
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managers on investees through governance mechanism of ownership, control, and 
board representation. These governance mechanisms are deployed to influence the 
strategies of investee SMEs pre- and post-investment. The 'how' of impact 
investment strategy depends on finance-first, hybrid, or impact-first strategy of CMB 
fund managers. Any of which entails selective SME investment, financial returns 
and ESG considerations as pillars of investment consideration and social impact 
orientation. Finally, impacts realised through investee SMEs by way of strategy 
encompasses deliberate pursuit of social impact and financial returns from the social 
entrepreneurship literature (Austin et al., 2006; Peredo and McLean, 2006; Seelos 
and Mair, 2005) emerged. These strategies reflect integrated, single, unified hybrid, 
embedded and complementary. Some of these findings through transformational 
does not seem to be surprising. 
Impact investor objective of alleviating intractable societal problems through 
development established in the context review of Section 3.2 shows evidence of the 
transformation that CMB fund managers are pursuing. High growth, missing middle 
and established SMEs targeted by CMB fund managers in sectors including 
agriculture, education, off-grid energy, and financial services can be described as 
transformational in BoP communities. These sectors represent priority sectors of 
impact investors and where social impact can be observed to be automatic in terms 
of many people whose livelihood can be affected. With the emergence of impact 
funds focusing on agri-business and technologies that provide solutions to farmers 
in such BoP communities, evidence of impact can be observed. Further, unreliable 
energy from the national grid implies that many people in BoP communities were 
denied access to energy, as reviewed in Section 3.2. CMB funds investment into 
investee SMEs providing off-grid solar solutions on a credit basis allow women in 
rural and peri-urban communities to procure such products and use in their 
respective homes. This further show how BoP communities are impacted. Job 
creation for sales agents and distributors emerged who are mostly in BoP 
communities. 
Further, the object of promoting financial inclusion and creating more 
entrepreneurial financing opportunities within the research setting of Ghana 
manifest through the growing adoption and usage of mobile financial services. Thus, 
incentivising CMB fund managers to invest in MFI's and NBFI. Allocating impact 
investment capital to such institutions for acquisition of ATMs, and mobile money 
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points of sales and software to upgrade their existing technology can be observed 
and termed transformational. Creating more opportunities for the youth through 
manufacturing and other economic ventures within the emerging oil and gas industry 
can also potentially eradicate the menace of unemployed youth engaged in artisanal 
or illegal mining. 
Critically, some of the CMB fund managers invest in struggling established 
SMEs, pay-down their obligations to bank-based fund managers, and restructure 
the business through governance and strategy change. Such approach denotes 
evidence of quick-fixes and unwillingness to nurture other high growth SMEs that 
are seeking for impact investment capital. Such a strategy is plausible with a critical 
analysis of the fund economics of CMB fund managers. Evidence which answered 
RQ1 of section 1.3 and in line with the objectives of the chapter, the study presented 
analysis on the nature governance at the investor-fund manager level and fund 
manager-SME investee level. At the investor fund manager level, evidence showed 
investor influences on fund managers through minority ownership in funds, 
shareholder rights through a partnership agreement, and equal voting rights. 
Ownership dimension of governance cascade into control rights through fund 
manager limits to sectors, geographies, and deal size. Board representation at the 
fund level granted impact investors board rights and voting rights through the LPAC. 
Voting rights were available to all shareholders in the fund on matters that affect the 
partnership and shareholders agreement.  
Empirical evidence of how CMB managers govern SMEs that pursued dual 
goals were uncovered in the way in which ownership, control and board 
representation are constituted and operationalised between the fund managers and 
the owner-managers of SMEs. The critical empirical findings are that generally CMB 
fund managers acquire significant minority interest (up to 49%) in investee SMEs, 
appoint independent directors to their board and restrict strategic decisions which 
require their consent. From ownership dimension, CMB fund managers took 
significant minority interest with equity funds, secured voting rights and power to 
remove CEO in exceptional cases. Emerging evidence on governance via control 
showed that CMB fund managers utilised minority protection clauses, milestone 
investments, rights of first refusal for entrepreneur's equity stake and vesting to 
influence SME investees. Board representation constituted the third dimension of 
governance that fund manager adopted to influence SME investees. The evidence 
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shows that board representation granted fund managers voting rights and board 
rights when equity capital SME investees. These rights enable fund managers to 
reduce information asymmetry, influence strategic decision, formalisation of 
governance systems and enhance the legitimacy of the investee to access other 
resources from the financial landscape. 
In presenting the analysis and findings, strategy change at the impact 
investor-fund manager level were initially presented due to the correlation with fund 
manager-SME investee level evidence to show why of strategy change to answer 
research question 2 in Section 1.3. The analysis presented showed evidence on 
strategy change and alignment of CMB fund managers to DFI's at the investor-fund 
manager level. Emerging evidence relate more of strategy alignment of fund 
managers rather than strategy change as argued in the theoretical framework. Fund 
Managers A, B, D and E, have aligned their strategy. For fund manager C, the 
evidence appears more coincidental that their first and only fund under management 
was exactly what impact investors required a few years within the emergence of 
impact investing. Fund Manager A is adopting the same investment model, 
operational strategy, and post-investment support services. However, with the 
emergence of impact investors, fund manager A aligned their strategy and 
presented an investment philosophy of an embedded social impact and financial 
returns to access a large pool of capital including technical assistance facilities. 
Fund Manager B utilised the first phase of their set up to experiment their investment 
model with an embedded impact strategy basically from funding from private 
investors then grew regionally through DFI's in their second fund. Strategy 
alignment with the emergence of impact investing evidence through access to DFI's, 
family offices, and philanthropic organisations that invested in their fund model 
encapsulating social impact and financial returns in Africa. 
At the fund manager-SME investee level, the chapter presented evidence on 
CMB fund manager influences on SME investee strategies to realise the social 
impact and financial returns. Evidence showed that CMB fund managers modified 
and shaped strategies of SME investees generally through pre-investment 
processes and post-investment monitoring and support. Finally, the analysis of 
expected impacts (financial and social) was presented as depicted in the theoretical 
framework. The primary evidence of social impact is the focus on job creation by 
SME entrepreneurs and CMB fund managers including others in BoP communities 
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depicted in figure 6.2. Financial returns findings indicate revenue growth, 
profitability, repayment of capital deployed and interest for debt funds and 
contribution to economic growth through taxes, pension, and insurance schemes. 
Evidence emerged on the role of entrepreneurs and CMB fund managers in search 
of a solution to societal problems. The next section presents a discussion of findings 
and conclusion of the study. 
.  
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CHAPTER 7  
Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis develops and critically explores two qualitative case studies that reveal 
the role of bank-based and capital market-based impact investments in addressing 
SME financing in Ghana through a theoretical lens that integrates governance, 
strategy change and impacts. As the research setting for the two empirical case 
studies, Ghana represents a suitable BoP context for this thesis considering the 
myriad of societal problems in some communities. In the past these research 
themes have been largely addressed within discrete disciplinary silos. This research 
applied an integrated theoretical framework drawing on different academic 
disciplines to uncover four significant findings. These findings include 
distinctiveness of finance and impact first investors; uniqueness of bank-based and 
capital market-based intermediaries; entrepreneurial financing through impact funds 
versus traditional financing; high growth, missing middle and established categories 
of SMEs for impacts. These findings have implications for multiple stakeholders 
within the impact investment ecosystem.  
In arriving at the findings, the study sought to understand and explain how 
impact investment funds through governance, strategy change, and impacts ensure 
that SMEs simultaneously realise dual goals in BoP communities. This has resulted 
in an important research gap, which requires a more integrated approach. The study 
has brought together relevant sources from the following contributing literatures: 
impact investments  (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015), fund 
governance and strategies (Gompers et al.,2016; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009); 
entrepreneurial financing (Cumming et al.,2019; Ayyagari et al, 2011; Abor and 
Biekpe, 2007), social entrepreneurship ( Luke and Chu, 2013; Peredo and 
McClean,2006; Seelos and Mair,2005), SME management (Beck, 2013; Abor and 
Biekpe,2010) and the  governance of bank – SME relationship (Vashishtha,2014; 
Chakraboty and Ray, 2006; Peterson and Rajan, 1994).  I have drawn on these 
diverse sources to develop an integrated theoretical framework. I have applied this 
framework empirically, taking Ghana as a research setting. I used the initial findings 
to refine the framework and for further theory building and elaboration purposes.  
Bank-based funds and SME analysis presented in Chapter 5 uncovered three 
governance mechanisms that impact investors adopt to influence bank-based fund 
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managers to deliver on social impact and financial returns expectation as 
intermediary fund managers. These mechanisms comprise pre-approval processes, 
control and monitoring. Similarly, governance mechanisms deployed by impact 
investors to influence BBF managers also manifest at the fund manager-SME level. 
Extant literature on banks financial intermediation (Boot, 2000) have focused on 
accepting deposits for on-lending to customers, risk management and financial 
performance. Impact investors represented by DFI’s in this PhD study exert 
influences on bank-based fund managers through governance and strategy change 
to realise expected social impact and financial returns by financing SMEs. Previous 
literature however focused more on two of these governance mechanisms namely 
control and monitoring (Vashishtha, 2014; Bharath et al, 2011; Scarlata and 
Alemany, 2010). Internal governance mechanism in the view of Bharath et al (2011, 
p.1142) aims to “screen-out” low quality borrowers and are usually compounded by 
information asymmetry (Dass and Masa, 2011).  
Strategy change by bank-based fund manager represent more of strategy 
alignment to secure impact investment funds for liquidity management and capital 
adequacy requirements. These evidences reflect more of strategic adaption view of 
the firm (Boeker, 1997; Vicente-Lorente and Zuniga-Vicente, 2006) of explaining the 
‘why’ of strategy change by BBF managers. Access to manage funds, collaboration 
with DFI’s, securing of long-term funding and financing of BoP SMEs at the impact 
investor-fund manager level enabled financing of projects, sectors and SMEs that 
hitherto were neglected as agents of private wealth creation. Evidence presented 
shows that BBF managers target different categories enterprise namely high growth, 
missing middle and established to realise dual goals of social impact and financial 
returns. Social entrepreneurship theory provides understanding of ‘how’ about 
strategy change including integrated, complementary, unified hybrid strategies are 
deployed by BBF to ensure that SMEs realise dual goals.  
 Capital market-based funds typically follows the structure of private equity 
and venture capital funds. Previous studies on structure of private equity funds and 
governance shows arrangement of capital commitment by limited partners 
representing shareholders and fund managers as general partners (Kaplan and 
Stromberg; 2009; Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). Analysis in empirical chapter 6 
uncovered, ownership, control and board representation as governance 
mechanisms. These governance mechanisms between impact investors and CMB 
fund managers further manifest at the fund manager-investee SME level. Impact 
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investors appoint nominees to the funds advisory committee and ensure 
compliances to clauses, terms, and conditions in shareholders’ agreement by the 
fund manager as governance mechanism. Strategy change influences at the 
investor-fund manager level uncovered evidence that shows that impact investors 
commit capital to fund managers that demonstrate an impact investment strategy in 
their investment policy. Moreover, integration of ESG and SDG consideration prior 
to investing in SMEs were critical in accessing impact investor funds. CMB fund 
managers target enterprise that adopt integrated, complementary, embedded, and 
unified hybrid strategies to realise social impact and financial returns explaining the 
‘how’ of strategy change.   
The remaining sections are structured as follows: Section 7.2 discusses 
theoretical findings through cross-case analysis of bank-based and capital market-
based funds. Section 7.3 presents theoretical contributions of the study and 
implications to policy and practise. Section 7.4 sets out limitation of the research 
and future directions. Section 7.5 concludes the chapter.  
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7.2 Research findings: a cross-case comparison  
 
This section analyses the main theoretical findings from the two sets of cases 
presented in chapters 5 and 6. Having reviewed the literature and applied the 
integrated theoretical framework to the empirical research setting of Ghana to 
examine two sets of cases in the previous two chapters, emerging findings are 
discussed through cross-case analysis. A cross-case analysis involves comparing 
the similarities and differences in the accounts within each case study, which helps 
to improve the elaboration, accuracy and reliability of the theory developed from the 
cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Eisenhardt (1989) further suggest that theory 
elaboration involve demonstrating that a theoretical approach has sustained a case-
replication method. 
 This thesis produced four main findings: distinct categories of impact 
investors (finance first, impact first and hybrid); Bank-based versus Capital market-
based funds as unique intermediaries of impact investments; Impact funds  versus 
traditional entrepreneurial financing; Impact investing and social entrepreneurship- 
uniqueness and similarities of high growth, missing middle and established investee 
SMEs  
 
7.2.1 Distinctiveness of Bank based versus Capital Market Based funds 
A major motivation of this study set out in Section 1.1 and objective in section 1.3 
was to uncover the characteristics of bank and capital market-based impact 
investment funds in SME financing in BoP communities through governance, 
strategy change and impacts. This distinctiveness has been evidenced through 
three theoretical concepts and different variables. Previous impact investing 
literature have examined impact investment intermediaries namely venture 
philanthropy (PhVC) (Scalarta and Alemany, 2010), social venture capital funds 
(Spiess-Knafl and Aschari-Lincoln, 2015), mainstream versus social venture funds 
(Rajan et al, .2014) all representing categories of capital market-based funds. Rajan 
et al., (2014) compared mainstream venture capital fund (MVC) and social venture 
capital (SVC) fund. Rajan et al (2014) conceptualised SVC’s as impact investing 
funds and noted 10 evidence of differences compared to MVC. These differences 
correspond to the key features of CMB funds in this study based on strategy change. 
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Bank-based funds in the context of managing impact funds has received little 
attention in financial intermediation literature. Previous studies of BBF focused on 
intermediated funds for on-lending to SMEs and large corporates. Emerging 
differences and similarities between BBF and CMB funds as intermediaries 
represent a major finding as discovered in the two sets of cases presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Section 2.2 of the literature review uncovered BBF and CMB 
funds as intermediaries of impact investment capital and Section 3.4 situated them 
within the financial architecture in Ghana as recipient of impact investment funds. 
These sets of intermediaries comprised sample of research participants accessed 
for data collection and analysis. This further shows that distinctness and similarities 
of BBF and CMB funds represent an important finding based on governance, 
strategy change and impact. 
 While BBF deploy internal approval processes, control and monitoring as 
governance mechanisms, CBM funds generally utilise ownership, control and board 
representation to influence categories of investee SMEs. Internal pre-approval 
mechanisms adopted by bank-based fund managers to influence SMEs aim at 
eliminating adverse selection. Bharath et al (2011) suggests that lenders such as 
banks invest in due diligence to determine quality clients and facilitate screening-
out of poor borrowers (adverse selection). In terms of control, covenants, terms and 
conditions in loan contracts impose limitations on SMEs supported by bank-based 
fund managers in BoP communities. This evidence is in line with Chava and Roberts 
(2008) suggestion that control rights reside with borrowers (SMEs) provided they 
are not violated. However, when covenants are violated, control rights shift to bank-
based fund managers which enable them to intervene in management and 
investment to ensure investment returns (Chava and Roberts, 2008, p 2088). In 
effect bank-based fund influence via control on SMEs financed serve as disciplinary 
means to ensure compliance to objectives of social impact and financial returns. 
Moreover, Vashishtha (2014) further find that covenant violation enables lenders to 
take immediate action to either bank-based funds to take action for accelerated 
repayment or terminate pending commitment. Peterson and Rajan (1994) finds that 
monitoring provides banks access to information on borrowers including cash flows 
and balance sheet. Finally, Chakroboty and Ray (2006) notes that monitoring is 
critical for banks as it enable them to resolve agency problems. 
 CMB funds governance mechanism of ownership evidence is consistent and 
extends the application of private equity and venture capital governance from 
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ownership perspectives (Gompers et al., 2016; Connelly et al.,2010) to impact 
investments. What is unique from the impact funds analysed is that in terms of 
ownership, impact funds within the research setting acquire significant minority 
interests instead of majority ownership in extant literature on private equity and VC 
funds in the developed economies (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009; Gompers et 
al.,2016). Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) observe that private equity funds acquire 
majority control in existing firms. 
Strategy change evidences of BBF revealed that through collaborative 
impact funds, grants and guarantees, revolving funds and other incentives from 
impact investors, bank-based fund managers allocated capital to previously under-
banked and unprofitable sectors such as health, education, water and sanitation. 
Moreover, financing of initiatives aimed at promoting financial inclusion in BoP 
economies through MFI’s, agency banking and mobile money distributors and 
agents. In addition, provision of value chain financing within the agri-business sector 
by connecting MNC’s, SMEs and farmers in BoP economies that hitherto were 
perceived as high-risk, low-returns sector. This evidence reflects more of strategic 
adaption view of the firm (Boeker, 1997; Vicente-Lorente and Zuniga-Vicente, 2006) 
which suggest that managers continuously monitor external environmental changes 
and ensure internal strategy fit to external contingencies. CMB fund managers’ 
strategy change or alignment uncovered the reality of selective investment in high 
growth and established SMEs in alignment with an impact investment strategy of 
integrating social impact and financial returns. Also, board appointment and 
independent directors to the investee SME boards irrespective of minority interest. 
Embedding ESG and SDG in the due diligence process and expecting investees to 
fulfil these expectations post-investment represents significant differences from BBF 
on strategy change to influence investee SMEs.  
Technical assistance facilities which hitherto were for Government 
infrastructure projects now serve as enablers for investees to improve capacity, 
acquire financial reporting software and strategically operate in accordance with 
international standards. Such post investment support represents what Gompers et 
al (2016) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) finds termed as value addition that 
private equity and venture capital funds provide for their portfolio. Evidence of social 
impact presented reveals different dimensions. These includes supplying products 
to BoP economies, poverty reduction, increased household income, job creation; 
improved access to education and health; and access to reliable energy confirming 
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existing social entrepreneurship (Austin et al, 2006; Desa, 2012; Luke and Chew, 
2013) and impact investing literatures (Addis et al., 2013; Hotchstadter and Scheck, 
2015).These evidences to Hotchstadter and Scheck, (2015) represent positive 
social impact and reflect instances of non-financial returns. Similarly, emerging 
findings on financial returns dimension of these SMEs is consistent with extant 
literature in terms of economic and social value (Seelos and Mair, 2005) commercial 
goals (Paredo and McLean, 2006) and ability to return investment capital to fund 
managers, preservation of invested capital, and allow market return (Hotchstadter 
and Scheck, 2015) to impact investors (Addis et al., 2013; Ormiston et al., 2015). 
 The differences and similarities observed based on governance, strategy 
change, and impacts are significant because of impact investor motivation and 
expectation of realising social impact and financial returns. The following evidences 
detailed in Table 7.1 reveals the differences among the sets of cases. 
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Table 7. 1 Governance, strategy change and impact distinctiveness of BB and CMB 
Funds 
Theoretical 
concepts 
Variables BBF CMB 
Governance 
mechanisms 
Ownership, control 
and board 
representation 
Pre-approval; 
Control and Monitoring 
Ownership, control and 
board representation 
(Equity funds) 
-Pre-investment 
screening; control and 
monitoring (Debt Fund) 
Strategy 
change and / 
alignment 
Sector/Geography/stra
tegy  
Agri-business value 
chain financing; financial 
inclusion; social sector 
financing; Water and 
Sanitation financing; 
financial returns first 
alongside social impact 
Agri-business; 
education; health; 
financial services; 
Finance first, impact first 
and hybrid finance-
impact fist; 
institutionalised ESG; 
priority sectors; technical 
assistance; post 
investment support; 5-7 
years monitoring; social 
impact and financial 
returns 
Financing instrument Debt, Trade Credit, and 
Guarantees 
Debt, Equity, 
Convertible debt, 
Guarantees, Grants 
Average transaction 
number 
Relatively many Relatively few 
Average funding 
duration 
Short, 1-3 years Medium, 5-7 years  
Consequences of 
default 
Short renewals with 
charges; legal action; 
excessive tension arises 
Solution-oriented; 
restructuring; 
relationship 
management for 
improved results 
Post financing support Advisory Technical assistance 
support towards 
strategy, capacity 
building, procurement, 
and recruitment. 
SME owner perception Finance or returns-
oriented 
Better in managing 
relationship 
Impacts Financial returns Cash flow generation, 
profitability; turnover; 
growth 
Investor indicators; firm-
specific viability; 
economy-wide 
contribution 
Social Impact Job creation; financing 
of BoP communities and 
SMEs; out grower-
scheme finance 
Financial inclusion; 
employment-related; 
market access and 
sourcing from BoP 
communities for wealth 
creation 
Simultaneous impact 
and returns 
Target SMEs that seek: 
Financial returns plus 
CSR; MFIs for financial 
inclusion, finance SMEs 
that deploy out-grower 
schemes 
Target high growth and 
established SMEs to 
promote financial 
inclusion eg NBFI and 
MFIs; agri-business and 
manufacturing 
enterprises;  
Source: Authors illustration of cross-case analysis based on empirical chapters 
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 Bank-based intermediaries managing varied funds on-behalf of impact 
investors for specific high growth and established SMEs represent significant 
channels for realising developmental objectives. Some bank-based funds aim to 
achieve the expected dual objectives in different sectors, and market segments. 
They attract impact investors because of the established network of branches, 
human capital, effective corporate governance structures and existing database of 
clients to facilitate delivery of social impact and financial returns. These features 
uniquely position them as unavoidable financial agents to realise developmental 
objectives. BBF managers are therefore capable of financing many clients in BoP 
communities through different impact fund models to reduce poverty, social 
transformation, improve income and wealth creation (Rajan et al., 2014; Addis et 
al., 2013; Paredo and McClean, 2006). However, three major issues or challenges 
emerge where banks are managing impact investor funds as bank-based fund 
managers. First, bank-based intermediaries deploy both intermediated funds and 
managed funds of impact investors to different categories of investee SMEs. The 
choice of deploying intermediated fund versus impact fund given risk-return 
relationship poses a challenge. Secondly, tension of deliberately realising social 
impact and financial returns through SMEs financed arises. A need for employee 
capacity development for effective provision of such service create issues for 
officials. Lastly, BBF managers demand all requisite risk-mitigating instruments from 
SME owners even where guarantees are available to avoid reputational risk of 
calling-in the guarantee because of client default. 
 CMB fund managers deliver the expected financial returns and social impact-
based on their unique structure, governance, and strategy change. Debt fund 
managers, through pre-approval screening, selective investment of businesses, 
viability, and entrepreneur test, embedded ESG consideration, post investment 
monitoring and technical assistance support realise social impact and financial 
returns in BoP communities. Similarly, equity funds managed by CMB fund 
managers through governance (ownership, control, board representation) and 
strategy change ensure that investees SMEs realise the expected impact. 
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7.2.2 Manifesting investor intentionality: Finance first, Impact First and 
Hybrid Intentions 
Three categories of strategic intentions of impact investors emerged from the cross-
case analysis, though the strategic intentions overlap in some areas. While previous 
impact investing literature (Hotchstadter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015) 
posits distinct finance first and impact first – strategic intentions at investee level, 
the evidence from this thesis suggest a third category, namely hybrid finance-impact 
first. As reviewed in section 2.2.1 finance first and impact first investors have 
different financial returns and impact expectation when committing capital to country 
fund managers. The review of the institutional context of Ghana evidence this flow 
of funds into BBF and CMB funds situated within the financial architecture and acting 
as vehicles for direct investments into SMEs. It is at this fund manager – SME 
interaction level that the finance-first and impact-first distinction no longer appears 
as clearly defined as documented in the literature. The findings suggest that, 
finance-first and impact-first become integrated into a hybrid investment type at 
country level. This suggests that, as impact investors within the global context  
decide which financial intermediary serves as effective conduit for their investments, 
within the local context, the  strategies of these intermediaries (or fund managers) 
changes as they adapt to multiple investor intentions  to effectively deliver on their 
mandate based on strategies presented to investors. This also informs owner 
managers of SMEs regarding the options for available enterprise financing which 
comprise returns-oriented, impact-driven or hybrid for enterprise growth and 
expansion. 
 The above finding confirms existing literature which indicate ‘what’ an impact 
investment strategy should be pursued (Brandstetter and Lehner 2015 Höchstädter 
and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2013), however the ‘how’ of 
that strategy is demonstrated through social entrepreneurship theory (Batillana et al 
2011; Austin et al., 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005). The strategies of BBF and CMB 
fund managers in manifesting the motivations and objectives of finance-first, impact-
first or hybrid to some extent determine SMEs targeted. Evidence presented from 
the two cases shows some high growth SMEs that deploy integrated strategy of 
social impact and financial returns. Some established and missing middle SMEs 
emerged in the area of financial inclusion adopting a unified hybrid strategy. Also 
established SMEs that employ complementary strategy of profit and some CSR 
while other missing middle SMEs adopted an embedded social purpose strategy 
within their operations and sectors. These evidences seem that social impact is 
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purposed by the funds but whether they are transformational enough in BoP 
communities is not apparent because of the manifestation of finance-first, impact-
first, and hybrid in the strategies of bank and capital market-based fund managers. 
Capital commitment from different categories of investors determines finance first 
and impact first orientation at the fund manager- investee SME level. Investee 
portfolio of the hybrid fund managers comprise high growth and missing middle 
SMEs that deliver high financial returns relative to social impact and others that 
deliver high social impact relative to financial returns. Typical funds managed by 
BBF tend to be finance first. However, collaborative funding arrangement between 
BBF and impact investor (e.g. DFIs and USAID) represent hybrid of finance-impact 
first.  
 Similarly, CMB fund manager evidence shows that a fund is more finance 
first based on the type number of institutional investors in the fund with and relativity 
of their financial return expectations. There was one pure impact first fund manager 
which secure resources from philanthropic donations. The fund manager posit that 
their portfolio had a mix of finance and impact first. However, they dwell more on 
how investee SMEs embed social impact strategies in their operations and 
objectives. Hybrid finance-impact first targeted enterprise operating in agri-
business, education, health, and manufacturing. Therefore, an impact investor has 
several choices of committing capital to achieve developmental objectives in BoP 
communities. An option of debt to BBF with generally high finance return 
expectations or collaborative arrangement with BBF mainly debt. Three option await 
an investor in choosing a particular CMB fund with both hybrid finance and impact, 
more financial returns driven and CMB fund with an overarching social impact and 
floor on financial returns. Some of the previous studies (Hotchstadter and Scheck, 
2015; Ormiston et al., 2015) have focused on global context of finance first and 
impact first and social venture funds (Spiess-Knafl and Aschari-Lincoln, 2015; Rajan 
et al, .2014). This study is the first to evidence these three distinctiveness of impact 
investors at the fund manager level from bank-based and capital market-based 
funds. Evidence of differences and similarities based on governance, strategy 
change, and impacts were presented earlier in Table 7.1 of subsection 7.2.1  
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7.2.3 Impact on High Growth, Missing Middle and Established SMEs 
The results from analysing two case studies reveals the nature of the impacts that 
impact investments are having on three categories of SMEs.  SMEs are studied in 
this thesis as for profit-social enterprises that pursue social and commercial goals, 
which underpins the objective of impact investments and the theoretical lens of 
social entrepreneurship reviewed in Chapter 2. Evidence presented in the two 
empirical chapters show illustration of how BBF and CMBs impact on SMEs through 
direct funding, strengthened governance mechanism and tools/frameworks for 
demonstrating/measuring the extent to which the objectives of social impact and 
financial returns in BoP communities are being achieved. CMB fund managers 
invest in relatively few high growths, and established SMEs to realise the expected 
developmental objective, in what many of the interviewees acknowledged can been 
seen as quick wins. Milligan and Schoning (2011) observed that management fee 
of fund managers serves as a major determinant for targeting relatively larger 
enterprises. The selectivity of these few high growth and established SMEs in 
different sectors mainly agri-business, manufacturing, health, education and other 
essential services sectors imply more SMEs with dual objectives are excluded 
especially micro enterprises and small social enterprises (Milligan and Schöning, 
2011). Evidence uncovered shows that CMB fund managers focus on relatively few 
deals and large deal size compared to BBF managers which can be attributed to the 
fund economics and personnel size.  
 High growth SMEs indicated in subsection 2.2.3 exhibit high growth potential 
(Nelson and Levesque, 2007) and not gazelles (Delmar et al., 2003). Evidence from 
this study based on the two empirical cases in chapter 5 and 6 show different types 
of these category of enterprise that have experienced growth based on governance, 
strategy change and impact through impact funds. Previous literatures on high 
growth enterprises have focused on sales, employees, size, revenue and 
managerial capacity (Brown et al., 2017; Obeng et al., 2014; Goedhuys and 
Sleuwaegen, 2010; Nelson and Levesque, 2007; Delmar et al, 2003) with little 
attempt to consider governance and strategies of these enterprises. Case 
illustrations, box two in section 5.3 and box seven in section 6.5 represent two 
examples of high growth enterprises which realised employment growth, financial 
returns and social transformation in BoP communities. This evidence reflects 
semblance with the expression adopted by Grimm et al., (2012) as “constrained 
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gazelles” within the informal sector in many West African countries. High growth 
enterprises have attracted both bank-based and CMB funds to realise strategic 
objectives and developmental impacts. Features of these enterprises include older 
owner managers, more experienced in managing enterprises, good governance 
systems and a diversified board of directors and more than 10 years old from the 
time of incorporation. 
 Missing middle enterprises from the empirical chapter 5 attracted subsidised 
funding from BBF that accessed guaranteed and incentivised impact investor 
funding. Some of these enterprises operate in health, water and agric-business 
sectors. Further, others based on strategy change involving integrated and 
complementary social impact and financial returns strategy attracted such funding. 
For example, MFIs supported by BBF exhibited in 5.3.4 constitute enterprises that 
Jones and Turner (2014) posit that they require funding of $200,000 to $2 m. 
Quartey et al., (2017) submit that missing middle SMEs in SSA lack collateral for 
commercial bank loans relatively to larger businesses, but too big for micro loans 
and government support schemes. The governance of these enterprises varied with 
small board size mainly family members, growing formality of structures and controls 
and more receptive to debt than equity capital. An example of a missing middle that 
welcomed equity capital is SM2 presented in section 6.3 box six which remained 
small for almost 15 years. Impact investor equity funding, appointment of 
independent director and influence on strategy enabled the enterprise to realise 
growth and developmental impact. Previous literatures Jones and Turner (2014) and 
Milligan and Schöning, (2011) have noted significance of missing middle SMEs for 
developmental impact and financial returns. However, such enterprises tend to be 
financially constrained (Beck, 2013; Ayyagari et al, 2011; Robson and Obeng, 
2008). Impact investment funding has therefore alleviated some of the constraints 
of these enterprises through governance mechanism, strategy change and impact.  
Established SMEs that attracted both bank based and CMB funds have 
governance control systems, are receptive to appointment of independent directors 
on their board, and operated for more than 10 years (Robson and Obeng, 2008; 
Autio, 2007). Established SMEs permitted minority equity interest from CMB fund 
managers and engaged with strategy development and implementation with 
funders. The strategy changes of this category of SMEs that simultaneously pursue 
social impact and financial returns enabled them to access impact investment 
capital, achieved business expansion and growth and secured legitimacy for 
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alternative funding. Emerging observation from the empirical analysis is that some 
of these categories previously secured commercial bank funding at exorbitant 
interest rates resulting in over-indebtedness. Therefore, impact investment provided 
window of financial opportunity as shown section 6.3. Rajan et al (2014) finds that 
investee companies in BoP economies accessed who were unable to secure 
mainstream finance had access to social venture funds to for expansion with the 
emergence of impact investing. Access to subsidised funding, post financing 
advisory support, secure legitimacy, and alternative funding from CMB funds while 
achieving growth and expansion in target market and international markets. 
 Policy attention to these enterprise categories of high growth, missing middle 
and established SMEs is essential because of their ability to overcome 
entrepreneurial financing constraints and attract impact investor capital within the 
enterprise architecture. Further, developmental impacts of such enterprises in job 
creation, wealth improvement in BoP communities, providing access to water, 
sanitation and health as agents of social transformation (Rajan et al, 2014; Addis et 
al., 2013; Seelos and Mair, 2005) through access to funding require attention of 
academics, policy makers, pension fund managers and regulatory institutions.  
 
7.2.4 Alternative enterprise financing: Impact funds versus traditional 
sources  
Impact funds emerged as an alternative source of financing for entrepreneurs, high 
growth and established SMEs with social impact and financial returns goals 
compared to traditional financing in BoP communities. Entrepreneurial financing 
literature document traditional bank financing of debt, trade credit, and guarantees; 
venture capital financing, business angels, private equity financing, microfinance 
and stock exchange for large businesses (Cumming et al., 2019; Harrison et al., 
2016). In recent times alternative entrepreneurial financing sources and providers 
have emerged including business angel, impact investing, crowdfunding and other 
forms such as incubators and accelerators (Cumming et al., 2019; Harrison et al., 
2016). The next three paragraphs discuss and show evidence of similarities and 
differences of impact funds as alternative financing to traditional enterprise funding 
source and provider. 
Private equity, venture capital funds and other emerging funding described 
in the entrepreneurial finance literature as patient capital (Harrison et al., 2016) 
represent long-term funding sources for growth stage and early stage enterprises 
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alongside technical value addition to the entrepreneurs (Kaplan and Stromberg, 
2009). Evidence of social impact intentionality and integration in the business 
models of PE/VC funds were not explicit. In recent time however, impact funds have 
emerged as alternative financing to entrepreneurs and SMEs with social impact and 
financial return goals to traditional financing in BoP communities. CMB Impact funds 
have drawn on the strategies and governance mechanisms of private equity and 
venture capital funds (Gompers et al., 2016; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Along a 
continuum, a CMB fund could be described as venture capital fund when they target 
start-ups and early stage enterprises. At the extreme end of the continuum, a CMB 
fund could also be described as a private equity fund when they target larger 
transactions (Milligan and Schoning, 2011) such as high growth, missing middle and 
established investee SMEs with higher financial return expectations (Harrison et 
al.,2016). These categories of investees characteristically require large deal sizes, 
formalisation of governance structures, strategies to scale and secure legitimacy to 
break-out into large businesses for initial public offering (IPOs). These similarities 
and evidences permit theoretical descriptions of impact funds as PE/VC funds and 
beyond venture philanthropy.  
Four major conditions differentiate CMB funds from a typical PE/VC fund 
within the research setting of Ghana namely governance, strategy change, impacts 
and deals size. First, from a governance perspective a typical PE/VC fund manager 
like those in developed economies acquire significant majority interest in an investee 
company (Gompers et al., 2016; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). However, the 
evidence from the empirical chapter 6 reveals that CMB funds acquire significant 
minority interest in investee SME. Even exceptional cases of debt fund, example 
from the analysed data uncovered that a CMB fund manager which currently invest 
debt only previously invested equity of about 20% in addition to debt before they 
amended their policy to invest only debt. Second, strategies adopted differ. For 
instance, the buy and fire, restructure, invest and later sell strategies of typical PE 
fund is less evident compared to the CMB funds. In addition, PE/VC funds focus 
generally on sectors which provide high level of market, above market and 
commercial returns with incidental social impacts with little (if any) intentionality. 
 However, CMB funds prioritise sectors generating relatively high social 
impact and financial returns that are significantly influenced by investors. Exclusion 
list further restrict CMB funds to allocate capital to sectors such as oil and gas, 
mining, construction, tobacco, alcohol manufacturing due to environmental impact 
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and negative externalities. On the contrary, financial orientation of PE/VC funds 
does not restrict them. Third, simultaneous realisation of social impact and financial 
returns expectations from impact funds further differentiate them from PE/VC fund 
managers. Large scale infrastructure projects with above market returns constitute 
a major driver or motivation of the investment decision-making by PE/VC fund 
manager. This contrasts with the simultaneous social impact and near market or 
sometimes below market financial returns realised by CMB fund managers. 
Moreover, deal sizes remain another distinguishing feature of CMB funds and 
PE/VC funds.  
Should impact investors be cautious about private equity/VC fund managers 
who have either changed or aligned strategies with the emergence of impact 
investing? To facilitate flow of funds from mainstream investors to impact investing, 
governance is essential because of multiple funds under management and potential 
conflict of interest of PE/VC fund managers who have adopted the impact investing 
label.  Suffice to add that it’s common to observe a fund management company with 
multiple funds under management concurrently from different investors. A fund 
manager could be managing a pure PE fund and another impact fund with different 
objectives, outcomes, and expectations. These nuances create a huge potential 
conflict of interest situation which further raises the importance of governance at the 
investor-fund manager level. Evidence presented based on strategy change and 
alignment shows that PE/VC fund managers that hitherto were agents of private 
wealth creation have either changed or aligned their strategies as impact investors 
to access funding. The potential risk of multiple funds under management create is 
the issue of conflict of interest where a fund manager access impact funds and apply 
to a pure commercial deal because of the fees and returns to the fund management 
company. A classic case is the $ 1 billion Global health Fund with commitments from 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, IFC, CDC and other investors formerly managed 
by the now defunct Abraj Group.  
Microfinance institutions, Commercial Banks and Government funds 
represent heterogeneous sources of traditional funding to SMEs in Ghana and many 
developing countries. Microfinance institutions (MFI) emerged over the last two 
decades as lower-tier financial institutions providing capital to micro-entrepreneurs 
and small businesses to alleviate poverty and realise financial returns (Beck, 2013). 
MFI financing characteristically tend to be small size targeting micro and small 
enterprises with no collateral, adopting group lending schemes where the social 
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standing of a member is critical due to group guarantee scheme for repayment 
(Praseeda, 2011; Ashta, 2012). Two major objectives underpinning MFI activities 
and funding include economic sustainability and poverty alleviation which other 
literatures label micro-credit and outreach. MFI funding within the informal sector 
aims at financial inclusion, social transformation and economic revival in poor 
communities (Praseeda 2011; Ngoasong and Kimbu, 2016). These objectives of 
MFIs align with the investment objectives of impact investors. To assure realisation 
of these goals in BoP communities, MFI’s provide loans economically active 
engaged poor, marginalised from the financial system for economic activities while 
promoting and empowering them to emerge from poverty. 
These social transformation and commercial returns objectives of MFI is also 
central to impact investors. Therefore, some literatures have sought to equate 
impact investing to microfinance (Rajan et al., 2014; Ashta 2012). In view of this, 
impact investors regard MFIs as financial intermediaries in pursuit of dual goals of 
social impact and financial returns. Thus, through equity and debt capital 
investments in MFIs, impact investors deliberately realise social impact and financial 
returns. Further, technical support facilities through grants for capacity building and 
procurement of software from impact investors enable MFIs to realise their 
objectives. Evidence of impact investors viewing MFI as financial intermediaries to 
realise social impact and financial returns in BoP communities emerged. The 
uniqueness is that these MFIs are not managing the impact investment fund but 
rather the investment are direct loans repayable over five to six years along with 
technical assistance support to enable delivery of the expected social impact in the 
BoP communities. 
In terms entrepreneurial financing, impact investment funds are typically 
different from microfinance first because MFIs are unable to finance medium to large 
enterprises in the context of developing countries (Beck, 2013). CMB fund 
managers rather target MFI as investees and commit either equity or debt capital 
while supporting them to realise the expected social impact and financial returns in 
BoP communities. Similarly, BBF provide loans to MFI for on-lending to small and 
micro clients in peri-urban and rural communities to promote financial inclusion. So, 
through governance, strategy change and impact, CMB fund managers invest in 
MFI’s to meet the need of low-end categories of micro and small enterprises in BoP 
communities. Second CMB funds investment duration is medium to long term in 
high growth, established and missing middle SMEs for development. However, MFIs 
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financing tend be short term up to 12 months or 18 months. Third, while CMB fund 
managers could target enterprises at different enterprise growth cycle stage based 
on the funding size and post investment support, MFI funding after the start-up and 
early growth stage seize because of the capital requirements at latter stages of the 
enterprise. Finally, differences exist in terms of financial instrument deployed.  
Commercial banks are the key financial intermediaries representing bank-
based funds in Ghana. Analysis presented in empirical chapter 5 and implications 
for commercial banks as effective intermediaries of impact investment capital shows 
their role in enterprise financing. In Ghana and many developing countries, 
commercial banks constitute a major external funding sources to SMEs (Beck, 2013; 
Ayyagari et al. 2011). 
 
7.3 Research Contributions 
7.3.1 Contribution to theory 
First, the study contributes  to the theory of impact investing (Hotchstadter and 
Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015) and financial intermediation (Boot, 2000) by 
explaining and understanding the effects of bank-based funds on categories of 
SMEs financed from a governance, strategy change and impact perspectives. By 
developing a new theory in Section 5.2 which builds on existing silo-based  agency 
theory of governance, strategic adaptation/alignment and social entrepreneurship 
theories of strategy change and impact investing theory of embedded social impact 
and financial returns, the study theorises the influences of bank-based funds on 
SMEs financed within the impact investing discipline. The new theory shows how 
the interaction between impact investors, bank-based fund managers and SMEs 
that integrate social impact and financial returns in their strategic operations result 
in a transformation of BoP communities. Finally, the study uncovers the role of these 
actors (impact investors, bank-based fund managers and SME owners) as catalysts 
for social entrepreneurial activities in BoP communities.  
The second theoretical contributions relate to impact investing (Hotchstadter 
and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2013) and social 
entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2012; Peredo and McLean, 2006; Seelos and 
Mair, 2005) theory. By developing a new theory in Section 6.2 which  builds on four 
existing theories namely agency theory of governance,  resource-based view of 
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strategy change, social entrepreneurship theory related to simultaneous pursuit of 
social and financial returns and institutional theory, by specifically focusing on 
analysing how capital market-based funds influence  investee SMEs in deliberate 
and simultaneous pursuit of social impact and financial returns in BoP communities.  
The empirically derived framework in section 6.2 contributes to our understanding 
of the relationship between impact investors, CMB fund managers and SMEs  and 
the implications for the nature of social impact and financial returns that can be 
generated by impact investing in BoP communities. The study also advances 
literature related to impact investing (Hotchstadter and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et 
al., 2015; Rajan et al, 2014), social entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2011; Peredo 
and McLean, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005) entrepreneurial financing (Cumming et 
al., 2019) and SME growth literature (Brown et al., 2017; Goedhuys and 
Sleuwaegen, 2010; Nelson and Levesque, 2007). 
First, to understand and explain how bank-based fund managers influence 
SMEs in BoP communities, a focus on governance, strategy change, and impacts 
is essential. These influences can be understood and studied at the impact investor- 
fund manager level (Wood et al., 2013) at the first instance because it manifests at 
the second instance, fund manager-investee SME level. Impact investor influences 
on bank-based fund managers within the global context manifest the nature of 
governance and strategy change employed in the local environment to realise 
expected impacts. Governance mechanisms of internal pre-approval screening, 
control reflected in covenants, terms, clauses, remedies for violation embedded in 
agreements and post –disbursement monitoring cause bank-based fund managers 
to discharge their obligations in BoP communities. Previous studies on financial 
intermediation argues that that banks utilise control and monitoring as key 
governance mechanisms (Vashishtha, 2014, Chava and Roberts, 2008; Boot, 
2000). Second, these governance mechanisms agreed with impact investors, bank-
based fund managers alter or align their strategies and position themselves as 
reliable intermediary of transformation in BoP communities to secure impact 
investment funds (Rajan et al, 2014).  
This explains the rationale of strategy change or alignment which manifest in 
opportunities to manage impact funds, collaborate with DFI’s, secure long-term 
funding for liquidity and capital adequacy requirements. Fund management of 
commercial banks in developing countries remain unexplored research in the 
financial intermediation literature (Boot, 2000). The process delivering strategy 
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change by bank-based fund managers reflect integration of social impact orientation 
in financing decision, capital allocation, financing processes, and risk management 
approach in hitherto under-banked, high risk and high impact sectors. Social 
entrepreneurship theory (Peredo and McLean, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005) 
facilitate understanding of SMEs financed that employ integrated, unified hybrid, 
complementary, and profit plus CSR strategy (Battilana et al., 2012; Peredo and 
McLean, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005) to pursue social impact and financial returns. 
These categories of SMEs that simultaneously seek to realise social impact and 
financial returns either though an integrated strategy or hybrid business model, 
bank-based funds shaped their strategies.  
The second theoretical contribution relates to impact investing (Hotchstadter 
and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Rajan et al, 2014; Wood et al., 2013) and 
social entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2012; Peredo and McLean, 2006; Seelos 
and Mair, 2005) theory by analysing the influences of capital market-based funds 
on investee SMEs in BoP communities. High growth SMEs exhibit high growth 
potential (Nelson and Levesque, 2007) rather than gazelles (Delmar et al., 2003). 
They are also managed by more experienced entrepreneurs, good governance 
systems and a diversified board of directors and more than 7 years old from the time 
of incorporation. Missing middle SMEs in SSA tend to lack collateral to attract large 
funding from commercial banks and relatively large for MFI loans and government 
support schemes (Quartey et al., 2017). Established enterprises typically have 
proper governance systems, receptive to appointment of independent directors on 
their board, and operated for more than 10 years. These distinct SMEs have 
attracted impact investment capital from CMB funds for simultaneous social impact 
and financial returns. CMB fund influences on these categories of SMEs that 
simultaneously realise social impact and financial returns can be investigated 
through critical examination of governance, strategy change and impacts. 
 In studying these influences at the fund manager- investee SME level, it 
suffices to understand and explain the influences of impact investors on CMB fund 
managers at the fund level. As thoroughly analysed and presented in Chapter 6, 
impact investors (limited partners) commit about 98% of capital to a fund initiated by 
a fund manager (general partner) who also contribute about 2%. In general, most of 
these impact investment funds are equity funds and tend to generalist in terms of 
sectors and geographies. There are relatively few funds that represent debt funds 
only. Generally, impact investors through governance mechanisms of ownership, 
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control and board representation influence fund managers to realise expected 
objectives. Limited Partner Advisory Committee (LPAC) represent the advisory 
board of the fund and act in a fiduciary interest of the shareholders (impact 
investors). Strategy change of CMB fund managers with the emergence of impact 
investing shows evidence of strategy alignment to the demands of impact investors.  
Generally, equity CMB funds deploy ownership, control and board 
representation as governance mechanisms to influence SMEs. This study builds on 
previous literature from the economics discipline on private equity and venture 
capital funds (Gompers et al., 2016; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009) theory which 
addresses governance, strategies and value addition through hands-on post 
investment support to investee. However, this study advances fund management 
theory and investee governance and explains strategy change of CMB fund 
managers to deliver social impact and financial returns simultaneously (Peredo and 
McLean, 2006; Seelos and Mair, 2005). Exceptions however involves debt CMB 
fund managers that adopt internal approval checks, control, and post investment 
monitoring as governance mechanisms to influence investee SMEs. Social 
entrepreneurship theory facilitates understanding of the ‘how’ of strategy change by 
CMB fund managers and investee SMEs for deliberate realisation of social impact 
and financial returns in BoP communities. The study builds on integrated or unified 
hybrid strategy (Battilana et al., 2012; Seelos and Mair, 2005), Peredo and McLean 
(2006) complementary strategy and embedded social purpose strategy (Austin et 
al, 2006).  
These two theoretical illustrations presented earlier in figure 5.1 and 6.1 of 
sections 5.2 and 6.2 respectively are presented through a unified theory in line with 
theory building and elaboration (Eisenhadt and Grabner, 2007; Eisenhadt, 1989). 
By drawing on different sources of literature stated in section 7.1 to develop an 
integrated theoretical framework, an elaborated theory presented in section 5.1 and 
5.2, the study further presents a unified theoretical contribution (Figure 7.1). I have 
created and illustrated how figure 7.1 can be adapted to specific case studies, in the 
case of bank-based and capital market-based funds through the elaborations in 
figure 5.1 and 6.1. Figure 7.1 critically explains the influences/role of BB and CMB 
fund managers on investee SMEs within the local context through governance, 
strategy change and impacts. Having applied the integrative theoretical framework 
drawing on financial intermediation (Boot, 2000) and impact investing (Hotchstadter 
and Scheck, 2015; Ormiston et al., 2015; Rajan et al, 2014), social entrepreneurship 
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toward theory building, a further refinement through a unified new theory emerged. 
It further uncovers the influences/role of bank and capital market-based fund 
managers on categories of SMEs based on ownership/ internal approval, control 
and board representation or monitoring (Gompers et al., 2016; Vashishtha, 2014; 
Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Besides, strategy change from social 
entrepreneurship theory (Battilana et al., 2011; Peredo and McLean, 2006; Seelos 
and Mair, 2005) explains how BB and CMB fund managers ensure that SMEs 
deliberately realise social impact and financial returns in BoP communities.  
Figure 7.1 depicted below illustrate the interaction between impact investors 
(finance-first and impact first) within the global context and impact investment fund 
managers (BB and CMB) in the local environment. The global context shapes the 
funding sources, determine, or define societal problems which require urgent 
solutions and affect impact investor objectives (Ormiston et al.; Wood et al., 2013). 
The global context within which impact investment capital flows into the country/local 
environment shapes the institutional context and determines the interaction of the 
financial and enterprise architecture. 
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Figure 7. 1 Emergent theory of the influences of BB and CMB funds on SMEs in BoP communities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors theorizing of the role of BB and CMB based on cross-case analysis of two cases studies communities.
Global context 
• Funding sources 
• Societal problems 
• Investor objectives 
• Development 
 
Impact investors 
(Finance-first v. Impact first) 
 
Governance mechanisms 
• Ownership 
• Control 
• Board rep 
Strategy Change 
• Strategy mandate-fit 
• Investment philosophy 
• ESG Considerations 
Impacts 
• Social impact 
• Financial returns 
 
Country environment 
Institutional context 
• Policymaking 
• Regulations 
• Laws and Codes 
• Standards 
• Registration and 
licensing 
• Promotional and 
Regulatory 
Institutions 
Financial architecture 
Enterprise Architecture 
Impact investment funds 
BB versus CMB 
Finance-first, impact-first, 
hybrid 
• Impact investing and 
social entrepreneurship 
• Public vs private 
sector-led development 
 
SME investees 
• High growth 
• Missing middle 
• Established 
 
 
 
Entrepreneurial Financing 
• Impact funds vrs 
PE/VC 
• Impact funds and 
MFI, Commercial 
Banks and Gov’t fund 
• Jobs created 
and 
sustained 
• Cash flows 
• Return on 
investment 
• Loan 
repayment 
291 
 
Further, the symbol ( ) shows the interaction between impact investors 
and impact investment fund managers (BB and CMB) and the concepts of 
governance and strategy change. It suggests that based on impact investment 
strategy presented to impact investors which address strategy mandate-fit, 
investment philosophy and ESG considerations, a governance mechanism is 
agreed between the parties. The governance mechanism and strategy change 
agreed at the investor-fund manager level within the global context manifest same 
within the local institutional context. Thus, based on the influences of impact 
investors on BB and CMB fund managers at the fund level within the global context, 
BB and CMB fund managers apply similar governance and strategy change 
influences on investee SMEs in the country environment for social impact and 
financial returns. In applying these mechanisms, the institutional context (Welter, 
2011; Scott, 2001) comprising formal regulations, laws, standards and codes, 
policymaking, regulatory and promoting institutions shape the financial and 
enterprises architecture. These variables within the institutional context shape the 
financial and enterprise architecture representing the research setting. The context 
and setting in turn determine, affect, and shape the entry and post-entry choices of 
bank and capital market-based fund managers, and categories of SMEs in pursuit 
of impact investor objectives. 
The four findings emerging from this study interact to realise the ultimate 
investor objectives of impacts. The symbol (       ) shows that it is the integration of 
these findings within the institutional context which would create the expected 
impacts of social and financial returns in BoP communities. An examination of these 
findings in silos might not yield the intended objectives. An interaction occurs 
between finance first and impact first investors (Hotchstadter and Scheck, 2015; 
Ormiston et al., 2015) through governance and strategy change agreed with BB and 
CMB fund managers for SME categories (Jones and Turner, 2014; Nelson and 
Levesque, 2007; Autio, 2007). The high growth, missing middle and established 
SMEs now have access to diverse entrepreneurial financing opportunities 
(Cumming et al., 2019; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009) to realise developmental 
impact and financial returns. 
  A summary of the theory based on the findings reveal that; the differences 
of finance first, impact first and hybrid investors based on motivation and objectives 
on one hand and the distinctiveness between BB and CMB funds based on 
governance and strategy change determine an impact investor choices of a channel 
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(BB and CMB) within the local context for effective delivery of financial and social 
impact expectations. It is instructive to both finance-first, impact first and hybrid 
investors in making informed decision regarding the most effective intermediary to 
realise their objectives and their role in governance. BBF that typically align with 
finance first investors have a governance mechanism which does not permit board 
representation by an impact investor except where the funding is equity capital and 
size of amount is also relevant. CMB fund managers allow appointment of nominees 
of shareholders to the LPAC of the fund usually in a fiduciary capacity of the 
shareholders. These nuances have implications to impact investors and policy 
makers. An impact investment strategy that embed social impact and financial 
returns are executed through strategy change of SME categories drawing on social 
entrepreneurship theory. Moreover, impact investors approach to development 
evidence radical change from public-sector approach which relies on aid to private 
sector-led development through investment and trade for sustainability of the funds 
and enterprises as agents of social transformation and financial returns. 
 The interaction between finance first, impact first and hybrid and SME 
categories acknowledge an awareness among impact investors about categories of 
SMEs that BB and CMB funds target to realise the expected developmental 
objectives. Further, SME categories which are distinct presented in sub section 
7.2.4 as a major finding based on governance and strategy represent agents of 
social and financial returns in pursuit of private sector led approach to development. 
Finally, impact investor distinctiveness has created alternative entrepreneurial 
financing opportunities showing the interaction between finance-first, impact-first 
and hybrid investors. 
 Similarly, SME categories shown in the figure 7.1 that hitherto were 
financially constrained (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Ayyaagari et al., 2011) 
have access to a pool of entrepreneurial financing opportunities with the emergence 
of impact investing (Harrison, et al., 2016). They have access to different providers 
of entrepreneurial financing including impact funds, PE/VC, commercial banks, and 
Government funds which best serve their growth and expansion needs ((Cumming 
et al., 2019; Harrison et al., 2016). In addition, depending on the growth stage of 
these categories of SMEs, diverse financial instruments that can be tailored to their 
needs including debt, equity, convertible debt, mezzanine, and grants as enablers 
for growth. 
 Impact investment funds (BB and CMB) through the emergence of impact 
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investing deploy different financial instruments which has created diversified 
sources of entrepreneurial financing opportunities for SME categories that employ 
a strategy entailing simultaneous impact and financial returns. Distinctiveness and 
similarities between impact funds and traditional enterprise financing evidencing 
growth in entrepreneurial financing in sub section 7.2.5 reflect the link shown in 
figure 7.1 between the funds and entrepreneurial financing. These findings 
represented in a unified theory aims at realising social impact and financial returns 
in BoP communities. Major social impact from the analysis evidence job creation 
while financial returns include cash flow generated, return on investment and loan 
repayment.  
 This emergent theory can be applied in different context especially in 
developing and emerging countries with similar context specific factors. More 
importantly, this unified theory emerged from two separate theoretical contributions 
shown in figure 5.1 and 6.2. So, figure 7.1 should be applied with a background of 
these previous refined theories. Another context specific factor is the financial 
architecture of a country. In this context of the study, the financial architecture has 
four major segments and with four regulatory institutions. Therefore bank-based 
funds were regulated differently from capital market-based funds. In most developed 
economies, Commercial banks provide pension fund management, financial 
intermediation, investment banking and retail banking all under one regulatory body. 
Applying this theory to such context would be problematic. However, where the 
context is more bank-based financial system with different lower-tier banking 
institutions, then the emergent theory will be highly applicable. Other contributions 
emerging from this framework are presented in subsection 7.6.2. 
The emerging theory (Figure 7.1) therefore builds on the impact investing 
theory of finance and impact first investors (Hotchstadter and Scheck, 2015; 
Ormiston et al., 2015), fund governance and strategies (Gompers et al., 2016; Rajan 
et al., 2014; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009), strategy change theory of social 
entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2012; Peredo and McLean, 2006; Seelos and 
Mair, 2005), financial intermediation (Vashishtha, 2014; Boot, 2000) and high 
growth, missing middle and established categories of SMEs (Jones and Turner, 
2014;Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2010; Nelson and Levesque, 2007).These 
literature have examined the concepts integrated in the emerging theory in silos and 
omitted other dimensions which require investigation to understand and explain the 
phenomenon of impact investing. 
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7.3.2 Other contributions to literature 
The study also contributes insight that are relevant to several of the research 
literature that have been drawn on to construct the integrated framework to different 
sets of literatures in advancing knowledge within the discipline and other disciplines 
• Impact investment: It fills a recognised gap in this literature regarding the 
governance of impact investments (Geobey and Harji, 2014, p.275). 
Governance evidence of ownership, control and board representation 
advances the impact investing literature in response to the call from Geobey 
and Harji (2014, p.275) regarding governance of impact investment funds. 
These governance mechanisms were analysed and presented at the impact 
investor-fund manager level and fund manager- investee SME levels. Details 
of findings were discussed in sub-sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 respectively. 
Secondly, Hotchstader and Scheck, (2015) pointed out the need for future 
research to determine “whether impact investors place limits on the size and 
ownership structure of investees”. The study further the debate in this 
literature on the school of thought that place limits on impact investors 
focusing on unlisted enterprises. Evidence presented from the data analysis 
reveal that all the high growth, missing middle and established SMEs that 
bank-based and capital market-based fund managers financed or invested 
respectively were unlisted enterprises with an integrated, complementary 
and embedded social impact and financial return strategies. In terms of 
ownership structure of investees, generally CMB fund managers acquire 
significant minority interest (up to 49%) in investee SMEs based on the 
corpus of data analysed and presented. Established SMEs that experienced 
indebtedness which led to their near collapse were bailed-out through impact 
investment capital in box 6.1 and 6.2. This advance and fills the research 
gap about future research on how investee organisations are benefiting from 
impact investment growth by Ormiston et al., (2015, p.375). 
• Social entrepreneurship: It provides additional evidence on social 
entrepreneurship activity in BoP communities. The study represent 
originality in analysing and presenting evidence of high growth, missing 
middle and established SMEs conceptualised as for-profit social enterprises 
based on motivation, access to resources and activities spanning different 
sectors. Moreover, Seelos and Mair (2005, p.243) findings on Sekem, a 
profit-oriented business that utilised these profits to support education and 
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medical centres in Egypt within the social sector depicts business models 
that integrate social impact and financial returns. Thus, this study further 
advances with more cases that simultaneously realise these objectives in 
BoP communities. In further advancing the social entrepreneurship 
literature, Austin et al., (2006, p.2) suggests that the nature of social 
problems and format of the organisation which effectively enable 
mobilisation of resources to solve a social problem is important. In line with 
this notion, the evidence presented shows high growth and missing middle 
SMEs as for-profit social enterprises mobilizing impact investment capital to 
provide solutions in BoP communities for both social impact and financial 
returns.  
Further, these categories of SMEs adopted market-based approaches to 
solve societal problems in BoP communities while simultaneously realising 
social impact and in some cases environmental impact alongside financial 
returns. These evidences fill the gap on suggestions by Chell et al., (2010) 
on how social enterprises could provide solutions to societal problems while 
realising the triple bottom line. Lastly, the how of strategy change based on 
social entrepreneurship literature by investee SMEs that deliberately pursue 
dual goals uncovered integrated, complementary, embedded, and 
standalone models of strategy. These findings extend existing debate in the 
social entrepreneurship literature on how for-profit social enterprises can 
concurrently satisfy two institutional logics (Battilana et al., 2012; Austin et 
al, 2006; Peredo and McLean, 2005; Seelos and Mair, 2005). 
• Entrepreneurial Financing: The characteristic of impact funds versus 
traditional entrepreneurial financing in recent time based on discussion in 
this study advances the literature on sources and types of SME finance. 
Existing entrepreneurial finance literature have observed variety of “finance 
types and providers” (Cumming et al, 2019, p. 251) and inherently equate 
impact funds to private equity and venture capital. However, evidence 
presented in this study extend the debate in the entrepreneurial financing 
literature. It further adds to two major themes that address the finance-
provider organisation and sources of funding representing investors 
(Cumming et al., 2019; Harrison et al., 2016). The board role in the 
governance of a portfolio firm (high growth and established SME) improve 
the literature in this discipline. 
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7.3.3 Implications for Policy and Practice 
 
The findings from this thesis has implications for impact investors, financial 
intermediaries (bank and capital market-based fund managers), owner managers of 
SMEs and policy makers which are discussed in turn. The study first informs impact 
investors about heterogeneous channels of bank-based and capital market-based 
intermediaries for deliberate realisation of social impact and financial returns based 
on governance, strategy, and impacts. Impact investor motivation and objectives of 
deliberately realising social impact and financial returns require investment in SME 
categories that can integrate impact variables in their operational and strategic 
decision making. Engagement with officials of DFIs (e.g. CDC Group, Proparco, 
OPIC), private commercial banks, sovereign wealth funds, development agencies   
(e.g., DFID, USAID) within the global impact investment network on how ESG are 
integrated within the operational strategies of investee SMEs will inform their 
investment considerations and policies.  
Another significant implication is the tensions encountered by bank-based 
fund managers in the pursuit of impact investment funds from three perspectives; 
namely financial returns, governance mechanisms deployed and the intentionality 
of social impact. Based on the evidence presented, bank-based fund managers 
encounter the difficulty of generating lower returns from impact funds under 
management due to the social impact expectations of impact investors compared to 
intermediated funds which generate high interest income. Moreover, in view of little 
capacity in measuring social impact, BBF managers either consign such duties to 
NGOs or decline access to impact funds. Finally, most BBF adopt the same 
governance mechanisms irrespective of funds under management and modality of 
disbursement. Some encounter tensions in managing impact funds due to the 
existing organisational structure and geographical spread of the bank resulting in 
poor monitoring and recovery. To this end, this study informs BBF managers about 
the type and models of impact funds that they can access based on their existing 
structure, governance mechanisms and effective ways to overcome social impact 
measurement challenges. Besides, another implication for BBF is that this study 
could form a basis for many commercial banks in developing countries to design, 
embed social impact and financial returns models in their loan appraisal, 
governance systems to attract impact investor capital for societal transformation. 
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Further, this study informs impact investment policy framework. With my 
experience within the banking industry and opportunity as graduate research 
assistant at the GIMPA centre for impact investing (GCII), initial stakeholder efforts 
led by the VCTF and GCII in promoting impact investing appears to have declined. 
Absence of a regulatory policy framework on impact investing emerged during my 
pilot (2017) and PhD fieldwork (2018). This study therefore informs SEC policy on 
regulatory institutional knowledge relating to the types of impact funds in the country 
and nature of governance deployed by impact funds in Ghana. This is due to the 
void on regulation on impact investment funds that emerged during the PhD 
fieldwork from Ghana’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) amidst current 
effort at gathering data to develop regulations for private equity and impact 
investment based on SEC Act 2016 (Act 929), (PhD fieldwork, 2018). Moreover, the 
study will catalyse the effort by the VCTF to develop an impact investment policy 
document for Ghana.  
Another key policy area of the study is opportunity to inform stakeholders in 
the Pension industry on capital allocation to SME categories in this study through 
engagement with the National Pension’s Regulatory Authority (NPRA), SEC, MOTI, 
and pension fund managers. It emerged during my fieldwork that pension fund 
managers (Tier two) are allocating capital to Government securities, fixed 
certificates of deposits at Commercial banks and some stocks on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange. More risk-averse investment which has been typical of most financial 
institutions including commercial banks over the past three decades. Further, 
pension fund managers of Tier two schemes only invest in SMEs that are listed on 
the Ghana Alternative Exchange (GAX) which is a second tier listing of companies. 
The problem is that pension fund managers with huge assets under management 
are not investing in categories of SMEs identified and at the same time 
unemployment, poverty and other intractable societal problems deteriorate in 
Ghana.  
The study also informs stakeholders in charge of policy, regulations, and 
financing on the nature of impact fund activities, funding sources, operational 
processes, and fund economics for regulatory purposes and why more of these 
funds are needed in the country. The Venture Capital Trust Fund (VCTF) efforts at 
promoting impact investing in conjunction with GCII from 2013-2015 is quite 
commendable. Stakeholder engagement and conferences were organised to 
promote the sector including policy briefs developed by GCII. Database of 
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intermediaries within the impact investment ecosystem were developed and 
dialogue with political stakeholders held as part of advocacy and engagement. 
However, more work needs to be done through multi-stakeholder engagement 
involving commercial banks, capital market fund managers, regulators (e.g. SEC, 
BoG, NPRA, NIC), VCTF and research centres such as GCII. The study thus is 
pivotal to knowledge dissemination which further enhances entrepreneurial 
financing opportunities to SMEs.  
SME categories of high growth, missing middle and established owner 
managers represent key stakeholders to be informed by this study. The Association 
of Ghana Industry (AGI), the Ghana Chamber of Commerce, Ghana Export 
Promotion Council have SME members who need to be informed about how to 
attract impact investment capital for growth and expansion. Thus, information and 
knowledge dissemination about capital from impact investment funds by owner 
managers of SMEs who integrate social impact and financial returns in their 
strategic and operational objectives would to some extent alleviate their financing 
constraints. Other SMEs that are now emerging requiring capacity development and 
support through technical assistance and grants will serve as alternative ventures 
for dissemination of this research. 
Several other policy contributions within the research setting of Ghana can 
be observed. First legislative void on social enterprises make it difficult for effective 
targeting and financing of enterprises that seek to realise social impact and financial 
returns goal simultaneously. A tax incentive policy to encourage high growth and 
established SMEs that pursue dual goals in BoP communities for employment, 
poverty reduction, health and education support would be helpful in alleviating the 
myriad of intractable problems confronting government. Furthermore, the study 
guides policy formulation that encourage CMB fund managers through technical 
assistance facilities to support established and emerging business incubators in the 
country to promote future pipeline of deals to reduce unemployment situation in the 
country. Additionally, regulatory policy changes to encourage impact investor capital 
for either converting some established NBFI’s into development banks or set up new 
to support high growth, missing middle and established SMEs with long-term 
funding and post-financing technical support. Incentives for bank-based capital 
market-based funds that commit a certain threshold of capital to high impact and 
relatively below market returns social sectors such as health, education, water, 
sanitation, and agri-business instead of reliance on foreign direct investments. 
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Indigenization drive by Ghana Free Zones incentives to promote specific priority 
sectors could be facilitated by impact investment funds.  
Finally, this study has potential implications for developing countries in Africa, 
Asia and to some extent Latin America adopting private sector-led approach to 
development and similar context-specific factors. The impact investment models 
emerging either bank or capital market-based structures are converging, and actors 
are concurrently focusing different markets and regions for social impact and 
financial returns. The main opportunity is for policymakers, bankers, fund managers, 
entrepreneurs, and institutional stakeholders to collaborate and develop an 
investment framework to attract impact investment capital for growth and 
development. In addition, attracting impact investment capital should be aligned to 
the sustainable development goals to mitigate any trade-off between social impact 
and financial returns. 
In summary, the study has two main contribution to theory, five major 
implications for policy and practice and other implication for development in Ghana 
and Africa with similar context. Dissemination of these findings and policy 
implications of the study to policy makers would transition Ghana from a middle-
income country to an emerging economy while facilitating the development of 
enterprises as agents of social transformation and economic growth in Africa. The 
next section present study limitations and future directions. 
 
7.4 Limitations and future directions for the study 
The study makes significant contribution to theory and practise by adopting a 
qualitative case study design research to examine the phenomenon of impact 
investing. Three main limitations to this study can be viewed from research design 
and methodology, theoretical shortcomings, and resource constraints. A case study 
research design is criticised for lack of generalisability of cases which tend to affect 
the findings. Section 4.3 and 4.4 respectively addressed how the research design 
was effectively employed to promote reliability and external validity of findings. 
Specifically, multiple data sources including interviews, rapid participant 
observations and documentary evidence where used to promote methodological 
triangulation. Although some CMB participants were reluctant to provide 
“confidential reports and documents” such as sample business plan for analysis, 
informal discussions from different fund managers evidenced unreliability of 
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submitted business plans by SMEs. It rather emerged that fund managers through 
due diligence uncover realistic estimates of revenues and cash flows complemented 
with records from bank statements. Further documents and information from DFIs 
and global industry associations (e.g. GIIN, EVPA) were secured to fill gaps in the 
local context. 
Some quantitative bias authors might raise issues about small sample size 
in extending the findings to different context. A purposive and theoretical sampling 
approach employed due to unique context of the case (Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
and cases extending relationship for theory building (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007) which relies on small sample size. Further, to curb this challenge from 
statistics bias scholars, the study elaborated in detail context- specific factors within 
the institutional context which has similarities with many developing countries and 
emerging economies. However, possible consideration adoption of a method with 
large sample size through quantitative research design will be consigned for further 
research.  
A possible theoretical limitation can be viewed from the issue of impacts or 
outcomes which are better captured over a period. The study acknowledges that 
though evidence of impacts were revealed, a longitudinal study has a potential of 
revealing concrete details. Jobs created and sustained emerged as the key metric 
measured as social impact shown in reports by fund managers because of the ease 
of quantification. This explains why some scholars from the impact investing 
discipline explored issues of impact measurement (e.g. Harji and Jackson, 2018; 
Reeder et al, 2015; Jackson, 2013) considering different standards, frameworks, 
and measures. Also, budgetary resources in terms of time and expenses constitute 
a short coming of the study because the study was conducted within three 
geographical regions in Ghana. A comparative study of three countries such as 
Kenya, Ghana and South Africa representing key destination of impact investments 
would have evidenced unique perspectives.  
Several research issues were unaddressed which constitute potential future 
directions for this study. First, a study that investigates impact investor effects using 
large sample of dataset from different asset owners including DFIs, foundations, 
Investment banks, and private investors in multiple countries could be insightful. 
Second, an application of the theoretical framework in other context in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America would provide relevant perspectives for theory elaboration. Third 
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area of future research worth considering is impact investor effects on non-profit 
social enterprises in multiple countries in Africa aimed at financial and social 
transformation. One of the major findings of this study relate to impact investment 
as alternative to traditional enterprise financing. A survey research design of 
different categories of SMEs in Ghana based on alternative enterprise financing 
would be critical for financial development in Ghana and other developing countries. 
Such study will be essential for policy making in addressing the perennial constraints 
of enterprise financing in Africa and other emerging economies. 
  
7.5 Conclusion 
The overarching objective has been to critically investigate the influences of impact 
investment funds on investee SMEs to realise social impact and financial returns in 
BoP communities through governance, strategy change and impacts. In many ways, 
realising this objective has enabled me to fulfil the four major motivation for 
conducting a PhD study. First, the thesis has uncovered some of the explanations 
about how the different governance arrangements for impact investment funds were 
influencing SMEs in BoP communities that I could not explain back in 2016 as part 
of my involvement in the GIMPA Centre for impact investing in Ghana. A rhetorical 
question was whether and how impact investment funds could help address these 
societal problems and if so which type of fund would prove most effective? A 
response to this question, based on the findings from this thesis, is that a 
development-oriented bank that integrate the governance and strategies of bank 
and capital market-based fund managers is required. Also, I intended to uncover the 
similarities and differences between impact funds and traditional enterprise 
financing to determine alternative funding to SMEs. My third motivation was to find-
out how these emerging impact investment models might help to address the 
upsurge in intractable societal problems, such as unemployment, education and 
health infrastructure. Finally, to understand and explain the effectiveness of impact 
investment flows to developing countries and specifically Ghana in changing the 
enterprise financing landscape. 
Drawing on diverse literature, the study developed an integrated theoretical 
framework linked with the concept of governance, strategy change and impacts and 
applied within the research setting of Ghana. Analysis and findings were presented 
in respective chapters. This study made two major theoretical contribution with 
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policy implications for impact investors, policy makers, fund intermediaries and 
owner managers of SMEs. Suffice to end that in order to overcome the paradox of 
abundant resources and intractable societal problems in Ghana and many other 
developing countries, impact investments model is an avenue for social and 
economic transformation. The rousing call to action is for the integration of the best 
of breeds in channels of impact investments to promote developmental objectives 
through sustainable job creation. Also, further academic research and collaboration 
with institutions, industries, and new entry organisations to ensure regulatory and 
legal reforms for the advancement of the impact investing field. 
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